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ABSTRACT 
The  following  thesis  examines  both  the  individual  and  the  societal 
confrontation  with  one  particular  aspect  of  the  legacy  of  the  GDR's 
Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit  (MfS,  or  Stasi),  that  is  the  debate 
concerning  onetime  MfS  informers  (Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter,  or  IM). 
The  thesis  is  divided  into  two  main  sections.  Section  One  describes  and 
analyses  specific  aspects  of  the  IM  system.  Characteristics  of  the 
population  of  IM  are  examined  in  Chapter  1,  and  the  ten  case  studies  which 
are  referred  to  throughout  the  course  of  the  work  are  presented.  These 
former  IM  were  interviewed  by  the  author  in  1994-95,  and  the  MfS  files  of 
eight  of  them  were  subsequently  viewed.  The  remaining  chapters  in  Section 
One  examine  the  following  issues:  the  recruitment  procedure  (2);  the  daily 
work  with  an  IM  and  his/her  relationship  to  the  MfS  (4);  the  motivational 
factors  behind  an  IM-Tätigkeit  (3  and  5). 
Section  Two  turns  to  the  private  and  public  confrontation  with  the 
IM  legacy.  The  debate  over  former  Stasi  collaborators  currently  active  in 
the  political  forum  is  considered  in  Chapter  6,  and  the  handling  of  the  IM 
issue  by  the  criminal  justice  system  in  Chapter  7.  The  final  three  chapters 
are  devoted  to  personal  and  interpersonal  issues.  Chapter  8  addresses  the 
Täter  /Opfer  debate.  Chapter  9  focuses  on  the  manner  in  which  an  IM 
sought  to  cope  with  this  aspect  of  his/her  biography  at  the  time  of  active 
collaboration,  and  on  how  s/he  seeks  to  justify  this  in  retrospect.  The  final 
chapter  examines  the  profound  effect  which  the  availability  of  the  MfS  files 
through  the  Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz  has  had  and  will  have  on  the 
understanding  of  personal  and  collective  history  in  the  former  GDR,  and  the 
work  concludes  that  this  is  the  most  significant  and  far-reaching  impact  of 
this  most  extraordinary  legacy. 3 
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Two  particular  incidents  come  to  mind  when  I  look  back  on  the  teaching  I 
did  in  1991-93  on  government  sponsored  re-training  schemes  for 
unemployed  East  Berliners.  The  first  was  when  a  man  in  one  class  admitted 
openly  to  having  worked  for  the  MfS  on  a  full-time  basis.  An  embarrassed 
silence  followed,  until  someone  started  to  nervously  giggle.  I  stopped  asking 
people  what  they  used  to  do  after  that,  but  on  one  occasion  I  brought  a 
newspaper  article  with  me  concerning  the  first  trial  against  former  GDR 
border-guards,  which  was  underway  at  that  time.  I  naively  imagined  that 
the  class  would  simply  be  interested  in  seeing  how  events  in  Germany  were 
discussed  in  the  British  press.  A  violent  row  ensued  concerning  the  relative 
guilt  of  the  border-guards  in  question.  Many  of  those  in  this  particular  class 
argued  that  Chris  Gueffroy,  the  young  man  who  had  been  fatally  wounded  in 
February  1989,  had  known  the  danger  he  faced  by  attempting  to  flee  the 
GDR.  Occurrences  such  as  these  were  fascinating,  but  the  issues  involved 
overwhelmed  me  at  the  time,  and  I  did  not  know  where  to  begin  and  what 
right  I,  in  an  already  somewhat  controversial  role  as  a  re-trainer,  really  had 
to  question  people  about  their  past  lives  and  about  the  way  in  which  these 
lives  were  being  re-shaped  and  re-defined  in  their  new  Germany. 
Four  years  later  some  of  the  questions  which  sparked  this  initial 
interest  are  discussed  in  the  following  thesis,  for  which  I  owe  many  people 
considerable  thanks.  First  and  foremost  Professor  Roger  Stephenson  and 
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carrying  me  through  the  rather  frequent  darker  moments  of  such  an 
undertaking.  Most  welcome  practical  help  was  afforded  by  the  Student 10 
Awards  Agency  for  Scotland  in  funding  the  project,  a  research  year  in 
Germany  (in  conjunction  with  an  Erasmus  grant),  and  several  conferences. 
Conference  participation  was  also  kindly  supported  by  the  German 
Department  and  by  various  Research  Support  Awards  from  the  Graduate 
School  of  Arts  and  Humanities  at  the  University  of  Glasgow.  I  would  also 
like  to  mention  Thomas  Rogalla  and  Helmut  Müller-Enbergs  of  the  BStU, 
whose  help  ensured  that  this  thesis  took  the  path  it  did.  Regardless  of  any 
moral  judgements  which  the  reader  might  make,  this  would  not  have  been 
possible  if  the  ten  former  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter,  whose  stories  are  woven 
throughout  this  work,  had  not  been  prepared,  sometimes  at  a  degree  of 
personal  risk,  to  contribute  to  this  one  small  part  of  the  confrontation  with 
the  Stasi  legacy. 11 
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Introduction:  Part  One 
'WANN  BRICHT  SCHON  MAL  EIN  STAAT  ZUSAMMEN!  ':  (J-35) 
THE  LEGACY  OF  A  NATION  AND  ITS  SECRET  SERVICE 14 
1.1  BEGINNINGS  OF  A  SOCIETAL  DEBATE 
The  collapse  of  the  Berlin  Wall  on  9  November  1989  signified  the  end  of 
forty  years  of  inner-German  division  and  meant  that  the  East/West  frontier 
of  Cold  War  politics,  which  had  been  gradually  eroding  throughout  the 
1980s,  was  finally  washed  completely  from  the  landscape.  The  following 
years  were  to  be  witness  to  massive  social  and  political  upheaval  in  the 
lands  of  the  former  Eastern  Block,  marked  by  the  fragmentation  of  nation 
states  as  a  consequence  of  regional  and  ethnic  conflicts.  Events  in  the 
former  GDR,  by  contrast,  did  not  follow  this  pattern  of  segmentation  and,  on 
3  October  1990,  less  than  one  year  after  the  jubilant  scenes  of  9  November, 
the  German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR)  and  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  (FRG)  were  politically  united.  The  voices  of  those  who  had  hoped 
not  for  unification,  but  for  a  reformed  GDR,  were  drowned  by  the  wave  of 
enthusiasm  with  which  ordinary  citizens  of  the  five  new  Länder  initially 
embraced  amalgamation  with  their  more  affluent  sister  state.  The  GDR 
had  ceased  to  be,  and  in  the  following  years  the  question  of  how  to  confront 
its  legacy  would  become  the  subject  of  bitter  controversy  between  and 
within  the  two  former  Germanys. 
Assessing  forty  years  of  post-war  history  was  never  going  to  be  an 
easy  undertaking,  and  attempts  by  the  legal  system  to  bring  the  crimes  of 
the  SED  state  to  light  were  criticised  for  their  laxness  and  ineffectiveness 
by  some  at  the  same  time  as  they  were  scorned  as  exemplifying  a  form  of 
Siegerjustiz  by  others.  Liberally  inclined  West  German  intellectuals  such  as 
Günter  Grass  tended  to  argue  that  the  FRG  did  not  have  the  right  to  stand 
in  judgement  over  the  GDR  (J-31).  Frank  Schirrmacher  of  the  conservative 
Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung  found  fault  in  turn  in  this  stance,  pointing 
out  the  irony,  as  he  saw  it,  that  it  was  precisely  those  who  had  been  highly 
critical  of  the  lenient  manner  in  which  the  crimes  of  the  National  Socialist 
regime  had  been  confronted  in  the  FRG  who,  after  the  collapse  of  the  GDR, 15 
protested  that  those  who  had  not  been  forced  to  live  under  the  SED 
dictatorship  did  not  have  the  right  to  judge  the  actions  of  those  who  had  (I- 
13). 
Since  only  one  of  the  two  Germanys  had  ceased  to  exist,  it  was 
ultimately  the  bulky  legacy  only  of  the  GDR  which  would  pose  so  many 
problems  after  the  initial  euphoria  of  unification  had  subsided.  A  substantial 
proportion  of  the  reckoning  with  the  GDR  past  centred  around  the  debate 
concerning  the  former  Ministry  of  State  Security  (the  MfS,  or,  more 
popularly,  the  Stasi).  The  decision  to  make  the  files  of  this  once  so  feared 
organisation  publicly  available  meant  that  citizens  of  the  former  GDR  were 
confronted  with  certain  harsh  realities  concerning  the  extent  of  their  own 
compliance  and  conformity.  Only  a  very  small  minority  of  GDR  citizens  had 
ever  voiced  the  criticisms  of  state  policies  which  an  increasing  number  had 
harboured  during  the  latter  years  of  their  country's  existence.  Most  had 
reconciled  themselves  to  the  fact,  as  they  saw  it,  that  they  would  never 
leave  the  GDR  and  had  suppressed  their  disapproval  of  certain  state 
practices  in  the  desire  for  as  conflict-free  a  life  as  possible.  By  doing  so  they 
had  helped  to  ensure  the  continued  existence  of  the  GDR.  Once  it  had  ceased 
to  be  and  its  many  flaws  had  been  brought  to  light,  this  was  a  stance  of 
which  few  were  particularly  proud.  It  was  with  a  considerable  degree  of 
reluctance  that  many  began  to  face  the  bitter  reality  that  they  had  never 
acted  in  a  manner  sufficiently  non-conformist  to  arouse  the  Stasi's 
suspicions,  particularly  since  they  had  perhaps  lived  their  lives  believing 
that  the  wilful  suppression  of  their  true  opinion  was  justified  by  the  fact 
that  they  were  under  Stasi  observation. 
In  the  turbulent  period  immediately  following  the  fall  of  the  Berlin 
Wall  a  wave  of  verbal  aggression  was  directed  towards  those  who  had 
served  the  MfS,  fuelled  by  the  stream  of  sensational  revelations  of  partly 
factual,  partly  fictional  Stasi  crimes  which  hit  the  headlines  of  the  tabloid 16 
press.  This  anger  gradually  subsided  when  the  considerable  material  and 
social  concerns  resulting  from  unification  began  to  take  precedence  in  most 
former  East  Germans'  lives,  and  after  it  had  been  established  that  the 
majority  had  not,  in  fact,  ever  been  under  direct  surveillance.  The  issue  of 
how  to  deal  with  those  whose  existence,  it  was  argued,  had  significantly 
contributed  to  an  all-prevailing  atmosphere  of  distrust,  the  Inoffizielle 
Mitarbeiter,  remained  very  much  on  the  agenda.  The  guilt  of  these 
individuals  was  often  extremely  difficult  to  define  in  a  legal  context,  and  the 
moral  issues  involved  were  equally  complex.  The  injustices  which,  to  varying 
degrees,  had  been  inflicted  upon  the  population  of  the  GDR  had  been  decreed 
at  higher  levels,  but  those  who  had  been  active  as  MfS  informers  had  more 
directly  exploited  trust  by  reporting  on  the  activities  of  friends,  neighbours, 
and  even  close  relatives.  Theirs  was  also  a  crime  which  had  remained 
undisclosed  until  the  files  were  made  available,  and  the  banal  fascination  of 
the  phenomenon  of  observation  and  control,  combined  with  the  compelling 
discussion  of  intricate  issues  of  guilt  and  compliance  within  a  German 
context,  meant  that  much  of  the  debate  concerning  this  unique  legacy  would 
focus  on  these  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter. 
1.2  ORIGINS  AND  END  OF  A  SECRET  SERVICE  AND  ITS 
INOFFIZIELLE  MITARBEITER  (IM) 
On  8  February  1950  the  Volkskammer  of  the  newly-founded  GDR  passed  a 
law  decreeing  the  creation  of  an  independent  Ministry  for  State  Security. 
The  text  of  this  law  encompassed  a  mere  two  paragraphs  and  stated:  'Die 
bisher  dem  Ministerium  des  Inneren  unterstellte  Hauptverwaltung  zum 
Schutze  der  Volkswirtschaft  wird  zu  einem  selbstständigen  Ministerium  für 
Staatssicherheit  umgebildet.  '  (F-13,  p.  180)  In  the  aftermath  of  the  events 
of  17  June  1953,  Wilhelm  Zaisser,  the  man  who  had  been  appointed  the  first 
Minister  for  State  Security,  was  dismissed  and  the  Ministry  was 17 
temporarily  stripped,  until  24  November  1955,  of  its  independence  and  re- 
integrated  into  the  Interior  Ministry.  Ernst  Wollweber  succeeded  Zaisser 
and  remained  in  power  until,  on  1  November  1957,  Erich  Mielke  took 
control.  Mielke  was  to  occupy  the  post  of  Minister  for  State  Security  for  the 
next  thirty-two  years. 
The  MfS  was  governed  from  a  central  complex  in  the 
Normannenstraße  in  Berlin  and  served  by  fifteen  district  divisions, 
Bezirksverwaltungen.  There  is  some  dispute  as  to  whether  the  once 
unquestionably  mighty  Stasi  is  best  described  as  having  been  a  state  within 
a  state  or  as  'ein  Instrument  der  SED-Bürokratie  zur  Aufrechterhaltung 
ihrer  Macht'.  1  The  more  convincing  arguments  support  the  latter 
hypothesis,  with  more  recent  work  suggesting  that,  although  even  the  MIS 
labelled  itself  the  'Schild  und  Schwert  der  Partei',  this  characterisation  alone 
is  too  superficial,  since  it  ignores  the  constantly  developing  dynamics  of  the 
relationship  between  the  Party  and  the  MfS  (J-93). 
In  contrast  to  the  discussion  outlined  above,  there  is  little  dispute 
that  the  foreign  espionage  department  of  the  MfS,  the  Hauptverwaltung 
Aufklärung,  achieved  considerable  success,  notably  the  positioning  of  top 
spy,  Günter  Guillaume,  in  the  office  of  the  Bundeskanzler  Willy  Brandt.  The 
unmasking  of  Guillaume  was  a  significant  factor  in  Brandt's  decision  to 
relinquish  power.  What  distinguished  the  MfS,  however,  from  other  secret 
services  was  the  quite  substantial  amount  of  resources  dedicated  to 
internal  affairs  (J-22,  p.  24).  The  analysis  of  the  documents  relating  to  the 
observation  and  control  of  internal  activities  has  brought  the  recognition 
that  much  of  the  MfS's  attention  was  focused  on  specific  groups  of  the 
population,  primarily  on  individuals  associated  with  the  church,  with 
cultural,  or  with  opposition  activities.  Yet,  in  the  minds  of  the  East  German 
population,  the  Stasi  functioned  as  though  it  were  physically  omnipresent, 
1  Hermann  Weber,  cited  by  Karl  Wilhelm  Fricke  (F-13,  p.  5). 18 
and  many  a  conversation  was  subjected  to  a  form  of  self-imposed 
censorship  in  the  belief  that  it  was  being  furtively  recorded  and  analysed. 
The  numbers  of  those  employed  by  the  MfS  increased  steadily 
throughout  the  life  span  of  the  organisation.  In  1974  55,718  people  were 
employed  on  a  full-time  basis,  by  1980  there  were  75,106  such  employees, 
and  when  the  MfS  went  into  dissolution  in  1989  this  figure  had  risen  to 
91,000  (J-29,  p.  34,  J-64,  p.  56).  Full-time  employees  were  often  known 
among  friends  and  family  to  be  working  for  the  MfS.  For  the  approximately 
174,000  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter  estimated  to  have  been  active  in  1989  this 
was  not  the  case  (J-64,  p.  56).  2  There  were  several  different  types  of 
Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter,  who  were  each  to  have  varying  tasks  and  areas  of 
responsibility  (J-62,  pp.  62-90).  By  far  the  most  common  category  was  the 
IMS  (IM  zur  politisch-operativen  Durchdringung  und  Sicherung  des 
Verantwortungsbereiches),  defined  in  the  1979  IM  guidelines  as  follows: 
Das  sind  IM,  die  wesentliche  Beiträge  zur  allseitigen 
Gewährleistung  der  inneren  Sicherheit  im 
Verantwortungsbereich  leisten,  in  hohem  Maße  vorbeugend 
und  schadensverhütend  wirken  und  mithelfen,  neue 
Sicherheitserfordernisse  rechtzeitig  zu  erkennen  sowie 
durchzusetzen.  Ihre  Arbeit  muß  der  umfassenden,  sicheren 
Einschätzung  und  Beherrschung  der  politisch-operativen  Lage  im 
Verantwortungsbereich  und  der  Weiterführung  des 
Klärungsprozesses  'Wer  ist  wer?  '  dienen.  (J-62,  p.  314) 
IME  (IM  für  einen  besonderen  Einsatz)  and  IMB  (IM  der  Abwehr  mit 
Feindverbindung  bzw.  zur  unmittelbaren  Bearbeitung  im  Verdacht  der 
Feindtätigkeit  stehender  Personen)  were,  as  these  definitions  indicate,  in 
comparison  to  the  IMS,  to  be  given  more  direct  and  specific  tasks.  During 
the  course  of  his/her  contact  to  the  MfS  the  status  of  an  IM  could  be 
changed  according  to  his/her  potential  to  obtain  specific  information  and 
according  to  the  needs  of  the  Führungsoffizier  concerned.  IM  'Fuchs',  for 
2  174,000  is  the  more  recent  and  now  more  frequently  cited  figure.  Müller-Enbergs 
originally  named  173,000  as  the  number  of  IM  active  in  1989  (F-10,  p.  17). 19 
example,  was  originally  recruited  as  an  IMS  but  was  later  promoted  to  a 
FIM  (Führungs-IM)  when  he  was  placed  in  charge  of  other  IM  in  the  prison 
where  he  worked  (C-5b,  pp.  87-90).  When  he  changed  jobs  in  1985  'Fuchs' 
was  once  again  given  the  status  IMS  (C-5b,  pp.  133-36). 
In  contrast  to  the  Hauptamtliche  Mitarbeiter,  the  majority  of  IM  did 
not  receive  a  regular  wage  for  their  services,  with  the  exception  of  what  was 
termed  a  Hauptamtlicher  IM  (J-62,  pp.  89-90).  Hauptamtliche  IM  worked 
for  the  MfS  on  a  full-time  basis  but,  by  the  creation  of  a  cover  occupation,  a 
Scheinarbeitsverhältnis,  care  was  taken  to  ensure  that  this  fact  remain 
secret  (F-3,  pp.  195-96). 
IM  were  engaged  in  the  amassing  of  vast  amounts  of  often  seemingly 
trivial  pieces  of  information  which  could  potentially  be  used  in  the  operative 
Zersetzung  of  the  enemy  (F-3,  p.  464).  Operative  Zersetzung  involved 
devising  strategies  to  destroy  or  neutralise  those  whose  political  stance  was 
perceived  as  a  threat  to  the  smooth  running  of  the  state.  Much  of  the  vast 
amount  of  information  collected  by  the  MfS  was  reproduced,  often  by  hand, 
several  times  within  any  given  file,  and  when,  in  1989,  the  MfS  realised  that 
its  days  were  numbered,  measures  were  put  into  action  to  begin  the 
immense  task  of  trying  to  destroy  these  screeds  of  written  material.  Amidst 
growing  political  unrest,  the  MfS  was  also  renamed  the  AfNS  (Amt  für 
Nationale  Sicherheit)  on  17  November  1989  by  Hans  Modrow,  the  new 
Ministerpräsident  of  the  rapidly  disappearing  GDR,  and  Wolfgang  Schwanitz 
was  appointed  head  of  the  reformed  organisation.  3  Less  than  one  month 
later  and  under  pressure  from  the  Runder  Tisch,  Modrow's  government 
announced  measures  to  restructure  the  AfNS  into  two  separate 
organisations,  one  responsible  for  domestic  and  one  for  foreign  affairs. 
Finally,  the  decision  was  taken  to  completely  disband  the  MfS  /AfNS  and  to 
stop  all  preparations  for  successor  organisations,  leaving  a  legacy  of  178 
3  For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  events  of  this  time,  see  J-29,  pp.  177-292. 20 
kilometres  of  filed  material,  which  is  now  in  the  care  of  the 
Bundesbeauftragter  für  die  Unterlagen  des  Staatssicherheitsdienstes  der 
ehemaligen  Deutschen  Demokratischen  Republik  (BStU  ). 
1.3  THE  WENDE 
During  the  1980s  the  political  climate  throughout  Eastern  Europe  had,  of 
course,  been  undergoing  dramatic  change.  Once  the  mood  of  had  upheaval 
finally  reached  the  GDR,  events  took  on  surprising  momentum.  A 
significant  turning  point  in  this  process  came  in  January  1988,  when  the 
traditional  Rosa-Luxemburg-Demonstration  ended  with  the  arrest  and 
subsequent  forced  temporary  exile  of  several  leading  Bürgerrechtler.  The 
authorities  had  been  enraged  when  protesters  had  attempted  to  participate 
in  the  march  carrying  a  banner  which  criticised  the  state  but  which 
displayed  a  quotation  from  Luxemburg  herself,  stating  that  freedom  was  'die 
Freiheit  des  Andersdenkenden'.  4  Vigils  were  held  for  those  arrested,  and  this 
rally  is  generally  regarded  as  the  first  time  that  previously  isolated 
opposition  groups  and  critical  voices  joined  together  in  protest.  The  mood  of 
dissatisfaction  continued  to  grow,  and  the  obvious  rigging  of  the  municipal 
election  results  of  May  1989  led  to  a  further  surge  of  anti-government 
sentiment.  The  situation  was  now  acute,  but  still  few  could  really  have 
believed  that  the  GDR  was  heading  towards  its  fortieth  and  final 
anniversary,  a  process  which  was  speeded  along  by  Hungary's  decision  in 
late  summer  1989  to  allow  the  GDR  citizens  who  had  been  flocking  there 
the  chance  to  escape  into  Austria.  This  decision  marked  the  beginning  of  a 
mass  exodus  from  the  GDR  in  the  following  months,  and  when  the 
Hungarian/Austrian  border  was  finally  officially  opened  on  10  September 
1989,20,000  GDR  citizens  crossed  over  into  the  West  in  the  first  few  hours 
4  For  a  description  of  the  events  marking  the  growing  unrest  in  the  GDR,  see  J-59,  pp. 
483-553,  or  J-38. 21 
alone  (J-38,  p.  28).  Thousands  of  East  Germans  had  also  been  gathering  in 
foreign  embassies  in  Czechoslovakia  and  Poland,  and  on  30  September  the 
GDR  government  allowed  the  first  wave  of  what  amounted  to  5,500 
refugees  in  Prague  and  800  in  Warsaw  safe  passage  to  the  FRG  via  special 
train  (J-38,  p.  29).  International  media  attention  was  focused  on  the  GDR, 
and  the  images  of  the  emotional  scenes  of  those  who  took  this  opportunity 
to  flee,  sometimes  even  leaving  their  children  behind  to  do  so,  have  become 
imprinted  in  the  minds  of  all  those  who  watched  in  awe.  The  stream  of  those 
leaving  the  GDR  seemed  endless,  and  celebrations  on  7  October  1989  to 
mark  the  fortieth  anniversary  of  the  Republic  were  marred  when 
spectators  of  the  parade  appealed  for  help  to  the  visiting  Michael 
Gorbachev.  The  Wende  was  completed  when,  on  9  November  1989,  and 
after  a  somewhat  confused  announcement  by  Politbüro  representative 
Günter  Schabowski,  the  inner-German  border  was  declared  open  and  the 
first  GDR  citizens  were  allowed  by  stunned  border-guards  to  pass  through 
the  Berlin  Wall,  the  barrier  which,  since  its  erection  in  1961,  had  divided  the 
world  into  East  and  West. 
1.4  POST-WENDE  TURMOIL 
1.4.1  Occupation  of  MfS  (Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit) 
Headquarters 
It  was  almost  a  month  after  the  events  of  the  historic  night  of  9  November 
1989  when,  on  4  December,  MfS  offices  in  Leipzig  were  first  occupied  by 
members  of  the  public,  some  of  whom  were  beginning  to  form  into  various 
Bürgerkomitees.  Similar  action  followed  throughout  the  GDR,  with  activities 
reaching  a  dramatic  climax  on  15  January  1990  when  the  headquarters  in 
Berlin  were  stormed  by  thousands  who  had  been  protesting  outside, 
chanting  slogans  such  as  'Stasi  raus'  and  'Stasi  in  die  Produktion'.  Although 
subsequent  reports  suggest  that  the  MfS  was  fully  prepared  for  this  attack, 22 
probably  even  actually  opening  the  doors  to  the  protesting  mass  outside, 
the  event  was  immensely  symbolic  and  seemed  to  signify  the  final  liberation 
of  the  Volk  from  its  oppressor  (J-109,  pp.  33-40).  It  was  later  to  be 
established  that  most  of  the  files  which  literally  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
protesters  as  they  ran  blindly  through  the  complex  were  fairly  harmless  and 
had  been  carefully  and  cunningly  placed  in  their  path  with  the  intention  of 
distracting  them  from  going  in  search  of  other  potentially  more  explosive 
material.  Representatives  of  the  MfS  and  possibly  even  of  other  secret 
services  were  very  probably  taking  advantage  of  the  chaotic  atmosphere  to 
smuggle  more  delicate  material  out  of  the  building  at  that  very  moment  (J- 
17,  p.  80). 
One  of  the  ironies  of  the  period  immediately  following  this  occupation 
is  that  MfS  officers  worked  closely  with  the  citizens'  committee  established 
to  oversee  the  safekeeping  of  the  files.  These  officers  had,  of  course,  their 
own  interests  at  heart  in  this  process  and,  as  a  result  of  their  inside 
knowledge,  a  distinct  advantage  over  the  members  of  the  committee. 
Stefan  Wolle  later  said  that  he  and  other  members  of  the 
Normannenstraße  Committee  allowed  themselves  'to  be  led  through  the 
labyrinth  as  though  through  a  museum,  without  taking  command'  (J-105,  p. 
352).  The  uniqueness  of  the  situation  meant  that  many  of  those  who  were 
involved  in  the  ensuing  process  of  disbanding  the  Mf  S/A  f1VS  were  bound  to 
make  what  are  now  seen  to  be  erroneous  judgements  when  carrying  out  this 
immense  task.  Hans  Schwenke,  who  was  involved  in  the  dissolution 
process,  would  later  write  of  this  time:  'Die  Stasi-Leute  hatten  ihre  eigenen 
Vorstellungen  von  der  Auflösung  ihres  Geheimdienstes  und  spielten  mit  den 
Auflösern  lange  Zeit  Katz  und  Maus.  '  (J-109,  p.  218) 23 
1.4.2  The  Runder  Tisch 
One  of  the  most  seriously  misguided  decisions  made  in  the  period 
immediately  following  the  storming  of  Stasi  headquarters  was  the  one  taken 
in  February  1990  to  destroy  the  electronic  data  bank  which  catalogued  the 
material  contained  in  the  files.  The  proposal  to  take  such  action  was  put 
forward  and  agreed  upon  by  the  Runder  Tisch,  with  the  justification  that  the 
information  stored  in  this  bank  had  been  illegally  obtained  and  was 
potentially  exploitable  by  members  of  the  Stasi  or  of  other  secret  services. 
With  hindsight,  this  action  is  recognised  by  many  to  have  ultimately  served 
only  to  complicate  the  ensuing  attempt  to  administer  the  screeds  of 
documents  now  in  possession  of  the  Gauck-Behörde,  the  name  by  which  the 
BStU  is  more  commonly  referred  to  after  the  Bundesbeauftragter  himself, 
Joachim  Gauck  (J-29,  p.  225).  Soon  it  was  evident  that  the  destruction  of 
material  best  served  the  interests  of  those  who  had  compiled  it.  The  Runder 
Tisch  found  itself,  however,  in  an  unfortunate  position,  suffering  as  it  did 
from  a  lack,  not  only  of  past  experience,  but  also  of  legitimacy  (see  J-24,  p. 
77).  As  a  body  of  representatives  from  the  various  political  parties  and 
organisations  active  at  the  time,  many  of  those  who  sat  at  the  Runder 
Tisch  aimed  to  ensure  that  the  principles  of  democracy  were  adhered  to  in 
this  turbulent  period.  Yet  the  Runder  Tisch  was  itself  a  self-appointed  and 
thus  undemocratic  body,  some  of  whose  members,  it  was  later  to  be 
revealed,  had  collaborated  with  the  M/S: 
Es  mutet  wie  ein  Kalauer  der  Geschichte  an,  daß  die  ersten  freien 
Wahlen  zur  Volkskammer  veranstaltet  wurden,  um  eine  gesetzgebende 
Körperschaft  zu  kreieren,  die  nur  eine  Aufgabe  hatte:  sich  selbst 
abzuschaffen.  So  etwas  hat  es  in  der  Geschichte  parlamentarischer 
Demokratien  noch  nicht  gegeben,  es  sind  schon  etliche  Staaten 
untergegangen,  aber  keiner  so  ordentlich  wie  die  DDR.  Ebenso  einmalig 
ist  es,  daß  an  der  Spitze  der  revolutionären  Bewegung  Mitarbeiter  des 
Sicherheitsapparates  agierten,  deren  eigentliche  Aufgabe  darin  lag, 
revolutionäre  Veränderungen  zu  verhindern:  de  Maiziere  bei  der  CDU, 
Ibrahim  Böhme  bei  der  SPD,  Wolfgang  Schnur  beim  Demokratischen 
Aufbruch,  nur  um  die  prominentesten  zu  nennen.  (J-16,  pp.  22-23) 24 
Within,  as  Wolle  described  it,  the  'bizarre  coalition  of  extreme 
opposites'  which  made  up  the  Runder  Tisch  there  were  then  those  who  were 
not  so  much  interested  in  seeing  that  justice  be  done,  but  rather  that  their 
own  collaboration  with  the  MfS  remained  undisclosed,  leading  Jens  Reich  to 
remark  that  he  had  the  feeling  that  he  and  other  representatives  of  the 
Bürgerbewegung  had  been  somewhat  'über  den  Runden  Tisch  gezogen'  (J- 
106,  p.  140,1-90). 
1.5  THE  STASI-UNTERLAGEN-GESETZ  (StUG) 
1.5.1  General 
In  spite  of  the  immense  difficulties  and  resistance  they  faced,  the  dedication 
of  members  of  the  various  Bürgerkomitees  resulted  in  the  passing  of  a  law 
on  24  August  1990  by  the  Volkskammer  concerning  the  protection  and  use 
of  the  data  collected  by  the  MfS  (G-2).  This  law  was  not  adopted  in  the 
unification  treaty  of  3  October  1990,  but  ensured  that  a  ruling  was  included 
which  guaranteed  temporary  conditions  of  use  until  the  Stasi-  Unterlagen- 
Gesetz  (StUG)  was  finally  passed  over  one  year  later  (G-3).  This  was  a 
significant  victory,  as  many  on  both  sides  of  the  rapidly  disappearing 
German-German  border  would  rather  have  seen  the  lid  kept  firmly  shut  on 
this  quite  extraordinary  Pandora's  box. 
Germany's  StUG  is  unique  in  the  former  Eastern  Block.  No 
comparable  law  was  passed  in  countries  such  as  Poland,  Hungary  or 
Romania.  In  Hungary,  for  example,  legislation  was  implemented  to  allow 
the  screening  of  individuals  in  specific  public  positions,  but  was  eventually 
abandoned  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  there  were  so  few  judges  available 
to  implement  the  law  who  were  not  themselves  liable  for  screening  and 
possible  dismissal  (1-93).  In  Romania  the  files  came  under  the  standard 
thirty-year  closure  rule,  leading  one  journalist  there  to  comment: 25 
Heute  ist  die  Angst  vor  der  eigenen  Akte  größer  geworden  als  die 
Angst  vor  dem  Repressionsorgan.  Das  Einfrieren  der  Dossiers  für 
dreißig  Jahre  bedeutet  eine  dreißigjährige  Verlängerung  der 
Machtgarantie  für  jene,  die  mit  diesen  Dossiers  aus  dem  Dunkel 
operieren  können.  (1-94) 
The  Czech  Republic  is  the  only  former  Eastern  Block  country  which  comes 
close  to  having  adopted  legislation  comparable  to  the  StUG,  although  this 
ruling  is  somewhat  less  differentiated  and  intricate  than  its  German 
counterpart  (J-73,  pp.  319-26). 
1.5.2  The  StUG  and  the  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter 
The  passing  of  the  StUG  meant  that  theoretically  an  end  was  in  sight  to  the 
mass  speculation  about  who  had  or  had  not  collaborated  with  the  MfS. 
Since  its  subject  matter  was  so  delicate  and  its  implications  so  potentially 
grave,  the  law's  specifications  were  the  cause  of  much  heated  dispute. 
According  to  the  StUG  (§  16),  for  example,  former  IM  are  not  granted  access 
to  the  reports  which  they  wrote  or  helped  compile,  with  the  justification 
that,  if  they  were  to  be  allowed  to  view  this  material,  'altes  Wissen  zum 
Nachteil  von  Betroffenen  und  Dritten  aufgefrischt  werden  könnte'  (Angelika 
Barbe,  F-16,  p.  116).  An  IM  may  apply  to  see  these  sections  of  the  file  only 
if  s/he  can  prove  that  a  legal  interest  exists  to  do  so  (StUG,  §  16/4).  This 
particular  aspect  of  the  law  has  been  heavily  criticised  on  the  grounds  that, 
'die  Betroffenen  vor  laufender  Kamera  mit  ihrer  Akte,  die  sie  selbst  noch  nie 
gesehen  haben,  zu  konfrontieren,  erinnert  an  Stasi-Methoden'  (J-86,  p.  123). 
Calls  for  the  destruction  of  the  files  by  the  likes  of  Friedrich  Schorlemmer 
arose  partly  out  of  such  sentiment.  There  has,  however,  been  a  huge  public 
response  to  the  StUG  and  by  1995,  when  the  second  report  of  the  BStU 
went  to  press,  over  2.7  million  applications  to  view  files  had  been  lodged  (F- 
17,  p.  4).  The  majority  of  these  requests  had  come  from  employers  in  the 26 
public  sector,  but  close  to  one  million  were  private  applications  from 
ordinary  citizens  who  wished  to  know  if  they  had  been  under  Stasi 
observation.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  there  is  wide  public  interest  in  the 
MfS  legacy.  Joachim  Gauck,  the  head  of  the  BStU,  argues,  therefore,  that 
the  decision  not  to  confront  the  harsh  truths  in  the  files  would  lead  to  'ein 
enormes  Maß  an  Frustration  und  Unmut'  in  the  former  GDR  (J-17,  p.  91). 
It  is  likely  that  very  little  of  the  'Frustration  und  Unmut'  which 
Gauck  predicts  would  be  detectable  on  the  part  of  former  IM,  who  face 
possible  social  stigmatisation  as  well  as  dismissal  from  employment  if  their 
contacts  to  the  MfS  become  public.  Many  of  these  individuals  feel  that  they 
have  been  unfairly  singled  out  as  scapegoats  in  the  reckoning  with  the  GDR 
past.  Establishing  the  identities  behind  the  cover  names  of  former  IM  is, 
however,  arguably  a  necessary  element  to  the  confrontation  with  the  Stasi 
legacy.  When  he  published  extracts  of  his  Stasi  file,  the  writer  Reiner  Kunze 
made  the  following  statement  in  the  introduction  to  his  book:  'Wäre  es 
möglich,  eine  solche  Dokumentation  über  einen  Dritten  herauszugeben, 
würde  ich  auf  die  Veröffentlichung  dieses  Buches  gern  verzichten.  Es  geht 
um  die  Mechanismen,  nicht  um  Personen.  '  (J-48,  p.  12)  When  writing  to  a 
woman  who,  together  with  her  husband,  had  informed  the  MfS  on  his 
activities,  Erich  Loest  made  a  similar  statement.  Loest  was  interested  in 
finding  out  whether  the  IM-Tätigkeit  had  been  brought  to  an  end  by  the  MfS 
or  on  the  initiative  of  the  woman  and  her  husband,  'weil  ich  hinter  das 
System  kommen  will,  nicht  um  Ihnen  und  Wilfried  noch  irgendwas  am  Zeug 
zu  flicken.  Das  ist  vorbei  und  mir  nicht  mehr  wichtig.  '  (J-52,  p.  134) 
One  of  the  primary  consequences  of  the  fact  that  the  MfS  files  are 
now  publicly  available  is  that  the  mechanisms  of  the  system  of  oppression 
can  be  studied  in  detail.  Yet,  as  the  above  statements  from  Kunze  and 
Loest  indicate,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  any  real  confrontation  with  the  past 
without  identifying,  among  other  key  actors,  former  IM.  A  recent  court  case 27 
is  interesting  in  this  context.  After  publishing  his  book  on  the  MfS 
observation  of  the  literary  scene  in  the  GDR,  Joachim  Walther  has  found 
himself  losing  a  case  brought  by  a  man  who  is  named  in  the  book  as  having 
been  an  IM  (J-100).  The  court  decreed  that  those  IM  whose  collaboration 
was  minimal  have  the  right  to  remain  anonymous  and  that  the  book  should 
be  temporarily  removed  from  circulation.  The  publisher  and  the  BStU, 
where  Walther  has  been  employed  while  working  on  his  project,  intend  to 
contest  this  decision. 
Wolfgang  Thierse  found  the  emphasis  on  the  IM  in  the  debate 
concerning  the  Stasi  legacy  undesirable,  arguing  that  the  phenomenon  was 
merely  'ein  banales  Faszinosum,  eine  negativ  mythisierte  Alltäglichkeit'  (J- 
95,  p.  30).  Thierse  appealed  to  the  general  public  to  stop  thinking  of  former 
IM  as  'irgendwelche  fernen  dämonischen  Bösewichter,  Verbrechertypen, 
Schweinehunde',  and  to  realise  that  they  were  friends,  neighbours,  and  even 
relatives  (J-95,  p.  30).  It  is,  however,  precisely  this  aspect  of  the  IM 
network,  its  banality  and  the  fact  that,  whether  imagined  or  real,  it  was  a 
feature  of  the  day-to-day  reality  of  many  GDR  citizens,  which  ensures  the 
public's  fascination  with  it.  The  following  study  will  concern  itself  with  the 
way  in  which  the  IM  themselves  and  the  society  around  them  confront  this 
'banales  Faszinosum'. 28 
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2.1  AIMS 
Von  den  dem  Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit  zur  Verfügung 
stehenden  Mitteln  und  Möglichkeiten  im  Kampf  gegen  die 
konspirative  Tätigkeit  des  Klassenfeindes  nehmen  die  inoffiziellen 
Mitarbeiter  den  wichtigsten  Platz  ein.  (1958,  J-62,  p.  198) 
Das  Kernstück  der  gesamten  politisch-operativen  Arbeit  des 
Ministeriums  für  Staatssicherheit  sind  die  Inoffiziellen 
Mitarbeiter.  (1968,  J-62,  p.  247) 
Die  erforderliche  gesellschaftliche  und  politisch-operative 
Wirksamkeit  der  politisch-operativen  Arbeit  insgesamt  ist  durch 
eine  höhere  Qualität  und  Wirksamkeit  der  Arbeit  mit  den  IM  -  der 
Hauptwaffe  im  Kampf  gegen  den  Feind  -  zu  erreichen.  (1979,  J-62, 
p.  305) 
The  above  statements,  taken  from  the  three  successive  comprehensive 
guidelines  for  the  work  with  IM,  demonstrate  that  the  MfS  undoubtedly 
considered  that  its  'unofficial  employees'  played  a  key  role  in  the  war  waged 
against  those  who  had  been  designated  state  enemies.  Yet,  were  these  bold 
statements  merely  a  demonstration  of  the  prevailing  state  rhetoric,  or  had 
the  thousands  of  GDR  citizens  who  had  been  active  as  Inoffizielle 
Mitarbeiter  truly  been  such  a  fundamental  asset  to  the  MfS? 
After  the  events  of  1989,  and  particularly  after  the  introduction  of 
the  StUG  in  December  1991,  the  identities  of  onetime  informers  began  to  be 
gradually  revealed,  often  in  a  most  spectacular  manner.  Since  very  few 
were  prepared  on  their  own  initiative  to  admit  to  having  collaborated  with 
the  MfS,  former  IM  were  generally  outed  after  information  became  available 
from  the  MfS  dossiers.  As  if  caught  up  in  some  kind  of  murder  mystery 
game,  the  nation  pondered  over  the  questions  of  who  had  done  it?  by  what 
means?  where?  and  to  whom?  Two  possible  explanations  of  the  motivation 
behind  an  IM-Tätigkeit  were  popularly  developed  and  expounded:  were  the 
IM  evil  and  sinister  individuals  who  had  ruthlessly  betrayed  their  friends  and 
family  for  their  own  gain,  or,  as  many  IM  began  to  vehemently  protest,  were 30 
they  themselves  victims  of  a  brutal  system  of  control  whose  political 
naivete  had  been  cunningly  abused? 
The  following  study  will  focus  predominantly  on  IM  who  were  citizens 
of  the  GDR  and  who  were  active  within  its  boundaries.  Separate  guidelines 
and  conditions  were  in  force  for  those  who  worked  outside  the  GDR,  in  the 
so-called  Operationsgebiet  (J-62,  pp.  351-61).  Section  One  is  concerned  in 
the  first  instance  with  reconstructing  a  profile  of  the  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter 
by  detailed  examination  of  several  key  questions.  Who  were  the  IM  in  terms 
of  sex,  age,  personality,  social  grouping?  Why  were  they  selected  for  this 
apparently  so  vital  task?  What  was  their  motivation  for  agreeing  to  comply 
and  continuing  to  collaborate  with  the  MfS?  And  what  exactly  did  their 
duties  entail  on  a  day-to-day  basis?  These  questions  are  posed  with  the 
intention  of  establishing  details  of  the  concrete  identities  behind  the  label  IM 
and  thus  behind  the  stereotypical  characterisation  of  the  informer.  Section 
One  is  as  much  a  retrospective  analysis  as  Section  Two,  since  it  is 
concerned  not  only  with  the  knowledge  of  the  workings  of  the  MfS  and  the 
details  of  an  IM-Tätigkeit  which  the  opening  of  the  files  has  brought,  but 
also  with  the  effect  which  the  post-1989  Stasi  debate  has  had  on  the  way  in 
which  these  details  of  collaboration  are  perceived  and  characterised  by  both 
the  IM  and  the  society  in  which  s/he  lives. 
Section  Two  examines  the  public  and  private  confrontation  with  this 
aspect  of  GDR  history,  with  respect  to  the  legal  and  political  decisions 
concerning  dealings  with  former  IM  and  to  the  personal  and 
interpersonal  reckoning  with  this  issue.  How  does  a  society  and  how  does 
the  individual  within  that  society  cope  with  the  phenomenon  of  wide-scale 
observation  and  control  once  the  political  and  legal  structures  on  which  the 
system  rested  no  longer  exist?  Who  decides  where  guilt  lies?  And  in  what 
manner  and  by  whom  should  it  be  atoned?  The  impact  which  the 31 
availability  of  the  MfS  files  under  the  StUG  has  had  on  these  issues  is  also 
discussed. 
The  complex  interaction  of  legal  and  political  issues  with  social  and 
moral  ones  is  studied  throughout  the  work  by  reference  in  particular  to 
interviews  carried  out  with  former  IM  and  by  an  analysis  of  MfS 
documentation,  including  the  MfS  files  of  the  majority  of  these  interviewees. 
These  sources  are  used  as  a  means  of  trying  to  gain  an  understanding  of  the 
macro  through  the  micro.  In  other  words,  the  experiences  of  individual 
actors  are  used  in  the  analysis  of  the  societal  debate,  whilst  studying  at  the 
same  time  the  interactive  ¢.  ffect  of  this  public  discussion  on  these 
individuals. 
2.2  METHODOLOGY 
2.2.1  Oral  History:  Origins  and  Application 
Although  the  use  of  oral  sources  in  the  writing  of  history  is  as  old  as  history 
itself,  oral  history  as  a  distinct  and  standardised  methodology  only  came 
into  being  about  fifty  years  ago,  when  the  advancement  of  technology 
allowed  the  testimonies  of  larger  numbers  of  interviewees  to  be  recorded  and 
analysed.  The  term  'oral  history'  is  generally  accepted  as  having  been  coined 
by  Alan  Nevis,  who  is  credited  with  having  pioneered  the  first  recognised 
oral  history  project  in  1948  by  recording  the  memories  of  elite  American 
males.  1  In  the  intervening  years  oral  historians  have  tended  to  be 
concerned  not  so  much  with  the  elite  or  prominent  members  of  society  as 
with  collecting  the  testimonies  of  rather  more  ordinary  men  and  women, 
whose  experiences,  as  depicted  in  their  life  stories,  have  been  used  as  a 
means  of  understanding  the  interaction  between  socio-political  change  and 
the  individual. 
1  For  information  on  Oral  History,  see  J-32,  J-66  and  J-98. 32 
It  is  not  the  intention  of  oral  historians  to  write  history  solely  by 
conducting  interviews,  but  to  incorporate  these  sources  into  a  wider  socio- 
historical  analysis.  Allesandro  Portelli  comments  on  the  somewhat 
misleading  nature  of  the  term  'oral  history',  stressing  that  what  oral 
historians  such  as  himself  are  really  concerned  with  is  the  application  of 
oral  sources  in  historical  analysis,  rather  than  with  an  attempt  to  conduct 
historical  research  solely  by  reference  to  this  material  (J-67,  p.  96).  On  the 
subject  of  the  credibility  of  oral  sources  Portelli  continues:  'Subjectivity  is  as 
much  the  business  of  history  as  the  more  visible  "facts".  What  the 
informant  believes  is  indeed  a  historical  fact  (that  is,  the  fact  that  he  or  she 
believes  it)  just  as  much  as  what  really  happened.  '  (J-67,  p.  100)  Recently 
Ronald  Grele  argued  that  oral  historians  were  not  so  much  interested  in  'the 
truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth'  but  in  studying  the  'quality  of  the  lie',  since, 
according  to  Grele,  'the  relationship  between  the  culture  and  the  lie  is  a 
truth'  (H-3). 
The  use  of  the  oral  testimonies  of  former  IM  is  particularly 
enlightening  in  this  particular  study  for  two  principal  reasons.  First,  since 
the  GDR  no  longer  exists  as  a  political  and  legal  entity,  attempts  of  the 
collective  and  the  individual  to  come  to  terms  with  the  legal  and  moral 
issues  at  hand  from  within  the  new  Germany  are  both  complex  and 
fascinating.  Second,  the  unprecedented  decision  to  make  the  files  of  the 
GDR's  Secret  Service  so  widely  accessible  meant  that  the  testimonies  of 
the  IM  interviewed  could  be  directly  compared  and  contrasted  with  the 
information  contained  in  the  Mf  S  dossiers  relating  to  these  same  individuals. 
Furthermore,  since  the  files  have  not  been  subject  to  a  standard  closure 
rule,  the  likelihood  that  witnesses  are  both  alive  and  traceable  is  greatly 
increased. 
Both  the  written  MfS  sources  and  the  oral  sources  of  the  witnesses' 
testimonies  must  be  treated,  as  indeed  with  any  source,  with  a  certain 33 
degree  of  scepticism,  and  the  question  of  the  validity  of  MfS  material  will  be 
considered  in  Part  Three  of  this  introduction.  The  availability  in  this  case  of 
both  sources  facilitates  the  possibility,  through  examination  of  convergence 
and  divergence,  of  reconstructing  a  more  objective  representation  of 
external  events,  as  well  as  contributing  to  an  understanding  of  the  more 
subjective  interpretation  of  these  same  occurrences  on  the  part  of  the 
individual  IM  and  the  M/S. 
2.2.2  The  Biographical  Approach:  The  Use  of  Life  Stories  in 
Sociological  Research 
Oral  History  has  much  in  common  with  the  qualitative  biographical 
approach  used  in  sociology.  Rejecting  a  merely  quantitative  method  of 
analysis,  a  growing  number  of  sociologists  began  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  to 
work  with  the  detailed  life  histories  of  particular  individuals  who  were  active 
in  the  field  of  social  life  under  examination.  A  frequently  cited  early  study 
which  drew  on  autobiographical  accounts  is  the  work  of  Thomas  and 
Znaniecki  on  The  Polish  Peasant  in  Europe  and  America,  which  appeared  in 
the  1920s  (J-96).  Some  similar  work  was  carried  out  in  the  intervening 
period,  but  it  was  only  in  the  1970s  that  significant  numbers  of  sociologists 
working  with  comparable  methods  began  to  come  together  and  standardise 
this  approach.  2 
By  using  the  biographical  approach  the  sociologist  aims  to  attain  a 
closer  understanding  of  the  social  reality  under  analysis,  that  is  to  move 
closer  to  an  understanding  of  objectivity  on  the  macro-sociological  level  by 
studying  the  subjectivity  of  the  micro-level.  Kohli  distinguishes  the 
biographical  approach  in  sociology  from  that  found  in  anthropology  by 
stressing  that,  whereas  the  latter  is  interested  in  individuals  as 
'differentiated  personalities',  in  sociology  'the  analysis  of  life  histories  does 
2  For  a  comprehensive  overview  of  this  approach,  see  J-9. 34 
not  primarily  aim  at  individual  particularities,  but  seeks  to  unravel  what 
general  (or  generalizable)  elements  they  contain'  (J-43,  p.  63). 
Sociology  is  then  ultimately  interested  in  the  dynamics  of  the  larger 
social  grouping.  Pierre  Bourdieu  describes  the  focus  of  the  sociologist  as 
being  one  concerned  with  different  fields  of  social  relations: 
Fields  present  themselves  synchronically  as  structured  spaces  of 
positions  (or  posts)  whose  properties  depend  on  their  position 
within  these  spaces  and  which  can  be  analysed  independently  of  the 
characteristics  of  their  occupants  (which  are  partly  determined  by 
them).  [...  ]  Whenever  one  studies  a  new  field,  whether  it  be  the  field  of 
philology  in  the  nineteenth  century,  contemporary  fashion,  or  religion 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  one  discovers  specific  properties  that  are  peculiar 
to  that  field,  at  the  same  time  as  one  pushes  forward  our  knowledge 
of  the  universal  mechanisms  of  fields,  which  are  specified  in  terms  of 
secondary  variables.  [...  ]  In  order  for  a  field  to  function,  there  have  to 
be  stakes  and  people  prepared  to  play  the  game,  endowed  with  the 
habitus  that  implies  knowledge  and  recognition  of  the  immanent 
laws  of  the  field,  the  stakes  and  so  on.  (J-15,  p.  72) 
Bourdieu  goes  on  to  define  the  habitus  as  'a  system  of  dispositions  acquired 
by  implicit  or  explicit  learning  which  functions  as  a  system  of  generative 
schemes,  generates  strategies  which  can  be  objectively  consistent  with  the 
objective  interests  of  their  authors  without  having  been  expressly  designed 
to  that  end'  (J-15,  p.  76).  Taking  this  model  of  a  definition  of  social  relations 
and  applying  it  to  the  situation  in  contemporary  Germany  we  could  say 
that  the  many  sub-fields  which  made  up  the  GDR  have  now  been 
incorporated  into  the  pre-existing  construct  of  the  FRG.  Since  the  previous 
habitus  has  been  superseded,  the  norms  which  defined  and  shaped  life  in  the 
old  field  are  no  longer  applicable.  The  properties  and  values  of  the  new 
habitus  are  now  imposed  after  the  fact  on  the  remnants  of  the  old  in  the 
confrontation  with  its  uncomfortable  legacy.  Dealings  with  the  GDR  legacy 
from  within  the  boundaries  of  the  new  FRG  result  thus  in  a  confounding 
array  of  complex  legal,  moral,  and  political  issues  for  the  collective.  In  a 
process  of  self-justification  the  individual  begins  to  defend  his/her  stance  in the  former  field.  This  act  of  justification  takes  place  from  within  a  new  set  of 
social  structures  containing  the  old,  and  is  often  a  process  of  re-definition. 
Suffice  it  then  to  say  that  there  are  definite  parallels  in  the  methods 
of  oral  historians  and  of  sociologists  using  the  biographical  approach.  Both 
are  concerned  with  using  the  detailed  autobiographical  accounts  of 
particular  individuals  whose  lives  have  been  subject  to  similar  socio-political 
change  as  a  means  of  analysing  the  wider  socio-historical  dynamic.  In  the 
late  1970s  Paul  Thompson  formulated  these  similarities  as  follows: 
Both  sociologists  and  social  historians  have  recently  been 
rediscovering  the  value  of  the  retrospective  in  depth  interview,  but 
under  different  banners.  This  is  because  the  'life  history'  sociologist 
and  the  'oral  historian'  meet  on  a  common  ground  which  they  have 
reached  from  different  directions.  (J-97,  p.  289) 
2.2.3  The  Psychology  of  Memory 
In  Section  Two:  9.1,  where  the  manner  in  which  an  IM  reflects  on  and 
remembers  his/her  past  is  discussed,  some  work  from  the  field  of  psychology 
is  cited,  particularly  that  of  Michael  Ross,  who  carried  out  research  into 
autobiographical  memory.  The  use  of  this  material  is  not  intended  to 
constitute  an  in-depth  study  of  memory,  but  has  merely  been  cited  to 
support  the  arguments  made. 
Indeed,  all  of  the  cross-disciplinary  methodologies  or  approaches 
described  above  are  used  merely  as  tools  to  facilitate  insight  into  the 
confrontation  in  contemporary  Germany  with  the  Stasi  legacy,  in  particular 
the  case  of  the  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter.  The  interviews  and  analysis  of  MfS 
documents  should  serve  as  much  to  increase  knowledge  of  the  mechanisms 
which  supported  the  system  of  observation  and  manipulation  as  to  aid  the 
analysis  of  the  debate  surrounding  the  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter  and  its  micro 
and  macro  impact  in  the  new  Germany. 
35 2.3  THE  INTERVIEWS 
In  his  analysis  of  the  processes  which  led  the  ordinary  men  of  Reserve 
Police  Battalion  101  to  commit  the  atrocities  they  did  in  the  Second  World 
War  in  Poland,  Christopher  Browning  concluded  that,  for  the  men  of 
Battalion  101,  'normality  itself  had  become  exceedingly  abnormal'  (J-18, 
Preface  xix).  By  interviewing  the  ordinary  citizens  who  had  collaborated 
with  the  MfS,  I  hoped  to  examine  whether  the  above  statement  could  also 
be  applied  in  the  case  of  former  IM,  and  to  discover  how  they  themselves 
viewed  their  actions,  both  at  the  time  of  active  collaboration  and 
retrospectively  from  within  the  context  of  unified  Germany. 
Ten  interviews  were  carried  out  in  1994-95.  This  admittedly 
represents  a  small  number  of  respondents,  who  were  not  randomly  selected. 
They  are  therefore  to  be  considered  case  studies,  an  analysis  of  which  may, 
as  in  the  work  of  oral  historians  or  sociologists  using  a  biographical 
approach,  contribute  to  the  general  understanding  of  the  IM  phenomenon. 
In  a  discussion  of  his  work  with  Isabelle  Bertaux-Wiame  on  baker's  workers 
in  Paris,  Daniel  Bertaux  argues  that  sociological  representativity  was 
achieved  after  the  collection  of  thirty  life  histories.  After  listening  to  the 
stories  of  about  fifteen  baker's  workers  it  became  clear  that  'every  new  life 
story  was  confirming  what  the  preceding  ones  had  shown'  (J-8,  p.  187).  The 
authors  concluded  that  they  'had  moved  in  another  realm  than  the  one  of 
traditional  sample  representativity'  (J-8,  p.  187,  see  also  J-7).  Since 
'saturation'  had  taken  place,  nothing  new  was  being  learned  from  successive 
life  stories: 
A  single  life  story  stands  alone,  and  it  would  be  hazardous  to 
generalize  on  the  ground  of  that  one  alone,  as  a  second  life  story 
could  immediately  contradict  those  premature  generalizations. 
But  several  life  stories  taken  from  the  same  set  of  sociostructural 
relations  support  each  other  and  make  up,  all  together,  a  strong 
body  of  evidence.  (J-8,  p.  187) 
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Clearly  the  Bertauxs'  perspective  is  that  of  the  sociologist  comparing 
the  merits  of  qualitative  data  from  a  relatively  small  number  of 
interviewees  with  those  of  the  analysis  of  survey  responses  from  a  large 
number  of  often  anonymous  respondents  in  the  more  traditional 
quantitative  approach.  Thirty  interviews  is  also  three  times  as  many  as 
were  conducted  for  this  particular  study.  Yet,  although  the  cited  IM  cases 
are  not  statistically  representative,  they  do  represent  concrete  examples  of 
the  implementation  of  MfS  guidelines  concerning  recruitment  procedure  and 
subsequent  operations  with  IM.  Furthermore,  many  of  the  statements 
which  these  particular  IM  made  when  explaining  and  justifying  their  past 
bore  strong  similarities  to  ones  made  by  more  prominent  IM  in  the  media. 
These  legitimation  strategies  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  Section  Two: 
9.2. 
Seven  of  the  interviewees  were  men  and  three  were  women.  The 
youngest  of  the  ten  was  34  and  the  oldest  66  years  old.  Two  of  the 
interviewees  answered  a  small  contact-advertisement  which  appeared  in 
the  Junge  Welt,  formerly  the  newspaper  of  the  GDR's  youth  organisation, 
the  FDJ.  The  advertisement  appeared  on  1  October  1994  and  read  as 
follows:  'Forscherin  aus  Großbritannien  sucht  ehemalige  Inoffizielle 
Mitarbeiter  des  MfS  zwecks  Gespräch  zum  Thema  Aufarbeitung  der  Stasi- 
Vergangenheit.  Vertraulicher  Umgang  garantiert.  '  A  further  six 
interviewees  were  selected  from  the  responses  to  an  article  which  appeared 
in  the  Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  published  in  Potsdam  (1-30,  reproduced 
in  Appendix  1).  This  article  had  generated  a  total  of  twenty-three  responses, 
thirteen  from  former  IM,  and  a  further  ten  from  a  mixture  of  full-time  MfS 
employees  and  individuals  who  had  themselves  been  informed  upon.  The 
ninth  interviewee  was  Kerstin  Kaiser-Nicht  (IM  'Katrin'),  the  only  IM  in  the 
study  who  was  publicly  known.  Kaiser  had  gained  a  seat  in  the  Bundestag 
representing  the  PDS  (the  successor  party  to  the  SED)  after  the  1994 38 
elections.  Although  she  had  made  the  fact  of  her  previous  Stasi 
collaboration  public  before  the  elections,  Kaiser  was  accused  of  not  having 
been  entirely  honest  about  the  details  and  extent  of  these  contacts  and  was 
eventually  pressurised  by  her  own  party,  as  well  as  by  opposing  political 
fractions,  into  resigning  her  mandate.  I  approached  Kaiser  directly  and 
asked  if  she  would  be  prepared  to  speak  to  me.  Finally,  the  tenth  interview 
took  place  with  Berthe  Zulind  (a  pseudonym),  alias  IM  'Sonnenblume', 
whom  I  contacted  after  reading  the  account  of  her  Stasi  collaboration  in  her 
autobiography  (J-110).  By  examining  predominantly  cases  of  IM  who  were 
not  public  figures  I  hoped  that  a  more  open  dialogue  would  be  facilitated.  I 
suspected  that  those  IM  whose  cases  had  been  prominent  in  the  media 
would  be  so  practised  at  answering  certain  typical  questions  regarding  their 
IM-Tätigkeit,  that  they  would  have  built  up  a  repertoire  of  set  answers.  This 
suspicion  seemed  to  be  confirmed  when,  at  times  during  my  conversation 
with  'Katrin',  I  almost  had  the  feeling  that  I  was  listening  to  a  tape  recorded 
account  of  her  MfS  collaboration.  The  phenomenon  of  the  professional 
interviewee  is,  indeed,  one  with  which  oral  historians,  dealing,  for  example, 
with  a  limited  number  of  Holocaust  survivors,  must  contend.  An  additional 
rationale  for  seeking  dialogue  with  IM  who  were  not  prominent  public  figures 
was  that  I  would  be  able  to  promise  them  that  they  would  remain 
anonymous,  and  by  doing  so  hoped  that  they  would  be  less  inhibited  when 
relating  aspects  of  their  collaboration.  A  certain  lack  of  restraint  may  also 
have  been  encouraged  by  the  fact  that  I  was  a  foreigner,  a  complete 
outsider,  to  whom  my  interviewees  seemed  to  attribute  political  neutrality. 
Nine  interviews  took  place  in  the  homes  of  the  IM,  one  in  the  office  of 
the  person  concerned.  All  interviews  were  taped.  I  informed  my  interview 
partners  that  they  should  feel  free  to  ask  me  to  stop  recording  at  any  time 
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specific  question.  Only  one  of  my  interview  partners  did,  in  the  end,  ask  me 
not  to  record  a  few  select  details  of  his  IM-Tätigkeit. 
There  were  several  stages  to  each  interview  (interview  questionnaire 
is  reproduced  in  Appendix  2).  First  I  asked  each  interviewee  to  give  an 
autobiographical  account  of  his/her  life.  At  some  point  this  account 
necessarily  reached  the  point  where  contact  to  the  Stasi  had  begun,  and  the 
IM  generally  came  themselves  to  recounting  the  details  of  this 
collaboration.  This  second  section  of  the  interview,  during  which  the  IM 
recounted  the  details  of  his/her  IM-Tätigkeit,  was  generally  one  where  s/he 
spoke  relatively  freely.  I  interrupted  occasionally  to  clarify  details  or  if  I  felt 
that  a  particular  aspect  of  the  contact  in  which  I  was  interested  had  been 
neglected  in  the  telling.  These  first  two  sections  of  the  interview  were  not 
then  carried  out  in  a  set  question-reply  format.  In  the  third  section  of  the 
interview,  where  I  was  interested  in  discovering  how  these  former  IM 
perceived  and  judged  specific  aspects  of  the  way  in  which  the  Stasi  legacy 
was  being  confronted  in  the  public  sphere,  the  pattern  was  very  much  more 
that  of  question  and  answer.  I  did  not  listen  to  any  of  the  tape  recordings 
until  I  had  completed  all  ten  interviews.  After  I  had  listened  to  the 
conversations  and  begun  to  work  with  the  material  I  contacted  most  of  the 
IM  again  by  letter  and  asked  them  to  clarify  and  expand  on  certain  details. 
Only  after  this  point  had  been  reached  did  I  view  the  files  of  those 
concerned. 
In  order  that  they  remain  anonymous  and  for  the  sake  of  simplicity, 
all  IM  will  be  referred  to  throughout  the  study  by  their  cover  name.  In  a  few 
cases,  on  the  request  of  the  IM  concerned,  even  this  cover  name  has  been 
changed.  Quotations  have  not  in  general  been  tidied  up  or  standardised  into 
formal  German  and,  with  the  exception  of  a  very  few  omissions  of,  for 
example,  a  repeated  'you  know'  type  utterance,  appear  as  they  were 
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2.4  FURTHER  SOURCES 
2.4.1  Beyond  Autobiographical  Accounts:  The  Stasi  Files 
MfS  files  were  available  for  eight  of  the  ten  IM  interviewed.  I  was  not 
granted  access  to  the  file  of  IM  'Thaer',  the  one  FRG  citizen  with  whom  I 
spoke.  In  1993  'Thaer'  had  been  tried  on  the  charge  of  spying  for  a  foreign 
power  and  had  received  a  fine  and  probationary  sentence.  Unfortunately 
the  files  relating  to  this  case,  I  was  informed,  were  subject  to 
'Geheimschutzbestimmungen'  (B-5).  It  is  likely  that  the  work  of  the  tenth 
IM,  'Wolfgang',  had  come  under  the  auspices  of  the  foreign  espionage 
department  of  the  MfS,  the  Hauptverwaltung  Aufklärung.  The 
Hauptverwaltung  Aufklärung  was  granted  permission  in  the  immediate 
post-Wende  period  to  disband  itself,  and  much  of  the  material  relating  to 
foreign  espionage  has  consequently  disappeared  or  been  destroyed. 
The  MfS  divided  IM  files  into  two  main  sections.  In  the  Personalakte 
personal  details  of  the  IM  concerned  were  recorded,  alongside  those  of 
his/her  immediate  family.  Documentation  regarding  the  selection  and 
recruitment  of  the  IM  was  also  stored  here,  as  well  as  other  general 
information,  such  as  details  of  any  reward  s/he  had  received  for  services 
rendered.  The  second  part  of  the  file  was  termed  the  Arbeitsakte,  and  it  was 
here  that  the  actual  reports  of  the  meetings  were  filed.  Each  section  could 
have  various  volumes,  depending  on  the  length  and  intensity  of 
collaboration.  3  Information  deemed  personal  and  intimate  concerning  either 
the  IM  or  any  third  person  is,  according  to  the  StUG,  to  be  covered  when  an 
outsider  views  the  file  (StUG,  §  32). 
3  For  a  more  detailed  description  of  the  administration  of  the  IM  files,  see  J-62,  pp.  111- 
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2.4.2  IM  Richtlinien 
These  extensive  guidelines  for  the  work  with  IM,  drawn  up  in  1958,1968 
and  1979,  are  cited  throughout  the  study  (J-62).  The  recently  published 
edition  of  the  IM  Richtlinien,  edited  by  Helmut  Müller-Enbergs,  a  researcher 
in  the  Abteilung  Bildung  und  Forschung  at  the  BStU,  offers  in  addition  a 
comprehensive  summary  and  analysis  of  the  Richtlinien,  which  were 
originally  published  by  the  BStU  (F-5).  References  in  this  work  are  to  the 
Müller-Enbergs  volume,  except  where,  for  example,  additional  regulations, 
or  introductory  speeches  by  Mielke  to  the  various  seminars  on  the  work 
with  IM  are  cited.  Since  these  are  not  documented  in  full  in  the  Müller- 
Enbergs  edition,  the  original  BStU  edition  is  referenced.  The  IM  Richtlinien 
are  fundamental  to  an  understanding  of  the  theoretical  structure  of  the  IM 
system.  It  seems  to  have  been  the  case  that  certain  aspects  of  the  formal 
procedure  laid  down  in  the  guidelines  were  often  not  strictly  adhered  to.  This 
is  evident  from  a  reading  of  various  speeches  made  by  Erich  Mielke  at  MIS 
seminars  concerned  with  the  implementation  of  these  guidelines  and  from 
even  a  brief  acquaintance  with  the  IM  files  themselves,  which  are  often  not 
in  accordance  with  the  guidelines  concerning  their  administration  (see  J-64). 
In  this  study  the  guidelines  function  primarily  as  a  vital  tool  for  deciphering 
the  general  mechanisms  involved  in  the  recruitment  and  work  with  IM  and 
for  gaining  an  understanding  of  the  extent  to  which  the  facts  of  any  one  case 
deviated  from  this  theoretical  underpinning. 
2.4.3  The  Juristische  Hochschule 
The  MfS  established  its  own  educational  institute  in  Potsdam-Eiche,  which 
operated  under  the  pseudonym  Juristische  Hochschule  (JHS).  The  material 
used  in  this  study  originating  from  the  JHS  falls  into  two  categories: 
pedagogic  material  used  in  the  training  of  MfS  officers;  the  results  of 
research  undertaken  at  the  JHS.  The  pedagogic  material  can  be  regarded 42 
as  being  comparable  in  content  to  the  IM  guidelines,  that  is  as  theoretical 
statements  of  the  desired  procedure  in  the  work  with  IM.  When  applying  the 
results  of  research  undertaken  at  the  JHS  caution  must  be  exercised,  since 
it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  such  dissertations  were  carried  out  within  the 
MfS  and  will  be  at  least  tainted  with  its  ideology.  Nevertheless,  these  works 
are  still  valuable,  since  they  allow  insight  into  the  issues  of  the  IM  system 
which  were  addressed  by  the  MfS  in  its  own  research.  They  are  particularly 
interesting  when  they  demonstrate  that  certain  aspects  of  the  daily  work 
with  IM  often  did  not  follow  the  strict  form  which  was  laid  down  in  the 
guidelines. 
2.4.4  SED  Archives 
In  the  archives  of  the  SED,  the  SAPMO  (Stiftung  Archiv  der  Parteien  und 
Massenorganisationen  der  DDR),  there  is  little  material  available  which  is  of 
direct  application  in  this  study.  One  report  from  the  early  1950s  discussing 
the  finding  that  a  significant  proportion  of  individuals  who  had  recently  been 
recruited  for  the  MfS  had  subsequently  fled  to  the  FRG  is  cited  in  Section 
One:  2.5. 
2.4.5  The  Press 
Since  this  was  one  historical  discussion  with  such  an  immediate  and  wide- 
scale  impact,  much  of  the  Stasi  debate  was  carried  out  in  the  German 
press,  particularly  in  the  Feuilleton  sections.  Newspaper  articles  from 
various  daily  and  weekly  publications  have  therefore  been  drawn  on 
throughout  the  study.  Often  these  articles  contain  citings  of  the  oral 
testimonies  of  more  prominent  IM  and  of  key  political  and  cultural  figures  in 
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2.4.6  Secondary  Literature 
Despite  the  relatively  short  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  dramatic 
events  of  1989-90,  a  substantial  body  of  secondary  literature  relevant  to 
this  work  has  been  published.  Some  of  this  literature  has  been  produced 
from  an  analysis  of  MfS  documentation  and  personal  dossiers.  Sections  of 
particular  individual's  files  have  also  been  published  and  have  provided 
another  measure  of  comparison  with  the  specific  IM  files  to  which  I  was 
able  to  gain  access. 
2.5  ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION 
Material  stemming  principally  from  Section  Two:  8-10  has  been  presented 
at  the  following  conferences:  'Memory  and  the  Sense  of  Place',  annual 
meeting  of  the  Oral  History  Association,  Philadelphia,  USA,  10-13  October 
1996;  'Self  and  Other:  The  Fifth  International  Conference  on  Narrative', 
University  of  Kentucky,  Lexington,  USA,  18-20  October  1996;  The  Eighth 
Annual  WIGS  (Women  in  German  Studies)  Conference,  University  of 
Exeter,  9  November  1996;  'Biographical  Perspectives  on  Post-Socialist 
Societies',  a  meeting  organised  by  the  ESA  (European  Sociological 
Association)  and  the  Centre  for  Independent  Social  Research,  St. 
Petersburg,  Russia,  13-17  November  1996;  and  in  the  Kulturhaus  Mitte  in 
Berlin  by  invitation  of  the  Berlin-Brandenburgische  Geschichtswerkstatt,  27 
March  1997. 
Proceedings  from  at  least  one  of  these  conferences  may  be  published 
at  a  future  date,  and  in  July  1997  an  article  similar  in  content  to  Chapter 
10  will  appear  in  the  journal  German  Life  and  Letters. 44 
Introduction:  Part  Three 
DICHTUNG  ODER  WAHRHEIT?: 
ON  THE  TRUTH  CONTENT  OF  THE  STASI  FILES 45 
3.1  THE  BONFIRE 
Die  Akten  sind  ein  gefährliches  Gemisch  aus  Dichtung  und 
Wahrheit.  (Vera  Wollenberger,  J-107,  p.  162) 
Since  the  turbulent  events  of  1989  and  the  subsequent  dissolution  of  the 
MfS  there  have  been  many  appeals  for  the  destruction  of  the  MfS  files. 
Although  he  later  claimed  not  to  have  meant  it  literally,  Friedrich 
Schorlemmer  was  quoted  as  suggesting  that  a  huge  bonfire  be  made  with 
the  documents  (1-23).  Chancellor  Kohl  also  seemed  to  advocate  that  the 
files  be  disposed  of,  stating  that  they  were  an  'Ärgernis'  and  source  of  evil 
rumours  (1-63).  Such  sentiments  were  not  uncommon,  and  many, 
particularly  of  those  who  had  worked  for  the  MfS,  would  have  been  only  to 
happy  to  see  the  last  of  the  178  kilometres  of  filed  material. 
Often  it  was  those  MfS  officers  who  had  worked  on  a  daily  basis  with 
the  information  contained  in  the  files  who  maintained  that  the  documents 
were  inaccurate  and  misleading.  At  one  of  a  series  of  'Täter/Opfer' 
discussions  in  the  Museum  at  Checkpoint  Charlie  one  former  Stasi  officer 
claimed:  'Selbst  wenn  da  steht,  der  IM  "Dirk"  oder  sonst  wer  berichtete  das 
und  das,  das  muß  wirklich  so  nicht  unbedingt  stimmen.  '  (H-1)  Manfred 
Stolpe  was  of  a  similar  opinion,  arguing  that  the  files  did  not  correspond  to 
the  whole  truth,  'und  die  halbe  Wahrheit  kann  als  ganze  Lüge  wirken'  (1-42, 
p.  32).  Stolpe  proposed  that  it  was  possible  to  analyse  the  information 
contained  in  the  files  only  in  conjunction  with  the  statements  of  'Zeitzeugen' 
(1-42,  p.  32).  It  was  no  surprise  that  Stolpe  held  this  view  since,  in  the 
debate  surrounding  his  extensive  contact  to  the  MfS,  the  overwhelmingly 
positive  testimonies  of  numerous  politicians  and  theologians  from  both  East 
and  West  were  undoubtedly  a  key  factor  in  ensuring  that  his  name  was 
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Arguing  against  the  destruction  or  closure  of  the  Stasi  files,  the 
historian  Armin  Mitter  pointed  out  that  no  one  would  ever  conceive  of 
burning  chronicles  from  the  Middle  Ages  simply  because  there  was  mention 
of  divine  miracles  in  them  (I-11).  Mitter  proposed  that  the  MfS  files  be 
treated  with  the  same  distanced  objectivity  which  should  be  applied  to  any 
historical  source.  Yet  one  crucial  difference  between  the  MfS  files  and  other 
comparable  historical  legacies  is  that  the  fates  of  those  who,  for  example, 
compiled  the  documents  which  spoke  of  heavenly  intervention  have,  in 
contrast  to  those  of  the  authors  of  the  Stasi  files,  long  since  been  decided. 
The  unique  decision  to  make  the  MfS  files  immediately  accessible  has 
necessarily  resulted  in  dealings  with  their  contents  being  very  much  more 
sensitised  than  might  have  been  the  case  if  a  customary  period  of  closure 
had  been  imposed. 
3.2  FACT  OR  FICTION?:  DETAILS  AND  ESSENCE  OF 
COLLABORATION 
Joachim  Gauck  repeatedly  stresses  that  the  BStU  has  not  been  assigned 
the  task  of  making  value  judgements  on  any  material  it  releases,  and  calls 
for  a  differentiated  treatment  of  this  information  by  its  recipients  (1-73). 
The  clause  in  the  unification  treaty  regarding  the  dismissal  of  public  service 
employees  who  are  shown  to  have  held  contacts  to  the  MfS  allows  for  but 
does  not  necessitate  differentiation  (G-1).  In  the  hysteria  which,  at  least 
initially,  surrounded  the  confrontation  with  the  Stasi  legacy,  a  critical 
analysis  of  the  information  released  by  the  BStU  certainly  did  not  take 
place  in  many  cases,  leading  Ste-an  Heym  to  observe  that  the  texts  in  the 
Stasi  files  were  being  treated  'als  kämen  sie  geradewegs  aus  der  Bibel'  (J-36, 
p.  74).  Heym  was  personally  doubtful  of  the  validity  of  texts  which  had  been 
compiled  by  IM  who,  he  argued,  were  rewarded  by  the  number  and  length  of 
reports  given,  and  by  Führungsoffiziere,  whose  welfare  was  dependent  on 
the  number  of  IM  in  their  charge:  'Was  wurde  da  nicht  erlogen  und  gefälscht 47 
und  zurechtgeschneidert  nach  Wunsch  und  Bedarf!  '  (J-36,  p.  74)  It  is 
certainly  the  case,  as  Heym  suggests,  that  throughout  the  history  of  the 
MfS  IM  were  all  too  often  recruited  on  the  basis  of  quality  rather  than 
qua  L  ity,  a  fact  of  which  Mielke  was  critically  aware  (J-62,  pp.  93-96).  A 
few  cases  are  also  documented  where  Führungsoffiziere  literally  invented 
so-called  'fiktive  IM'.  These  incidents  were,  however,  few  and  far  between 
and  when  discovered  had  serious  repercussions  for  the  officer  concerned  (J- 
62,  pp.  140-41,  F-4,  p.  66).  That  it  is  simply  not  the  case  that  a  mass  of 
unwitting  individuals  was  registered  as  IM  is  confirmed  by  the  observation 
that  in  almost  every  single  case  of  someone  having  been  identified  through 
the  Stasi  files  as  having  been  an  IM,  this  person  has  sooner  or  later 
admitted  to  collaboration. 
It  is  certainly  true  that  IM  were  not  always  entirely  honest  with  their 
Führungsoffizier,  perhaps,  as  Heym  suggests,  in  order  to  please  him,  but 
also,  as  shall  be  discussed,  for  a  number  of  other  reasons.  Pedagogic 
material  from  the  Juristische  Hochschule  stipulates:  'Zur  Aufklärung  der 
Persönlichkeit  des  Kandidaten  sind  nur  zuverlässige  IM  einzusetzen'  (D-4,  I, 
192).  This  caution  suggests  that  the  MfS  was  well  aware  of  the  existence  of 
dishonest  IM  who  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  give  factually  accurate 
information.  Since  the  IM's  primary  task  was  to  provide  information  which 
was  operativ  bedeutsam,  that  is  information  which  could  be  employed  in  the 
creation  and  execution  of  measures  to  neutralise  the  enemy,  logic  would 
decree  that  such  unreliable  IM  ought  not  to  have  been  allowed  to  remain 
active. 
It  was  precisely  the  'Wahrheitsgehalt,  Vollständigkeit,  Aktualität, 
Neuigkeitswert  und  Überprüfbarkeit'  of  the  reports  received  from  IM  which 
was  of  interest  to  the  MfS  (F-3,  p.  171).  In  order  to  ensure  that  the 
information  had  these  qualities  it  was  checked  and  double-checked.  Such 
verification  was  entirely  feasible  since  IM  were  not  evenly  distributed 48 
among  the  population  but  rather,  according  to  the  Schwerpunktprinzip, 
concentrated  in  areas  of  suspected  subversive  activity.  This  working 
principle  meant  that  reports  from  any  one  IM  could  be  compared  with  those 
of  others  active  in  the  same  circles.  In  this  sense  the  MfS  increasingly,  as  a 
result  of  an  'über  die  Jahrzehnte  im  App  arat  erfolgten 
Professionalisierungsprozess',  tested  and  re-tested  the  reliability  of  its 
sources,  rather  as  a  historical  researcher  might  do  (J-22,  p.  33).  It  was  thus 
difficult  for  an  individual  IM  to  be  consistently  untruthful.  IM  'Fuchs',  for 
example,  tried  to  disguise  the  fact  that  he  was  still  in  contact  with  an  old 
friend  who  lived  in  the  FRG.  Unbeknown  to  'Fuchs',  a  second  friend,  who 
actually  functioned  as  the  link  to  the  man  in  the  West,  was  also  registered 
as  an  IM,  and  this  man  informed  his  Führungsoffizier  whenever  there  was 
communication  between  'Fuchs'  and  his  friend  in  the  West.  These  reports 
found  their  way  through  the  MfS's  internal  channels  to  'Fuchs's' 
Führungsoffizier  and  were  noted  down  (C-5a,  p.  229).  'Stephana'  was  equally 
unsuccessful  in  her  attempt  to  deceive  the  MfS.  From  the  files  it  is  clear 
that  'Stephana'  had  told  her  new  boyfriend  that  she  had  contacts  to  a 
representative  from  the  MfS  and  in  doing  so  had  broken  the  oath  taken  to 
remain  silent  about  her  collaboration.  She  was,  at  least  at  this  point, 
unaware  that  her  new  boyfriend  was  also  active  as  an  IM  and  had  reported 
the  story  to  his  Führungsoffizier,  who  had  in  turn  passed  this  information  on 
(C-6a,  pp.  102-12). 
Just  as  it  was  not  easy  to  keep  facets  of  one's  private  life  secret  from 
the  MfS,  it  was  generally  futile  to  fabricate  information  concerning  others. 
Information  which  was  judged  significant  usually  required  verification  by 
various  sources  before  it  was  acted  upon.  One  report  given  by  'Falke'  in 
June  1985  was,  for  example,  judged  as  'operativ-bedeutsam'  and  'als 
Bestätigung  der  Informationen  der  IMS  "SEE"  und  "Harald  Wenk"  zu 
werten'  (C-3b,  II,  109). 49 
This  is  not  to  say  that  every  individual  piece  of  information  which  an 
IM  gave  corresponded  to  some  sort  of  objective  reality,  rather  that  the 
general  character  of  the  collaboration  may  be  deduced  from  any  one  IM  file. 
Particular  caution  must  be  exercised  when  the  reports  of  the  meetings 
have,  as  was  often  the  case,  been  written  up  after  the  fact  by  the  officer  in 
charge.  It  is  clear  that  what  we  are  dealing  with  in  these  cases  is  not  a 
protocol  of  the  actual  meeting,  but  a  subjective  selection  and  interpretation 
of  what  was  said.  The  MfS  was  aware  of  potential  discrepancies  between 
the  content  of  the  actual  meeting  and  that  of  the  report,  and  later  guidelines 
underline  the  importance  of  obtaining  written  reports  from  IM  to  try  and 
combat  this  problem  (see  J-22,  pp.  36-37). 
The  fact  that  the  MfS  was  concerned  to  eradicate  such  flaws  in  the 
system  is  further  underlined  by  the  following  complaint  made  by  Mielke  in 
1971  concerning  the  work  with  IM: 
Selbst  Hinweise  oder  Anzeichen  auf  Unehrlichkeit, 
Unzuverlässigkeit,  Dekonspiration,  Ablehnung  der 
Zusammenarbeit  oder  andere  verdächtige  Erscheinungen  über  IM, 
die  in  einigen  Diensteinheiten  fast  10%  des  gesamten  IM-Systems 
betreffen,  wurden  nicht  zum  Anlaß  für  tiefgründige  Überprüfungen 
genommen.  (F-5,  I,  307) 
The  MfS  carried  out  routine  spot  checks  on  its  IM  and 
Führungsoffiziere,  and,  although  Mielke  seems  to  have  considered  the  degree 
of  dishonesty  high,  it  was  clearly  detected  only  in  a  small  minority  of  all 
cases.  1  Even  in  the  incidents  mentioned  by  Mielke  it  may  well  have  been 
the  case  that  the  IM  was  guilty  not  of  inventing  specific  information,  but 
rather,  as  in  the  above  examples  from  'Fuchs'  and  'Stephana',  that  s/he  had 
been  untruthful  about  details  of  his/her  personal  life.  The  argument  that  the 
average  IM  did  not  simply  fabricate  the  majority  of  the  information  given  to 
the  MfS  is  supported  by  a  comment  from  Reiner  Kunze,  who,  when 
1  For  a  description  of  these  regular  checks,  see  J-62,  pp.  137-45. 50 
describing  the,  by  all  accounts,  extraordinary  Ibrahim  Böhme,  claimed  that 
he  was  'anders  als  alle  Spitzel  in  meiner  Akte.  Er  hat  sich  eine  Welt 
geschaffen  mit  lebendigen  Menschen.  Und  die  hat  er  dann  manipuliert.  '  (J- 
49,  p.  117) 
There  is  undoubtedly  a  degree  of  inconsistency  and  inaccuracy  in  the 
files,  yet  to  propose  that  the  documents  ought  to  be  destroyed  on  these 
grounds  ignores  the  fact  that  in  the  debate  surrounding  the  IM  the 
controversial  issue  has  often  been  less  the  relative  truth  content  of  the 
reports  which  a  specific  IM  helped  compile,  but  rather  more  commonly  the 
question  of  whether  this  person  was  or  was  not  aware  that  s/he  was 
registered  as  an  IM. 
Although  a  comprehensive  representation  of  the  exact  course  of  past 
events  cannot  be  reconstructed  from  the  files,  it  is  possible  in  the  majority 
of  cases  to  assess  the  extent  and  general  nature  of  an  individual's  Stasi 
connections.  Accordingly,  Günter  Nooke  felt  that  Manfred  Stolpe's  name 
should  not  have  been  cleared  by  the  committee  investigating  the  latter's 
contacts  to  the  MIS.  Nooke  argued  that  although  no  signed  document  could 
be  found  from  which  it  was  clear  that  Stolpe  had  been  aware  that  he  was 
registered  by  the  MfS  as  IM  'Sekretär',  the  Ministerpräsident  had 
nonetheless  collaborated  to  such  an  extent  and  in  such  a  secretive  manner 
that  the  question  of  whether  he  was  aware  of  the  superficial  label  was 
irrelevant  (F-2,  I,  Part  C  (2),  13). 
The  balance  of  fact  or  fiction  in  specific  details  of  the  information  in 
the  files  is  an  issue  which  not  only  affects  dealings  with  former  IM  but  is  one 
with  which  those  who  were  under  Stasi  observation  have  been  very  much 
concerned.  The  inaccuracies  or  misconstructions  of  their  life  histories  as 
they  remember  them  did  not  weaken  the  resolve  of  the  Bürgerrechtler  to 
keep  the  files  open.  Reiner  Kunze  did,  however,  advocate  that  a  clause  be 
included  in  the  StUG  allowing  individuals  like  himself  to  have  their  files 51 
destroyed  if  they  so  wished.  Kunze  argued  that  even  a  serious  researcher 
would  be  unable  to  recognise  where  the  boundary  lay  between  fact  and 
fiction  in  the  files:  'Ich  verwahre  mich  dagegen,  daß  schon  wieder  ich 
derjenige  sein  soll,  der  nachzuweisen  hat,  daß  Lüge  Lüge  ist.  Das  habe  ich 
fast  mein  ganzes  Leben  lang  tun  müssen.  Jetzt  muß  ich  es  schon  über 
meinen  Tod  hinaus  tun.  '  (F-16,  p.  216)  A  clause  was,  in  fact,  subsequently 
included  in  the  StUG  allowing  'Betroffene'  such  as  Kunze  to  request  that 
their  files  be  destroyed  after  1  January  1997  (StUG,  §  14).  There  are 
certain  conditions  attached  to  this  clause,  one  of  which  is  that  the  files  will 
not  be  destroyed  if  the  information  they  contain  is  deemed  necessary  for  the 
political  and  historical  confrontation  with  the  past.  It  remains  to  be  seen  if 
such  prominent  former  state  dissidents  as  Kunze  will  request  and  be 
granted  the  destruction  of  the  material  relating  to  their  person. 
3.3  LEGAL  DECISIONS 
The  question  of  whether  the  relative  truth  content  of  the  information  in  the 
files  should  be  a  consideration  when  it  is  made  public  has  received  varying 
responses  in  German  courts  of  law.  Paragraph  34/2  of  the  StUG  specifies 
that  if  an  individual  considers  information  published  from  the  files  to  be 
false  then  s/he  has  the  right  to  make  a  counter  declaration,  which  must  be 
printed  alongside  any  subsequent  publications  of  the  material.  When  Reiner 
Kunze  was  taken  to  court  by  Hermann  Kant  for  having  published  extracts 
from  his  file  which  showed  Kant  in  an  unfavourable  light  and  whose  validity 
Kant  contested,  Kunze  won  the  case.  The  court  ruled  that,  in  keeping  with 
the  StUG,  it  was  Kant's  right  to  ensure  that  in  the  future  his  counter 
declaration  was  printed  with  the  material,  but  that  ultimately: 
Die  Publikation  einer  Stasi-Akte  ist  ein  wichtiger  Beitrag  zur 
zeitgeschichtlichen  Diskussion.  An  ihr  besteht  ein  erhebliches 
öffentliches  Interesse  (§  193  StGB).  Es  kann  deshalb  nicht  verlangt 
werden,  daß  vor  der  Veröffentlichung  jede  in  der  Akte  enthaltene 52 
Aussage  auf  ihre  Richtigkeit  überprüft  wird.  Die  Beweislast  für  die 
Unwahrheit  liegt  deshalb  bei  demjenigen,  der  die  Richtigkeit 
bestreitet.  (J-3,  p.  349) 
Not  all  legal  decisions  concerning  the  publication  of  information  from 
the  Stasi  files  were  based  on  the  principles  applied  in  the  above  case. 
Members  of  the  Neues  Forum  in  Halle  were  dismayed  to  find  themselves 
losing  several  court  battles  after  having  made  anonymously  donated  lists  of 
former  MfS  employees  available  for  public  viewing.  Although,  in  this  case, 
checks  by  the  BStU  seemed  to  indicate  that  the  information  was  factually 
accurate,  it  was  ruled  that  the  right  of  the  public  to  the  information  did  not 
outweigh  the  individual  rights  of  those  whose  names  appeared  on  the  lists 
(1-27,  see  Section  Two:  7.1).  In  the  Kant/Kunze  case  it  was  decided  that  the 
material  was  of  public  interest  almost  regardless  of  its  relative  truth 
content.  The  members  of  the  Neues  Forum  were  in  contrast  found  to  have 
acted  unlawfully  in  making  material  public  even  when  it  had  been  shown  to 
correspond  to  fact. 
3.4  JURISTISCHE  HOCHSCHULE  MATERIAL 
The  results  of  research  originating  from  the  Juristische  Hochschule  which 
are  cited  in  this  study  must  be  treated  with  some  degree  of  scepticism. 
These  are  scholarly  works  which  were  written  and  evaluated  within  the 
MfS,  and  as  such  are  certainly  likely  to  be  tainted  with  state  ideology.  Yet 
they  are  valuable  in  that  they  provide  useful  insight  into  the  kinds  of  issues 
which  the  MfS  considered  worthy  of  research,  and  are  particularly 
interesting  when  they  document  inconsistencies  between  the  theory  of  the 
work  with  IM  and  the  day-to-day  reality.  The  analysis  of  these 
discrepancies  by  the  MfS  demonstrates  once  again  that  some  form  of 
verification  of  methods  and  sources  was  carried  out  internally. 53 
3.5  CONCLUSIONS 
Engelmann  argues  that  the  legacy  of  MfS  files  is  of  considerable  value  in  the 
confrontation  with  the  GDR  past  for  three  principal  reasons.  First,  the  MfS, 
in  comparison  to  other  secret  services,  was  a  relatively  large  apparatus, 
whose  activities  affected  a  considerable  number  of  individuals  and  whose 
legacy,  at  178  kilometres  of  filed  material,  was  not  depleted  to  the  same 
extent  as  the  files,  for  example,  of  the  National  Socialist  regime.  Second,  the 
area  in  which  the  MfS  was  active,  as  was  the  case  for  the  other  secret 
services  in  Eastern  Europe,  was  more  extensive  than  that  of  traditional 
secret  police.  Third,  the  amount  of  written  documentation  is  unusually  high 
and  was,  furthermore,  often  compiled  according  to  precise  regulations  (J-22, 
p.  24). 
The  MfS  acquired  and  documented  vast  amounts  of  information 
which  its  Operative  Mitarbeiter  relied  upon  to  construct  operational  plans. 
Before  any  action  was  taken,  information  deemed  significant  was  generally 
confirmed  from  a  number  of  sources  whose  identities  remained  unknown  to 
one  another.  The  reports  supplied  by  the  IM  could  not  be  easily  fabricated 
as  this  might  have  been  detected,  and  if  such  incidents  had  been  all  too 
commonplace,  the  IM  network  would  have  been  unable  to  function  at  all.  A 
certain  degree  of  inaccuracy  and  ideological  influence  is  undoubtedly  to  be 
found  in  the  files,  and  Karl  Wilhelm  Fricke  emphasised  that  although  it  was 
highly  unlikely  that  information  had  been  simply  invented,  since  it  formed 
the  basis  of  MfS  operations,  the  possibility  should  not  be  eliminated  that  the 
files  were  not  sometimes  'geschönt'  (F-13,  p.  79).  Fricke  stresses  that  these 
documents  should  therefore  be  judged  only  in  'Kontext  zur  jeweiligen 
politischen  Entwicklung  und  zur  konkreten  Situation  des  Betreffenden  [...  1, 
über  den  die  Akten  angelegt  wurden'  (F-13,  p.  79).  On  the  basis  of 
arguments  such  as  these  the  consideration  of  the  relative  truth  content  of 54 
the  MfS  files,  as  is  relevant  for  this  study,  ends  with  the  conclusion  and 
caution  contained  in  the  final  report  of  the  Enquete-Kommission: 
MfS-Unterlagen  weisen  dort,  wo  sie  über  die  Beschreibung 
konkreter  Handlungen  und  Sachverhalte  hinausgehen,  zuweilen 
einen  beträchtlichen  Grad  an  Ideologisierung  auf.  Natürlich  hat 
auch  dieses  'Ideologiesyndrom'  in  den  MfS-Akten  seine  Spuren 
hinterlassen.  Soweit  man  dies  bis  zum  gegenwärtigen  Zeitpunkt 
beurteilen  kann,  bildete  die  Berichterstattung  des  MfS  ein 
Gegengewicht  zur  allgemeinen,  ideologisch  geprägten  und 
schönfärberischen  Tendenz  der  Berichterstattung  von  SED, 
Blockparteien  und  Massenorganisationen.  Schließlich  hatte  die 
Staatssicherheit  die  Aufgabe,  politisch  gefährliche  Stimmungen  in 
der  Bevölkerung  und  sicherheitsrelevante  Disfunktionen  aller  Art 
'aufzuklären'.  Es  wird  ständige  Aufgabe  der  wissenschaftlichen 
Analyse  von  MfS-Akten  sein,  zwischen  ideologischen  Aussagen  und 
'operativer'  Substanz  zu  unterscheiden  sowie  das  Verhältnis  dieser 
beiden  Elemente  zueinander  zu  bestimmen.  (F-1,  pp.  227-28) 55 
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Section  One:  Chapter  One 
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1.1  TERMINOLOGY  FOR  THE  EMPLOYMENT  OF  IM 
Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter  were  considered  instrumental  in  the  extensive 
surveillance  and  control  measures  implemented  by  the  MfS.  These 
involved  being  constantly  aware  and  informed  of  which  individuals  posed 
a  threat  to  internal  security  at  any  one  time,  in  other  words  of  'Wer  ist 
wer?  '  (F-3,  p.  286).  Operative  Personenkontrollen  (OPK)  were  often 
introduced  to  this  end.  An  OPK  had  three  main  applications:  to  confirm  or 
reject  suspicions  that  an  individual  had  acted  unlawfully;  to  identify 
individuals  who  were  negatively  disposed  towards  the  state;  to  screen 
individuals  who  held  positions  of  power  which  were  potentially  open  to 
misuse  (F-3,  p.  286).  An  OPK  sometimes  led  to  an  Operativer  Vorgang 
(OV)  being  put  into  operation,  the  next  and  more  intensive  stage  of 
surveillance.  IM  were  to  establish  or  to  exploit  already  existing  contacts  to 
individuals  who  were  being  observed  under  an  Operativer  Vorgang  and  so 
aim  to  obtain  information  which  was  operativ  bedeutsam.  The  objectives  of 
an  OV  were  stated  as  follows: 
Im  einzeln  muß  aus  ihnen  [OV]  hervorgehen: 
-  zu  welchen  Tatbestandsmerkmalen  und  zu  welchen 
Handlungen  operativ  bedeutsame  Informationen  und  Beweise 
erarbeitet  werden  sollen, 
-  welche  begünstigenden  Umstände  und  Bedingungen 
festzustellen,  zu  beweisen  und  auszuräumen  sind, 
-  was  zur  Schadenverhütung  erforderlich  ist, 
-  welche  Pläne,  Absichten  und  Maßnahmen  imperialistischer 
Geheimdienste,  anderer  feindlicher  Zentren,  Organisationen 
und  Kräfte  umfassend  aufzuklären,  zu  beweisen  und 
rechtzeitig  zu  verhindern  sind.  (F-3,  pp.  296-97) 
An  essential  part  of  any  OV  was  the  concept  of  Zersetzung,  that  is  the 
'Zersplitterung,  Lähmung,  Desorganisierung  und  Isolierung  feindlich- 
negativer  Kräfte'  (F-3,  p.  464).  Once  again,  it  was  the  IM  who  were  to  be 
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The  following  section  aims  to  profile  the  network  of  individuals  who 
were  selected  to  carry  out  the  task  documented  above;  first,  by  describing 
features  of  the  population  of  IM,  and  second,  by  introducing  the  individual 
IM  whxnI  interviewed  and  whose  cases  will  be  referred  to  throughout  this 
work. 
1.2  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  POPULATION  OF  IM 
1.2.1  Overall  Number 
In  1989  174,000  IM  were  registered  as  active.  Overall  numbers  of  IM  had 
decreased  slightly  during  the  1980s  after  rising  steadily  throughout  the 
previous  two  decades  (F-10,  p.  11).  There  was  a  fairly  high  annual 
turnover  of  IM,  estimated  as  being  on  average  approximately  10%  (F-10, 
p.  8).  In  some  district  divisions  the  figure  may  have  been  higher.  One 
division  is,  for  example,  reported  as  having  an  annual  turnover  of  18%  (D- 
4,  I,  43). 
1.2.2  Gender 
Besondere  Sorgfalt  erfordert  die  Gestaltung  der 
Zusammenarbeit  mit  weiblichen  IM.  (J-62,  p.  271) 
Females  were  not  highly  represented  in  the  IM  network.  80-90%  of  IM 
were  male,  and  it  seems  that  there  were  no  female  Führungsoffiziere  at  all 
(1-33).  Of  newly  recruited  IM  in  the  area  of  Rostock  in  1989,  for  example, 
only  10%  were  female  (F-10,  p.  13).  It  is  not  clear  why  the  percentage  of 
women  informers  should  have  been  so  low  or  why  'particular  care'  was  to 
be  taken  in  dealings  with  them.  There  seems  to  be  no  evidence  that 
women  made  less  competent  IM  than  men.  The  low  percentage  of  female 
IM  may  simply  reflect  the  patriarchal  structures  of  the  SED  and  MfS. 
Perhaps  there  was  also  concern  that  Führungsoffiziere  might  become 59 
intimately  involved  with  their  female  IM  and  so  run  the  risk  of  betraying 
confidential  information.  Mielke,  at  least,  seemed  to  be  in  favour  of 
increasing  the  number  of  female  IM  working  for  him.  Women,  he  felt,  had 
shown  themselves  to  be  capable  of  the  task  at  hand  and  he  stated 
explicitly  that  more  females  should  be  recruited,  particularly  as  IMV  (F-5, 
I,  288).  IMV,  who  were  later  referred  to  as  IMB,  were  defined  as  IM  'die 
unmittelbar  an  der  Bearbeitung  und  Entlarvung  im  Verdacht  der 
Feindtätigkeit  stehender  Personen  mitarbeiten'  (J-62,  p.  258).  It  is 
possible  that  Mielke  considered  women  to  be  particularly  suited  as  IMV 
since  they  could  potentially  form  intimate  relationships  with  'im  Verdacht 
der  Feindtätigkeit  stehender  Personen'.  These  bonds  could  be  fruitful  for 
extracting  information,  or  their  very  existence  could  potentially  be  used  to 
blackmail  the  man  involved,  if,  for  example,  he  were  married.  Indeed, 
earlier  guidelines  suggest  that  'junge,  gut  aussehende  weibliche 
inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter,  mit  guten  Umgangsformen  und  guter 
Auffassungsgabe,  die  auf  Grund  ihrer  beruflichen  Stellung  in  der  Lage 
sind,  schnell  bei  bestimmten  Personenkreisen  Anschluß  zu  finden'  should 
be  recrui-ted  as  GME  (Geheimer  Mitarbeiter  im  besonderen  Einsatz)  (J-62, 
p.  203). 
1.2.3  Social  Grouping 
IM  were  not  distributed  evenly  among  the  population  but  were  recruited 
according  to  a  Schwerpunktprinzip,  defined  as  follows: 
Schwerpunktprinzip  -  wichtiges  Grundprinzip  der  politisch- 
operativen  Arbeit  und  deren  Leitung  zur  Gewährleistung  einer 
zielstrebigen  vorbeugenden  Verhinderung  Aufdeckung  und 
Bekämpfung  aller  subversiven  Angriffe  des  Feindes  durch 
Konzentration  der  operativen  Kräfte  und  Mittel  einschließlich  der 
verfügbaren  Arbeitszeit,  der  vorhandenen  technischen  und 
finanziellen  Mittel  auf  die  entscheidenden  politisch-operativen 
Aufgabenstellungen  bzw.  auf  die  vorbeugend  zu  sichernden 
entscheidenden  Objekte,  Bereiche,  Territorien,  Personenkreise  und 
Personen.  (F-3,  pp.  374-75) 60 
The  three  main  areas  where  IM  were  active  were  in  groups  affiliated  with 
the  church,  with  cultural  activities,  or  with  the  opposition.  The  ratio  of  IM 
to  non-IM  could  be  fairly  high  in  such  groups,  but  in  line  with  the 
principle  that  jeder  nur  das  weiß,  was  er  für  die  Erfüllung  seiner 
Aufgaben  benötigt',  these  IM  were  generally  unaware  of  each  other's 
identity  and  were  perhaps  not  even  aware  that  other  IM  were  active  in 
their  immediate  environment  (F-3,  p.  129).  Informers  were  thus  often 
reporting  on  one  another  as  much  as  on  those  individuals  being  observed 
in  an  OPK  or  OV.  The  sheer  density  of  IM  occasionally  made  it  difficult  for 
a  Führungsoffizier  to  ensure  that  his  IM  did  not  become  aware  of  one 
another's  identity.  On  one  occasion,  when  the  writer  Rainer  Schedlinski 
was  meeting  with  his  Führungsoffizier  in  a  car  park,  he  suddenly  caught 
sight  of  Sascha  Anderson  coming  towards  him  and  quickly  took  cover. 
Unbeknown  to  Schedlinski,  Anderson  was  also  active  as  an  IM  and  was 
working  with  the  same  Führungsoffizier.  It  later  transpired  that  Anderson 
had  spotted  Schedlinski  and  realised  that  he  must  also  be  collaborating. 
When  Anderson  reported  this  incident  to  his  Führungsoffizier,  the  latter 
confirmed  that  this  was  the  case,  but  asked  Anderson  to  keep  Schedlinski 
in  the  dark  about  the  matter  (J-2,  pp.  248-49). 
Since  the  most  successful  IM  was  clearly  going  to  be  someone  who 
had  contacts  to  the  enemy,  it  was  more  practical  for  the  MfS  to  recruit 
from  within  opposition  circles  rather  than  to  try  and  infiltrate  them.  This 
led  to  the  paradoxical  situation  that  many  IM  were  reporting  on  the 
activities  of  opposition  groups  which  they  simultaneously  worked  with. 
The  policy  of  the  MfS  towards  these  IM  was  at  times  somewhat  illogical 
and  ambivalent.  'Stephana',  for  example,  was  requested  on  several 
occasions  to  break  off  the  contact  she  had  to  a  man  who  had  applied  to 
leave  the  GDR.  She  was  warned  that  such  contacts  were  undesirable  and 61 
that  if  she  continued  to  pay  no  heed  to  these  cautions  she  could  not  expect 
the  support  of  the  MfS  if  she  were  to  get  into  difficulties  (C-6b,  I,  266,325, 
390).  Since  'Stephana'  was  reporting  on  the  activities  of  a  man  who,  as 
someone  who  had  expressed  the  wish  to  leave  the  GDR,  was  under 
surveillance,  it  seems  rather  odd  to  suggest  to  her  that  contact  with  such 
an  individual  was  to  be  avoided.  Perhaps,  in  cases  such  as  these,  logic 
decreed  that  the  IM  have  contact  to  the  enemy,  but  ideology  confounded 
this  logic,  causing  Führungsoffiziere  to  become  uneasy  when  the  bond 
between  the  IM  and  the  individual  under  observation  appeared  to  be  one 
of  genuine  friendship.  This  contradiction  between  MfS  policy  and  practice 
is  evident  throughout  the  life  span  of  the  organisation.  Guidelines  from 
1952  concerning  'die  Suche,  Anwerbung  und  Arbeit  mit  Informatoren, 
geheimen  Mitarbeitern  und  Personen,  die  konspirative  Wohnungen 
unterhalten'  emphasise  that  in  order  to  most  effectively  combat  KgU 
(Kampfgruppen  gegen  Unmenschlichkeit)  it  is  necessary  to  recruit 
individuals  who  will  win  the  trust  of  such  groups  most  easily:  'Dies  sind 
ehemalige  Faschisten,  aktive  Offiziere  und  Unteroffiziere  der 
faschistischen  Armee,  Angehörige  bereits  verhafteter  Agenten,  kriminelle 
und  korrupte  Personen,  moralisch  verkommene  Jugendliche,  sogenannte 
politische  Flüchtlinge  usw.  '  (J-62,  p.  166)  This  extract  from  the  Richtlinie 
21  is  in  line  with  the  Schwerpunktprinzip,  which  stipulated  that  IM  were 
to  be  recruited  from  within  the  ranks  of  subversive  groups.  Yet  the 
guidelines  from  1958  state  that  recruitment  on  the  basis  of  political 
conviction  was  to  be  the  most  important  and  frequently  employed  method 
(J-62,  p.  212).  The  Schwerpunktprinzip  and  the  stipulation  that  political 
conviction  should  be  the  principal  motive  for  recruitment  seem  inherently 
contradictory,  but  are  not  in  fact  if  one  considers  that  the  MfS,  believing 
in  its  own  ideology,  hoped  to  be  able  to  convince  'korrupt'  and  'verkommen' 
individuals  of  the  political  necessity  of  co-operation  (J-62,  p.  166). 62 
As  well  as  belonging  to  specific  social  circles  IM  were  in  theory  also 
expected  to  have  reached  a  certain  level  of  education.  This  was  not  always 
realised  in  practice.  In  1971  Mielke  complained  that  not  only  was  the 
average  age  of  an  IM  too  high,  but:  'Die  Qualifikation  der  IM  entspricht 
ebenfalls  nicht  mehr  ausreichend  den  heutigen  und  künftigen  politisch- 
operativen  Aufgaben.  Abgesehen  von  der  operativen  Erziehung  und 
Schulung  haben  besonders  in  den  Kreisdienststellen  die  Mehrzahl  der  IM 
keine  Fach-  bzw.  Hochschulausbildung.  '  (F-5,  I,  289) 
1.2.4  Political  Affiliation 
The  1968  IM  guidelines  explicitly  stipulate  that  SED  members  were  only 
to  be  recruited  as  IM  in  exceptional  cases  (J-62,  p.  261).  The 
argumentation  behind  this  ruling  was  that  Party  members  were  already 
committed  to  actively  supporting  the  state.  Before  recruiting  such  an 
individual  as  an  IM  it  was  therefore  to  be  considered  whether  it  would  not 
suffice  to  give  this  person  the  status  of  a  Ge4'lschaftlicher  Mitarbeiter  für 
Sicherheit,  to  whom  contact  was  less  formalised  and  less  secretive  (J-62,  p. 
261).  All  too  often,  as  far  as  Mielke  was  concerned,  Führungsoffiziere 
ignored  this  ruling  and  swelled  the  ranks  of  the  IM  network  with  SED 
members,  who  tended  to  be  relatively  easy  to  recruit.  Mielke  complained 
that  in  many  regional  divisions  as  many  as  one  in  three  new  IM  were 
Party  members  (F-5,  II,  440).  An  MfS  study  by  Seidler  and  Schmidt  from 
1968  puts  the  figure  even  higher,  at  40.7%.  (D-6,  I,  7).  Although,  as 
discussed,  it  cannot  be  considered  to  be  a  representative  sample,  it  is 
interesting  that  five  of  the  ten  IM  with  whom  I  carried  out  interviews  had 
been  SED  members.  Furthermore,  a  higher  proportion,  at  least  seven, 
reported  being,  at  least  at  the  time  of  interview,  PDS  voters. 63 
1.3  SELECTING  A  CANDIDATE:  THE  ANFORDERUNGSBILD 
1.3.1  Definition 
Individuals  were  only  to  be  selected  for  recruitment  as  IM  when  they 
could  satisfy  an  already  existing  need.  This  need  was  expressed  in  an 
Anforderungsbild.  An  Anforderungsbild  profiled  a  particular  need,  and 
identified,  in  terms  of  experience,  ability  and  personality  characteristics, 
the  type  of  person  who  might  be  suitable  for  this  specified  task  (J-62,  p. 
341). 
1.3.2  The  Task 
In  reality,  many  IM  were  recruited  because  it  proved  relatively  easy  to  do 
so  rather  than  because  there  was  a  specific  task  at  hand  for  them  to  carry 
out.  It  seems  also  to  have  been  the  case  that  some  Anforderungsbilder 
were  constructed  with  a  particular  person  in  mind,  rather  than  that  this 
person  was  recruited  to  fit  a  pre-existing  need.  Mielke  was  critical  of  such 
shoddy  practice,  complaining:  'Es  kann  nicht  ein  beliebiger  IM  geworben 
und  nachträglich  geprüft  werden,  für  welche  Aufgabe  er  einsetzbar  ist.  ' 
(F-5,  II)  581)  In  the  following  three  examples  from  my  own  interviews 
there  does,  however,  seem  to  have  been  a  existing  need,  as  defined  by  an 
Anforderungsbild.  IM  'Sonnenblume'  was  recruited  because  of  her 
suspected  involvement  with  a  Kriminelle  Menschenhändlerbande,  the  MfS 
definition  for  a  group  of  individuals  involved  in  trying  to  help  people 
escape  the  GDR  (C-8a,  p.  65).  In  'Stephana's'  case,  the  MfS  was  interested 
in  recruiting  someone  who  had  contacts  to  various  religious  groups,  an 
Anforderungsbild  which  'Stephana'  fitted  perfectly  (C-6a,  p.  14).  The  third 
example  is  the  case  of  'Fuchs',  who  was  recruited  as  a  Führungs-IM  (FIM) 
in  order  that  he  could  build  up  a  network  of  IM  among  the  inmates  of  the 
prison  where  he  worked  (C-5a,  p.  80). 64 
1.3.3  The  Personality 
Theoretically  IM  were  to  have  a  considerable  number  of  interpersonal 
skills  in  order  to  successfully  carry  out  the  task  at  hand.  One  study  from 
the  Juristische  Hochschule  names,  among  others,  the  following  desired 
qualities  for  all  IM: 
Das  Einschätzungsvermögen 
Die  Fähigkeit,  politisch-ideologische  Inhalte  und  Wirkungen 
von  Ereignissen  differenziert  zu  erfassen 
Die  Menschenkenntnis  und  Fähigkeit,  menschliches 
Verhalten  zu  analysieren 
Die  Fähigkeit  zur  Anbahnung  und  Aufrechterhaltung 
vertrauensvoller  Beziehungen 
Die  Beobachtungsfähigkeit  zur  planmäßigen,  konzentrierten, 
langdauernden  oder  auch  sehr  kurzfristigen  Wahrnehmung 
von  interessanten  Gegebenheiten  und  Personen  sowie  die 
Fähigkeit  zum  möglichst  schnellen  und  genauen  Speichern 
und  Reproduzieren  des  Beobachteten 
Die  Fähigkeit,  erhöhte  Beanspruchungen  und  Belastungen  zu 
ertragen,  mit  individuellen  Bedenken  und  Skrupeln  fertig  zu 
werden.  (D-4,  I,  140-46) 
Finding  candidates  who  fulfilled  all  the  above  requirements  cannot  have 
been  easy,  and  the  authors  of  the  study  do  concede  that  it  is  not  to  be 
expected  that  an  IM  possess  all  these  qualities  at  the  time  of  recruitment. 
Some  of  them  were  to  be  developed  in  the  course  of  the  work  with  the  MfS 
(D-4,  I)  148). 
It  tended  to  be  the  positive  characteristics  of  the  IM-Kandidat 
which  were  emphasised  in  the  documentation  relating  to  recruitment. 
'Fuchs',  for  example,  was  considered  a  suitable  candidate  because  of  his 
ability  to  understand  people  and  to  make  accurate  observations  (C-5a,  p. 
76).  He  was  also  noted  as  being  dedicated  to  his  work:  'Hervorzuheben  ist 
sein  Bemühen,  bestmögliche  Methoden  in  der  Erziehungsarbeit  unter  den 
Bedingungen  des  Strafvollzuges  zu  finden  und  zu  nutzen.  '  (C-5a,  p.  76) 
'Stephana'  was  likewise  thought  to  be  particularly  suited  for  the  task  as  a 
result  of  the  fact  that  she  was  'kontaktfreudig',  'zielstrebig',  and 65 
'gewissenhaft'  (C-6a,  p.  34).  It  is  somewhat  ironic  that  in  order  to  carry  out 
this  most  deceitful  of  tasks,  the  MfS  wished  their  candidates  to  have  such 
virtuous  qualities,  including,  indeed,  an  'ausgeprägtes 
Gerechtigkeitsempfinden'  (J-62,  p.  266).  Accordingly,  when  'Katrin'  is 
selected  as  an  IM-Kandidat,  among  other  things  because  she  is  a  high 
achiever  and  popular  member  of  her  class,  one  of  the  entries  under  the 
heading  'Anforderung  an  die  Kandidatin'  is  'Ehrlichkeit  und 
Zuverlässigkeit'  (C-7a,  p.  11). 
Although  there  are  certain  general  characteristics  which  can  be 
applied  to  the  population  of  IM,  it  is  clear  that  the  MfS  was  successful  in 
recruiting  a  wide  range  of  personalities  to  work  as  informers.  By  briefly 
introducing  the  ten  case  studies  which  will  be  referred  to  throughout  this 
work  the  next  section  aims  to  give  an  insight  into  the  diversity  of 
character  types  to  be  found  within  the  IM  network.  On  some  occasions 
certain  biographical  details  have  been  changed  in  order  that  the  person 
concerned  remain  anonymous. 
1.4  INTRODUCTION  OF  CASE  STUDIES 
1.4.1  'Rolf  (A-1,  B-1,  C-1a,  b) 
'Rolf  was  born  in  1952  in  a  small  town  in  Saxony.  After  leaving  school  he 
studied  agriculture  and  worked  in  various  jobs  for  several  years  before 
returning  in  1979  to  his  hometown  to  take  up  a  post  in  the  museum  there, 
which  he  held  until  1991.  During  this  time  he  completed  a  degree  in 
biology  by  distance  learning. 
As  a  young  man  'Rolf  was  somewhat  negatively  disposed  towards 
the  state.  He  had  the  impression  that  all  his  mail  at  the  boarding  school 
he  attended  was  being  checked,  and  this  bothered  him  intensely.  As  he 
grew  older  his  attitudes  began  to  change.  Although  he  was  not  a  member 
of  the  SED,  'Rolf  increasingly  felt  that  he  should  support  the  state  he 66 
lived  in.  He  was  a  keen  supporter  of  environmental  issues  and  one  of  the 
reasons  why  he  came  to  the  Stasi's  attention  was  because  of  the  contacts 
he  held  to  environmentalists  in  the  West. 
When  I  visited  him,  'Rolf  was  obviously  nervous,  yet  eager  to  talk. 
His  wife  sat  in  on  most  of  our  conversation,  and  his  18  year-old  son,  his 
only  child,  came  and  listened  quietly  for  a  short  time.  'Rolf  seemed  a  shy 
man,  somewhat  naive,  but  someone  who  was  making  an  apparently 
genuine  attempt  to  face  up  to  his  past.  This  was  reflected,  among  other 
things,  in  the  open  family  atmosphere  regarding  his  Stasi  connections  and 
in  the  fact  that  he  was  the  only  IM  with  whom  I  spoke  who  would  have 
been  prepared  to  have  been  referred  to  by  his  real  name  in  this  study. 
In  1993  'Rolf  made  his  Stasi  connections  publicly  known  to  the  local 
council  with  which  he  was  involved.  He  had  hoped  that  such  a  revelation 
would  lead  to  an  enlightened  debate  in  this  forum  and  was  disappointed 
when  it  did  not.  Yet  he  felt  personally  unable  to  take  the  initiative  and 
begin  such  a  discussion.  The  news  of  his  IM-Tätigkeit  appeared  in  the 
local  press  shortly  afterwards.  He  was  astounded  to  discover  that  the  only 
person  to  broach  the  topic  with  him  was  an  old  school  friend  who  was 
visiting  the  town  at  the  time.  At  work,  none  of  his  wife's  colleagues 
discussed  the  matter  with  her  either.  Although  surprised  and 
disappointed  by  this  public  reaction,  'Rolf  feels  relieved  that  he  has 
overcome  the  hurdle  of  making  his  IM-Tätigkeit  public  and  feels  that  the 
matter  is  now  in  some  ways  settled. 
During  the  IM-Tätigkeit  itself  'Rolf  found  that  he  could  not 
overcome  his  scruples  about  reporting  on  an  acquaintance  of  his,  Michael 
Beleites.  'Rolf  approached  Beleites  and  confessed  his  Stasi  connections, 
whereupon  Beleites  asked  if  'Rolf  would  be  prepared  to  try  and  help  him. 
Beleites  hoped  that  if  he  and  'Rolf  met  secretly  and  jointly  compiled 
reports  in  which  Beleites  was  presented  as  someone  who  did  not  pose  a 67 
threat  to  internal  security,  the  MfS  might  relax  the  ban  from  travelling 
outside  the  GDR  which  had  been  imposed  upon  him.  In  the  book  Beleites 
later  wrote  documenting  his  observation  by  the  Stasi,  a  short  account 
appears  by  'Rolf  describing  his  IM-Tätigkeit  (J-6,  pp.  196-98).  Beleites 
praises  'Rolf  in  the  book  for  his  willingness  to  endanger  himself  by 
agreeing  with  his  plan:  'Mit  dem  Versuch,  mir  auf  diese  Weise  zu  helfen, 
hat  er  wesentlich  mehr  Mut  und  Charakter  bewiesen,  als  die  vielen 
"Unbelasteten",  die  keine  Kontakte  zur  Stasi  hatten.  '  (J-6,  p.  193) 
When  I  last  heard  from  'Rolf  he  was  working  on  a  freelance  basis  at 
his  hometown  museum  again  and  considering  applying  for  a  new  job  as 
the  head  of  a  recently  opened  nature  park.  He  was  aware  of  the  fact  that 
his  IM-Tätigkeit  might  hinder  his  chances  of  getting  this  job,  but  felt  that 
the  Stasi  hysteria  had  subsided  to  the  extent  that  his  case  would  be 
viewed  objectively  (B-1). 
1.4.2  'Theodor'  (A-2,  B-2,3,  C-2a,  b) 
On  the  phone  'Theodor'  seemed  rather  confused  and  nervous,  so  it  was 
quite  a  shock  to  meet  the  composed,  polite,  and  articulate  man  behind  the 
voice.  During  our  conversation  he  periodically  became  excited  and 
animated,  but  remained  ultimately  in  control  of  the  situation,  never,  it 
seemed,  giving  away  more  than  he  intended  to. 
'Theodor'  expanded  on  his  family  background  in  great  detail.  His 
father  had  been  an  officer  in  the  First  and  Second  World  Wars  and  had 
worked  as  a  banker  in  the  Weimar  Republic.  The  end  of  World  War  II  had 
signalled  the  second  great  defeat  in  the  life  of  Theodor's'  father.  Once 
again  the  system  he  had  actively  supported  had  crumbled  and  been  shown 
to  be  corrupt.  Comparing  his  own  situation  today,  'Theodor'  felt  that  he 
could  now  empathise  with  his  father. 68 
Born  in  the  1930s,  'Theodor'  says  that  as  a  young  boy  he  was  deeply 
shocked  by  and  ashamed  of  Germany's  war  crimes,  and  so  embraced  life  in 
the  GDR  as  a  true  alternative  to  fascism.  He  describes  himself  as 
'überdurchschnittlich  autoritätsgläubig'  and  joined  the  army  after  leaving 
school  (A-2).  He  claims  to  have  initially  loathed  military  life,  but,  since  he 
had  committed  himself  to  ten  years  service,  would  have  been  unable  to 
stand  the  humiliation  of  leaving  before  this  time.  When  he  became  a 
communications  officer,  life  improved  immensely  for  'Theodor'.  He  was 
often  working  with  highly  motivated  trainees,  and  he  found  the  research 
projects  he  was  involved  in  stimulating.  It  was  during  this  period  that  he 
was  active  as  an  IM,  from  1975  until  1985.  Interestingly,  he  writes  in  his 
first  letter  to  me  that  his  IM-Tätigkeit  had  spanned  the  period  from 
approximately  1972  until  1986  (B-2).  Since  there  would  be  no  advantage 
to  his  claiming  that  he  was  active  as  an  IM  for  longer  than  was  actually 
the  case,  it  would  seem  that  this  mistake  on  his  part  is  evidence  that 
individuals  do  have  trouble  remembering  the  exact  details  of  their  contact 
with  the  MfS,  if  not  its  general  nature  (see  Section  Two:  9.1). 
'Theodor'  retired  from  his  job  in  the  wake  of  unification  out  of  the 
fear  that  if  he  did  not  do  so  his  Stasi  connections  would  become  public  and 
he  would  be  dismissed.  He  now  lives  with  his  family  in  Brandenburg. 
1.4.3  'Falke'  (A-3,  B-4,  C-3a,  b) 
'Falke',  who  was  born  in  the  late  1940s,  describes  his  biography  as  having 
been  'ganz  normal'  (A-3).  His  mother  was  a  housewife,  his  father  a 
bricklayer.  Since  he  did  well  at  school,  he  was  able  to  complete  his  Abitur 
and  says  that  he  was  the  only  child  from  a  working-class  background  in 
his  class.  After  three  years  in  the  army  he  joined  the  police  force  and,  in 
1971,  began  work  with  the  criminal  investigation  department.  During  this 69 
time  he  undertook  further  studies  and  feels  that  he  had  a  lot  of  success  in 
his  work. 
'Falke'  related  the  details  of  his  biography  at  the  same  high  speed 
and  with  the  same  apparent  brusque  detachment  with  which  he  carried 
out  the  whole  interview.  In  many  ways  he  incorporated  all  the 
characteristics  of  the  archetypal  remorseless  IM,  unprepared  to  admit  to 
any  feelings  of  guilt  whatsoever  and  tending  rather  to  wallow  in  self-pity 
about  his  present  situation.  Previously  a  man  with  an  important  job,  he 
had  been  dismissed  from  his  post  as  a  senior  criminal  investigator  in  1993 
when  screening  revealed  that  he  had  been  active  as  an  IM  from  1977  until 
1989.  'Falke'  had  denied  having  been  an  IM  when  asked  on  the  mandatory 
questionnaire  concerning  previous  MfS  connections  which  all  public 
service  employees  from  the  GDR  were  required  to  complete.  He  is  now 
rather  a  sad  figure,  taking  his  dog  for  a  walk  in  his  track  suit,  too  old  to 
begin  again  and  too  young  to  be  content  in  this  unexpected  early 
retirement. 
1.4.4  'Reiner'  (A-4,  C-4a,  b) 
When  I  ask  'Reiner'  at  the  beginning  of  our  conversation  to  relate 
something  about  his  biography,  he  takes  some  time  before  getting  around 
to  answering  the  question,  first  and  foremost  emphasising  his  lack  of  guilt 
and  his  belief  that  'das  Leben'  has  determined  his  biography  (A-4).  Indeed, 
it  was  difficult  to  get  'Reiner'  to  talk  at  length  about  his  IM-Tätigkeit  at 
any  point  in  our  conversation.  He  seemed  to  want  to  dwell  on  anything 
else  but  his  Stasi  connections.  I  felt  that  if  I  had  never  really  insistently 
questioned  him  about  this  aspect  of  his  life  he  would  not  have  noticed  or 
minded.  He  requested  that  we  take  a  break  from  recording  on  several 
occasions  and  seemed  to  find  having  me  in  the  house  quite  exciting.  He 
told  me  about  a  previous  holiday,  about  his  weekend  cottage  and  the 70 
squirrel  he  often  feeds  there,  but  very  little  about  the  Stasi.  He  often  did 
not  answer  the  question  I  had  asked,  but  drifted  off  onto  another  issue.  I 
left  the  interview  not  knowing  that  'Reiner'  had  in  fact  been  a 
Hauptamtlicher  Führungs-IM  (HFIM),  as  I  later  discovered  from  the  files. 
Throughout  the  interview  'Reiner'  became,  however,  increasingly  direct 
and  to  the  point  when  questioned  on  specific  matters  concerning  the 
public  confrontation  with  the  Stasi  legacy.  He  had  very  firm  opinions 
about  the  way  things  should  have  been  in  the  GDR  and  was  bitter  about 
much  of  what  has  happened  since  unification,  feeling  that  the  people  from 
the  East  are  being  as  badly  treated  now  as  they  were  under  Honecker. 
'Reiner'  was  born  in  1931  in  Pomerania.  When  he  was  one  year  old 
he  was  entrusted  to  the  care  of  foster  parents  with  whom  he  spent  a  happy 
childhood.  At  the  end  of  the  war  his  family  was  forced  to  flee  his 
hometown,  and  they  moved  to  Magdeburg,  where  'Reiner'  trained  as  a 
mechanic  after  leaving  school.  His  adoptive  parents  had  been  relatively 
old  when  they  took  him  in,  and  both  died  shortly  after  the  end  of  the  war. 
Around  this  time  there  were  many  advertisements  for  careers  in  the  police 
force  and  'Reiner'  decided  to  join  up  since  he  had  no  family  or  other 
commitments.  He  began  work  with  the  Volkspolizei,  and  was  transferred 
to  Berlin,  where  he  worked  as  a  motorbike  policeman.  He  later  returned  to 
Magdeburg  after  getting  married  to  a  local  woman.  Back  home,  he 
initially  worked  with  the  fire  brigade  and,  in  1955,  joined  the 
Kriminalpolizei,  with  whom  he  remained  employed  until  the  early  1970s. 
By  this  time  'Reiner'  had  become  disillusioned  with  the  work  atmosphere 
and  had  been  trying  to  break  his  contract  for  some  time.  In  a  lengthy 
declaration  as  to  the  reasons  why  he  wanted  to  terminate  his  employment 
he  wrote: 71 
Im  VPKA  [Volkspolizeikreisamt]  [X]  herrscht  eine  unpersönliche 
Arbeitsatmosphäre,  keine  kämpferische  Atmosphäre,  wie  sie  zur 
Erfüllung  der  gestellten  Aufgaben  notwendig  wäre.  Die  Ursachen, 
daß  es  einen  solchen  Zustand  in  unserem  \TPKA  gibt,  sehe  ich 
darin,  daß  sich  die  Kritik  und  Selbstkritik  in  den  60er  Jahren  nach 
und  nach  zurückentwickelt  hat.  (C-4a,  I,  120) 
One  of  the  reasons  why  the  MfS  was  interested  in  recruiting  'Reiner'  was, 
indeed,  precisely  because  of  the  critical  stance  which  he  took.  The 
advantageous  circumstance  that  he  wished  to  leave  his  job  was  exploited 
to  recruit  'Reiner'  as  a  HFIM.  He  continued  to  work  in  this  capacity  until  a 
series  of  health  complaints  compelled  him  to  retire  from  this  full-time 
status  in  the  1980s.  'Reiner'  continued  contact  to  the  MfS  as  an  IM  until 
1989. 
1.4.5  Thaer'  (A-5,  B-5) 
Thaer'  was  the  only  IM  from  the  FRG  to  whom  I  spoke.  In  1992  he  had 
been  tried  for  foreign  espionage  and  given  a  two-year  probationary 
sentence  and  a  fine.  As  mentioned  previously,  I  was  unable  to  gain  access 
to  any  MfS  documentation  relating  to  Thaer',  either  from  the  BStU  or 
from  court  records  (see  Introduction:  2.4.1).  I  had  the  feeling  that  the 
details  of  Thaer's'  IM-Tätigkeit  were  considerably  more  complex  than  he 
was  prepared  to  reveal.  Since  I  had  only  his  word  to  go  on,  there  was, 
however,  no  way  of  knowing  how  much  he  chose  to  leave  out  or  gloss  over 
in  his  account. 
Thaer'  was  born  in  the  late  1940s  in  a  small  town  near  Hamburg. 
The  family  later  moved  to  Bavaria  and  then,  in  1963,  to  Berlin.  Here 
Thaer'  took  up  his  studies  in  agriculture.  He  had  originally  toyed  with  the 
idea  of  a  career  in  development  work  in  the  Third  World,  but  by  the  time 72 
he  had  graduated  the  job  prospects  for  such  work  no  longer  looked  so  rosy. 
He  began  to  work  for  an  organisation  called  the  Bauernverband.  It  was 
during  this  time  that  'Thaer's'  contacts  to  the  MfS  began.  These  contacts 
were  maintained  even  after  he  changed  jobs,  and  he  was  still  active  as  an 
IM  in  1989. 
Today  'Thaer'  lives  in  Brandenburg  and  has  set  up  his  own 
business. 
1.4.6  'Fuchs'  (A-6,  B-6,7,  C-5a,  b) 
At  the  beginning  of  our  conversation  I  told  'Fuchs'  that  if  he  felt 
uncomfortable  about  a  specific  question  then  he  should  feel  free  to  decline 
answering  it,  or  request  that  I  switch  the  tape-recorder  off.  'Fuchs' 
assured  me  that  this  would  not  be  necessary:  'Ich  habe  überhaupt  keine 
Probleme.  Sie  können  fragen,  was  Sie  wollen.  '  (A-6)  Despite  these  bold 
words  'Fuchs'  often  answered  questions  vaguely  and  frequently  seemed  to 
be  avoiding  delicate  issues. 
'Fuchs'  was  born  in  the  late  1930s.  His  father  was  not  initially 
called  up  for  service  but  was  latterly  ordered  to  join  the  Volkssturm  while 
trying  to  flee  West  with  his  family.  His  wife  and  two  sons  never  heard 
from  him  again  and  presume  that  he  died  in  a  Soviet  camp.  'Fuchs's' 
mother  continued  the  journey  West  with  the  children.  Chaos  reigned  at 
this  time,  and  'Fuchs'  says  that  he  remembers  these  traumatic  events 
vividly,  even  although  he  was  still  so  young,  saying  that  these  days  are 
'manchmal  wie  gestern'  (A-6).  The  family  was  unable  to  carry  on  and 
began  to  return  in  the  direction  they  had  come.  At  first  they  found  work 
on  an  estate  in  what  is  now  Poland.  They  later  left  again  and  ended  up  in 
Soviet-occupied  Germany,  where  'Fuchs'  was  enrolled  in  a  school.  By  this 
time  he  had  missed  a  considerable  amount  of  education  and  was  the  oldest 
in  his  class.  He  often  organised  activities  with  the  younger  pupils,  and  did 73 
this  with  such  enthusiasm  and  ability  that  he  was  encouraged  to  go  on  to 
teacher  training  college,  which  in  fact  he  did.  One  day  at  college  he  caught 
sight  of  an  announcement  targeting  young  people  from  the  East  who 
might  be  interested  in  taking  part  in  an  exchange  programme  with 
students  in  Yugoslavia.  'Fuchs'  and  two  friends  followed  up  the 
advertisement  and  began  to  meet  regularly  with  a  woman  in  an  office  in 
West  Berlin.  They  were  asked  about  aspects  of  their  educational  training 
and  were  often  given  some  money  at  the  end  of  the  meeting.  These 
contacts  carried  on  for  about  a  year  until  the  three  friends  noticed  that 
they  were  being  observed.  They  also  felt  that  they  were  being  given  more 
and  more  concrete  tasks  to  carry  out  by  the  woman  and  they  had  begun  to 
realise  that  the  promise  of  a  holiday  exchange  had  been  merely  a  pretext 
and  would  never  be  realised.  The  three  broke  off  the  contact  but  noticed  in 
the  following  months  that  they  were  still  being  observed:  'Man  hatte  ein 
Auge  dafür,  nicht,  ganz  früh.  '  (A-6)  One  day,  shortly  before  their  final 
exams,  'Fuchs'  and  his  two  friends  were  called  in  to  meet  with 
representatives  from  the  MfS  and  informed  that  they  had  not  been 
involved  with  a  youth  organisation  at  all,  but  with  a  spy  recruiting  agency 
which  had  been  on  the  verge  of  trying  to  engage  them  officially.  'Fuchs' 
told  me  that  after  their  statements  had  been  taken  they  were  told  they 
would  be  allowed  to  sit  their  impending  examinations,  but  that  afterwards 
they  would  not  be  admitted  to  the  army,  for  which  all  three  had 
registered.  They  were  also  told  that  they  would  not  be  allowed  to  start 
teaching  immediately  and  were  to  find  alternative  employment  for  a  year. 
When,  in  1993,  'Fuchs'  was  sacked  on  the  grounds  of  his  IM-Tätigkeit  he 
contested  the  sacking,  stressing  to  me  and  in  his  letters  to  the  Ministry  of 
Justice  that  the  'Täter-Opfer'  aspect  of  his  life  history  should  be 
considered  when  assessing  his  case.  He  does  not,  however,  consider  his 
circumstances  in  any  way  exceptional  and  in  his  original  letter  to  me 74 
describes  his  biography  as  being  'nicht  spektakulär,  aber  sicher  für  einen 
ehemaligen  DDR-Bürger  typisch'  (B-7). 
The  school  where  'Fuchs'  began  his  teaching  career  had  ties  with 
the  local  prison.  After  new  legislation  was  passed  which  meant  that 
prisoners  were  to  receive  educational  opportunities,  he  took  up  a  post 
there.  This  was  a  welcome  opportunity,  as  it  meant  that  he  would  have 
Saturdays  free,  and  that  he  would  earn  more  money.  'Fuchs'  was  put  in 
charge  of  the  teaching  programme  for  inmates.  In  1977  he  was  asked  to 
work  with  the  MfS  as  a  FIM  and  as  such  had  about  five  or  six  prisoners 
reporting  to  him  at  any  one  time.  When  'Fuchs'  left  the  prison  in  the  mid- 
1980s  and  took  up  another  job  he  was  re-registered  as  an  IMS. 
1.4.7  'Wolfgang'  (A-7) 
'Wolfgang'  states  emphatically  at  the  beginning  of  our  conversation  that 
he  considers  it  vital  that  he  gives  a  lot  of  detailed  information  about  his 
biography  in  order  that  his  story  can  be  fully  understood:  'Die  DDR  war 
mein  Staat.  Ich  war  davon  überzeugt,  daß  das,  was  dort  vorgesehen  ist, 
richtig  ist.  '  (A-7)  His  loyalty  to  the  GDR  was  a  recurring  theme  throughout 
the  interview,  and  he  became  periodically  quite  animated  when  talking 
enthusiastically  of  certain  positive  aspects  of  life  there  and  of  how  terrible 
things  were  by  comparison  under  the  current  system. 
'Wolfgang'  was  born  in  the  midst  of  economic  crisis  in  the  late  1920s 
and  was  brought  up  in  a  small  village  in  Saxony.  His  family  was  very  poor 
and  'Wolfgang'  was  fortunate  that  the  local  teacher  was  keen  to  see 
someone  from  the  village  obtain  a  secondary  education.  He  attended  an 
Aufbauschule,  a  cross  between  a  Gymnasium  and  a  Volksschule.  He  was 
the  only  working-class  child  at  the  school  and  was  conscious  of  how  poorly 
dressed  he  was  in  comparison  to  the  other  children  there.  'Wolfgang'  was 
called  up  in  1944  but  never  saw  active  service.  Young  men  who  had  been 75 
born  a  year  before  him  were  involved  in  fighting  in  the  latter  days  of  the 
war,  and  many  of  them  were  killed  in  action.  After  finishing  school 
'Wolfgang'  began  work  as  a  civil  servant  in  a  post  which  involved  having 
dealings  with  Soviet  troops  stationed  nearby.  During  this  time  he  made 
the  acquaintance  of  many  Russian  officers  with  whom  he  says  he  had  a 
good  working  relationship.  Later  he  studied  economics  and  took  up  a 
managerial  post. 
'Wolfgang'  told  me  that  he  began  work  for  the  MfS  in  the  early 
1960s.  This  work  involved  travelling  undercover  to  West  Berlin  and 
meeting  with  a  man  there  who  gave  him  seemingly  harmless  pieces  of 
information  to  pass  back  to  the  MfS.  The  BStU  was  unable  to  uncover  any 
material  relating  to  'Wolfgang'.  It  is  possible  that  his  file  was  destroyed  in 
the  extensive  destruction  of  material  from  the  HVA  (Hauptverwaltung 
Aufklärung),  for  which  he  may  well  have  worked,  or  that  the  relevant 
material  is  still  to  be  catalogued. 
1.4.8  'Stephana'  (A-8,  C-6a,  b) 
'Stephana'  is  an  interesting  and  complex  personality.  Before  our  first 
meeting  I  had  the  feeling  that  she  did  not  actually  want  to  go  through 
with  the  interview  at  all,  since  arranging  a  time  and  date  seemed  to  be  an 
unnecessarily  lengthy  and  complicated  process.  During  the  interview, 
however,  she  was  extremely  co-operative  and  answered  questions 
thoughtfully  and  thoroughly.  She  seemed  to  have  a  real  need  to  analyse 
her  past.  I  spoke  to  her  several  times  on  the  phone  afterwards  and  visited 
her  again  that  summer  after  viewing  her  file.  The  reasons  for  'Stephana's' 
burning  interest  in  contemplating  her  past  are  perhaps  partly  explained 
by  the  fact  that  she  is  someone  who  has  spent  many  years  becoming 
intensely  involved  with  a  variety  of  religious  groups  and  tends  to  engage 
in  much  self-reflection.  Her  biography  is  also  one  which  is  characterised 76 
by  periods  of  emotional  instability  and  vulnerability.  Her  active  interest  in 
different  ideological  systems,  in  addition  to  an  apparent  need  for  stability, 
are  perhaps  partly  responsible  for  the  fact  that  someone  who  had  not  been 
at  all  sympathetic  towards  the  state  could  become  so  bound  to  the  MfS 
after  having  been  recruited  as  an  IM  only  under  considerable  duress. 
'Stephana'  was  born  in  the  1960s  in  Schwerin.  Her  parents  were 
Catholics,  and  theirs  was  one  of  few  Catholic  families  in  the  area.  She 
says  that  as  a  result  she  feels  that  she  grew  up  in  a  Diaspora  and 
emphasises  that  hers  was  a  life  characterised  by  inner  and  outer  conflict. 
She  did  well  at  school,  but  difficulties  arose  when,  because  of  her  beliefs, 
she  did  not  take  part  in  the  Jugendweihe  ceremony,  the  ritual  celebration 
of  entrance  into  adulthood  which  was  commonly  practised  in  the  GDR.  As 
a  result  'Stephana'  says  that  she  was  not  allowed  to  complete  her  Abitur 
and  trained  instead  as  a  construction  worker.  'Stephana'  found  this  work 
frustrating  because  she  felt  that  she  was  getting  nowhere,  and  also 
because  she  had  married  someone  who  was  doing  well  in  a  more 
stimulating  job.  She  decided  to  take  up  work  with  the  Post  Office  since 
this  job  offered  good  childcare  facilities  at  the  time.  Her  decision  was  also 
partly  influenced  by  the  fact  that,  although  she  had  completed  the 
training,  very  few  women  actually  worked  in  construction  and  she  found  it 
a  difficult  working  environment.  Her  husband,  who  travelled  extensively 
in  his  job,  was  disappointed  that  she  had  taken  on  such  menial  work.  The 
marriage  did  not  fare  well,  and  they  separated  when  'Stephana'  was  still 
only  twenty.  The  child  remained  in  the  custody  of  her  ex-husband. 
'Stephana'  met  someone  else,  had  a  second  child  and  changed  job  again. 
Prior  to  being  recruited  as  an  IM,  'Stephana'  had  applied  on  two  occasions 
to  leave  the  GDR,  once  to  marry  an  Algerian,  and  once  to  pursue  her 
religious  interests  in  a  Buddhist  centre  in  the  West.  She  then  began  a  new 
relationship  and  changed  her  mind  about  trying  to  go  West. 77 
In  May  1985  'Stephana'  was  picked  up  and  interrogated  by  the  MfS. 
She  had  remained  in  contact  with  a  former  colleague  with  whom  she  had 
at  one  time  discussed  leaving  the  GDR.  This  man  still  intended  to  do  so 
and  had  told  her  of  his  plan  to  escape  by  entering  the  American  embassy 
and  seeking  asylum.  They  had  agreed  that  if  he  did  not  reappear  within 
two  days  of  his  planned  entry  of  the  embassy  she  would  phone  a  number 
in  West  Berlin  which  he  had  given  her  and  relate  the  story  to  the  person 
who  answered.  After  the  man  did  not  return  within  the  agreed  time 
'Stephana'  phoned  the  number,  which  turned  out  to  be  that  of  a 
newspaper.  The  MfS  interrogated  her  for  her  role  in  this  attempted  escape 
and  threatened  her  with  legal  action.  She  was  then  given  the  option  of 
agreeing  to  co-operate  as  an  IM  or  of  facing  legal  repercussions  for  her 
actions.  She  signed  a  Schweigeverpflichtung  and,  approximately  four 
months  later,  on  1  October  1985,  a  Verpflichtungserklärung,  so  beginning 
an  IM-Tätigkeit  which  lasted  until  1989. 
Today  'Stephana'  is  still  involved  in  various  religious  groups.  She 
has  recently  started  up  a  small  business. 
1.4.9  'Katrin'1  (A-9,  C-7a,  b) 
'Katrin',  alias  Kerstin  Kaiser-Nicht,  was  the  only  IM  with  whom  I  spoke 
who  was  publicly  known.  2  She  was  a  successful  candidate  for  the 
Bundestag  elections  in  1994  but,  shortly  after  arriving  in  Bonn  to  take  up 
this  position,  Kaiser  was  put  under  pressure  from  her  own  party  to  resign, 
since  it  was  felt  that  her  IM-Tätigkeit  was  damaging  the  PDS's  public 
profile.  Although  she  had  made  her  Stasi  connections  known  before 
standing  for  election,  she  was  accused  of  having  disguised  the  true  extent 
1  In  the  files  'Katrin'  is  sometimes  written  'Kathrin'.  In  this  work  she  is  referred  to  as 
'Katrin',  since  this  was  the  spelling  which  she  used  herself  when  signing  documents  (C- 
7a,  b). 
2  Kaiser-Nicht  is  sometimes  referred  to  simply  as  Kaiser,  her  name  prior  to  her  current 
marriage.  In  conversation  Kaiser  says  that  she  finds  the  Kaiser-Nicht  formulation 
rather  clumsy  (A-9). 78 
of  these  contacts  (see  1-19,31)  50,64).  As  someone  who  has  had  to  recount 
her  story  on  many  occasions,  'Katrin'  was  more  than  practised  in  doing  so, 
and  the  experience  of  talking  to  her  emphasised  how  much  more 
potentially  fruitful  dialogue  with  lesser  known  IM  can  be.  Nevertheless, 
Kaiser's  case  is  relevant  in  that  it  provides  a  concrete  and  public  example 
of  how  an  individual  and  a  society  confront  an  IM-Tätigkeit. 
'Katrin'  was  born  in  1960.  She  enjoyed  a  happy  childhood  and,  since 
she  lived  in  a  small  town,  claims  that  her  only  contact  to  the  West  was 
when  an  aunt  whom  she  was  not  particularly  fond  of  occasionally  visited 
her  family.  As  the  daughter  of  two  SED  members,  'Katrin'  was  encouraged 
not  just  to  be  a  member  of,  but  to  be  active  in  the  Pioniere  and  the  FDJ. 
She  was  also  involved  in  a  music  group,  and  as  a  high  achiever  and 
popular  student,  fulfilled  all  the  prerequisites  necessary  to  be  among  a 
group  of  students  chosen  to  carry  out  their  studies  in  what  was  then 
Leningrad.  While  she  was  being  prepared  for  these  studies  at  the  Arbeiter 
und  Bauernfakultät  in  Halle  'Katrin'  was  approached  by  the  MfS  and 
asked  to  co-operate  as  an  IM.  She  agreed,  and  her  IM-Tätigkeit  continued 
until  she  left  Leningrad  at  the  end  of  her  studies  in  1984. 
1.4.10  'Sonnenblume'  (A-10,  C-8a,  b) 
I  contacted  'Sonnenblume'  after  reading  her  autobiography  and  asked  her 
if  she  would  be  prepared  to  talk  to  me  (J-110).  'Sonnenblume'  contracted 
polio  in  1940  when  she  was  ten  years  old,  and  has  been  confined  to  a 
wheelchair  ever  since.  Her  mother  was  a  teacher,  who,  she  says,  was 
suspended  after  being  overheard  saying  that  her  daughter  probably 
contracted  her  crippling  disease  after  playing  in  a  station  where  Russian 
soldiers  had  spat  on  the  ground.  Her  father  returned  from  the  war  in  1946 
and  found  employment  in  a  bank.  'Sonnenblume'  had  two  brothers  and 
one  sister  and  describes  her  early  childhood  positively,  despite  the  hunger 79 
and  the  cold  that  the  family  had  to  endure  at  this  time.  She  completed  her 
Abitur  at  a  special  school  for  physically  disabled  children,  and  went  on  to 
obtain  a  distance  learning  degree  in  translation  from  Leipzig  University, 
subsequently  setting  herself  up  as  a  freelance  translator  for  French. 
As  a  disabled  person,  'Sonnenblume'  was  not  subjected  to  the  same 
travel  restrictions  as  other  East  Germans  and  often  used  this  relative 
freedom  to  visit  friends  who  had  left  the  GDR  and  lived  in  West  Germany. 
In  the  course  of  these  visits  her  friends  asked  her  to  secretly  relay 
information  to  another  friend  who  was  trying  to  flee  the  GDR.  When  she 
was  picked  up  from  a  train  on  her  way  home  from  a  trip  West  in  late  1979 
'Sonnenblume'  was  interrogated  about  her  role  in  this  attempted  escape. 
She  was  threatened  with  legal  action  if  she  did  not  agree  to  co-operate 
with  the  MfS  and,  after  being  detained  through  the  night,  signed  a 
Verpflichtungserklärung.  Her  IM-Tätigkeit  lasted  just  over  a  year.  A 
change  in  Führungsoffizier  gave  her  the  courage  to  make  the  break  from 
the  MfS. 
After  1989  increased  competition  in  the  translation  business  meant 
that  'Sonnenblume'  was  unable  to  continue  to  find  work.  She  did  manage, 
however,  to  translate  one  book  about  the  life  of  a  French  singer  after  this 
time,  something  she  considers  a  great  personal  success,  since  getting  this 
contract  involved  a  great  deal  of  hard  work  and  personal  initiative.  When 
her  own  book  was  published  in  1993  'Sonnenblume'  was  dismayed  to  find 
that  several  friends,  including  and  above  all  the  couple  whom  she  had 
always  visited  in  the  West,  broke  off  contact  to  her.  She  claims  that  she 
had  told  these  friends  of  her  contacts  to  the  MfS  at  the  time  of  her 
collaboration,  albeit  in  rather  vague  terms.  She  now  feels  hurt  and 
disappointed  that  they  have  terminated  the  friendship.  Other  reactions  to 
her  book  have  been  mixed,  from  horror  and  disgust  that  she  should  write 80 
so  openly  about  intimate  details  of  her  private  life  to  statements  of  open 
admiration  for  having  the  courage  to  do  so. 81 
Section  One:  Chapter  Two 
THE  RECRUITMENT  PROCESS: 
A  WORK  OF  ART 82 
2.1  GENERAL 
Die  Anwerbung  darf  nicht  abstrakt  und  formal  durchgeführt 
werden  und  muß  fast  wie  ein  Kunstwerk  in  der  Arbeit  betrachtet 
werden,  die  man  bemüht  sein  muß,  ständig  zu  verbessern.  (J-62,  p. 
171) 
The  MfS  was  not  interested  in  recruiting  individuals  who  voluntarily 
offered  their  services  as  informers.  Instead,  MfS  officers  approached  and 
actively  recruited  those  who  had  been  selected  to  be  IM,  so-called  IM- 
Kandidaten.  A  considerable  amount  of  detailed  planning  went  into  the 
individual  stages  of  recruitment.  Once  a  candidate  had  been  found  who 
corresponded  to  a  particular  Anforderungsbild,  s/he  and  his/her 
immediate  family  were  thoroughly  screened.  The  transition  from  IM- 
Kandidat  to  IM  could  take  months,  or  even  years.  When  suspicions  that 
'Rolf  was  involved  in  foreign  espionage  were  not  confirmed  it  was  decided, 
in  1983,  to  change  his  status  from  an  OPK  to  an  IM-Kandidat  (C-1a,  p.  3). 
'Rolf  remained  a  candidate  for  a  further  three  years,  until,  in  1986,  he 
was  finally  recruited  as  an  IM  (C-1a,  pp.  277-80).  By  this  time  'Rolfs' 
history  with  the  MfS  had  encompassed  a  period  of  thirteen  years.  He  had 
first  come  to  the  Stasi's  attention  in  1973  when  IM  'Bernd  Avis'  had 
reported  on  'Rolfs'  connections  'zum  kap.  [kapitalistischen]  Ausland'  (C- 
la,  p.  57). 
Not  all  recruitments  spanned  such  an  extensive  period  of  time. 
Some  were  achieved  rapidly  and  without  the  investment  of  much  effort  on 
the  part  of  the  Führungsoffizier.  Yet,  even  in  these  cases,  the  analogy  of  a 
'Kunstwerk'  is  in  some  ways  fitting.  There  were  several  key  components  to 
the  recruitment  procedure  and,  in  order  to  achieve  maximum  success, 
Operative  Mitarbeiter  had  to  ensure  that  the  timing  and  structure  of  the 
various  stages  of  such  an  operation  had  been  carefully  planned  in 
advance. 83 
2.2  INITIAL  APPROACH 
After  the  preliminary  stages  of  recruitment  had  been  completed,  that  is 
the  creation  of  an  Anforderungsbild  and  the  selection  and  screening  of  a 
particular  Kandidat,  the  Führungsoffizier  was  faced  with  the  task  of 
making  contact  with  the  individual  concerned.  As  in  any  other  aspect  of 
the  work  with  IM  or  potential  IM,  the  initial  approach  had  to  be  carried 
out  with  utmost  discretion  and  was  thus  termed  'die  konspirative 
Kontaktaufnahme': 
Zur  Festlegung  der  Art  und  Weise  der  konspirativen 
Kontaktaufnahme  sind  die  Möglichkeiten  zu  prüfen 
-  zur  legendierten  Bestellung  des  Kandidaten  zum 
Kontaktgespräch, 
-  zum  direkten  Ansprechen  und  Beginn  des 
Kontaktgespräches  durch  den  Mitarbeiter, 
-  zum  Schaffen  von  Einflüssen  und  Umständen,  durch  die  der 
Kandidat  zur  selbständigen  Kontaktaufnahme  mit  dem 
MfS  veranlaßt  wird. 
Das  Kontaktgespräch  ist  taktisch  beweglich  unter  ständiger 
Beachtung  der  Persönlichkeit  und  der  Reaktionen  des  IM- 
Kandidaten  zu  führen.  (J-62,  p.  344) 
An  MfS  survey  carried  out  in  1973  which  analysed  strategies  of 
'konspirative  Kontaktaufnahme'  in  sixty  MfS  divisions  found  that  the  IM- 
Kandidat  was  directly  approached  by  an  Operativer  Mitarbeiter,  usually 
at  work  or  at  home,  in  34%  of  cases  studied  (D-4,  I,  294).  Contact  was 
initiated  by  written  appointment  in  33%  of  all  cases,  by  telephone  in  17%, 
and  by  an  approach  through  a  third  party  in  the  remaining  16%  (D-4,  I, 
294). 
The  above  figures  demonstrate  that  in  the  vast  majority  of  IM 
recruitments  the  initial  contact  with  the  IM-Kandidat  was  of  an  official 
nature.  The  formal  tone  of  the  preliminary  contact  resulted  in  the 
individual  concerned  feeling  more  duty-bound  to  appear  for  the  first 
meeting  and,  furthermore,  often  meant  that  his/her  suspicions  were  not 
aroused.  Operative  Mitarbeiter  were  concerned  to  avoid  a  situation  where 84 
an  IM-Kandidat  came  to  the  conclusion  before  the  initial  meeting  that 
s/he  was  to  be  recruited  to  work  with  the  MfS.  If  this  were  to  occur  it 
might  allow  a  candidate  who  was  negatively  disposed  to  the  idea  of 
collaboration  with  the  MfS  time  to  plan  a  possible  defence  strategy  and 
perhaps  to  inform  others  of  the  forthcoming  meeting,  so  limiting  the 
chances  of  a  fruitful  IM-Tätigkeit.  In  order  that  the  IM-Kandidat  did  not 
suspect  the  true  purpose  of  the  summons,  the  MfS  resorted  to  its  much- 
loved  tactic  of  employing  a  'Legende',  described  in  the  MfS  Wörterbuch  as 
a  'glaubhafter  Vorwand,  durch  den  Personen  in  der  operativen  Arbeit  über 
die  wahren  Ziele  und  Absichten  des  MfS  getäuscht  werden'  (F-3,  p.  240). 
In  the  previously  mentioned  study,  the  majority  of  those  who  received  a 
written  invitation  to  the  Kontaktgespräch  were  under  the  impression  that 
they  would  be  attending  an  appointment  with  the  Volkspolizei.  The 
remaining  Kandidaten  were  led  to  believe  that  they  would  be  meeting 
with  representatives  of  various  other  state  organs  (D-4,  I,  294).  Even 
when  the  IM-Kandidat  was  aware  that  s/he  was  to  meet  with  a 
representative  from  the  MfS,  s/he  was  generally  misled  as  to  the  true 
purpose  of  this  meeting.  The  authors  of  Die  Gewinnung  Inoffizieller 
Mitarbeiter  suggest  that  the  Legende  could  be  so  constructed  to  convey  to 
the  IM-Kandidat  the  feeling  that  s/he  was  regarded  as  someone  to  whom 
confidential  information  could  be  entrusted.  They  propose  that  one 
possible  Legende  would  be  the  pretence  that  the  MfS  was  interested  in 
enlisting  the  Kandidat  to  help  investigate  reports  that  a  child  in  his/her 
immediate  neighbourhood  had  been  abused: 
Die  mit  einer  emotional  tiefgehenden  Wirkung  verbundene 
Mitteilung,  die  dem  Kandidaten  in  einem  solchen  Fall  gegeben 
werden  kann,  berührt  gemeinsame  Interessen  zwischen  den 
Gesprächspartnern.  Sie  wird  vom  Kandidaten  als 
Vertrauensbeweis  des  operativen  Mitarbeiters  zu  seiner  Person 
und  als  reale  Gesprächsgrundlage  erlebt.  (D-4,  II,  417) 85 
2.3  TIMING 
It  was  essential  that  the  time  lag  between  the  notification  of  the  meeting 
and  the  event  itself  was  optimal  for  the  specific  situation  and  candidate.  If 
the  time  lapse  were  too  great  then  the  chances  that  the  Kandidat  would 
inform  someone  of  the  planned  meeting  increased.  One  IM  is  quoted 
describing  the  disturbing  half  hour  he  spent  between  being  called  to  a 
meeting  with  an  MfS  officer  and  the  imminent  appointment.  In  this  time 
he  contemplated  the  different  stages  of  his  public  life,  searching  for 
potential  misdemeanours  which  might  have  resulted  in  this  unexpected 
summons:  'Diese  innere  Spannung  hielt  an  bis  zum  Beginn  dieser 
Aussprache.  '  (D-4,  I,  301-02)  There  was  an  obvious  danger  that  in  a  case 
like  this  the  candidate  would,  through  increasing  uneasiness  and 
nervousness,  be  unable  to  remain  silent  about  the  approaching  meeting. 
Yet  the  inducement  of  this  cognitive  state  could  also  work  to  the  MIS  's 
advantage.  The  relief  on  the  part  of  the  candidate  to  discover  that  s/he 
was  not  to  be  rebuked  for  having  done  something  wrong,  but  had  rather 
been  selected  to  assume  a  position  of  trust  with  the  MfS  may  have  been 
significant  in  his/her  decision  to  agree  to  the  proposed  IM-Tätigkeit.  The 
desire  of  the  candidate  or  newly  recruited  IM  to  diminish  his/her  fears  of 
the  unknown  by  complying  with  the  MfS  could  be  exploited  at  various 
stages  in  the  recruitment  process.  Both  'Stephana'  and  'Sonnenblume' 
describe  the  period  immediately  after  their  initial  interrogation  as  an 
emotionally  turbulent  one,  during  which  they  were  plagued  by  doubts  and 
fears  (A-8,  A-10).  After  the  two  women  had  been  contacted  by  their 
respective  Führungsoffiziere  and  the  co-operation  with  the  MfS  had  begun 
to  take  on  concrete  form,  they  experienced  intense  relief  that  this  period  of 
uncertainty  had  passed.  'Stephana'  and  'Sonnenblume'  were  consequently 
less  negatively  disposed  towards  the  notion  of  working  with  the  MfS,  since 86 
such  co-operation  seemed  to  offer  a  more  satisfactory  alternative  to 
waiting  and  uncertainty  (see  Section  One:  3.4). 
2.4  MORE  LEGENDEN 
After  the  Kontaktgespräch  had  taken  place  and  the  candidate  had  been 
made  aware  of  the  true  reason  why  s/he  had  been  summoned,  it  was 
necessary  to  ensure  that  this  fact  remain  secret  from  those  with  whom 
s/he  had  close  contact.  In  order  that  this  was  possible,  further  Legenden 
were  created.  After,  as  a  result  of  her  detainment  by  the  MfS, 
'Sonnenblume'  returned  home  a  day  later  than  expected  from  her  trip  to 
the  FRG,  she  was  instructed  to  explain  to  her  father  that  she  had  been 
delayed  because  of  a  formality  concerning  her  passport  (C-8a,  p.  70). 
Although  in  his  case  the  period  of  absence  was  relatively  brief,  it  was  still 
considered  necessary  to  create  a  Legende  to  explain  why  'Theodor'  had  left 
his  workplace  when  he  was  summoned  to  his  Kontaktgespräch. 
Accordingly,  he  was  asked  to  bring  with  him  a  piece  of  equipment  which 
he  had  borrowed.  The  equipment  belonged  to  a  man  whose  office  was 
situated  near  the  room  where  the  Kontaktgespräch  took  place.  Returning 
the  item  thus  served  as  the  Legende  for  'Theodor's'  absence  (C-2a,  I,  141). 
2.5  COMMITMENT 
Operative  Mitarbeiter  could  not  expect  that  an  IM-Kandidat  would  agree 
'spontaneously  and  unquestioningly'  to  co-operate  with  the  MfS 
(D-9,  p.  35).  In  most  cases  some  enticement  was  required  and  a  Sinn- 
Angebot  was  often  created  to  achieve  this  aim  (see  Section  One:  3.2).  At 
this  crucial  early  stage  it  was  important  that  the  candidate  made  some 
kind  of  commitment,  but  that  not  too  much  was  demanded,  in  case  s/he 
became  frightened  off  the  idea  entirely.  In  the  late  1950s  and  early  1960s 
there  was  concern  over  the  observation  that  a  number  of  those  who  had 87 
been  approached  by  the  MfS  and  asked  to  work  as  IM  had  fled  to  the  West 
shortly  afterwards  (E-1,  pp.  42-46).  It  was  suggested  that  those  who  had 
gone  to  the  FRG  were  individuals  who,  before  being  approached  by  the 
MfS,  would  never  have  considered  leaving  the  GDR  (E-1,  p.  43)  Operative 
Mitarbeiter  were  consequently  to  be  discouraged  from  trying  to  recruit  too 
many  IM  too  quickly.  All  too  often,  the  report  continued,  compromising 
material  was  being  used  to  coerce  Kandidaten  into  signing  an  agreement 
to  co-operate,  with  the  result  that  they  felt  themselves  'so  in  die  Enge 
getrieben,  daß  sie  den  einzigen  Ausweg  nur  noch  in  der  Flucht  sehen'  (E-1, 
p.  43).  It  was  advised  that  more  effort  be  made  to  convince  candidates  of 
the  political  necessity  of  the  task  at  hand,  instead  of  pressurising  them 
into  agreement.  That  sufficient  time  was  not  being  invested  to  this  end 
was  seen  to  be  reflected  in  the  fact  that: 
Solange  die  inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiter  allgemeine  Berichte  schreiben, 
arbeiten  sie.  In  dem  Moment,  wo  sie  jedoch  an  eine  bestimmte 
Person  angesetzt  werden  und  über  dieselbe  konkret  berichten 
sollen,  werden  sie  flüchtig,  d.  h.,  diese  Leute  werden  durch  die 
Mitarbeiter  nicht  genügend  auf  ihre  eigentlichen  Aufgaben 
vorbereitet  und  von  deren  politischen  Notwendigkeit  politisch 
überzeugt.  (E-1,  p.  43) 
Operative  Mitarbeiter  were  tending  to  encourage  IM  to  formally  commit 
themselves  at  a  premature  stage  and  were  subsequently  demanding  that 
they  compile  specific  reports  before  sufficient  persuasive  tactics  had  been 
employed.  The  recruitment  of  IM  for  the  long-term  required  that  OM  keep 
sight  of  the  fact  that,  although  written  commitment  was  desired  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  'entscheidend  ist  nicht  die  Verpflichtung,  sondern  die 
positive  Mitarbeit  des  Kandidaten'  (F-5,  I,  83).  If  a  candidate  was  fulfilling 
the  required  duties  of  an  IM,  that  is  delivering  information  which  was 
potentially  operativ  bedeutsam,  then  the  goal  of  recruitment  was  seen  to 
be  achieved.  Insisting  upon  written  confirmation  of  the  agreement  when 88 
the  candidate  seemed  unwilling  to  take  this  step  could  only  endanger  the 
co-operation  (J-62,  p.  174).  It  was  thus  often  the  case  that  generally 
compliant  candidates  were  less  likely  to  be  asked  to  make  a  written 
commitment.  The  case  of  the  physicist  Robert  Havemann  provides  one 
such  example.  In  the  late  1960s  and  1970s  Havemann  became  one  of  the 
ar3eýA  sand  suffered  the  gross  injustices 
which  accompanied  this  status  until  his  death  in  1982.  In  the  early  days  of 
the  new  Republic,  however,  Havemann,  a  convinced  anti-fascist,  was  a 
strong  supporter  of  the  state  and,  under  the  cover  name  'Leitz',  was 
registered  for  seven  years  as  a  Geheimer  Informator  (an  earlier  term  for 
an  IM).  When  he  was  officially  recruited  in  1956  Havemann,  who  had 
been  active  as  a  Kontaktperson  since  1953,  was  not  required  to  sign  a 
written  commitment:  'Auf  Grund  seiner  schon  langen  Tätigkeit  und  seiner 
gesellschaftlichen  Stellung  wurde  eine  schriftliche  Verpflichtung  als 
formal  angesehen  und  deshalb  auf  diese  verzichtet.  '  (from  Havemann's 
MfS  file,  1-56,  p.  87)  Around  this  time  Christa  Wolf  also  agreed  to  co- 
operate  with  the  MfS  and,  at  least  initially,  seemed  prepared  to  deliver 
the  kind  of  information  which  was  desired.  When  asked  if  she  would  be 
prepared  to  co-operate  Wolf  agreed  'without  much  hesitation'  (J-99,  p.  90). 
The  only  aspect  of  the  co-operation  which  seemed  to  bother  Wolf  at  this 
time  was  the  idea  that  she  should  remain  silent  about  the  contacts  to 
others.  At  the  mention  of  such  secrecy  Wolf  became  visibly  uncomfortable 
with  the  result:  'Von  einer  schriftlichen  Verpflichtung  wurde  wegen  ihrer 
Mentalität  Abstand  genommen.  '  (J-99,  p.  90) 
Before  being  asked  to  sign  the  actual  Verpflichtungserklärung 
candidates  were  often  asked  to  make  a  Schweigeverpflichtung,  in  which 
they  pledged  to  remain  silent  about  the  Kontaktgespräch.  On  29  August 
1986,  for  example,  'Rolf  pledged  'strengstes  Stillschweigen  zu  wahren'  (C- 
la,  p.  255).  The  Schweigeverpflichtung  had  a  dual  purpose.  It  gave  the 89 
MfS  some  sort  of  guarantee  that  the  candidate  would  remain  silent  about 
having  been  approached  by  the  MfS,  and  it  was  also  a  first  commitment  to 
becoming  a  fully-fledged  IM.  In  the  majority  of  cases  the  signing  of  the 
official  Verpflichtung  was,  however,  still  fundamental  to  the  recruitment 
process: 
Die  Verpflichtung  ist  mehr  als  das  Schreiben  oder  mündliche 
Formulieren  einer  Verpflichtungserklärung.  Sie  ist  für  den 
Kandidaten  die  Besiegelung  eines  komplizierten 
Bewußtseinsprozesses.  (D-4,  II,  662) 
Bei  relativ  schwachen  Uberzeugungsmotiven  muß  die  von  dieser 
Bewußtseinstatsache  ausgehende  fördernde  Wirkung  besonders 
genutzt  werden,  weil  sich  darin  die  Erkenntnis  an  eine 
übernommene  Pflicht  verfestigt.  (D-4,  II,  664-65) 
This  theory  certainly  seems  to  have  been  borne  out  in  practice  in  the  case 
of  IM  'Thaer'.  'Thaer'  tells  me  that  despite  the  doubts  he  experienced  after 
signing  the  Verpflichtung,  he  saw  the  matter  as  sealed  once  he  had  taken 
this  step  and  consequently  resigned  himself  to  the  fact  (A-5). 
The  MfS  exploited  the  psychological  significance  for  an  IM  of  the 
signing  of  a  Verpflichtung,  but  naturally  played  down  the  effect  such  a 
step  could  have  when  trying  to  encourage  the  IM-Kandidat  to  make  this 
written  commitment.  During  his  Kontaktgespräch  'Rolf  was  asked 
whether,  on  his  frequent  trips  to  the  area  of  natural  habitat  near  the 
training  ground  of  the  Soviet  forces,  he  had  ever  noticed  anything 
suspicious.  'Rolf  told  the  MfS  officers  that  he  had  been  surprised  at  the 
number  of  cars  he  had  seen  in  this  area,  since  he  knew  that  it  was 
forbidden  to  drive  there:  'Hier  wurde  dem  Kandidaten  aufgesagt,  daß  dies 
bereits  die  Informationen  sind,  die  wir  brauchen.  '  (C-la,  pp.  252-53)  'Rolf 
was  thus  led  to  believe  that  he  would  be  concerned  with  helping 
investigate  cases  of  possible  foreign  espionage  which  he  might  be  witness 
to,  and  that  in  doing  so  no  more  would  really  be  required  of  him  than 90 
delivering  the  type  of  information  he  had  already  given.  Only  later  did  it 
transpire  that  'Rolf  was  to  be  set  directly  upon  individuals  belonging  to 
his  circle  of  acquaintances. 
2.6  CONSOLIDATING  THE  AGREEMENT 
Die  Verpflichtung  der  neuen  IM  ist  in  würdiger  Weise  so 
durchzuführen,  daß 
-  die  Verbindlichkeit  der  getroffenen  Vereinbarungen  ausgedrückt 
wird.  (J-62,  p.  349) 
Once  the  candidate  had  committed  him/herself  to  co-operation,  the  MfS 
made  efforts  to  ensure  that  this  agreement  was  seen  as  binding  and  the 
wording  of  the  Verpflichtungserklärung  often  referred  to  the  potential 
legal  repercussions  for  the  IM  if  the  contract  were  broken.  The 
commitment  was  also  further  intensified  by  the  fact  that  IM  were  asked  at 
this  point  to  assume  a  cover  name  for  future  contact.  In  some  cases  a 
name  was  suggested  to  the  newly  recruited  IM,  in  others  s/he  was  asked 
to  choose  one.  Korth,  Jonak  and  Scharbert  advise  that  the  OM  might  wish 
to  convey  the  concept  of  a  'Deckname'  rather  as  a  "'Zweitname", 
"Arbeitsname"  oder  "Pseudonym"'  (D-4,  II,  668).  Indeed,  on  17  November 
1975,  IM  'Theodor'  actually  did  write  in  the  text  of  his 
Verpflichtungserklärung:  'Als  Pseudonym  für  die  Zusammenarbeit  wählte 
ich  "Theodor.  "'  (C-2a,  I,  11) 
The  IM  was  theoretically  to  be  assigned  a  task  for  completion  before 
the  first  meeting  after  the  Werbungsgespräch  (J-62,  pp.  349-50).  In  the 
case  of  'Theodor'  this  first  mission  was  threefold,  and  Point  2.  was 
documented  as  follows: 
2.  Erarbeitung  eines  ausführlichen  E.  -Berichts 
[Ermittlungsbericht]  zur  Person  des  OSL  [Oberstleutnant]  [X]  und 
[orig.  uns]  Familie  zu: 
-  dienstliche  und  politische  Entwicklung 91 
-  Verbindungen/Reisetätigkeit 
-  Hobbys/Interessen/Leidenschaften 
-  besondere  Verhaltensweisen 
-  politische  Einstellung/Widersprüchlichkeiten.  (C-2a,  I,  143) 
The  strategies  described  above  had  the  effect  of  intensifying  the 
bond  and  commitment  on  the  part  of  the  IM  to  the  MfS,  as  did  the 
champagne  toast  which  sometimes  followed  the  signing  of  this  document. 
In  this  chapter  the  recruitment  procedure  as  far  as  the  MfS  was  concerned 
has  been  outlined.  The  motivation  on  the  part  of  the  IM  to  actually  agree 
to  co-operate  will  be  considered  in  the  following  chapter. 92 
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3.1  'POSITIVE  GESELLSCHAFTLICHE  ÜBERZEUGUNG' 
The  MfS  guidelines  drawn  up  in  1979  define  possible  premises  for  the 
recruitment  of  an  IM.  Recruitment  strategy  could  be  centred  around  the 
positive  political  stance  of  the  IM-Kandidat  towards  the  state  ('positive 
gesellschaftliche  Überzeugung'),  on  his/her  personal  needs  and  interests 
('persönliche  Bedürfnisse  und  Interessen'),  on  the  desire  to  atone  for 
previous  misdemeanours  ('Wiedergutmachungsbestrebungen'),  or  on  a 
combination  of  all  three  approaches  (J-62,  p.  347). 
The  first  of  these  strategies  is  further  defined  as  follows: 
Bei  der  Werbung  auf  der  Grundlage  positiver  gesellschaftlicher 
Überzeugungen  ist  auf  den  bei  den  Kandidaten  bereits 
vorhandenen  weltanschaulichen,  moralischen  und  politischen 
Überzeugungen  aufzubauen  und  daraus  die  Bereitschaft  zur 
Zusammenarbeit  mit  dem  MfS  zu  entwickeln.  (J-62,  p.  347) 
Earlier  guidelines  from  1958  specify  that  this  basis  for  recruitment  was  to 
be  the  most  important  and  frequently  employed  one  (J-62,  p.  212).  The 
results  of  the  Seidler/Schmidt  study  suggest  that  this  was  indeed  the  case. 
An  analysis  of  IM  in  the  district  of  Karl-Marx-Stadt  in  1968  found  that  as 
many  as  81%  of  IM  surveyed  had  been  recruited  on  the  basis  of  political 
conviction  (D-6,  I,  6).  It  is  necessary  to  exercise  caution  in  the  evaluation 
of  this  finding;  first,  since  this  form  of  recruitment  was,  according  to  the 
theory,  to  be  the  most  frequently  employed  one,  it  is  possible  that  the 
authors  wished  to  find  evidence  that  this  was  realised  in  practice;  second, 
Führungsoffiziere  who  were  aware  that  IM  were  to  be  primarily  recruited 
on  this  basis  may  have  tended  to  exaggerate  the  number  of  times  when 
this  was  the  case.  In  reality,  as  will  be  discussed,  most  IM  were  motivated 
by  the  of  a  number  of  variables  a,  ýrd  , ýoý  rncýe  ,6  lrr  cfr 
Several  IM  whom  I  interviewed  were  certainly  keen  to  emphasise 
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work  with  the  MfS.  'Wolfgang'  wasted  no  time  in  making  this  point  by 
beginning  the  interview  with  a  statement  of  his  loyalty  to  the  GDR  (see 
Section  One:  1.4.7).  'Wolfgang'  repeated  and  elaborated  on  the  strength  of 
this  commitment  throughout  the  interview.  Likewise,  'Katrin,  born  in 
1960,  argued:  'In  meinem  bewußten  Leben  gab  es  immer  die  Mauer  zum 
Beispiel,  und  ich  bin  relativ  widerspruchsfrei  aufgewachsen  in  diesem 
Land.  '  (A-9)  Both  these  IM  and  many  others  claim  that  when  approached 
by  the  MfS  it  seemed  'das  Normalste  auf  der  Welt'  to  agree  to  co-operate 
and  thereby  endeavour  to  prevent  anti-state  activities  (A-9). 
It  should  be  taken  into  consideration  when  examining  such  claims 
of  fervent  conviction  that  IM  such  as  'Katrin'  and  'Wolfgang'  tend  now 
perhaps  to  exaggerate  somewhat  the  extent  of  their  commitment  to 
supporting  the  SED  in  order  to  justify  their  behaviour  in  the  face  of  what 
has  sometimes  been  harsh  societal  criticism  (see  Section  Two:  9.2.2). 
'Katrin's'  biographical  details  do,  however,  read  rather  like  those  of  an 
archetypal  patriotic  GDR  citizen,  indicating  a  high  level  of  sympathy  or  at 
least  compliance  with  state  ideology  (see  Section  One:  1.4.9).  Although  she 
seems  to  have  subsequently  doubted  her  actions,  it  is  easy  to  comprehend 
why  'Katrin'  might,  at  least  initially,  have  considered  it  self-explanatory  to 
agree  to  work  for  the  MfS. 
Other  IM  recruited  primarily  on  the  basis  of  a  pre-existing  positive 
stance  towards  the  state  stress  now  that  they  viewed  co-operation  with 
the  MfS  as  having  bee-  L  an  integral  part  of  their  working  lives  (see 
Section  One:  9.2.5).  'Falke'  explains  his  decision  to  agree  to  collaborate  as 
follows: 
Ich  bin,  wie  gesagt,  seit  '71  bis  '77,  war  ja  sechs  Jahre 
Zusammenarbeit,  auch  mit  diesen  Leuten.  Ich  habe  viele  von  denen 
gekannt.  Und  dann  habe  ich  keine  Berührungsängste  oder  sonst 
'was  gehabt.  Ich  habe  einfach  gedacht:  Gut,  das  ist  eine  Sache,  die 
tut  keinem  weh.  Das  ist  aber  notwendig.  Also,  was  soll  das.  Machst 
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In  a  letter  to  the  Ministry  of  Justice  contesting  his  sacking  on  the  grounds 
of  having  been  an  IM,  'Fuchs'  argued  similarly  that,  since  MfS  officers 
were  closely  involved  in  the  running  of  the  prison,  had  he,  a  prison 
employee,  refused  to  co-operate  with  them,  he  imagined  that  he  would 
have  had  to  reckon  with  repercussions  (B-6). 
Recruiting  IM  such  as  'Wolfgang',  'Katrin',  'Fuchs'  and  'Falke' 
tended  to  be  a  relatively  straightforward  task  for  the  MfS  officers 
concerned.  In  accordance  with  the  usual  procedure,  careful  checks  had  to 
be  made  on  the  candidate  and  his/her  immediate  family,  but  once  these 
had  been  carried  out  and  the  meeting  where  recruitment  was  to  take 
place,  the  Werbungsgespräch,  been  planned,  it  was  fairly  certain  that  the 
candidate  would  agree  to  the  proposal  without  much  further  ado.  If  any 
uncertainty  at  all  was  detected  on  the  part  of  such  a  basically  willing 
candidate  it  could  generally  be  quickly  put  to  rest  by  the  Führungsoffizier. 
In  the  report  documenting  the  successful  recruitment  of  'Theodor',  for 
example,  the  Führungsoffizier  noted: 
Der  Kandidat  erklärte  seine  Bereitschaft  zur  Zusammenarbeit 
sofort  und  versuchte  aber  gewisse  Einschränkungen  hinsichtlich 
von  Informationen  familiären  Charakters  bzw.  ihm  nahe  stehender 
Personen  zu  erheben.  Dies  wurde  ihm  aber  als  für  die  inoffizielle 
Zusammenarbeit  widersprechend  dargelegt,  was  der  Kandidat 
einsah  und  dann  sofort  Informationen  zu  sich  bzw.  Familie 
gab.  (C-2a,  I,  141) 
'Theodor'  seems  to  have  needed  only  to  be  given  a  very  gentle  assurance 
that  what  he  was  doing  was  officially  sanctioned.  Not  all  candidates  came 
to  the  Werbungsgespräch  with  such  intense  pre-established  political 
conviction,  and  in  these  cases  the  MfS  had  the  task  of  convincing  such 
potential  informers  that  there  was  a  politically  and  morally  justifiable 
purpose  to  agreeing  to  work  as  an  IM. 96 
3.2  THE  SINN  ANGEBOT 
The  writer  Günter  Kunert  discusses  what  he  terms  the  'Sinn-Angebot' 
involved  in  working  for  the  MfS  (J-47,  p.  18).  Particularly  in  cases  where 
it  could  not  be  taken  for  granted  that  an  IM-Kandidat  would  agree 
unhesitatingly  to  co-operate,  the  MfS  was  often  able  to  create  a  plausible 
Sinn-Angebot  to  facilitate  recruitment:  'Diese  endgültig  letzte  weltliche 
Transzendenz  half  dem  Spitzel,  sein  Werk  zu  tun  und  dabei  seine 
individuelle  Verantwortung  der  "Sache"  zu  überlassen. 
Gewissensregungen  ließen  sich  auf  diese  Weise  ausschalten.  '  (J-47,  p.  18) 
This  Sinn-Angebot  not  only  helped  many  IM  carry  out  their  duties  but  was 
also  significant  at  recruitment.  'Rolf  was  undoubtedly  swayed  by  the 
Sinn-Angebot  presented  to  him  at  the  initial  meeting.  As  a  result  of  his 
active  commitment  to  environmental  issues  'Rolf  had  many  contacts  to 
individuals  whose  activities  the  MfS  was  keen  to  closely  monitor.  The 
officers  involved  in  'Rolf  s'  recruitment  were  well  informed  that  the 
candidate  was  critical  and  sceptical  of  the  GDR's  policies  on 
environmental  protection.  This  information  was  used  to  construct  a  basis 
for  recruitment  which  stressed  the  necessity  of  supporting  the  MfS  in 
order  to  bring  about  change  in  these  environmental  practices  and,  on  a 
wider  scale,  to  help  ensure  world  peace,  an  issue  which  also  concerned 
'Rolf.  To  this  end  the  Werbungsgespräch  began  with  a  discussion  of  the 
recent  summit  meeting  in  Reykjavik  and  of  certain  environmental  issues. 
During  the  discussion  'Rolf  expressed  his  belief  that  not  enough  was  being 
undertaken  to  combat  pollution  in  the  GDR  (C-1a,  p.  277).  'Rolf  was 
therefore  critical  of  government  policies,  but  did  not  reject  the  state  as 
such,  still  believing  that  change  was  possible.  The  Führungsoffizier 
cleverly  managed  to  turn  this  critical  stance,  combined  with  'Rolf  s' 
ultimate  faith  in  the  state,  into  a  Sinn-Angebot  of  working  with  the  MfS, 
an  offer  the  IM-Kandidat  had  difficulty  refusing: 97 
Ich  habe  damals  die  Weltbühne  immer  gelesen,  und  da  stand  mal 
ein  Artikel  drin,  daß  man  in  dieser  Zeit,  ja,  es  ist  fast  verrückt, 
daß  man  in  dieser  Zeit  eben,  über  seine  tägliche  Pflichterfüllung 
oder  über  das  tägliche  Arbeitgehen  -  darüber  hinaus,  müßte  man 
etwas  tun,  um  den  Frieden  zu  sichern,  oder  um  etwas  zu  tun,  daß 
es  so  nicht  weiter  geht,  und  ...  aber  jetzt  den  Sprung 
... 
Also,  ich 
sage  es  mal  so,  ich  war  in  dem  Moment  nicht  abgeneigt.  Ich  war 
fast  davon  überzeugt,  das  ist  eigentlich  eine  gute  Sache,  ja,  da  hilfst 
du,  etwas  zu  verhindern.  (A-1) 
Initially  'Rolf  was  led  to  believe  that  he  would  be  involved  in 
preventing  military  espionage  and  given  the  impression  that  the  MfS  was 
concerned  with  any  deficiencies  in  environmental  protection  of  which  he 
might  inform  them.  Although  somewhat  hesitant,  he  decided  that  he  could 
justify  such  an  undertaking: 
Kurz  und  gut,  die  haben  also,  meine,  ja,  wie  soll  ich  sagen, 
Friedensliebe  oder,  das  klingt  vielleicht  pathetisch,  meine  Sorge  um 
diese  Welt  haben  die  als  Anlaß  genommen  und  haben  gesagt:  'Da 
helfen  Sie  uns  doch,  daß  wir  das  gemeinsam  verhindern.  '  Ja,  und  da 
habe  ich  gesagt:  'Dagegen  habe  ich  nichts'.  (A-1) 
'Rolf  signed  a  Verpflichtungserklärung  and  the  motivation  for  recruitment 
was  consequently  noted  in  his  Personalakte  as:  'Positive  moralische 
Überzeugungen  des  IM,  insbesondere  solche  Überzeugungen  wie 
Erhaltung  des  Friedens  und  Durchsetzung  der  Abrüstungsbestrebungen 
der  soz.  Staaten,  Durchsetzung  des  Umwelt,  -und  Naturschutzes.  '  (C-la,  p. 
38) 
The  text  of  the  Verpflichtungserklärung,  the  written  confirmation  of 
the  oral  agreement,  was  often  worded  so  as  to  strengthen  further  the 
appeal  of  the  Sinn-Angebot,  by  conveying  to  the  individual  concerned  the 
impression  that  s/he  would  be  engaged  in  such  lauclAble  pursuits  as 
protecting  socialism  and  ensuring  world  peace.  On  1  September  1970,  for 
example,  'Reiner'  was  dictated  a  Verpflichtungserklärung  which  began: 98 
'Ich  verpflichte  mich,  das  Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit  bei  der 
Erfüllung  seiner  Aufgaben  zum  Schutz  und  zur  Festigung  der  Deutschen 
Demokratischen  Republik  mit  meiner  ganzen  Kraft  zu  unterstützen.  '  (C- 
4a,  I,  203) 
In  some  cases  the  sense  that  there  was  an  honourable  purpose 
involved  was  short-lived  and  functioned  only  as  a  motivating  factor  at  the 
time  of  recruitment.  'Rolf  soon  realised  that  the  MfS  was  not  concerned 
with  environmental  issues  and  that  he  was  to  be  increasingly  encouraged 
to  give  information  about  people  within  his  circle  of  acquaintances  rather 
than  about  any  spies  whom  he  might  find  lurking  around  the  Soviet 
training  ground.  It  became  more  and  more  difficult  for  him  to  convince 
himself  of  the  Sinn-Angebot  of  working  for  the  Stasi,  and  he  eventually 
broke  off  the  contact. 
IM  who  remained  active  often  endeavoured  to  keep  alive  the  belief 
in  the  purposefulness  of  the  collaboration.  They  were  not  alone  in  this 
endeavour,  since  the  MfS  was  well  aware  of  the  necessity  of  continually 
persuading  its  informers  that  the  IM-Tätigkeit  was  morally  and  politically 
justifiable.  Much  emphasis  was  placed  on  training  the  IM  to  this  way  of 
thinking.  The  1958  guidelines  stipulate  that  the  political  education  of  the 
IM  is  the  most  important  principle  of  the  work  with  them,  and  further: 
'Die  Einsatzbereitschaft  des  inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiters  muß  soweit 
entwickelt  werden,  daß  er  selbst  sein  Leben  für  diese  Sache  einsetzen 
wird.  '  (J-62,  pp.  212,219)  In  spite  of  the  obvious  attempts  of  the 
Führungsoffiziere  to  educate  and  develop  their  IM  in  this  manner,  many 
informers  became  sceptical  and  disillusioned.  One  former  IM  interviewed 
for  the  book  Stasi  intim  describes  the  battle  of  trying  to  maintain  the 
belief  in  the  good  of  what  he  was  doing  as  follows: 
Immer  wieder  diese  gebrochene  Moral,  es  ist  ja  für  eine  gute  Sache, 
Ordnung  und  Sicherheit,  und  wir  müssen  das  Land  schützen,  klingt 99 
ja  alles  nicht  schlecht  ... 
Ohne  sich  Gedanken  darüber  zu  machen, 
daß  man  eine  Sache  vertritt,  die  unterm  Strich  politisch  und 
moralisch  nicht  zu  rechtfertigen  ist.  (J-71,  p.  149) 
The  Sinn-Angebot  was  nevertheless  an  important  contributing  factor  in 
influencing  this  IM's  and  'Rolf  s'  initial  agreement  to  co-operate  with  the 
M  fS 
. 
For  IM-Kandidaten  who  were  not  so  pre-disposed  to  the  idea  of 
supporting  the  state,  recruitment  strategy  was  structured  so  as  to  appeal 
more  to  the  personal  needs  and  interests  of  a  candidate,  rather  than  to 
those  of  the  collective. 
3.3  'PERSÖNLICHE  BEDÜRFNISSE  UND  INTERESSEN' 
The  MfS  guidelines  subdivide  this  strategy  for  recruitment  into  material 
needs  ('materielle  Bedürfnisse'),  social  needs  ('soziale  Bedürfnisse'),  and 
intellectual  interests  ('geistige  Interessen')  (J-62,  p.  348). 
3.3.1  'Materielle  Bedürfnisse' 
Material  needs  are  defined  as  those,  'die  auf  das  Erlangen  finanzieller 
Zuwendungen  und  anderer  Vorteile,  auf  die  Befreiung  von  materiellen 
Belastungen  und  Verpflichtungen,  auf  das  Beibehalten  besonderer 
Lebensgewohnheiten  gerichtet  sind'  (J-62,  p.  348).  This  definition  should 
not  be  taken  to  mean  that  a  significant  number  of  IM  received  a  salary  for 
their  services.  This  was  really  only  the  case  for  a  small  minority  and  for 
the  Hauptamtliche  IM.  The  MfS  aimed  to  develop  a  sense  of  loyalty  and 
obligation  rather  than  to  create  a  business  partnership  with  its  informers. 
The  political  tuning  of  the  IM  was  therefore  to  be  achieved  through  'eine 
klug  abgestimmte  Arbeit  mit  Lob  und  Anerkennung  sowie  Kritik'  (J-62,  p. 
324).  Korth,  Jonak  and  Scharbert  observe  that  'Kandidatin  P.  's'  decision 
to  agree  to  co-operate  was  positively  influenced  by  the  help  she  received  in 
securing  her  child  a  place  in  a  psychiatric  clinic  (D-4,  II,  618).  The  authors 100 
view  this  kind  of  enticement  positively,  clearly  distinguishing  it  from 
other  less  desirable  motives: 
Ganz  anders  sind  solche  materielle  Bedürfnisse  zu  bewerten,  die 
Ausdruck  kommerzieller  Grundhaltungen,  egoistischen 
Vorteilsstrebens  sind.  [...  )  Stabile  Motive  sind  auf  der  Grundlage 
solcher  egoistischer  Bedürfnisse  nicht  zu  entwickeln  -  sie  müssen 
durch  immer  neue  Zuwendungen  stets  neu  geschaffen  werden.  (D-4, 
II,  619) 
If,  at  the  Werbungsgespräch,  the  MfS  promised  or  hinted  at  the 
advantages  to  be  gained  from  working  as  an  IM,  then  these  tended  to  be  of 
the  kind  from  which  'Kandidatin  P.  '  benefited,  rather  than  financial 
rewards. 
After  they  began  working  with  the  MfS,  many  IM  did,  however, 
receive  regular  financial  bonuses  and  presents.  'Sonnenblume',  for 
example,  was  presented  with  champagne  and  flowers  on  the  occasion  of 
International  Women's  Day  in  1978.  Her  Führungsoffizier  noted 
afterwards  that  she  seemed  genuinely  pleased  to  receive  these  gifts  (C-8b, 
p.  43). 
Although  the  material  recognition  which  IM  received  may  have 
strengthened  the  desire  to  continue  co-operating  with  the  MfS,  it  cannot, 
in  the  majority  of  cases,  be  seen  as  having  been  a  major  motivational 
factor  at  the  time  of  recruitment. 
3.3.2  'Soziale  Bedürfnisse' 
'Soziale  Bedürfnisse'  are  defined  as  those,  'die  auf  das  Erlangen  eines 
besonderen  Ansehens  und  Rufs,  auf  gesellschaftliche  und  staatliche 
Wertschätzung  und  Vertrauensbeweise,  auf  den  Ersatz  für  tatsächliche 
oder  scheinbare  Benachteiligungen  gerichtet  sind'  (J-62,  p.  348).  It  is 
important  at  this  point  to  consider  that  an  individual  could  not  simply 
approach  the  MfS  and  offer  his/her  services  as  an  IM.  In  fact  the 101 
guidelines  from  1952  warn:  'Bei  Personen,  die  sich  freiwillig  melden,  ist 
besondere  Vorsicht  angebracht.  '  (J-62,  p.  173)  The  candidate  had  been, 
and  this  was  made  clear  to  him/her,  carefully  selected  for  the  task.  The 
effort  which  was  invested  throughout  recruitment  and  during  the  IM- 
Tätigkeit  itself  to  ensure  that  s/he  felt  at  ease  could  have  a  flattering 
effect,  and  perhaps  gave  a  candidate  the  impression  that  such 
recruitments  were  not  everyday  occurrences.  Guidelines  from  the  1950s 
suggest  that  the  Geheimer  Mitarbeiter  should  be  made  to  feel  comfortable 
by  being  received  in  a  clean  and  tidy  flat  where  s/he  was  offered  a  little 
something  to  eat  or  drink:  'Bei  weiblichen  geheimen  Mitarbeitern  ist  auch 
an  Süsswaren  zu  denken.  '  (J-62,  p.  189) 
Potential  IM  were  perhaps  also  influenced  at  recruitment  by  the 
appeal  of  the  enhanced  social  standing  which  they  imagined  would  result 
from  being  affiliated  with  the  MfS.  Since  an  IM  was  under  oath  to  remain 
silent  to  even  close  family  members  about  the  IM-Tätigkeit,  s/he  could, 
however,  only  hope  for  such  recognition  within  the  MfS.  The  enjoyment 
derived  from  such  a  perceived  increase  in  social  standing  had  to  be  a 
private  affair  and  could  only  be  confirmed  by  the  Führungsoffizier.  The 
individual  may  thus  have  believed  that  his/her  societal  ranking  would 
improve  by  conspiring  with  those  in  power,  but,  ironically,  was  unable  to 
actually  enjoy  this  perceived  increase  in  esteem  publicly. 
3.3.3  'Geistige  Interessen' 
The  third  subgroup  in  the  category  of  personal  needs  and  interests  are 
defined  as  those,  'die  auf  neu-  und  andersartige  Tätigkeiten  und 
Wirkungsbereiche,  auf  den  Gewinn  eines  neuen  Lebensinhaltes,  auf  das 
Bekanntwerden  mit  bisher  nicht  zugänglichen  Problemen  und 
Erkenntnissen  gerichtet  sind'  (J-62,  p.  348). 102 
Much  of  the  daily  life  of  an  IM  was  undoubtedly  staggeringly  banal, 
and  the  majority  of  IM  themselves  'das  ganze  Gegenteil  von  James  Bond, 
praktisch  das  Spiegelbild  von  Herrn  und  Frau  Jedermann'  (J-55,  p.  42). 
Yet  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  thrill  of  feeling  just  a  little  bit  like  an  exotic 
spy  was  not  sometimes  influential  in  a  candidate's  decision  to  agree  to 
work  as  an  IM.  The  secrecy  and  intrigue  involved  in  even  just  the 
arrangement  of  the  Kontaktgespräch  or  Werbungsgespräch  was  certainly 
enough  to  stimulate  a  sense  of  adventure  in  some  candidates.  The 
frequently  ensuing  banality  and  routine  of  the  meetings  with  the 
Führungsoffizier  could  not  be  foreseen  at  this  time.  'Thaer'  recounted  the 
decidedly  adventurous  story  of  the  way  in  which  he  was  recruited  as 
follows  (A-5):  As  he  was  travelling  on  the  Transitstrecke  one  day  'Thaer' 
came  into  what  he  took  to  be  a  casual  conversation  with  an  East  German 
guard.  I  After  chatting  to  him  for  some  time  the  guard  offered  to  set  up  a 
meeting  between  Thaer'  and  an  acquaintance  of  his,  with  a  view  to  giving 
Thaer',  who  had  studied  agriculture,  the  opportunity  of  visiting  an  LPG 
(Landwirtschaftliche  liche  Produktionsgenossenschaft).  The  meeting  became  the 
first  in  a  series  of  trips  by  Thaer'  to  the  GDR,  during  which  he  and  the 
border-guard's  'friend'  talked  of  many  things,  including  the  possibility  of 
setting  up  a  youth  exchange  programme  between  the  two  Germanys. 
Thaer'  experienced  his  trips  to  the  East  as  stimulating  and  exciting.  He 
also  began  to  regard  his  East  German  escort  as  a  friend.  Finally,  when  the 
question  was  put  to  him  on  the  morning  after  the  two  men  had  spent  a 
merry  evening  together  at  the  Leipzig  trade  fair,  Thaer'  agreed  without 
much  hesitation  to  co-operate  with  the  MfS. 
If  not  quite  as  prolonged  and  complex  as  that  of  'Thaer',  the 
recruitment  of  an  IM  within  East  Germany  could  be  equally  exciting.  By 
use  of  a  Legende  'Theodor'  was  summoned  to  his  Werbungsgespräch  on  the 
1  The  Transitstrecke  was  the  name  given  to  a  stretch  of  road  running  through  the  GDR 
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14  November  1975  (see  Section  One:  2.4).  The  recruitment  ran  smoothly, 
and  it  was  agreed  that  whenever  'Theodor'  or  his  Führungsoffizier  wished 
to  contact  one  another  they  should  endeavour  to  incorporate  the  words 
'Diaserie  -  DV  10/9'  into  a  fitting  context  within  a  written  or  oral 
communication  (C-2a,  I,  142).  The  use  of  such  code-words  or  -phrases  was 
common  and  perhaps  helped  to  stimulate  the  sense  of  adventure  in  some 
candidates. 
Both  'Thaer'  and  'Theodor'  would,  for  different  reasons,  probably 
have  agreed  without  much  further  ado  to  co-operate  with  the  MfS.  The 
adventure  involved  in  and  around  the  recruitment,  and  the  anticipation  of 
future  mental  stimulation  was  more  of  an  added  bonus  than  the  principal 
motivational  force. 
3.4  'WIEDERGUTMACHUNGSBESTREBUNGEN' 
It  was  not  considered  correct  procedure  to  use  coercion  as  a  means  of 
recruitment.  Seidler  and  Schmidt  found  that  only  7.7%  of  the  IM  they 
analysed  were  recorded  as  having  been  recruited  using 
'kompromittierendes  Material'  (D-6,  I,  6).  Once  again,  it  is  difficult  to 
know  to  what  extent  this  figure  reflects  some  kind  of  objective  reality, 
given  that  both  the  authors  of  the  study  and/or  the  Führungsoffiziere  may 
have  underplayed  their  use  of  this  method  in  light  of  the  fact  that  the  MfS 
guidelines  from  1958  specified  that  this  basis  for  recruitment  was  only  to 
be  used  when  other  possibilities  were  not  available  (J-62,  p.  213).  The 
1979  guidelines  did  not  state  this  explicitly,  but  did  caution  that  if 
recruitment  was  to  be  made  on  the  basis  of 
'Wiedergutmachungsbestrebungen',  approval  had  to  be  sought  in  advance 
from  superiors  (J-62,  p.  349). 
The  key  element  to  this  type  of  recruitment  was  clearly  the 
existence  of  suitable  'kompromittierendes  Material'.  In  the  case  of 104 
'Sonnenblume'  this  took  the  form  of  the  evidence  held  by  the  MIS  that  she 
had  played  a  small  role  in  the  attempt  of  a  woman  to  escape  from  the 
GDR.  Her  task  had  been  to  relay  messages  to  the  woman  from  mutual 
friends  in  West  Germany.  'Sonnenblume'  was  picked  up  from  a  train  as 
she  was  returning  from  a  visit  to  the  FRG,  taken  to  a  nearby  police  station 
and  questioned  through  the  night  about  this  'Kurierdienst'  (C-8a,  p.  67). 
The  MfS  officer  concerned  with  the  proceedings  had  predicted:  'Es  ist  zu 
erwarten,  daß  die  IM-Kandidatin  nach  der  Herausbildung  eines 
Schuldgefühls  ihre  Bereitschaft  für  die  inoffizielle  Zusammenarbeit  mit 
dem  MfS  gibt.  '  (C-8a,  p.  67)  The  next  morning  'Sonnenblume'  did,  indeed, 
sign  a  Verpflichtungserklärung  in  which  she  pledged  'das  Ministerium  für 
Staatssicherheit  auf  der  Basis  der  Wiedergutmachung  bei  der  Klärung 
von  Problemen  und  Realisierung  von  Aufgaben  im  Rahmen  meiner 
Möglichkeiten  zu  unterstützen'  (C-8a,  p.  63).  The  nature  of  the  co- 
operation  was  not  elaborated  upon  at  the  time  of  recruitment,  and 
'Sonnenblume'  describes  the  following  days  and  nights  before  the  first 
meeting  with  her  Führungsoffizier  as  extremely  distressing.  She  did  not 
know  what  lay  before  her:  'Deshalb  schwebte  ich,  ja,  in  dieser 
fürchterlichen  Ungewissheit,  was  passiert  jetzt,  in  der  nächsten  Zeit,  als 
sie  sagten:  "Sie  hören  noch  von  uns.  "'  (A-10,  see  also  J-110,  p.  234) 
The  pattern  of  'Stephana's'  recruitment  bears  strong  similarities  to 
that  of  'Sonnenblume's'.  'Stephana'  was  picked  up  from  her  home  on  22 
May  1985  and  questioned  about  her  role  in  the  attempted  Republikflucht 
of  a  friend  of  hers.  At  the  end  of  the  interrogation  she  signed  an  initial 
commitment  to  the  MfS,  which  was  worded  as  follows:  'Unter  dem  Aspekt 
des  Absehens  von  weiteren  strafprozessualen  Maßnahmen  gegen  meine 
Person,  erkläre  ich  mich  im  Rahmen  der  Wiedergutmachung  zur 
Unterstützung  des  MfS  bereit.  '  (C-6a,  p.  7)  'Stephana'  was  subsequently 
sent  home  and  she  too  experienced  the  following  period  of  uncertainty  as 105 
highly  distressing.  She  says  that  she  suffered  from  a  sort  of 
'Verfolgungswahn',  unable  to  shake  off  the  feeling  that  she  was  being 
constantly  observed  and  followed  (A-8).  Regular  meetings  soon  began  to  be 
set  up  between  'Stephana'  and  MfS  officers  during  which  she  was  asked  to 
give  information  on  the  various  religious  groupings  with  which  she  was 
involved.  Just  over  four  months  after  the  initial  interrogation  'Stephana' 
signed  the  official  Verpflichtung,  committing  herself  to  an  IM-Tätigkeit 
which  would  last  until  right  up  until  the  demise  of  the  MfS  in  late  1989. 
Both  'Stephana'  and  'Sonnenblume'  were  certainly  to  some  extent 
coerced  into  agreeing  to  work  for  the  MfS.  Psychologist  Hans-Joachim 
Maaz  argues,  however,  that  no  IM  can  really  claim  to  have  been  forced  to 
work  for  the  Stasi,  as  otherwise  these  individuals  would  have  come 
forward  after  the  Wende  to  denounce  their  Führungsoffiziere.  The  fact 
that  this  did  not  happen  is  an  indication,  according  to  Maaz,  'daß  zur 
Erpressung  immer  auch  eine  innere  Bereitschaft  oder  eine  bestimmte 
seelische  Konstellation  des  Erpreßten  hinzugerechnet  werden  muß'  (J-55, 
p.  87). 
Evidence  does  seem  to  suggest  that  refusing  to  agree  to  work  as  an 
IM  rarely  led  to  any  negative  repercussions  for  the  person  concerned.  Yet, 
since  this  was  something  which  one  could  only  establish  after  the  fact, 
refusing  to  collaborate  did  require  a  certain  amount  of  courage  and 
potential  risk.  Martin  Schubert  managed  to  dissuade  the  MfS  officers 
trying  to  recruit  him  by  insisting  that  his  wife  join  them  in  their  meeting 
and  by  telling  them  that  he  could  never  keep  a  secret.  His  wife  confirmed 
these  claims.  The  men  went  away  and  Schubert  reflects: 
Im  nachhinein  erschien  es  mir  eigenartig,  daß  sie  sich  damit 
begnügt  haben.  Es  kam  nichts  mehr.  Sie  haben  uns  in  Ruhe 
gelassen.  Ich  war  erstaunt  darüber,  denn  ich  habe  lange  Zeit 
befürchtet,  daß  irgendwas  geschehen  würde.  (J-41,  p.  356) 106 
Further  examples  of  such  resistance  are  given  by  Andreas  Schmidt,  who 
documents  how  one  man  was  able  to  escape  the  Stasi's  clutch  simply  by 
telling  the  MfS  officers  who  approached  him  that  he  was  not  a  'Spitzeltyp' 
(J-80,  p.  169).  Another  man  rarely  turned  up  for  meetings  and  only 
reported  positively  about  others  when  present  (J-80,  p.  171).  Such 
behaviour  was  referred  to  as  'Ausweich-  und  Täuschungsverhalten',  and 
when  it  was  detected  the  MfS  quickly  lost  interest  in  the  candidate  or 
newly  recruited  IM  (J-80,  p.  174). 
The  MfS  was  keen  to  recruit  IM  within  a  positive  motivational 
framework.  This  served  internal  ideology  and,  if  successful,  meant  that 
the  IM  were  more  likely  to  be  reliable.  Even  in  cases  where  the  candidate 
was  to  be  coerced  into  agreeing  to  comply,  the  guidelines  for  recruitment 
emphasise  the  positive  aspect  of  such  co-operation,  that  is  the  atonement, 
the  'Wiedergutmachung'.  A  sense  of  guilt  was  to  be  aroused  in  the 
candidate  in  order  that  s/he  felt  the  need  to  make  good  past 
misdemeanours.  There  was  no  room  in  this  terminology  for  negative 
concepts  such  as  recruitment  on  the  basis  of  fear.  That  is  not  to  say  that 
fear  was  not  at  times  instrumental  in  a  candidate's  decision  to  agree  to 
collaborate.  The  ideological  structures  of  the  MfS  did  not,  however,  allow 
fear  to  be  documented  and  thus  sanctioned  as  a  motivational  factor. 
Inducing  fear  was  certainly  used  as  a  means  of  manipulating  candidates, 
but  this  method  was  rarely  noted  in  the  reports  relating  to  recruitment. 
The  IM  was  to  be  an  ally  in  the  fight  against  the  enemy,  and  it  was 
the  task  of  the  Führungsoffizier  to  educate  the  candidate  or  newly 
recruited  IM  and  so  aim  to  create  a  Sinn-Angebot  for  an  individual  who 
was  initially  negatively  disposed.  In  the  'Konze1ption  zum 
Kontaktgespräch',  drawn  up  on  the  13  September  1985,  'Stephana's' 
Führungsoffizier  planned  that  this  meeting  'soll  dazu  genutzt  werden,  die 
Bindung  der  [X]  an  das  MfS  weiter  zu  festigen,  sowie  ihre  Bereitschaft  zur 107 
inoffiziellen  Zusammenarbeit  mit  dem  MfS  weiter  zu  entwickeln'  (C-6a,  p. 
21).  When,  just  over  two  weeks  later,  'Stephana'  chose  her  cover  name  and 
signed  the  Verpflichtungserklärung  it  was  noted  that  she  had  placed 
emphasis  on  including  the  word  'weiter'  in  her  declaration  (C-6a,  p.  39). 
The  text  of  the  Verpflichtungserklärung  consequently  read  as  follows:  'Ich 
verpflichte  mich  zur  weiteren  konspirativen  inoffiziellen  Zusammenarbeit 
mit  dem  MfS  und  werde  den  Decknamen  "Stephana"  führen.  '  (C-6a,  p.  7) 
'Stephana'  was  clearly  keen  to  understand  the  future  contact  with  the  MfS 
as  a  continuation  of  what  had  gone  before  in  the  months  leading  up  to  the 
official  recruitment.  In  other  words,  it  seems  to  have  been  important  to 
her  to  emphasise  that  her  compliance  was  a  direct  consequence  of  her 
interrogation  and  the  threats  made  against  her.  Although  coercion  was 
used  initially,  the  MfS  will  however  have  been  interested  in  altering  this 
premise  for  collaboration  by  educating  'Stephana'  on  the  'moralische 
Rechtfertigung'  of  aiding  the  fight  against  the  enemy  (D-5,  p.  47): 
Die  Erzeugung  der  richtigen  Gefühle  gegenüber  dem  Feind  stärkt 
die  Überzeugungen  der  IM  von  der  Richtigkeit  der  eigenen 
Aufgabe  und  von  der  Überlegenheit  über  den  Feind  und  muß  sie 
dazu  bringen,  ihn  zu  verachten  und  zu  verabscheuen,  ihm  mit  Haß 
entgegenzutreten.  Aus  solchen  leidenschaftlichen  Haltungen 
ergeben  sich  bei  den  IM  starke  Treibkräfte,  aktiv  gegen  den  Feind 
vorzugehen,  wächst  ihr  Pflichtbewußtsein  und  ihre 
Opferbereitschaft.  (Mielke,  1975,  F-5,  II,  532) 
This  MfS  philosophy  could  never  be  a  reality.  The  IM  network,  if  it  were 
to  be  effective,  depended  on  IM  having  close,  even  intimate  contacts  to  the 
'Feind'.  A  good  IM  was  a  friend  and  neighbour  to  an  individual  whom  the 
MfS  had  placed  under  observation.  The  motivation  behind  an  IM's  co- 
operation  was  rarely  hatred  of  the  enemy  as  defined  by  the  MfS.  Such  an 
explanation  of  motivation  was,  however,  in  accordance  with  the  MfS's 
ideology  and  therefore  found  its  place  in  the  guidelines  relating  to  the 
recruitment  and  subsequent  political  education  of  IM. 108 
In  the  months  following  the  signing  of  the  official 
Verpflichtungserklärung  the  nature  of  the  co-operation  between 
'Stephana'  and  the  MfS  began  to  take  on  a  different  form.  She  began  to  be 
given  more  precise  goal-oriented  tasks  and  to  be  asked  to  report  on 
specific  individuals.  By  complying  with  these  tasks  'Stephana'  slipped 
increasingly  into  the  web  of  deceit  and  intrigue  which  was  part  of  the 
daily  life  of  an  IM,  with  the  result  that  fear  was  no  longer  as  significant  a 
factor  in  motivating  her  actions.  It  is  partly  for  this  reason  that  IM  did  not 
denounce  their  Führungsoffiziere  after  1989.  At  the  time  when  they 
agreed  to  work  as  an  IM  fear  may  well  have  been  a  strong  motivational 
factor  in  signing  the  Verpflichtungserklärung,  but  as  the  contact 
continued  this  became  decreasingly  the  case.  The  MfS  worked  hard  to 
convince  the  newly  recruited  IM  of  the  honourable  nature  of  his/her 
actions  and  the  IM  often  managed  to  rationalise  the  situation,  thus 
suppressing  any  nagging  doubts  about  the  morally  questionable 
compromises  which  s/he  was  making. 
3.5  PASSNITY 
A  further  significant  motivational  basis  which  is  not  documented  in  the 
IM  Richtlinien  may  simply  have  been  the  passivity  factor,  that  is  that  at 
the  moment  when  the  proposal  was  put  to  a  candidate,  the  easiest  option 
was  simply  to  agree.  The  MfS's  policy  of  carefully  selecting  and  seeking 
potential  IM  for  recruitment  meant  that  becoming  an  IM  was  not  the 
result  of  decisive  action  on  the  part  of  the  IM-Kandidat,  but  was  rather 
the  course  of  action  which  demanded  the  least  resistance.  The  Stasi  files 
are  testimony  to  the  fact  that  many  potential  IM  did  reject  the  attempts  of 
the  MfS  to  recruit  them  as  informers,  leading  Lutz  Rathenow  to  describe 
these  documents  as  'ein  Monument  des  Widerstandes,  eine  Chronologie 
der  Zivilcourage  in  der  DDR'  (J-68,  p.  1466).  The  majority  of  those 109 
approached  did  not,  however,  find  the  courage  which  Rathenow  speaks  of. 
'Wolfgang',  for  example,  claimed  that  he  'konnte  auch  nicht  zu  DDR-Zeiten 
Nee  sagen'  (A-7).  'Sonnenblume'  defends  her  compliance  by  arguing  that 
she  is  'nicht  aus  dem  Stoff,  aus  dem  Helden  gemacht  werden',  but  rather 
'lieber  für  einen  Kompromiß'  (A-10). 
Maaz  applies  the  term  'Gehorsamstäter'  to  describe  the  group  of  IM 
who  were  unable  to  resist  the  attempts  of  the  MfS  to  recruit  them  (J-55,  p. 
93).  The  'Gehorsamstäter',  according  to  Maaz,  were  a  relatively  small 
proportion  of  IM,  who  gave  information  'einfach  weil  es  von  ihm  verlangt 
oder  erbeten  wurde,  weil,  das  Neinsagen  nie  geübt,  aus  innerer 
Unsicherheit  und  Abhängigkeit  gar  keine  Verhaltensalternative  zur 
Verfügung  stand'  (J-55,  p.  93).  Perhaps  the  group  of  pure  'Gehorsamstäter' 
was  relatively  small.  Yet  the  inability  to  say  no  was  significant  in  many 
cases.  This  passivity  factor  in  motivation  was  one  which  MfS  recruiting 
officers  must  have  been  aware  of  through  their  dealings  with  IM 
candidates,  but  which,  because  of  its  negative  essence,  did  not  fit  with 
MfS  ideology  and  is  not  to  be  found  in  MfS  guidelines. 
3.6  CONCLUSIONS 
It  is  not  always  easy  to  obtain  objective  statements  from  former  IM 
concerning  their  motivation  for  agreeing  to  collaborate.  An  analysis  of  the 
statements  they  do  make  in  conjunction  with  the  MfS  files  held  on  these 
individuals  does,  however,  facilitate  our  understanding  of  the  mechanisms 
at  work.  For  many  IM-Kandidaten  it  was  the  interplay  of  several  of  the 
various  motivating  factors  discussed  above  which  swayed  their  decision  to 
agree  to  work  for  the  MfS.  This  motivational  basis  did  not  necessarily 
remain  constant  throughout  the  course  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit  (see  Section 
One:  Chapter  5).  Speaking  to  the  Enquete-Kommission  Walter  Schilling 
argued:  'Die  Motive  sind  kein  geeignetes  Kriterium  für  Spitzeltätigkeit.  ' 110 
(F-13,  p.  94)  The  motives  at  recruitments  may,  indeed,  not  be  sufficient 
justification  for  an  individual's  subsequent  actions  as  an  IM.  In  any 
confrontation  with  this  aspect  of  the  Stasi  legacy  it  is,  however,  vital  to 
understand  the  methodological  and  cognitive  mechanisms  which  were 
involved  in  such  a  recruitment,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  MfS  and  from 
that  of  the  IM. 111 
Section  One:  Chapter  Four 
BETWEEN  THEORY  AND  PRACTICE: 
A  DAY  IN  THE  LIFE  OF  AN  INOFFIZIELLER  MITARBEITER 112 
4.1  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  WORK  WITH  IM 
4.1.1  Theory 
The  IM's  essential  task  was  to  deliver  information  which  would  allow  the 
MfS  to  construct  plans  to  destroy  or  neutralise  the  enemy.  Such 
information  was  termed  operativ  bedeutsam  and  defined  as  follows: 
Information  über  Ereignisse,  Handlungen,  Personen, 
Einrichtungen,  Gegenstände  und  Zusammenhänge  zwischen 
diesen,  die  es  ermöglicht,  bestehende  oder  zu  erwartende  -  Sicherheitserfordernisse  herauszuarbeiten  bzw.  zu  realisieren  und 
daher  geeignet  ist,  zur  Bestimmung  und  wirksamen  Durchführung 
konkreter  politisch-operativer  Maßnahmen  beizutragen.  (F-3,  p. 
171) 
In  order  to  obtain  this  kind  of  information  it  was  necessary  for  the  MfS  to 
stay  in  close  contact  with  the  IM,  and  the  Operativer  Mitarbeiter  was  to 
plan  thoroughly  all  meetings  with  his  informers.  The  Treffbericht 
contained  a  report  of  this  preparation  and  of  the  subsequent  meeting  (J- 
62,  pp.  179-85).  Meetings  were  to  take  place  in  locations  specified  for  this 
purpose,  that  is  in  so-called  Konspirative  Wohnungen  (KW)  or 
Konspirative  Objekte  (KO).  If,  in  an  exceptional  case,  a  Führungsoffizier 
planned  a  rendezvous  outside  a  KW  or  KO,  this  intention  was  theoretically 
to  be  cleared  in  advance  with  a  superior  (J-62,  p.  333).  There  were  to  be 
three  important  components  to  the  meetings: 
das  persönliche  Gespräch  mit  dem  inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiter, 
die  Berichterstattung  des  inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiters, 
die  Auftragserteilung  und  Instruierung.  (J-62,  p.  223) 
Operative  Mitarbeiter  underwent  training  on  how  to  most  effectively  carry 
out  meetings  with  IM.  They  would,  for  example,  be  played  a  tape  of  a 
meeting  between  a  Führungsoffizier  and  an  IM.  OM  were  then  given  the 
task  of  evaluating  the  reported  information  and  then  deciding  what  tasks 
the  IM  ought  to  be  given  for  completion  before  the  next  meeting  (D-11). 113 
OM  were  also  asked  to  consider  that  throughout  the  course  of  the  IM- 
Tätigkeit  IM  were  to  be  challenged  and  stimulated  and  that  it  was  to  be 
avoided  at  all  costs  that  the  format  of  these  meetings  became  routine  and 
predictable  (J-62,  p.  180,  D-10,  p.  8). 
4.1.2  Practice 
The  reality  of  the  daily  work  with  the  IM  did  not  always  correspond  to  the 
theory.  OM  who  met  with  the  same  IM  on  a  regular  basis  over  a  period  of 
many  years  were  bound  to  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  prevent  the 
format  of  these  meetings  becoming  routine.  That  meetings  often  did  begin 
to  follow  a  set  pattern  is  reflected  in  the  Treffberichte.  On  numerous 
occasions  the  wording  of  the  notes  relating  to  the  preparation  and 
execution  of  the  meetings  with  IM  'Falke'  is  either  very  similar  or 
exactly  the  same  (C-3b,  II,  7-8,26-27,83-84).  On  the  whole,  the  content  of 
the  meetings  with  this  particular  IM  does  not  seem  to  have  varied 
significantly  over  the  years.  'Falke'  was  usually  asked  to  give  a  character 
description  of  a  colleague  or  describe  reactions  among  colleagues  to  a 
particular  event. 
Sometimes  the  information  which  'Falke'  gave  was  judged  as  being 
operativ  bedeutsam,  often  it  was  not.  Indeed,  evidence  suggests  that  at 
any  one  time  the  majority  of  IM  was  not  actively  involved  in  Operative 
Vorgänge.  The  situation  was  so  acute  that  in  1971  Mielke  complained  that 
'nur  ca.  5%  der  in  einem  Jahr  von  den  IM  erarbeiteten  Berichte  auf 
Operativvorgänge  bzw.  Vorlaufakten  Operativ  entfallen'  (F-5,  I,  346). 
Seidler  and  Schmidt  found  that  77.6%  of  the  IM  included  in  their  study 
were  neither  active  in  'Operativ-Vorgängen'  nor  'Vorläufen-Operativ',  and 
furthermore,  that  as  many  as  24.2%  had  never  been  involved  with  such 
work  (D-6,  I,  183). 114 
The  entire  IM  network  was  then  in  many  ways  chaotically  and 
inefficiently  managed.  In  1971  checks  showed  that  for  some  considerable 
time  no  meetings  had  been  held  with  up  to  30%  of  IM  registered  active  (F- 
5)  I,  295).  This  situation  may  have  arisen  partly  because  of  the  uneven 
distribution  of  IM  among  Führungsoffiziere.  Young  colleagues  tended  to  be 
given  a  disproportionately  high  workload,  with  some  having  a  network  of 
up  to  thirty  IM,  while  departmental  heads  often  had  no  informers  at  all 
under  their  guidance  (F-5,  I,  292,299).  It  is  likely  that  these  young  OM 
were  swamped  by  the  vast  administrative  commitment  which  each  IM 
case  required,  and  were  at  times  unable  to  meet  demands  adequately. 
Standard  administrative  procedure  was  certainly  not  always  strictly 
observed.  Documents  in  the  files  are  often  not  in  chronological  order,  and 
much  of  the  material  is  inefficiently  duplicated  several  times  by  hand. 
Although  Treffberichte  were  to  be  written  up  within  twenty-four  hours, 
there  are  often  delays  of  several  days  between  the  date  on  which  such 
documentation  was  completed  and  the  date  of  the  meeting  itself  (J-62,  p. 
224).  The  sheer  volume  of  paperwork  involved  in  any  one  IM  case  meant 
that  those  OM  who  were  in  charge  of  up  to  thirty  IM  were  under 
considerable  pressure  and  perhaps  simply  did  not  find  the  time  to  consider 
how  their  IM  could  be  put  to  more  effective  use. 
Many  of  these  young  Operative  Mitarbeiter  may  also  have  been 
insufficiently  familiar  with  some  of  the  most  basic  principles  of  the  work 
with  IM.  In  order  to  check  if  Richtlinie  1  /58  had  been  internalised  a  test 
was  carried  out  with  OM.  In  the  grading  system  for  this  test  heads  of 
department  were  instructed,  as  would  be  expected:  'Mit  "gut"  werden  die 
Mitarbeiter  bewertet,  die  den  gesamten  Lehrstoff  gut  kennen  und  ihn  klar 
darlegen.  '  (F-5,  I,  132)  Yet,  somewhat  less  predictably,  the  instructions 
continue:  `Genügend"  erhalten  die  Mitarbeiter,  die  wichtige  Teile  des 
Lehrstoffs  nicht  kennen.  '  (F-5,  I,  132)  This  grading  system  effectively 115 
meant  that  it  was  possible  for  an  OM  to  pass  the  test  even  if  he  were  not 
familiar  with  important  aspects  of  the  material  being  examined.  The  MfS 
was  aware  of  such  problems  and  consequently  pedagogic  material 
compiled  for  the  Juristische  Hochschule  warned  that  deficiencies  in  the 
system  resulted  partly  from  the  fact  that  officers  were  not  recognising 
information  as  being  operativ  bedeutsam  and  were  thus  unable  to  fully 
exploit  the  potential  of  the  IM  (D-10,  pp.  14-15).  Another  study  found  that 
110  of  260  IM  whose  IM-Tätigkeit  had  been  brought  to  an  end  on  the 
grounds  that  the  contacts  were  no  longer  fruitful,  actually  had  contacts  to 
individuals  whom  the  MfS  had  identified  as  'operativ  interessant'  (D-7,  I, 
13). 
It  was  then  completely  within  the  realms  of  possibility  that  an  IM 
could  complete  an  IM-Tätigkeit  without  ever  having  delivered  information 
which  was  judged  useful  to  the  MfS.  When  'Sonnenblume'  ended  her  IM- 
Tätigkeit,  for  example,  her  Führungsoffizier  was  not  particularly  sorry  to 
see  her  go  since  he  felt  that  the  work  with  her  had  not  produced  any 
'operativ  verwertbare  Ergebnisse'  (C-8a,  p.  149).  The  MfS  was  not 
interested  in  maintaining  contact  to  those  who  could  not  supply  them  with 
the  kind  of  information  they  needed,  and  for  this  reason  'Theodor's'  IM- 
Tätigkeit  was  ended  in  1985  by  the  MfS.  It  was  reasoned  that  the 
collaboration  was  no  longer  necessary,  since  officers  had  contact  to 
'Theodor'  on  a  daily  basis  anyway  at  work,  and  since  the  IM-Tätigkeit  was 
no  longer  producing  'wesentliche  op.  [operative]  Momente'  (C-2a,  II,  181). 
If  it  was  often  the  case  that  the  Führungsoffiziere  did  not  recognise 
information  as  being  operativ  bedeutsam,  then  it  is  possible  that  both 
'Sonnenblume'  and  'Theodor'  were  actually  delivering  potentially 
significant  reports  and  that  it  would  have  been  in  the  interests  of  the  MfS 
to  maintain  contact  with  them.  Conversely,  IM  who  really  were  of  no  use 
to  the  MfS  were  often  kept  on  the  records  in  order  to  boost  overall 116 
numbers,  and  Mielke  often  complained  that  all  too  frequently  IM  were 
being  recruited  for  quantitative  rather  than  qualitative  reasons  (F-5,  I, 
447).  Some  Führungsoffiziere  may  thus  have  over-  rather  than 
undervalued  the  significance  of  information  they  received  from  their  IM. 
'Thaer'  feels,  for  example,  that  more  fuss  was  made  of  him  and  the 
information  he  gave  than  was  really  warranted  (A-5).  This  may  well  have 
been  the  case,  yet  'Thaer'  could  not  know  where,  when,  or  in  what  manner 
the  apparently  banal  reports  he  gave  were  used  by  the  MfS. 
4.1.3  Apparent  Banality  and  the  Mosaic 
Konrad  Weiss  described  the  Stasi  files  as  being  'so  banal  und  falsch  wie 
Pornogr104  ie'  (1-45,  p.  6).  Many  of  the  character  descriptions  to  be  found 
in  the  files  are  certainly  concerned  with  the  drinking  habits  or  sexual 
exploits  of  the  person  under  observation.  A  key  issue  in  reports  also  seems 
to  have  been  the  question  of  whether  the  individual  under  surveillance 
had  a  well-ordered  family  life.  It  was,  however,  precisely  this  sort  of 
seemingly  trivial  and  banal  personal  information  which  could  be 
extremely  useful  to  the  MfS.  Such  information  could  potentially  be  used  as 
compromising  material,  and  it  also  helped  construct  a  comprehensive 
personality  profile  of  the  enemy,  which  would  facilitate  the  creation  of 
plans  to  destroy  him/her.  Reports  concerning  the  sexual  tendencies  or 
behaviour  of  an  individual  could  be  used  for  blackmail.  Other  apparently 
banal  personal  information  also  often  found  application.  Reports,  for 
example,  that  Gerd  and  Ulrike  Poppe's  marriage  was  going  through  a 
rough  patch  led  to  the  planning  of  measures  to  deepen  this  rift,  among 
other  things  by  setting  a  male  IM  on  Ulrike,  whose  task  it  was  to  seduce 
her  (1-37). 
The  MfS  was  interested  in  the  private  affairs  not  only  of  those 
whom  it  sought  to  destroy,  but  also  of  its  own  IM.  'Theodor',  who  was 117 
requested  to  get  his  family  life  in  order  when  it  was  discovered  that  his 
wife  was  having  an  affair  with  a  work  colleague  of  his,  compared  the 
morality  of  the  MfS  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  to  that  of  the  Catholic  Church 
(A-2).  IM  'Falke's'  private  life  was  also  a  subject  which  concerned  the  MfS. 
'Falke'  was  told  that  he  should  re-marry  his  ex-wife,  with  whom  he  had 
rekindled  his  relationship  (C-3a,  p.  212).  The  often  absurd  attempts  to 
maintain  a  factual  objectivity  when  documenting  such  incidents  is  evident 
in  one  of  the  Treffberichte  written  by  'Falke's'  Führungsoffizier,  who  noted: 
'In  bezug  auf  die  Befragung  nach  privaten  und  familiären  Sorgen  und 
Problemen,  äußerte  die  Quelle  in  dieser  Richtung  keine  Belange.  Zu  der 
Frage  nach  Beziehungen  zu  Frauen,  verneinte  die  Quelle.  '  (C-3b,  II,  94) 
Much  of  the  other  material  contained  in  the  files  seems  at  first 
glance  equally  trivial.  There  are  many  sketches  of  people's  flats  to  be 
found,  some  of  which  come  with  staggeringly  precise  measurement  details. 
'Theodor',  for  example,  made  an  extremely  detailed  plan  of  a  colleague's 
flat,  including  measurements  not  just  for  the  perimeter  of  the  various 
rooms,  but  also  for  the  stove  and  the  door  opening  size  (C-2b,  pp.  26-29). 
'Katrin'  reported  that  a  fellow  student  returned  from  visits  home  with 
many  products  from  the  West,  ranging  'von  Kosmetikartikeln  bis  zum 
Puddingpulver'  (C-7b,  p.  50).  Sometimes  it  is  the  clumsy  way  in  which  this 
information  is  recorded  which  increases  its  apparent  triviality,  yet  reports 
of  this  kind  were  potentially  of  considerable  use  to  the  MfS,  for  example,  if 
MfS  officers  were  able  from  a  sketch  of  a  flat  to  decide  where  to  plant 
bugging  devices. 
In  the  majority  of  cases  the  potential  harm  which  could  have  been 
caused  by  such  reports  was  not  realised.  The  IM  who  claims  that  his/her 
reports  never  caused  any  harm  can,  however,  never  know  this.  The 
seemingly  harmless  pieces  of  information  which  the  IM  gave  were  like 
fragments  of  a  mosaic  and  often  only  became  meaningful  when  combined 118 
with  information  from  other  IM.  The  MfS  did  not  like  to  take  chances  and 
checked  and  double-checked  information  which  was  considered  important. 
The  information  given  by  an  IM  was,  furthermore,  not  necessarily  of 
immediate  use,  but  was  often  filed  and  stored  for  later  application  (D-1,  p. 
5).  IM  were  also  never  supposed  to  know  more  than  was  necessary  to 
obtain  the  required  information  and  Legenden  were  sometimes  created  by 
the  Führungsoffizier  as  to  why  particular  information  was  being 
requested.  These  Legenden  ensured  that  the  IM  did  not  gain  insight  into 
the  'operatives  Wissen'  of  an  OM  (D-2,  p.  17).  Pedagogic  material  from  the 
Juristische  Hochschule  underlined  this  point: 
Selbst  ein  qualifizierter  IM  kann  im  konkreten  nicht  einschätzen, 
welche  detaillierte  Fragen  z.  B.  in  der  Vorgangsbearbeitung  zu 
lösen,  welche  Beweise  in  erster  Linie  zu  erarbeiten  und  zu  sichern 
sind,  da  er  stets  nur  einen  begrenzten  Einblick  in  die  operative 
Arbeit  hat  und  haben  darf.  (D-3,  pp.  3-4) 
IM  often  do  not  consider  the  potential  consequences  of  this 
amassing  of  small,  apparently  harmless  pieces  of  information  when  they 
claim,  as  do  the  majority  who  speak  out  publicly,  that  the  reports  they 
gave  were  harmless.  Since  most  of  the  reports  seemed  trivial,  the  IM  will 
have  been  less  aware  in  this  pervading  atmosphere  of  banality  that  s/he 
invariably  let  information  slip  which  was  potentially  more  harmful. 
4.1.4  Serious  Sleuthing 
Although  often  harmless,  or  at  least  apparently  so,  the  meetings  with  the 
IM  had  one  clear  objective: 
Die  zielstrebige  Bearbeitung  feindlich  tätiger  oder  verdächtiger 
Personen  in  Vorgängen  mit  dem  Ziel  der  beschleunigten 
Nachweisführung  und  Beendigung  der  staatsfeindlichen  Tätigkeit 
sowie  deren  schnellen  und  wirkungsvollen  Liquidierung.  (F-5,  I, 
279) 119 
In  rarer  cases  'Liquidierung'  literally  meant  the  physical  destruction  of 
the  enemy,  and  Wolf  Biermann  found  evidence  in  his  files  that  the  Stasi 
had  planned  to  tamper  with  his  car  brakes  (1-12).  More  often  the  enemy 
was  to  be  psychologically  tortured.  This  could  be  achieved  by  a  variety  of 
methods.  Sometimes,  as  in  the  case  of  Gerd  Poppe,  rumours  were  spread 
that  someone  who  was  actually  being  observed  and  manipulated  was 
him/herself  collaborating  with  the  MfS  (1-37).  Even  after  state  enemies 
were  forced  to  leave  the  GDR  they  did  not  escape  the  evil  of  the  MfS. 
When  Jürgen  Fuchs  arrived  in  West  Berlin  after  being  forced  to  leave  the 
GDR,  so  too  did  an  informer  who  had  also  been  in  captivity  in  the  GDR.  It 
was  this  man's  task  to  spread  disinformation  about  any  accounts  Fuchs 
might  give  of  the  harshly  unjust  treatment  he  had  received  in  the  GDR 
prior  to  his  departure  (J-27,  p.  78).  Although  only  a  small  proportion  of  the 
information  supplied  by  IM  was  ever  used  for  such  measures,  when  it  was 
it  could  have  grave  consequences  for  those  whose  existence  and  political 
stance  was  a  burden  for  the  MfS. 
Former  IM  may  have  an  unrealistic  idea  of  how  much  information 
they  actually  gave,  since  their  willingness  to  compromise  their  principles 
and  gradually  allow  the  Führungsoffizier  to  extract  more  intimate  and 
detailed  reports  tended  to  increase  gradually  throughout  the  course  of  the 
IM-Tätigkeit.  The  first  reports  which  an  IM  was  asked  to  give  were  often 
fairly  general,  and  it  was  only  later  that  s/he  was  requested  to  inform  on 
specific  individuals.  When  'Theodor'  looks  back  now  on  his  IM-Tätigkeit  he 
realises  how  he  gradually  compromised  himself:  '...  daß  ich  später  vor 
allen  Dingen  auf  bestimmte  Personen  angesetzt  wurde  ... 
ja 
... 
ja,  wissen 
Sie,  da  rutscht  man  dann  so  Stück  für  Stück  rein.  '  (A-2)  'Stephana',  too, 
began  her  IM-Tätigkeit  determined  not  to  compromise  herself  completely. 
When  she  signed  the  Verpflichtungserklärung  she  informed  her 
Führungsoffizier  that  there  were  specific  areas  of  her  life  on  which  she  did 120 
not  wish  to  give  reports.  He  assured  her  that  the  MfS  could  accept  this. 
When  a  superior  checked  through  the  file,  however,  he  noted  in  the 
margin  at  the  point  where  the  Führungsoffizier  had  reported  this 
conversation:  'Warum  so  absolute  Zusage?  '  (C-6a,  p.  39)  The 
Führungsoffizier  was  thus  under  pressure  to  encourage  'Stephana'  not  to 
withhold  any  information  in  which  the  MfS  might  be  interested. 
'Stephana'  does  admit  that  her  Führungsoffizier  was  skilled  at  getting  her 
to  talk  of  specific  events  and  casually  slipping  in  questions  about 
particular  participants  there  (A-8).  The  fact  that  the  MfS  had  various 
sources  reporting  on  these  events  gave  'Stephana'  the  impression  that  her 
Führungsoffizier  knew  everything  anyway,  and  that  there  was  no  point  in 
trying  to  keep  anything  hidden  from  him:  'Auch,  wenn  ich  was  nicht 
erzählt  habe,  ich  kam  eigentlich  nicht  dazu,  irgendwas  zu  verschweigen. 
Man  wußte,  daß  ich  dann  und  dann  bei  den  Zeugen  Jehovahs  war.  '  (A-8) 
Almost  hidden  within  the  triviality  of  the  majority  of  any  one  IM's 
reports  there  are  usually  moments  where  his/her  behaviour  was  most 
definitely  that  of  a  Spitzel,  a  snoop.  The  majority  of  'Sonnenblume's' 
reports  were  without  doubt  overwhelmingly  positive  character 
descriptions  of  her  friends  and  acquaintances.  She  tells  me  that  she 
decided  only  to  write  positively  of  others  in  the  hope  that  perhaps  such  a 
report  could  actually  help  someone  (A-10).  Yet,  in  the  course  of  her  contact 
to  the  MfS,  'Sonnenblume'  searched  her  friends'  flat  for  evidence  that  they 
were  involved  in  helping  people  to  escape  from  the  GDR,  taking  photos 
which  she  subsequently  handed  over  to  her  Führungsoffizier  (C-8a,  p. 
103).  Another  example  of  serious  sleuthing  is  found  in  the  case  of  'Falke', 
who  is  one  of  many  IM  who  were  at  some  point  asked  to  intensify  their 
friendship  with  a  particular  person  whom  the  Stasi  wished  to  place  under 
closer  surveillance.  In  order  to  achieve  this  aim  'Falke'  uses  the  chance  of 
'ein  Angebot  des  [X]  zum  gemeinsamen  abendtlichen  [sic]  Laufen  mit  den 121 
Ehefrauen'  (C-3b,  II,  235).  It  is  also  noted  that  'Falke'  has  suggested  that 
he  and  [X]  go  fishing  together  in  order  that  he  has  the  possibility  to  view 
the  man's  cottage  (C-3b,  II,  235). 
The  daily  life  of  an  IM  could  on  occasion  even  be  excitingly 
dangerous.  IM  'Theodor',  for  example,  was  given  the  task  of  obtaining  a 
key  from  a  colleague's  flat  to  allow  a  copy  to  be  made  of  it.  Preparations 
for  this  event  involved  determining  the  type  of  lock  and  at  what  times  the 
key  was  left  in  the  door.  Apparently,  as  'Theodor'  tells  me  when  he  relates 
this  same  story,  keys  were  often  left  in  the  doors  of  flats  at  this  time, 
when,  for  example,  as  in  this  case,  the  children  of  the  family  were  out 
playing  (A-2).  After  the  plan  had  been  successfully  realised  'Theodor' 
placed  the  key  on  the  floor  near  the  flat  door  to  give  the  impression  that 
children  had  removed  it  and  thrown  it  back  there.  Since  the  MfS  was  keen 
to  check  whether  this  ruse  had  worked,  'Theodor'  was  instructed  to 
continue  observing  the  flat  in  order  to  determine  if  the  key  was  left  in  door 
after  this  incident.  If  it  was,  this  would  suggest  that  the  occupants' 
suspicions  had  not  been  aroused  (C-2b,  pp.  53-54,61-62). 
4.1.5  Scruples 
Apart  from  the  obvious  time  commitment  involved  in  a  venture  such  as 
obtaining  the  key  in  the  above  example,  this  type  of  task  often  led  to 
scruples  being  aroused  on  the  part  of  the  IM,  and  'Theodor'  did,  in  fact, 
use  the  word  'Spitzel'  to  refer  to  himself  during  our  conversation  (A-2).  He 
says  that  at  the  time  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit  he  did  not  always  consider 
himself  such,  but  recalled  that  he  certainly  did  when  he  was  instructed  on 
one  occasion  to  hide  in  a  doorway  and  monitor  whether  a  man  under  MfS 
surveillance  received  visitors  from  the  West.  Of  course,  it  is  possible  that 
'Theodor'  may  not  really  have  been  experiencing  scruples  at  this  point,  but 
rather  humiliation  at  being  given  and  carrying  out  such  a  lowly  task, 122 
which  he,  since  he  was  after  all  an  officer  at  a  military  college,  may  have 
considered  beneath  him.  Many  IM,  including  'Theodor',  do  seem,  however, 
to  have  suffered  from  genuine  scruples  at  some  point  during  their  IM- 
Tätigkeit.  At  the  first  meeting  after  her  recruitment  'Sonnenblume'  made 
an  attempt  to  break  the  agreement  she  had  made  with  the  MfS  (C-8b,  p. 
4).  After  she  was  unsuccessful  in  this  venture  she  began  reluctantly  to  co- 
operate  with  the  wishes  of  her  Führungsoffizier,  but  the  doubts  remained, 
and  at  a  later  date  he  noted  that  'Sonnenblume'  had  told  him  how  she  had 
experienced  scruples  when  searching  her  friends'  flat  (C-8b,  p.  84).  There 
is  evidence  in  the  files  that  at  some  point  during  their  time  as  an  IM  most 
of  those  with  whom  I  spoke  did  express  doubts  to  their  Führungsoffizier. 
IM  'Rolf  experienced  scruples  very  early  on  in  his  contact  to  the  MfS  after 
writing  a  report  about  someone  for  the  first  time.  The  Führungsoffizier 
asked  'Rolf  if  he  felt  like  a  'Spitzel'  or  'Denunziant':  'Zögernd  bejahte  er 
diese  Frage.  Dem  Kandidaten  wurde  daraufhin  der  Unterschied  zwischen 
einem  Spitzel  und  einem  inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiter  der  Staatssicherheit 
erläutert.  '  (C-1a,  p.  278)  The  Führungsoffizier  succeeded  at  this  stage  in 
reassuring  'Rolf,  but  during  the  following  months  this  IM's  doubts 
continued  to  resurface.  The  whole  nature  of  'Rolf  s'  meetings  with  the  MfS 
was  suspect  to  him: 
Und  das  muß  ich  dazu  sagen,  während  das  im  Rathaus  ja  noch  so 
einen  offiziellen  Charakter  hatte,  mit  ja,  ja,  wir  waren  ja  in  der 
Dienststelle,  fiel  das  dann  in  so  eine  Wohnung  in  [X],  das  war  so 
eine  Konspirative  Wohnung,  wo  nachmittags  anonym  der 
Kaffeetisch  gedeckt  wird,  und  da  sind  wir  beispielsweise  um  16 
Uhr  bestellt,  und  da  steht  Kuchen  auf  dem  Tisch  und  Kaffee  und 
dann  irgendwie,  merken  Sie,  hier  stimmt  doch  'was  nicht,  na.  Das 
war  immer  so  dieser  Eindruck,  man  geht  so  die  Hintertreppe  hoch, 
darf  vorher  nicht  gesehen  werden,  und  soll  ja  unbedingt 
aufpassen,  daß  ihn  keiner  sieht  aus  der  Bekanntschaft.  Wenn  ich 
da  hingegangen  bin,  wurde  mir  gesagt:  'Also,  du  gehst  zur 
Versammlung',  und  all  das  hatte  immer  mehr  so  diesen  kriminellen 
Aspekt  gehabt.  (A-1) 123 
'Rolf  soon  ended  the  IM-Tätigkeit  on  his  own  initiative.  For  other 
potential  IM  the  doubts  were  too  strong  at  the  time  of  planned 
recruitment  to  get  involved  at  all.  One  man  simply  told  the  MfS  officer, 
'daß  er  sich  nicht  in  die  Rolle  eines  'Spitzels'  der  Staatssicherheit  begeben 
möchte  und  vielleicht  dabei  'Kumpels'  verpfeifen  soll'  (from  a  report 
written  by  the  OM,  J-80,  p.  167).  The  OM  concluded:  'Es  machen  sich 
weitere  Kontaktgespräche  notwendig,  um  den  Kandidaten  politisch- 
ideologisch  davon  zu  überzeugen,  daß  der  Begriff  'Spitzel'  ein  Begriff  des 
Gegners  ist,  um  gegen  die  Arbeiterklasse  und  ihre  Errungenschaften 
vorzugehen.  '  (J-80,  p.  167)  These  further  talks  were,  however,  to  no  avail, 
and  the  man  never  signed  a  Verpflichtungserklärung  and  became  an  IM. 
4.1.6  Summary 
Although  there  was  a  considerable  amount  of  discrepancy  between  theory 
and  practice,  the  work  with  IM  followed  in  general  the  basic  principles  of 
the  guidelines  set  down.  IM  were  instrumental  in  supplying  the  M/S  with 
information  which  could  be  potentially  used  to  destroy  or  neutralise  the 
enemy.  Often  this  information  had  an  apparently  banal  character  to  it, 
and  most  IM  thus  claim  that  their  IM-Tätigkeit  never  harmed  anyone.  It 
may  well  be  true  that  no  direct  harm  was  ever  caused  by  an  individual  IM, 
but  s/he  can  never  be  sure  that  this  was  the  case.  Giving  seemingly  banal 
information  could  have  serious  consequences,  either  at  the  time  of 
reporting  or  at  a  later  date.  This  was  especially  true  when  information 
was  amassed  from  a  variety  of  sources.  Furthermore,  there  were  moments 
in  most  IM's  careers  when  s/he  was  more  than  aware  of  the  potential 
harm  which  could  be  caused  to  others  as  a  result  of  the  reports  s/he  gave. 
For  this  reason  many  IM  experienced  doubts  or  scruples  at  some  point 
during  the  IM-Tätigkeit.  One.  of  the  most  significant  factors  in 
determining  whether  an  IM-Kandidat  would  begin  to  co-operate  with  the 124 
MfS  and  whether  s/he  would  continue  the  co-operation  in  spite  of  such 
doubts  was  the  relationship  between  the  IM  and  the  Führungsoffizier. 
4.2  THE  FÜHRUNGSOFFIZIER:  I  FRIEND  AND  HELPER? 
4.2.1  General:  Defining  the  IM/Führungsoffizier  Bond 
The  MfS  placed  great  importance  on  the  well-being  of  its  IM,  and 
Operative  Mitarbeiter  were  advised  to  keep  sight  of  the  fact  that  'die  IM 
die  Hauptlast  in  der  Auseinandersetzung  mit  dem  Feind  tragen  und  mit 
ihm  am  direktesten  konfrontiert  sind'  (D-4,  I,  55).  The  informer  was  to  be 
treated  at  all  times  with  the  utmost  respect,  and  the  OM  was  instructed  to 
develop  'echte  zwischenmenschliche  Beziehungen'  with  his  IM  (D-9,  p.  47). 
The  establishment  of  such  a  genuine  interpersonal  relationship  was 
thought  to  be  of  considerable  importance  in  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the 
work  with  the  IM.  When  questioned  on  the  factors  which  they  considered 
to  have  most  positively  influenced  their  co-operation  with  the  MfS,  84.1% 
of  IM  felt  that  a  good  relationship  to  the  Führungsoffizier  was  significant 
(D-6)  II,  Appendix  32).  In  comparison,  only  6.1%  ticked  the  factor  of 
'material  recognition'  as  being  positively  significant  (D-6,  II,  Appendix  32). 
It  cannot  be  ruled  out,  however,  that  the  low  percentage  of  IM  who 
identified  material  reward  as  positively  influencing  their  work  may  be 
partly  accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  some  IM  were  wary  of  admitting  that 
they  valued  such  rewards,  imagining  perhaps  that  this  response  would  be 
unfavourably  regarded. 
The  'echte  zwischenmenschliche  Beziehung'  which  the 
Führungsoffizier  strove  to  cultivate  with  his  IM  could  be  manifested  in  the 
various  forms  and  intensities  discussed  below. 
1  The  term  Führungsoffizier  was  not  widely  used  within  the  MfS,  but  is  much  more 
commonly  applied  in  the  Stasi  debate  than  the  formally  more  correct  term  Operativer 
Mitarbeiter,  even,  it  seems,  by  former  MfS  officers  themselves  (J-62,  p.  17). 125 
4.2.2  Equal 
Some  IM  claim  that  they  regarded  their  Führungsoffizier  as  a  colleague 
and  thus  an  equal.  'Theodor',  for  example,  had  great  respect  for  his  first 
Führungsoffizier,  but  did  not  even  consider  this  man's  successor  an  equal, 
describing  him  as  a  'Niete'  with  low  intellectual  ability  (A-2).  The 
relationship  of  an  IM  to  his/her  Führungsoffizier  was,  however,  only  ever 
superficially  one  of  equals.  When  put  to  the  test  the  power  hierarchy  was 
soon  evident.  It  was  the  Führungsoffizier  who  dictated  what  form  the 
meetings  with  the  IM  were  to  take  and  which  tasks  s/he  was  to  carry  out. 
Despite  his  lack  of  respect  for  the  man's  intellectual  capabilities  'Theodor' 
and  the  majority  of  other  IM  generally  complied  with  the  wishes  of  the 
Führungsoffizier.  'Thaer'  may  well,  as  he  claims,  have  considered  his 
Führungsoffizier  an  equal  in  many  respects,  but  since  'Thaer'  was  a  West 
German  citizen  who  was  betraying  his  country  by  conspiring  with  the 
MfS,  the  power  that  this  man  held  over  him  was  considerable.  'Thaer' 
describes  the  fear  he  experienced  at  the  thought  of  the  West  German 
authorities  finding  out  about  his  secret  life,  and  his  Führungsoffizier  was 
quick  to  remind  him  just  how  serious  the  matter  was.  When,  in  somewhat 
mysterious  circumstances,  'Thaer'  lost  a  briefcase  fitted  with  a  hidden 
compartment  which  had  been  given  to  him  by  the  MfS,  he  remembers  the 
chill  he  experienced  when  his  Führungsoffizier  said  in  response  to  this 
news:  "'Dafür  gehörst  du  an  die  Wand  gestellt.  "'  (A-5)  Moments  such  as 
these  were,  however,  relatively  rare,  and  the  pervading  ambience  of  this 
particular  IM/Führungsoffizier  bond,  as  of  many  others,  may  well  have 
been  that  of  a  relationship  of  equals. 
4.2.3  Friend 
In  some  cases  the  relationship  between  the  IM  and  the  Führungsoffizier 
went  beyond  that  of  colleagues  and  was  perceived,  at  least  on  the  part  of 126 
the  IM,  as  a  friendship.  'Stephana'  said  that  she  felt  she  could  talk  to  her 
Führungsoffizier  'wie  mit  einem  guten  Kumpel'  (A-8).  Evidence  suggests 
that  'Stephana's'  sentiments  were  shared  by  a  significant  number  of  IM. 
In  one  study,  ten  out  of  twenty-one  IM  compared  their  Führungsoffizier  to 
a  friend  or  even  best  friend  (D-8,  p.  7).  Any  trust  or  openness  which  was 
established  through  this  friendship  remained  ultimately  one-sided.  The 
Führungsoffizier  was  instructed  to  give  the  IM  the  impression  that  the 
relationship  was  a  friendship,  but  since  IM  were,  for  example,  never  to 
know  more  than  was  necessary  to  carry  out  the  desired  task,  the 
Führungsoffizier  was  constantly  engaged  in  manipulating  his  informers. 
When  one  newly-recruited  IM  decided  to  withdraw  his 
Verpflichtungserklärung,  he  insisted  upon  destroying  the  document 
personally.  It  was  noted  that  the  man  seemed  composed  and  satisfied  as 
he  burned  the  paper  in  the  oven  in  the  presence  of  his  Führungsoffizier  (F- 
11,  pp.  210-11).  The  man  was  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  this  act  was  futile 
since  the  Verpflichtungserklärung  had,  of  course,  been  copied  and  filed. 
The  one-sidedness  of  the  friendship  of  the  IM  with  the  Führungsoffizier  is 
further  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  at  the  beginning  of  every  IM  file  a  list 
was  drawn  up  of  the  Operative  Mitarbeiter  who  were  known  to  the  IM  and 
of  the  names  by  which  s/he  knew  them.  Sometimes  these  were  the  real 
names  of  the  OM  concerned,  sometimes  they  were  merely  cover  names.  In 
contrast,  the  Führungsoffizier  generally  had  access  to  detailed  information 
on  almost  every  aspect  of  the  IM's  public  and  private  life. 
In  cases  where  the  IM  considered  his/her  Führungsoffizier  to  be 
some  kind  of  friend  or  equal  it  was  not,  of  course,  the  reality  of  the 
situation  which  was  instrumental  in  achieving  the  best  results  from  the 
IM,  but  rather  the  way  in  which  s/he  perceived  the  bond.  Every  effort  was 
made  to  make  the  IM  feel  comfortable  during  meetings,  and  a  little 
something  to  eat  or  drink  was  often  offered  to  him/her.  This  cosy 127 
atmosphere,  and  the  impression  of  friendship  that  it  helped  to  simulate, 
lulled  the  IM  into  a  false  sense  of  familiar  congeniality.  The  informer  was 
no  longer  so  wary  as  might  otherwise  have  been  the  case  and  may  have  let 
information  slip  which  s/he  had  not  planned  to.  'Stephana'  says  that, 
particularly  since  her  Führungsoffizier  regularly  expressed  opinions  which 
were  critical  of  the  state  and  which  she  considered  genuine,  she  felt  that 
her  conversations  with  him  were  clearly  divided  into  an  official  section 
and  a  section  where  she  was  talking  to  him  privately  and  as  a  friend 
(A-8).  With  hindsight  'Stephana'  now  realises  that  information  which  she 
gave  in  what  she  considered  to  be  the  unofficial  part  of  their  meetings  was 
probably  used  in  the  reports  compiled  afterwards.  IM  'Katrin'  similarly 
recognises  the  potential  danger  in  feeling  too  relaxed  with  the 
Führungsoffizier.  She  remembers  having  a  better  rapport  with  the  first  of 
two  Führungsoffiziere  who  were  responsible  for  her  while  she  was  active 
as  an  IM  in  Leningrad.  She  describes  her  meetings  with  this  first  man  as 
'relativ  locker  -  vielleicht  war  es  deshalb  gefährlicher,  das  kann  ich  heute 
nicht  sagen'  (A-9).  The  danger  for  these  IM  lay  in  the  fact  that  when  the 
atmosphere  seemed  to  be  relaxed  and  friendly  they  tended  to  forget  that 
the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  meetings  was  for  the  Führungsoffizier  to 
extract  information  from  them,  rather  than  to  have  a  pleasant 
conversational  exchange. 
4.2.4  Admirer 
IM  'Sonnenblume'  describes  her  Führungsoffizier  as  'ein  teuflischer 
Magnet'  and  claims  that  she  felt  not  just  a  friendship  towards  this  man, 
but  an  intense  physical  and  mental  attraction  (J-110,  p.  260).  Since  she 
considered  him  to  be  both  good-looking  and  intelligent  she  felt  flattered  by 
his  attentions.  After  a  meeting  in  January  1978  her  Führungsoffizier 
certainly  did  note  that  'Sonnenblume'  had  told  him  that  she  had  been  very 128 
much  looking  forward  to  his  visit  since  she  had  not  been  able  to  get  out 
much  due  to  the  bad  weather  conditions  (C-8b,  p.  16).  When  pressed  in 
conversation,  'Sonnenblume'  admits,  however,  that  she  perhaps 
exaggerates  today  just  how  strong  her  attraction  to  this  man  was  in  order 
to  justify  her  IM-Tätigkeit  (A-10,  see  Section  Two:  9.2.4).  It  is, 
nevertheless,  the  case  that  when  she  was  assigned  a  new 
Führungsoffizier,  whom  she  did  not  find  so  attractive,  'Sonnenblume'  did 
break  off  the  contact  to  the  M/S. 
The  role  of  the  Führungsoffizier  as  an  admirer  is  clearly  one  which 
was  potentially  more  intense  for  female  IM.  IM  'Stephana'  also  felt 
flattered  by  the  attentions  of  her  Führungsoffizier  and  regarded  the  gifts 
which  she  received  in  the  course  of  her  IM-Tätigkeit  as  personal  and  as 
coming  directly  from  her  Führungsoffizier  rather  than  from  the  institution 
for  which  he  worked  (A-8). 
4.2.5  Therapist 
A  rather  more  intensified  form  of  the  Führungsoffizier/IM  relationship 
was  apparent  in  the  case  of  Monika  Haeger.  Haeger  had  been  a 
Hauptamtlicher  IM,  reporting  on  the  activities  of  the  opposition  groups 
with  which  she  was  involved,  such  as  Frauen  für  den  Frieden.  Two  of  the 
women  whom  she  reported  on,  Katja  Havemann  and  Irene  Kukutz, 
interviewed  Haeger  at  length  about  her  IM-Tätigkeit  and  subsequently 
published  extracts  of  these  conversations  (J-45).  Haeger  was  an  orphan 
who  had  spent  a  lonely  and  problematic  childhood.  As  an  adult  she  had 
psychological  difficulties  and  had  been  seeing  a  therapist  before  she  began 
working  for  the  MfS.  When  active  as  an  IM,  however,  Haeger  claimed  that 
she  no  longer  needed  this  therapy,  as  she  felt  that  she  had  found  a  sort  of 
substitute  therapist  in  her  Führungsoffizier  'Detlef,  whom  she  could  call 
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4.2.6  Concerned  Outside  Party 
Monika  Haeger's  psychological  dependence  was  intense.  The  majority  of 
IM  did  not  consider  their  Führungsoffizier  to  be  playing  the  role  of  an 
analyst.  The  Führungsoffizier  was,  nevertheless,  someone  with  whom 
many  IM  had  the  opportunity  to  discuss  personal  affairs.  The  IM 
Richtlinien  stipulate  after  all  that  'das  persönliche  Gespräch'  is  to  be  an 
integral  part  of  meetings  with  IM  (J-62,  p.  223).  The  Führungsoffizier  was 
to  be  aware  that  any  personal  problems  which  the  IM  had  could  hinder 
his/her  ability  to  fulfil  the  required  duties:  'Deshalb  muß  der  operative 
Mitarbeiter  die  Sorgen  kennen  und  ein  solches  Verhältnis  zum 
inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiter  herstellen,  daß  er  sich  auch  in  persönlichen 
Fragen  vertrauensvoll  an  den  operativen  Mitarbeiter  wendet.  '  (J-62,  p. 
228)  The  Führungsoffizier  was  then  expected  to  get  to  know  his  IM 
intimately.  In  a  study  for  the  Juristische  Hochschule  Wardezki  designed  a 
detailed  table  of  information  about  the  physical  appearance  of  IM,  which 
he  suggested  could  be  completed  by  all  Führungsoffiziere  (D-7,  II,  59-104). 
Each  part  of  the  IM's  face  was  to  be  described  in  detail  and  the  section 
under  nose  alone  asked  for  information  on  the  top,  bone,  tip,  width  and 
height,  as  well  as  any  other  defining  features  (D-7,  II,  102).  There  were 
eleven  possibilities  to  choose  from  to  describe  the  gait  of  an  IM,  and 
numerous  habits  were  listed  which  the  IM  might  engage  in,  such  as  the 
picking  of  nose  and/or  ears,  and  the  rubbing  of  ears  and/or  hands  (D-7,  II, 
101)  104).  The  fact  that  Wardezki  could  even  dream  up  this  unrealistic 
chart  indicates  that  it  was  considered  self-explanatory  that 
Führungsoffiziere  be  intensely  familiar  with  their  individual  IM. 
The  information  which  the  IM  gave  during  'das  persönliche 
Gespräch'  was  noted  down  in  the  Treffbericht,  allowing  the 
Führungsoffizier  to  keep  track  of  the  personal  circumstances  of  his  IM. 
Since  the  IM  was  regularly  asked  about  his/her  personal  situation, 130 
meetings  could  in  some  cases  function  as  a  mild  form  of  therapy  session, 
where  the  IM  was  free  to  discuss  personal  issues  with  a  neutral  but 
informed  outsider.  'Rolf  s'  Führungsoffizier  noted  that  it  seemed  to  have 
done  the  IM  some  good  to  talk  to  him  of  the  fact  that  he  had  separated 
from  his  wife  (C-1b,  Treffbericht  from  19  November  1987  [n.  p.  ]  ).  It  is 
possible,  however,  that  the  Führungsoffizier  exaggerated  the  willingness 
on  'Rolfs'  part  to  discuss  such  ,,  private  concerns.  'Rolf  experienced 
doubts  about  his  IM-Tätigkeit  from  the  outset,  and  when  I  ask  him  if  he 
talked  of  personal  matters  to  his  Führungsoffizier  he  says  that  he  felt  that 
this  aspect  of  the  meetings  tended  to  be  somewhat  forced  and  ultimately 
superficial  (A-1). 
4.2.7  Mentor 
The  Führungsoffizier  was  able  to  do  more  than  just  listen  to  his  IM's 
problems  and  could,  if  he  deemed  it  necessary,  actually  intervene  in 
his/her  private  life.  'Rolf  told  me  that  when  he  mentioned  the  fact  that  his 
mother  has  been  waiting  to  move  out  of  her  dilapidated  flat  for  quite  some 
time,  the  matter  was  quickly  resolved  with  the  necessary  authorities  (A- 
1).  Apparently  without  her  direct  request,  IM  'Stephana's' 
Führungsoffizier  arranged  that  her  divorce  proceedings  be  speeded  up  (C- 
6a,  p.  95).  Perhaps  the  relationship  of  the  Führungsoffizier  to  the  IM 
can  at  moments  such  as  these  be  best  described  as  that  of  a  mentor. 
Intervention  by  the  Führungsoffizier  in  the  private  life  of  an  IM  not  only 
meant  that  the  IM  would  consequently  be  in  a  better  position  to  carry  out 
the  assigned  tasks  competently,  but  also  created  a  debt  on  the  part  of  the 
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4.2.8  Accomplice 
The  Führungsoffizier  was  in  some  cases  the  only  person  who  knew  of  the 
IM's  contacts  to  the  MfS,  and  the  IM  could  only  hope  that  the  former 
would  never  choose  to  betray  him/her.  This  was  an  issue  which  caused 
some  IM  considerable  worry.  'Stephana'  was  concerned  that  her  boyfriend 
would  be  furious  if  he  found  out  that  she  was  collaborating  with  the  MfS 
and  asked  her  Führungsoffizier  if  the  MfS  would  support  her  if  her  Stasi 
connections  were  to  become  known  in  her  circle  of  acquaintances.  She  told 
him  that  she  was  worried  that  the  MfS  would  leave  her  in  the  lurch  if 
such  a  situation  were  to  arise  (C-6a,  p.  104).  When  'Rolf  expressed  doubts 
about  the  consequences  of  being  discovered  to  be  collaborating  with  the 
MfS,  he  was  assured,  ironically  given  today's  situation,  that  no-one 
outside  the  MfS  would  ever  find  out  about  his  IM-Tätigkeit  (C-1a,  p.  279). 
Some  IM  did  break  the  code  of  silence  they  had  taken  and  told,  for 
example,  their  partner  of  their  MfS  contacts.  Yet,  even  in  these  cases  of 
so-called  Dekonspiration,  the  Führungsoffizier  remained  the  only 
individual  who  really  knew  what  went  on  at  these  secret  meetings. 
Andreas  Sinakowski  describes  the  loneliness  of  being  a  Stasi  informer  and 
the  feeling  that  'der  einzige  Ausweg  aus  dieser  Isolation  ist  das  Gespräch 
mit  dem  Führungsoffizier'  (J-88,  p.  77).  Hendrik  Melle  likewise  makes  the 
point  that  the  only  person  he  could  talk  to  about  being  an  informer  was 
'meine  Stasi',  as  he  rather  endearingly  refers  to  his  Führungsoffizier: 
'Denn  der  einzige,  mit  dem  ich  darüber  reden  konnte,  war  meine  Stasi. 
Jedes  neue  Vertrauen  hätte  auch  eine  neue  Abhängigkeit  bedeutet.  So 
nah  wie  mein  Führer  ging  mir  keiner.  '  (J-56,  p.  156)  A  third  example  of 
this  intense  dependence  comes  from  Herbert  K.,  a  former  Hauptamtlicher 
IM  who  was  interviewed  for  the  book  Stasiprotokolle: 
Ich  habe  dreißig  Jahre  für  die  Staatssicherheit  gearbeitet,  fünfzehn 
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Arbeit.  Du  hattest  mit  niemandem  Kontakt,  du  konntest  dich  mit 
keinem  Kollegen  austauschen,  nur  mal  mit  deinem 
Führungsoffizier,  dein  Arbeitsplatz  war  zu  Hause,  wo  du  deine 
Berichte  zu  schreiben  hattest,  du  warst  von 
Betriebsveranstaltungen  ausgeschlossen,  du  mußt  dich  ja 
konspirativ  verhalten  gegenüber  anderen  Mitarbeitern.  (J-39,  p.  58) 
The  Führungsoffizier  was  for  many  IM  their  only  true  accomplice. 
The  relief  at  meetings  of  suddenly  no  longer  having  to  lead  a  double  life 
must  have  been  significant.  This  aspect  of  the  IM/Führungsoffizier 
relationship  could  only  work  in  the  MfS's  favour,  when,  as  a  consequence 
of  the  welcomed  sense  of  complicity,  IM  were  less  wary  about  what  they 
said  to  the  Führungsoffizier  than  they  perhaps  intended  to  be. 
4.2.9  Summary 
The  bond  between  Führungsoffiziere  and  IM  was  fundamental  to  the 
effectiveness  of  their  work  together.  This  bond  could  take  on  varying 
degrees  of  intensity,  but  the  IM  was  always  necessarily  to  some  extent 
dependent  on  the  Führungsoffizier.  Lienhard  Wawrzyn  notes  that  since 
the  Wende  he  has  talked  to  many  IM  who  wished  to  meet  their 
Führungsoffizier  again  (J-101,  p.  26).  Several  of  the  IM  with  whom  I  spoke 
also  expressed  an  interest  in  seeing  their  Führungsoffizier.  'Rolf  said  that 
he  would  like  to  ask  his  Führungsoffizier  if  he  had  been  aware  that  'Rolf 
and  the  man  on  whom  he  was  reporting  were  conspiring  against  the  MfS 
(A-1).  'Thaer'  claims  that  he  would  like  to  meet  up  with  his 
Führungsoffizier,  whom  he  had  considered  in  some  ways  to  be  a  friend,  in 
order  simply  to  talk  to  him  (A-5).  'Stephana'  likewise  feels  a  certain 
personal  loss  at  being  no  longer  able  to  meet  with  her  Führungsof  fzzier, 
whom  after  all  she  compared  to  a  good  'Kumpel'  (A-8). 
It  would  be  interesting  to  know  whether  these  Führungsoffiziere 
would  be  equally  keen  to  meet  their  former  IM,  whether  they  too  feel  a 133 
sense  of  loss  that  they  can  no  longer  do  so,  and  to  discover  how  they 
previously  regarded  the  relationship  to  their  IM,  but  this  issue  remains 
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5.1  GENERAL 
In  the  vast  majority  of  cases  where  contact  to  an  informer  was  broken  off, 
the  decision  to  end  the  IM-Tätigkeit  was  taken  by  the  MfS  and  not  the  IM. 
Such  a  decision  was  usually  reached  when  the  MfS  considered  that  the  IM 
was  no  longer  suitable  for  the  task  at  hand  or  that  the  task  itself  had 
become  superfluous.  In  71%  of  2,431  cases  where  an  IM  file  was  shelved  in 
the  area  of  Rostock  between  January  1987  and  October  1989,  the  main 
reasons  given  were:  the  contact  seemed  no  longer  fruitful, 
'Perspektivlosigkeit';  the  IM  was  not  suited  to  the  task  at  hand, 
'Nichteignung';  s/he  was  too  old  or  ill;  the  IM  had  been  promoted  to  a 
Hauptamtlicher  IM  (J-63,  pp.  123-24).  A  further  8%  of  these  IM- 
Tätigkeiten  came  to  an  end  because  the  IM  was  judged  to  be  dishonest, 
and  3%  were  released  from  their  duties  when  they  were  found  to  have 
broken  their  code  of  silence  about  the  collaboration,  that  is  in  cases  of 
Dekonspiration  (J-63,  p.  123).  In  only  16%  of  cases  did  the  IM  end  the 
contact  on  his/her  own  initiative  (J-63,  p.  123).  Similar  figures  are  given 
for  the  area  of  Frankfurt/Oder  for  the  period  of  1981  to  1985  (J-63,  p.  124). 
Some  of  the  possible  reasons  as  to  why  it  was  that  so  few  IM  ended 
their  IM-Tätigkeit,  given,  for  example,  that  many  suffered,  at  least 
periodically,  from  scruples  about  their  Stasi  connections,  will  be  discussed 
below. 
5.2  THE  ROLE  OF  MATERIAL  REWARD 
In  1953  Ernst  Wollweber,  Erich  Mielke's  predecessor,  explicitly  instructed 
his  employees  that  good  work  on  the  part  of  the  IM  was  to  be  rewarded  (F- 
5,  I,  61).  Although  most  IM  did  not  receive  a  regular  wage  for  their 
services,  many  were  rewarded  in  the  form  of  financial  bonuses  or  gifts. 
These  were  generally  awarded  to  the  IM  on  occasions  such  as  the 
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had  been  seen  to  successfully  carry  out  a  challenging  assignment.  The 
gifts  were,  somewhat  ironically,  often  in  the  form  of  goods  which  were  not 
easily  attainable  in  the  GDR,  such  as  flowers  or  particular  books,  and 
were  usually  only  too  willingly  accepted.  Indeed,  when  I  visited  them, 
several  of  the  IM  with  whom  I  spoke  showed  me  items  which  they  had 
been  given  by  their  Führungsoffizier.  IM  often  felt  flattered  to  receive 
such  gifts,  especially  when  they  were  carefully  chosen  to  reflect  their 
personal  taste  and  interests.  Both  'Stephana'  and  'Sonnenblume'  told  of 
how  they  liked  to  think  of  these  gifts  as  coming  from  their 
Führungsoffiziere  rather  than  from  the  MfS  (A-8,  A-10).  If  the  IM  was  able 
to  convince  him/herself  that  this  was  the  case,  s/he  not  only  experienced  a 
sense  of  flattery,  but  was  also  able  to  partly  diminish  any  feelings  of  guilt 
which  might  result  from  accepting  material  rewards. 
Material  rewards  were  influential  in  intensifying  the  bond  of  an  IM 
to  the  MfS,  not  so  much  because  of  their  objective  value,  but  rather  as  a 
result  of  the  fact  that  by  accepting  them  the  IM  entangled  and 
compromised  him/herself  further.  It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that  IM 
'Fuchs'  claims  to  have  been  reluctant  to  accept  the  financial  bonuses 
which  he  received  during  his  eleven  years  of  service  as  an  IM.  'Fuchs'  told 
me  that  he  informed  his  Führungsoffizier  that  he  did  wish  to  be 
financially  rewarded:  'Ich  hatte  immer  gesagt  am  Anfang:  "Was  soll  das? 
Das  halte  ich  für  völlig  normal,  Ihr  braucht  ja  kein  Geld  geben.  Das  macht 
vielleicht  3%  oder  5%  meiner  Arbeit  aus.  "'  (A-6)  'Fuchs'  claims  that  his 
Führungsoffizier  insisted,  however,  that  he  take  the  money,  telling  him 
that  he  should  buy  something  for  his  children  if  he  did  not  wish  to  spend  it 
on  himself.  At  such  times  as  'Fuchs'  was  not  receiving  money  for  his  co- 
operation  it  was  perhaps  easier  for  him  to  use  the  coping  strategy  that  his 
collaboration  with  the  Stasi  was  simply  part  of  his  normal  working  life 
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accept  the  money  in  order  to  justify  his  IM-Tätigkeit  as  having  been 
motivated  by  a  sense  of  duty  and  not  by  self-interest: 
Denn  darauf  wollte  ich  immer  hin;  daß  das  eigentlich  für  uns  ein 
völlig  normales  Verhältnis  war,  und  das  eigentlich  so  dazugehörte, 
daß  ich  das  natürlich  in  einer  solchen  Dienststelle  anders  gar  nicht 
vorstellen  konnte.  (A-6) 
When  an  IM  such  as  'Fuchs'  did  receive  money  or  other  material  goods  it 
may  thus  have  often  served  only  to  increase  any  moral  scruples  s/he 
experienced  as  a  result  of  the  collaboration,  and  to  undermine  the  Sinn- 
Angebot  which  had  been  made  to  the  IM  at  the  time  of  recruitment. 
As  discussed  earlier,  MfS  guidelines  discouraged  Operative 
Mitarbeiter  from  establishing  a  relationship  with  their  IM  which  was 
motivated  by  the  receipt  of  material  reward  and  encouraged  them  to  work 
on  the  education  of  the  IM  in  order  to  convince  him/her  of  the  political  and 
moral  necessity  of  the  task  (see  Section  One:  3.3.1).  OM  did  not  always 
heed  these  guidelines.  When  'Reiner's  'Führungsoffizier  applied  for  a  5,000 
mark  bonus  for  his  IM,  his  application  was  initially  rejected  on  the 
grounds  that  such  a  reward  was  not  in  line  with  the  principles  of 
Richtlinien  1/  79  (C-4a,  I,  332).  The  claim  does,  however,  appear  to  have 
been  finally  accepted,  as  soon  after  this  application  'Reiner'  signed  a 
receipt  for  exactly  this  amount  (C-4a,  I,  333).  This  was  a  princely  sum 
which  'Reiner'  was  perhaps  more  than  happy  to  receive,  but  Seidler  and 
Schmidt  suggest  that  Führungsoffiziere  were  not  always  successful  in 
giving  their  IM  the  type  of  reward  they  most  wished.  When  IM  were  asked 
to  specify  which  form  of  recognition  they  considered  most  effective  in  their 
work  with  the  MfS,  38.1%  ticked  the  category  'Lob',  23.1%  considered  a 
'staatliche  Auszeichnung'  most  valuable,  and  only  21.5%  named  a 
financial  reward  as  most  significant  (D-6,  I,  134).  When  Führungsoffiziere 
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gave  their  IM,  this  question  produced  quite  different  results:  21.9% 
reported  using  primarily  'Lob',  only  1.5%  reported  using  the  reward  of  a 
'staatliche  Auszeichnung',  whereas  a  financial  reward,  a  'Geldprämie', 
was,  at  58%,  by  far  the  most  favoured  form  of  recognition  (D-6,  I,  134).  It 
is  likely  that  some  IM  felt  that  to  state  that  they  considered  financial 
recognition  as  the  most  effective  reward  for  their  work  would  constitute  an 
undesired  response.  Perhaps  these  IM  were  consequently  not  entirely 
honest  about  the  extent  to  which  they  valued  such  recognition.  Yet, 
conversely,  the  Führungsoffiziere  who  were  not  supposed  to  use  material 
rewards  as  the  primary  form  of  recognition  for  their  IM  had  nothing  to 
gain  by  claiming  to  do  so  more  often  than  was  actually  the  case. 
Interestingly,  and  perhaps  significantly,  the  authors  of  this  particular 
study  see  its  validity  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  15.4%  of  the  IM 
questioned  admitted  having  told  their  spouses  about  the  contact  to  the 
MfS,  although  they  had  pledged  not  to  do  so  (D-6,  I,  12). 
In  summary,  most  IM  did  not  receive  sufficient  material  recognition 
for  this  to  be  a  significant  motive  for  continued  co-operation  with  the  MfS. 
The  material  recognition  which  many  IM  did  receive  on  a  fairly  regular 
basis  throughout  their  IM-Tätigkeit  did,  nevertheless,  have  a  strong 
bonding  effect  between  the  IM  and  the  MfS.  Once  the  IM  had  accepted 
such  gifts  or  rewards  this  individual  had  compromised  him/herself  further 
and  thus  intensified  his/her  involvement  with  the  MfS.  Although  they 
enjoyed  the  flattery  or  the  advantages  of  such  recognition,  this  was  not 
necessarily  a  feeling  with  which  IM  felt  entirely  comfortable.  IM 
'Sonnenblume',  for  example,  describes  how  disgusted  she  was  at  herself 
after  she  accepted  some  West  German  marks  from  her  Führungsoffizier 
which  she  herself  had  in  fact  requested  in  order  to  buy  spare  parts  for  her 
wheelchair.  'Sonnenblume'  considered  such  action  as  symptomatic  of  her 
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5.3  FEAR  AND  OBEDIENCE 
Possibly  more  significant  than  the  material  advantages  deriving  from  an 
IM-Tätigkeit  were  the  potential  social  benefits  of  having  found  favour  with 
those  in  power.  The  negative  aspect  of  such  a  liaison  for  the  IM  was  the 
fear  of  the  possible  repercussions  of  deciding  not  to  continue  co-operating 
with  the  MfS.  'Katrin'  told  of  how  she  had  decided  at  one  point  while  she 
was  still  studying  in  Leningrad  to  end  her  co-operation  as  an  IM.  Her 
Führungsoffizier  was  able  to  persuade  her  to  continue  working  for  the 
MfS.  When  I  asked  her  how  it  was  that  he  managed  to  do  this,  she  replied: 
Also,  wenn  Sie  mich  heute  fragen,  ich  weiß  es  nicht  mehr.  Ich  weiß, 
daß  es  auch  von  mir  so  ein  Gefühl  gab,  daß  es  nicht  unbedingt  gut 
wäre,  wenn  ich  da  jetzt  in  Unfrieden  gehe,  so  eine  Intuition.  [...  ] 
Vielleicht  war  es  sogar  von  mir  karrieresüchtig,  ist  Unsinn.  [...  ]  Ich 
habe  mir  schon  eingebildet,  daß  ich  irgendwie  so  leise  da 
'rauskomme,  ohne  dap  man  mich  dann  permanent  bekniet.  Ich 
wollte  nicht  einen  Bruch.  (A-9) 
'Katrin'  was  thus  concerned  about  the  consequences  which  leaving 
the  MfS  on  bad  terms  might  have  for  her  future  career.  For  those  who 
were  employed  as  Hauptamtliche  IM,  leaving  the  MfS  was  potentially 
even  more  dangerous.  The  contract  which  such  individuals  were  obliged  to 
sign  before  their  employment  began  stated  that  any  subsequent  problems 
relating  to  the  agreement  could  only  be  solved  within  the  MfS:  'Der 
Rechtsweg  ist  ausgeschlossen.  '  (J-62,  p.  424)  The  relationship  between  the 
Hauptamtlicher  IM  and  the  MfS  was  thus  explicitly  not  an 
'Arbeitsrechtsverhältnis  im  Sinne  des  Arbeitsgesetzbuches'  (J-62,  p.  430). 
Any  IM  who  did  make  the  break  away  from  the  MfS  did  not,  in  the 
vast  majority  of  cases,  suffer  any  serious  negative  repercussions  for  doing 
so.  Yet  in  some  sense  this  is  irrelevant,  as  the  more  important  question  is 
not  whether  those  who  took  this  step  actually  suffered,  but  rather  whether 
they  believed  that  they  would.  Christopher  Browning  concludes  that  the 140 
men  of  the  Reserve  Police  Battalion  101,  which  was  responsible  for  large- 
scale  round-ups  and  executions  of  Jews  during  the  Second  World  War, 
cannot  be  said  to  have  been  under  'putative  duress',  since  those  who  did 
not  feel  capable  of  participating  in  the  mass  shootings  were  granted 
permission  to  excuse  themselves  (J-18,  pp.  170-71).  Daniel  Goldhagen's 
recent  work  confirms  this  finding.  Goldhagen  discusses  the  case  of 
Lieutenant  Buchmann,  who  seems  to  have  been  the  only  man  to  make  use 
of  Major  Trapp's  offer  to  all  the  officers  that  it  was  not  mandatory  for 
them  or  their  men  to  take  part  in  the  shootings.  Buchmann  found  little 
sympathy  for  his  stance  among  the  other  officers,  but  his  decision  to  make 
use  of  this  freedom  was  tolerated,  and  Goldhagen  concludes:  'Lieutenant 
Buchmann  did  not  kill  because  pressure  was  not  applied;  the  others  killed 
anyway,  because  pressure  was  unnecessary.  '  (J-30,  p.  250)  Although  it 
would  be  grossly  inappropriate  to  equate  the  deeds  of  the  men  of  the 
notorious  Police  Battalion  101  directly  with  those  of  the  average  IM,  a 
comparison  is  possible.  Both  the  IM  and  the  men  in  the  Battalion  were 
engaged  in  actions  which  undoubtedly  violated  certain  basic  moral  codes, 
but  which  were  officially,  if  not  always  explicitly,  sanctioned  by  the  state. 
For  a  substantial  number  of  IM,  I  would  argue,  a  situation  of  putative 
duress,  albeit  in  a  mild  form,  did  exist.  This  was  particularly  the  case  for 
those  who  had  been  recruited  under  duress  in  the  first  instance,  such  as 
'Stephana'  and  'Sonnenblume'.  These  individuals  had,  after  all,  been 
threatened  with  legal  action  if  they  did  not  agree  to  co-operate  with  the 
MfS.  Many  IM  also  signed  a  Verpflichtungserklärung  in  which  they 
acknowledged  that  there  would  be  legal  repercussions  for  breaking  the 
agreement.  Most  IM,  however,  actually  put  themselves  under  putative 
duress,  by  imagining  that  the  consequences  of  disentangling  themselves 
from  the  clutches  of  the  MfS  would  be  potentially  grave,  even  when  direct 
threats  were  not  actually  made.  By  convincing  him/herself  that  s/he  had  to 141 
work  for  the  MfS  the  IM  reduced  personal  responsibility  for  collaboration. 
The  state  of  putative  duress  was  then  one  which  allowed  many  an  IM  to 
alleviate,  at  least  partially,  irksome  doubts.  IM  found  various  such  ways 
to  minimise  any  doubts  which  surfaced.  'Theodor',  who  describes  himself 
as  'überdurchschnittlich  autoritätsgläubig',  said  that  since  his  colleagues 
at  the  military  college  had  pledged  to  have  no  contact  to  the  West,  his 
work  in  helping  to  detect  whether  they  were  breaking  this  oath  was  in 
some  ways  justified:  'Die  Leute  hatten  ja,  die  hatten  unterschrieben,  daß 
sie  es  nicht  ...  nicht  machen.  Ich  fühlte  mich  insofern  völlig  im  Recht.  '  (A- 
2) 
In  his  work  on  obedience  to  authority  Stanley  Milgram  found 
deference  to  be  a  'deeply  ingrained  behaviour  tendency'  (cited  by 
Browning,  J-18,  p.  171).  Milgram's  subjects  were  led  to  believe  that  they 
were  involved  in  a  learning  experiment,  in  which  they  were  to  inflict 
increasingly  powerful  electric  shocks  on  the  'learners'  whenever  their 
responses  were  incorrect.  The  'learners'  were  in  reality  not  being  subjected 
to  shocks  at  all,  but  were  actors  who  were  stimulating  the  crying  noises 
which  were  relayed  to  the  unsuspecting  subject.  When  encouraged  to  do  so 
by  the  experimenter,  two-thirds  of  these  subjects  continued  to  inflict 
shocks  which  they  believed  were  causing  extreme  pain.  Milgram 
concluded  that,  once  they  have  begun  the  experiment,  subjects  become 
increasingly  entangled  and  disobedience  becomes  increasingly  difficult 
and  unlikely:  'The  "situational  obligation"  or  etiquette  makes  refusal 
appear  improper,  rude,  or  even  an  immoral  breach  of  obligation.  '  (J-18,  p. 
173)  Milgram  applied  his  findings  in  an  attempt  to  interpret  the 
behaviour  of  many  ordinary  citizens  in  Nazi  Germany,  concluding  that 
'men  are  led  to  kill  with  little  difficulty'  (J-18,  p.  173).  His  results  can  also 
facilitate  an  understanding  of  why,  in  a  considerably  less  extreme 
situation,  so  many  IM  continued  to  collaborate  with  the  MfS.  Several 142 
variations  of  the  experiment  are  interesting  in  this  context.  The  more 
physically  distant  the  subject  was  from  the  'learner',  the  higher  the  rate  of 
compliance.  Furthermore,  if  the  subject  had  to  actually  force  the  person's 
hand  onto  the  shock-plate,  compliance  to  extreme  levels  dropped  to  thirty 
percent.  Since  the  IM  network  functioned  as  a  mosaic,  IM  were  very  rarely 
witness  to  any  direct  harmful  consequences  of  their  actions.  Had  they 
been  able  to  see  how  their  apparently  trivial  information  could  cause 
harm  to  others,  one  could  suppose  that  compliance  would  have  dropped 
significantly.  A  further  variation  of  the  experiment  found  that  if  the 
instruction  to  give  the  shocks  were  delivered  by  a  figure  who  did  not 
appear  to  hold  a  position  of  authority,  compliance  rates  dropped  to  zero. 
MfS  officers  were  powerful  representatives  of  the  state,  and  the  IM's 
awareness  of  this  might  well  have  been  a  significant  factor  in  influencing 
his/her  behaviour,  regardless  of  his/her  own  political  convictions. 
IM  were  then  often  influenced  in  their  decision  to  carry  on  working 
for  the  MfS  by  their  own  sometimes  unquestioning  deference  to  authority. 
Not  all  IM  were  quite  as  'autoritätsgläubig'  as  IM  'Theodor',  but  many,  as 
a  consequence  of  a  series  of  'binding  factors'  and  'cementing  mechanisms', 
found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  disentangle  themselves  from  a  situation, 
which,  once  in  motion,  took  on  its  own  momentum  (Milgram's  terms,  J-18, 
p.  173). 
5.4  THE  SINN-ANGEBOT 
The  Sinn  Angebot  was  generally  more  relevant  at  the  point  of  recruitment 
than  as  a  motivating  factor  for  continued  collaboration,  but  the  MfS  was 
keen  to  preserve  the  belief  in  the  moral  and  political  necessity  of  the  co- 
operation  throughout  the  IM-Tätigkeit.  The  political  education  of  the  IM 
was  therefore  to  be  an  important  component  of  meetings.  IM  'Reiner',  for 
example,  was  given  the  task  of  studying  the  history  of  the  SED  in 143 
preparation  for  a  meeting  with  his  Führungsoffizier  (C-4a,  I,  284).  'Reiner' 
was  a  Hauptamtlicher  IM,  and  perhaps  the  Führungsoffizier  was 
particularly  concerned  to  ensure  that  political  education  was  a  continuous 
feature  of  the  work  with  this  IM.  In  other  cases  the  evidence  from  the  files 
indicates  that  most  of  the  political  work  with  the  IM  was  carried  out  in 
the  period  immediately  before  and  after  recruitment.  After  this  time  there 
is  little  mention  of  political  discussions  with  IM,  and  both  'Rolf  and  'Falke' 
recounted  experiencing  the  section  of  the  meetings  which  was  occasionally 
devoted  to  a  discussion  of  political  issues  as  sterile  and  patronising  (A-1, 
A-3).  The  continued  belief  in  a  Sinn-Angebot  was  generally  really  only 
adhered  to  in  the  formalised  rhetoric  of  the  MfS.  When  'Fuchs',  for 
example,  received  a  bonus  of  150  marks,  the  certificate  he  received  to 
mark  the  occasion  was  worded  as  follows:  'Für  die  weitere  gemeinsame 
Realisierung  des  Klassenauftrages  wünschen  wir  Ihnen  alles  Gute.  '  (C-5a, 
p.  107) 
IM  themselves  were  often  keen  to  keep  believing  that  the  contacts 
had  a  justifiable  purpose  (see  Section  Two:  9.2.3).  The  IM  who  was  unable 
to  summon  the  resolve  to  break  off  the  contact  to  the  MfS  strove  to 
convince  him/herself  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit,  even  if  this 
required  an  increasing  amount  of  self-deception.  The  MfS  was,  of  course, 
just  as  concerned  that  the  IM  remain  active,  and  in  this  sense  both  parties 
had  a  common  goal  and  worked  hard  at  deceiving  themselves  and  each 
other  in  its  pursuit. 
5.5  THE  SPLIT  PERSONALITY 
Hans-Joachim  Maaz  argues  that  most  GDR  citizens  were  only  able  to 
conform  publicly  in  situations  which  were  totally  at  odds  with  their 
private  convictions  as  a  result  of  a  split  in  personality  (J-54,  p.  76).  Maaz 
is  not  alone  in  explaining  conformity  in  the  GDR  in  terms  of  a  form  of 144 
schizophrenia.  Speaking  to  the  Enquete-Kommission,  Walter  Schilling 
said  that  IM  'haben  alle  mit  zwei  Gesichtern  leben  müssen.  Das  hat  bei 
ihnen  auf  die  Dauer  der  Zeit  zu  einer  erschreckenden  und  nicht  zu 
begreifenden  Schizophrenie  geführt.  '  (F-13,  p.  97) 
For  IM,  the  discrepancy  between  actual  behaviour  and  private 
perception  of  self  could  certainly  at  times  be  particularly  extreme,  as 
highlighted  by  the  paradox  inherent  in  the  fact  that  many  IM  were  active 
in  the  opposition  scene  at  the  same  time  as  they  worked  with  an 
organisation  who  aimed  to  undermine  such  activities.  Rainer  Eppelmann 
finds  this  phenomenon  baffling  as  he  comes  to  terms  with  the  fact  that 
Wolfgang  Schnur  seemed  to  be  able  to  develop  genuine  friendships  with 
those  on  whom  he  was  simultaneously  reporting:  'Es  klingt  zwar  völlig 
absurd,  aber  ich  glaube  noch  heute,  daß  Wolfgang  Schnur  sich  als  unser 
Freund  verstanden  hatte.  '  (J-23,  p.  294)  There  is  no  doubt,  as  this  example 
demonstrates,  that  many  IM  were  able  to  carry  on  a  double  life,  reporting 
on  those  whose  friendship  they  deeply  valued.  Yet  evidence  suggests  that 
it  was  not  so  much  that  the  IM  had  two  personalities,  one  of  an  average 
GDR  citizen  and  one  of  an  evil  Stasi  informer,  but  rather  the  case  that  the 
IM's  behaviour  represented  a  more  intense  form  of  the  pattern  of 
opportunistic  conformity  witnessed  in  the  behaviour  of  the  majority  (see 
Section  Two:  8.3).  Furthermore,  state  ideology  in  the  GDR  emphasised  the 
collective  rather  than  the  individual.  Self-reflection  and  analysis  were  not 
cultivated  and  propagated  to  the  same  extent  as  was  the  case  in  Western 
Europe  and  North  America.  One  possible  consequence  of  this  tendency 
was  that  individuals  did  not  reflect  to  the  same  extent  on  their  own 
behaviour,  not  seeking,  for  example,  psychological  counselling  to  help 
them  analyse  past  and  present  perceptions  of  self  and  others.  At  the  same 
time  as  this  tendency  was  encouraged  by  the  fact  that  the  system  focused 
on  the  collective,  it  was  simultaneously  reinforced  and  confirmed  by  the 145 
individual,  since  it  offered  a  feasible  way  of  coping  with  life  under  a 
dictatorship.  It  was  then  rather  more  the  case  that  a  behaviour  pattern  of 
opportunistic  conformity,  combined  with  a  lack  of  self-reflection  and 
analysis,  allowed  the  individual  to  engage  in  apparently  contradictory 
behaviour,  rather  than  that  several  selves  were  at  play  within  the  one 
individual: 
Die  dominierende  Ideologie  und  Alltagspolitik  in  der  DDR  setzte  - 
bezogen  auf  die  Menschen  -  allein  an  ihrer  Charakteristik  als 
Vertreter  sozialer  Gruppierungen  an.  Vernachlässigt  wurde  dabei 
die  jeweilige  Vermittlung  in  den  individuellen  und  konkreten 
Erfahrungsbereich  hinein.  [...  ]  Die  unmittelbaren  Ich-nahen 
Lebens-  und  Arbeitsbedingungen  konkreter  Personen  in  ihrer 
Ganzheit,  die  letztlich  Einstellungen  und  Verhalten  bedingen, 
interessierten  nicht.  Die  Abstraktion  davon  bedeutete,  daß 
Mensch/Persönlichkeit  als  philosophisch-ökonomische  Kategorie 
aufgefaßt  und  behandelt  wurde.  Sie  erschienen  als  Typen  von 
Produktivkräften,  als  Vertreter  grober  soziologischer  Klassifikate 
und  auch  als  Träger  von  Bewußtsein.  Dieser  Ansatz  vernachlässigt 
die  Subjekthaftigkeit  des  Individuums,  macht  es  zum  passiven 
Zielobjekt  von  Maßnahmen,  schließt  seine  eigenaktiven 
Positionierungen  vom  Monotonie-Erleben  bis  hin  zu 
verhaltenswirksamen  subjektiven  Modellierungen  der  Welt  und 
seiner  Stellung  darin  aus.  (J-84,  p.  348) 
The  IM  was  not  completely  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  s/he  led  a  sort 
of  double  life,  but  in  many  ways  such  a  behaviour  pattern  was  more  than 
familiar,  since  it  was  the  dominant  tendency  in  the  society  in  which  s/he 
lived.  For  Andreas  Sinakowski,  for  example,  the  process  of  'forgetting'  that 
he  was  attending  certain  events  as  part  of  his  duties  as  an  IM  was 
conscious  and  deliberate,  and  usually  did  not  require  all  too  much  effort. 
Describing  a  social  gathering  at  the  house  of  someone  he  was  supposed  to 
observe,  Sinakowski  writes:  'Ich  konnte  mu-  nicht  vorstellen,  von  der 
Stasi  zu  sein.  Noch  zwei  Gläser,  und  ich  hatte  es  vergessen.  '  (J-88,  p.  75) 146 
5.6  THE  SECURITY  OF  ROUTINE 
Christopher  Browning  concluded  that  the  Ordinary  Men  of  Reserve  Police 
Battalion  101  were  able  to  carry  out  the  atrocities  they  did  in  Poland  in 
the  Second  World  War  because  for  these  men,  'normality  itself  had  become 
exceedingly  abnormal'  (J-18,  Preface,  xix).  This  factor  does,  indeed,  help 
explain  why  it  was  that  most  IM  continued  to  collaborate  with  the  MfS 
even  after  they  were  neither  under  direct  pressure  to  do  so,  nor 
sufficiently  convinced  of  the  moral  or  policial  purpose  of  doing  so.  Since 
the  meetings  with  the  Führungsoffizier  generally  took  place  at  regular 
intervals,  it  was  relatively  easy  for  the  IM  to  integrate  the  contact  into 
his/her  daily  routine.  Most  Führungsoffiziere  also  did  not  adhere  to  MfS 
guidelines  which  explicitly  discouraged  OM  from  establishing  a  set 
pattern  in  the  contact  with  their  IM  (see  Section  One:  4.1.1,4.1.2).  This 
fact  was  possibly  significant  in  ensuring  that  many  an  IM  allowed  the  IM- 
Tätigkeit  to  continue  without  ever  giving  it  much  thought  or  attention.  If 
the  tasks  assigned  to  the  IM  tended,  as  indeed  was  most  often  the  case,  to 
be  similar  in  nature,  s/he  was  not  regularly  confronted  with  new  demands. 
Once  the  IM  had  come  to  terms  with  his/her  actions  and  decided  that  s/he 
could  cope  with  and  to  a  certain  extent  justify  this  behaviour,  the  contact 
could  continue  almost  indefinitely,  since  it  had  become  part  of  a  set  and 
predictable  routine.  Doubts  did  arise  on  the  part  of  the  individual  IM  from 
time  to  time  but  could  generally  be  relatively  easily  put  to  rest  by  the 
Führungsoffizier  concerned. 
5.7  CONCLUSIONS 
Those  belonging  to  the  minority  of  IM  who  did  sooner  or  later  end  the  IM- 
Tätigkeit  on  their  own  initiative  were  generally  surprised  at  how  easy  this 
move  was.  'Sonnenblume'  claims  that  if  she  had  only  known  how  easy  it 
was  to  break  off  the  contact  to  the  MfS  she  would  have  done  so  much 147 
sooner:  'Wenn  ich  gewußt  hätte,  wie  leicht  das  war  [...  ]  aber  man  war  so  in 
Angst,  man  hat  die  Drohungen  zu  ernst  genommen.  '  (A-10)  As  a  rule  the 
MfS  was  not  interested  in  continuing  contacts  with  those  who  proved 
themselves  unwilling  or  unreliable.  The  following  categories  were  named 
on  the  standard  Abschlußbericht  in  an  IM  file  as  the  possible  reasons  for 
the  discontinuation  of  an  IM-Tätigkeit: 
Dekonspiration 
Ablehnung  der  Zusammenarbeit 
Festnahme  im  Operationsgebiet 
Unehrlichkeit/Unzuverlässigkeit 
Krankheit/Alter/Tod 
Nichteignung/Perspektivlosigkeit 
Ungesetzliches  Verlassen  der  DDR 
Arbeitsplatz-  bzw.  Wohnungswechsel 
Einstellung  als  Mitarbeiter  des  MfS 
Registrierung  zum  GMS 
Feindliche/kriminelle  Handlungen,  operative  Bearbeitung, 
Einleitung  EV  [Ermittlungsverfahren] 
Personelle  Gründe,  offizielle  Verbindung,  sonstige  Ablagegründe. 
(C-la,  p.  314) 
The  above  table  shows  that  the  MfS  certainly  reckoned  with  IM  taking  the 
initiative  to  end  the  contact  for  a  number  of  reasons.  In  reality,  as 
discussed,  it  was  the  Führungsoffizier  who  most  often  made  the  decision 
to  bring  the  IM-Tätigkeit  to  an  end.  Very  few  IM  ever  realised  that  they 
need  only  'categorically  refuse'  to  continue  the  contact  to  the  MfS  in  order 
to  break  free  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit  (J-62,  pp.  280-81).  Most  considered 
themselves  bound  to  the  MfS  until  they  were  released  of  their  duties, 
fearing  at  the  same  time  the  imagined  repercussions  of  falling  into 
disfavour  with  the  MfS  and  consequently  having  the  Tätigkeit 
discontinued.  The  MfS  was  able  to  keep  its  informers  without  much  effort, 
since  the  IM  effectively  made  him/herself  captive,  leading  one  former  Stasi 
officer  to  make  the  following  comment:  'Die  brauchen  sich  doch  nur  einmal 
kräftig  zu  schütteln,  und  sie  wären  uns  los.  Aber  dazu  sind  sie  zu  feige. 148 
Wir  kontrollieren,  und  sie  lassen  sich  kontrollieren.  Zum  Bespitzeln 
gehören  immer  zwei.  '  (cited  by  Becker,  J-33,  p.  77) 149 
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6.1  'EIN  MANN  DER  KIRCHE'?:  (1-21)  MANFRED  STOLPE  AND 
THE  MfS 
6.1.1  The  Debate  Begins 
Wir  konnten  und  können  nicht  so  weitermachen  wie  bisher.  Nicht 
alle  Blütenträume,  die  manche  mit  dem  Staatsvertrag  verbunden 
haben,  konnten  in  Erfüllung  gehen.  Aber  niemandem  wird  es 
schlechtergehen  [sic]  als  bisher.  Im  Gegenteil.  Welches  Land 
bekommt  eine  solch  gute  Startposition  wie  wir  mit  diesem 
Vertrag?  (J-38,  p.  196) 
The  irony  of  these  words,  spoken  on  the  occasion  of  the  unification  of  the 
two  Germanys  on  3  October  1990,  by  the  man  who  had  been  the  last 
Ministerpräsident  of  the  GDR,  could  no  longer  be  concealed  a  mere  two 
months  later.  Fresh  evidence  from  the  MfS  files  meant  that  Lothar  de 
Maiziere  was  no  longer  able  to  deny  that  he  had  collaborated  with  the  MfS 
as  IM  'Czerny',  and  he  was  forced  to  resign  his  political  mandate  (see,  for 
example,  1-35).  The  absurdity  of  the  fact  that  the  unification  treaty  had 
been  countersigned  by  a  man  who  had  worked  with  the  East  German 
State  Security  Service  as  an  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter  was  to  be  a  feature  of 
the  political  and  cultural  climate  of  the  following  years,  during  which  a 
steady  stream  of  prominent  personalities  from  the  former  GDR  was 
unmasked  as  having  collaborated  in  this  way.  No  political  party  remained 
untouched  by  these  events.  Dirk  Schneider  from  the  Green  Party  was 
found  to  have  held  contacts  to  the  MfS  as  an  IM,  so  too  Ibrahim  Böhme, 
who  had  helped  to  found  the  SDP  (later  the  Ost-SPD),  and  Kerstin  Kaiser 
from  the  PDS,  to  name  just  a  few.  Most  of  the  politicians  who  were 
discovered  to  have  collaborated  as  IM  were  forced  to  resign  once  the  fact 
or  extent  of  their  IM-Tätigkeit  came  to  light.  Some  were  able  to  remain  in 
office,  notably  Rolf  Kutzmutz  of  the  PDS,  who  succeeded  in  being  voted  in 
as  mayor  of  Potsdam  using  the  provocative  election  slogan,  'Meine 152 
Biographie  beginnt  nicht  erst  1989',  a  tactic  which,  it  was  suggested,  had 
lost  him  10%  of  the  votes,  but  gained  him  20%  (1-48). 
The  case  which  resulted  in  the  most  extensive  discussion  of  a 
politician's  MfS  connections  was  that  of  Dr.  Manfred  Stolpe.  The  debate 
concerning  Stolpe's  connections  to  the  MfS  was  sparked  off  by  none  other 
than  Stolpe  himself  with  the  publication  of  his  book  Schwieriger  Aufbruch 
(J-91).  Stolpe  claimed  that  his  intention  in  writing  this  book  was  to 
document  'welche  Einsichten  ich  im  Laufe  der  Jahrzehnte  über  das 
Machtsystem  der  DDR  gewonnen  habe'  (J-91,  pp.  111-12).  In  Schwieriger 
Aufbruch  Stolpe  admitted  to  having  been  able  to  gain  his  knowledge  of  the 
power  structures  of  the  GDR  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  he  had  attempted 
since  the  1970s  to  achieve  his  political  aims  'auf  dem  Umweg  über  die 
Staatssicherheit'  (J-91,  p.  121).  Following  this  admission,  which  coincided 
with  the  StUG  coming  into  force,  the  Stolpe-Untersuchungsausschuß  was 
set  up  and  began  its  work  on  27  February  1992.  The  official  task  of  the 
committee  was  stated  as  follows:  'Aufklärung  der  früheren  Kontakte  des 
Ministerpräsidenten  Dr.  Manfred  Stolpe  zu  Organen  des  Staatsapparates 
der  DDR,  der  SED  sowie  zum  Staatssicherheitsdienst  und  der  in  diesem 
Zusammenhang  erhobenen  Vorwürfe.  '  (F-2,  I,  2)  Over  the  next  two  years 
the  committee  heard  the  testimonies  of  numerous  prominent  politicians 
and  theologians  from  both  the  former  GDR  and  FRG,  as  well  as  those  of 
former  MfS  officers.  The  Stolpe  debate  was  given  extensive  coverage  in 
the  media,  and  it  was  proposed  that  its  outcome  would  go  a  long  way  to 
deciding  'über  die  Orientierung  nach  dem  Untergang  der  DDR'  (J-70,  p. 
51).  Several  key  reasons  as  to  why  this  debate  took  on  such  significance 
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6.1.2  Immediate  Political  Ramifications 
A  great  number  of  East  Germans  identified  with  Manfred  Stolpe  and  did 
not  want  to  see  him  forced  to  resign  from  his  position  as  Ministerpräsident 
of  Brandenburg.  Stolpe's  party,  the  SPD,  also  had  a  clear  interest  in 
ensuring  that  the  popular  Stolpe  remain  in  power,  whilst  at  the  same  time 
trying  to  preserve  their  political  credibility  by  not  confronting  the 
problematic  legacy  of  the  GDR  in  too  lenient  a  fashion.  This  was  a 
problem  for  the  likes  of  SPD  politician  Wolfgang  Thierse,  who  had  to  be 
seen  to  support  his  party's  stance  on  the  Stolpe  debate,  but  whose 
contemporaries  among  the  ranks  of  the  Bürgerrechtler  criticised  him 
severely  for  not  speaking  out  against  Stolpe.  1 
Günter  Nooke  from  Bündnis  90  was  certainly  not  prepared  to  let 
the  immediate  political  agenda  stand  in  the  way  of  his  belief  that  Stolpe 
should  not  remain  in  office.  Nooke  threatened  to  leave  the 
Untersuchungsausschuß  in  summer  1992  in  protest  at  the  fact  that  an 
interim  report  had  been  passed  without  discussion.  He  returned  after  the 
summer  break  when  the  report  was  withdrawn  but  remained  dissatisfied 
with  the  working  methods  of  the  committee.  In  March  1993  Nooke  directly 
accused  Stolpe  of  having  lied  in  the  hearings.  The  SPD  demanded  that  he 
withdraw  this  accusation,  and  his  refusal  to  do  so  led  to  the  end  of  the  so- 
called  'Ampel-Koalition'  in  Brandenburg.  2  Nooke  was  largely  unsuccessful 
in  his  attempt  to  find  support  for  his  breakaway  party,  Bündnis,  and  in 
the  end  it  seemed  at  this  point  as  though  Nooke  and  not  Stolpe  had  been 
forced  to  sacrifice  his  political  career  as  a  result  of  the  latter's  Stasi 
connections. 
1  See  the  correspondence  between  Thierse  and  Jürgen  Fuchs  when  Thierse  refused  to 
sign  a  letter  in  support  of  Günter  Nooke,  claiming  that  to  do  so  would  be  to  go  against  the 
principles  of  'innocent  until  proven  guilty'  (1-67,1-68). 
2  See  'Abweichende  Meinung  des  Abgeordneten  Günter  Nooke  (BÜNDNIS)',  (F-2,  I,  C. 
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The  most  striking  political  irony  was  perhaps  the  fact  that  Lothar 
Bisky  was  the  chairman  of  the  Untersuchungsausschuß.  As  PDS  leader, 
Bisky  was  head  of  a  party  whose  very  existence  was  a  continued  source  of 
debate  in  unified  Germany.  In  the  end  Bisky  resigned  from  his  position  as 
chairman  shortly  before  the  final  report  was  passed  by  a  majority  of  SPD, 
FDP  and  PDS. 
The  Stolpe  debate  was  thus  one  with  obvious  ramifications  in  the 
volatile  political  climate  of  post-unification  Germany.  The  fact  that  Stolpe 
was  not  forced  to  resign  and  remains  to  this  day  in  office  as  the 
Ministerpräsident  of  Brandenburg  is  clearly  a  significant  victory  for  the 
SPD,  who  fared  so  badly  in  the  first  elections  after  the  fall  of  the  Wall. 
The  PDS  have  also  benefited  from  the  outcome  of  the  Stolpe  debate.  If 
Stolpe  can  remain  in  power  after  admitting  to  having  had  dealings  with 
the  MfS,  then  it  is  possible  that  other  cases  of  Stasi  collaboration,  of  which 
there  are  many  within  the  ranks  of  the  PDS,  will  be  viewed  more  leniently 
than  would  have  been  the  case  if  he  had  been  forced  into  resignation. 
6.1.3  The  Role  of  the  Church  in  the  SED  State 
Ich  kann  mir  schlecht  denken,  was  wir  als  Kirche  ohne  Manfred 
Stolpe  in  der  DDR-Zeit  gewesen  wären.  (Friedrich  Schorlemmer, 
J-82,  p.  276) 
Manfred  Stolpe  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  influential 
representatives  of  the  church  in  the  GDR.  He  established  strong  links  to 
leading  politicians  and  theologians  in  both  the  East  and  West,  and  many 
were  content  to  benefit  from  these  connections  without  questioning  to 
what  extent  Stolpe  might  be  collaborating  with  those  in  power  in  order  to 
preserve  and  facilitate  them.  A  declaration  by  leading  church  members  on 
this  issue  read  as  follows: 155 
Wir  haben  Manfred  Stolpe  insbesondere  in  der  Zeit,  in  der  er  die 
Leitung  des  Sekretariats  des  Kirchenbundes  innehatte,  die 
Verhandlung  aller  sensiblen  und  schwierigen  Fragen  im  Verhältnis 
zwischen  Staat  und  Kirche  anvertraut,  ohne  ihm  vorzuschreiben, 
welche  einzelnen  Schritte  zu  unternehmen  sind.  (F-2,  I)  62) 
Even  Rainer  Eppelmann,  who  was  vehemently  against  Stolpe  remaining 
in  office,  had  been  previously  content  to  allow  Stolpe  to  use  the 
connections  he  had  established  to  obtain,  for  example,  a  typewriter  for 
Eppelmann  'auf  irgendwelchen  geheimen  Wegen  aus  dem  Westen'  (J-23, 
p.  125).  When  it  had  been  made  explicit  that  such  an  undertaking  did,  of 
course,  involve  considerable  dealings  with  representatives  of  the  MfS, 
Eppelmann  began  to  question  seriously  Stolpe's  credibility  as  a  politician 
and  as  a  representative  of  the  church. 
In  the  GDR  the  church  had  often  attracted  those  who  were 
reluctant  to  conform  to  state  policies  and,  particularly  in  the  late  1980s, 
had  served  as  a  meeting  place  for  diverse  groups  and  individuals  who 
were  becoming  increasingly  disillusioned  with  the  state.  In  this  sense  the 
church  had  fostered  the  opposition  movement  in  the  GDR,  not  so  much 
because  representatives  of  the  church  had  been  at  the  forefront  of  anti- 
state  activities,  but  rather  because  it  had  provided  a  forum  for  individuals 
to  gather  and  establish  connections  which  they  used  to  develop  their  own 
opposition  activities.  Theology  was,  furthermore,  one  of  the  few  subjects 
open  to  those  who,  often  for  political  reasons,  had  been  refused  entry  to 
other  courses  of  study  in  the  GDR.  Under  the  roof  of  the  church  many 
individuals  were  thus  to  be  found  who  were  interested  in  bringing  about 
change  in  the  system.  The  church  itself,  however,  acted  more  as  a 
regulating  force,  as  an  integral  and  established  part  of  the  system,  and  in 
this  sense  did  nothing  to  challenge  the  existing  order.  Speaking  to  the 
Enquete-Kommission,  former  Bürgerrechtlerinnen  Ulrike  Poppe  and 
Katrin  Eigenfeld  stressed  that  the  church  had  not  been  interested  in 156 
promoting  opposition  activities  in  the  GDR,  but  had  rather  suppressed 
true  opposition.  By  always  encouraging  those  involved  in  opposition 
groups  to  act  within  the  law,  the  church,  they  argued,  had  in  fact 
functioned  as  a  censor  (F-14,  pp.  119-22).  Leading  church  representatives 
such  as  Stolpe  worked  with  rather  than  against  the  system,  and  although 
the  church  was  granted  a  degree  of  intellectual  freedom,  it  often 
effectively  provided  nothing  more  than  yet  another  protected  haven  in  this 
Nischengesellscha  ft. 
The  fact  that  the  church  as  an  institution  was  well  integrated  into 
the  existing  power  structures  became  even  more  evident  when  it  came  to 
light  that  many  of  its  prominent  members  had  collaborated  with  the  MfS. 
During  the  course  of  the  investigations  by  the  Untersuchungsausschuß 
representatives  from  the  church  were  also  meeting  to  come  to  their  own 
conclusions  about  how  Stolpe's  Stasi  connections  should  be  evaluated. 
With  so  many  leading  figures  either  having  collaborated  with  state  organs 
themselves  or  having  relied  on  others  to  do  so  on  their  behalf,  the  result  of 
the  debate  within  the  church  was  really  a  foregone  conclusion.  In  October 
1992  a  declaration  was  drawn  up  by  the  Evangelische  Kirche  of  Berlin- 
Brandenburg,  stating  that  'möglicherweise  hat  Manfred  Stolpe  im 
Einzelfall  seinen  Auftrag  überschritten',  but  that  ultimately  he  had  been 
'ein  Mann  der  Kirche,  nicht  des  MfS'  (1-21).  In  1995  the  Evangelische 
Kirche  for  Germany  came  to  a  similar  conclusion  after  examining  the 
Stolpe  case: 
Die  Kontakte  standen  angesichts  ihrer  Art  und  ihres  Umgangs  mit 
den  Amtspflichten  Dr.  Stolpes  nicht  im  Einklang. 
Eine  Würdigung  seines  gesamten  Wirkens  führt  aber  zu  der 
Empfehlung,  disziplinarische  Maßnahmen  gegen  ihn  nicht  in 
Erwägung  zu  ziehen.  Er  hat  seine  Gespräche  als  Vertreter  der 
Kirche  geführt,  er  hat  nicht  die  Seiten  gewechselt.  Er  hat  im 
Rahmen  seiner  dienstlichen  Aufgaben  und  darüber  hinaus  an 
verschiedenen  Stellen  mit  außergewöhnlichem  Einsatz  und 
sichtbarem  Erfolg  vielfältige  kirchliche  und  humanitäre  Belange 
wahrgenommen.  (1-24) 157 
6.1.4  The  West's  Complicity 
Dieser  ambivalente,  am  Fall  Stolpe  deutlich  gewordene  Charakter 
der  post-stalinistischen  Verstrickungen,  von  denen  wir  im  Westen 
nur  schwache  Vorstellungen  haben,  macht  im  übrigen  die 
moralische  Beurteilung  der  komplexen  Einzelfälle  um  so 
schwieriger.  (Jürgen  Habermas,  1-80,  p.  83) 
In  the  course  of  investigations  several  leading  political  figures  from  the 
FRG  came  before  the  Untersuchungsausschuß  and  spoke  out  in  Stolpe's 
defence.  Former  Bundeskanzler  Helmut  Schmidt,  for  example,  said  of  his 
conversations  with  Manfred  Stolpe:  'Das,  was  ich  nicht  weitergegeben 
haben  wollte,  das  habe  ich  auch  nicht  gesagt.  '  (F-2,  I,  187)  Schmidt  went 
on  to  say  that,  since  he  had  explicitly  asked  Stolpe  to  convey  certain 
information  to  his  political  contemporaries  in  the  GDR,  it  would  be  absurd 
to  reproach  him  for  having  done  so  (F-2,  I,  187).  The  former  Foreign 
Minister,  Hans-Dietrich  Genscher,  also  defended  Stolpe:  'Ich  habe  nicht 
nur  im  Kauf  genommen,  daß  über  dieses  Gespräch  von  den 
Gesprächsteilnehmern  an  die  Behörden  der  DDR  berichtet  wird,  sondern 
für  mich  war  es  wünschenswert,  daß  es  so  geschah.  '  (F-2,  I,  189) 
Statements  such  as  these  from  prominent  figures  brought  to  light  the 
issue  of  the  West's  own  complicity  with  the  system  in  force  in  the  GDR. 
Leading  politicians  from  the  West  had  welcomed  the  contact  which  they 
were  able  to  establish  to  Manfred  Stolpe  and  had  gladly  used  him  as  a  go- 
between.  Stolpe  was,  of  course,  only  able  to  fulfil  this  role  precisely 
because  he  was  prepared  to  have  dealings  with  those  in  power  in  the  SED 
state,  something  his  more  idealistic  contemporaries  were  less  willing  to 
do.  After  the  signing  of  the  Grundvertrag  in  1972  and  the  gradual  relaxing 
of  the  Cold  War  mentality  between  the  two  Germanys,  a  figure  like  Stolpe 
had  provided  a  valuable  means  of  realising  dialogue  between  political 
adversaries.  If  Stolpe  was  to  be  condemned  for  the  role  he  had  played, 158 
then  so  too  must  those  in  the  West  who  had  used  him  to  achieve  their  own 
ends,  by  taking  into  account,  and  indeed  actively  welcoming  the  fact  that 
here  was  a  man  who  had  close  links  to  politicians  in  the  GDR. 
6.1.5  The  East's  Complicity 
It  was  not  only  in  former  West  Germany  that  Stolpe  found  wide-spread 
support,  but  also  in  the  five  new  Länder.  The  journalist  Robert  Leicht 
aptly  summed  up  the  reasons  as  to  why  this  should  be  the  case: 
Manfred  Stolpe  hat  vom  Streit  um  seine  heikle  Vergangenheit 
letztlich  nur  profitiert,  vor  allem  weil  er  eben  wirklich  nur  ein  wie 
immer  umstrittener  Verhandler  und  nicht  ein  Verräter  war.  Aber 
insofern  er  den  'historischen  Kompromiß'  des  Überlebens  in  der 
DDR  repräsentiert,  finden  sich  viele  durch  ihn  vertreten:  Jene,  die 
dem  Regime  widerstanden,  wenn  auch  nicht  bis  zum  Äußersten 
- 
und  jene,  die  sich  ihm  anpaßten,  aber  nicht  bis  zum  Letzten.  (1-88) 
Only  a  small  minority  of  East  Germans  did  not  fit  into  either  of  the  two 
groups  which  Leicht  defines.  Stolpe  was  therefore  a  comfortable  figure  to 
identify  with.  His  position  in  the  GDR  had  not  involved  policy  making, 
and  in  this  sense  he  was  freed  from  any  direct  responsibility  for  the 
injustices  perpetrated  there.  Yet  Stolpe  had  not  resisted  the  system  in  the 
way  in  which  prominent  Bürgerrechtler  had  done.  He  had  presumed  that 
the  GDR  would  exist  beyond  his  lifetime,  a  point  he  makes  repeatedly  in 
Schwieriger  Aufbruch,  and  had  worked  with  and  not  against  the  system  in 
order  to  achieve  his  aims. 
It  was  those  who,  on  first  glance,  might  have  seemed  to  be  political 
adversaries,  that  is  representatives  of  the  citizens'  rights  movement  of  the 
former  GDR,  and  CDU  politicians,  who  met  on  common  ground  in  their 
wish  to  see  Stolpe  forced  into  resignation.  These  two  groups  were  often 
united  on  the  question  of  how  many  aspects  of  the  legacy  of  the  MfS 
should  be  confronted  in  a  unified  Germany,  and  recently  seven  former 159 
Bürgerrechtler,  among  them  Günter  Nooke  and  Vera  Lengsfeld  (formerly 
Wollenberger),  caused  a  sensation  when  they  did  in  fact  join  the  CDU  (I- 
95). 
In  contrast  to  the  Bürgerrechtler,  the  population  at  large  soon  lost 
interest  in  the  lengthy  debate  surrounding  Stolpe's  Stasi  connections.  An 
In  fas  survey  carried  out  in  late  1992  found  that  80%  of  those  questioned 
wished  an  end  to  the  Stolpe  debate  (1-9).  The  work  of  the 
Untersuchungsausschuß  carried  on  for  over  another  eighteen  months  after 
this  survey,  but  the  initial  positions  of  those  on  the  committee  remained 
unchanged.  The  Bürgerrechtler  refused  in  the  end  to  come  before  the 
committee,  wishing  by  their  refusal  to  protest  at  the  fact  that  they  had 
been  invited  to  give  testimony  at  such  a  late  stage  in  the  overall 
proceedings.  They  felt  that  by  this  point  it  was  already  more  than  evident 
that  Stolpe's  name  would  be  cleared  and  that  their  statements  would  have 
no  bearing  whatsoever  on  the  final  outcome  (1-22).  The  testimonies  of  the 
Bürgerrechtler  may  well,  as  they  claimed,  have  had  little  impact  at  this 
late  stage,  but  their  protest  also  proved  futile,  in  that  it  could  only  be 
symbolic  and  seemed  merely  to  support  Stolpe's  claim  that  the  difference 
between  himself  and  Bärbel  Bohley  was  that  whereas  he  was  a 
pragmatist,  Bohley  was  a.  fundamentalist  (1-81,  p.  3).  The  final  report  of 
the  Untersuchungsausschuß  merely  lists  the  accusations  made  by  the 
Bürgerrechtler  and  states  that  these  issues  could  not  be  adequately 
addressed  due  to  the  fact  that  the  invited  witnesses  refused  to  appear 
before  the  commission  (F-2,  I)  208-11). 
In  the  end,  the  Untersuchungsausschuß  accepted  the  version  of 
events  which  Stolpe  himself  had  presented,  that  is  that  the  pact  he  had 
made  with  those  in  power  in  the  SED  state  was  one  made  of  necessity  and 
was  justifiable.  As  discussed,  Stolpe's  position  was  one  with  which  many 
identified.  If  he  were  judged  to  have  acted  in  a  morally  justifiable  manner, 160 
then  so  too  had  the  vast  majority  of  East  Germans  under  the  dictatorship, 
namely  as  opportunistic  conformists  (see  Section  Two:  8.3).  In  his  book 
Stolpe  does  indeed  reinforce  the  concept  of  a  common  and  shared  fate  for 
East  Germans,  attributing  a  collective  responsibility  to  all  GDR  citizens: 
'Schließlich  hat  jeder,  der  im  Land  blieb,  arbeitete  und  Steuern  zahlte,  das 
DDR-System  mitgetragen,  ob  er  wollte  oder  nicht.  '  (J-91,  p.  12)  For  Günter 
Nooke,  the  acceptance  of  this  interpretation  meant  that  the  Stolpe  case 
had  led  to  a  distortion  of  historical  fact:  'Stolpe  beschwörte  das 
ostdeutsche  Schicksal  zu  Gemeinschaft  -  und  es  hat  geklappt.  '  (H-2)  It 
now  seems  to  be  widely  accepted  that  the  course  of  action  which  Stolpe 
took  was  justified.  This  observation  is  reflected  in  the  findings  of  an 
extensive  survey  carried  out  for  the  Institut  für  Demoskopie  in  Allensbach 
into  East  and  West  German  s'  views  on  various  aspects  of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  The  study  found  that  only  just  under  one 
quarter  of  both  East  and  West  Germans  questioned  in  1992  considered 
that  Stolpe  had  compromised  himself  to  too  great  an  extent  in  order  to 
achieve  his  aims  (F-12,  Tabel  A  15). 
6.1.6  The  Role  of  the  Gauck-Behörde 
The  Stolpe  debate  highlighted  an  issue  which  had  begun  to  be  the  cause  of 
much  controversy  at  the  time  when  the  Untersuchungsausschuß  took  up 
its  work,  namely  the  role  which  the  BStU  was  to  play  in  the  confrontation 
with  the  MfS  legacy.  Arnold  Vaatz,  Environmental  Minister  for  Saxony, 
said  that  such  was  the  significance  of  the  Stolpe  case,  if  his  name 
were  to  be  cleared  then  everyone  who  had  been  dismissed  on  the  grounds 
of  an  IM-Tätigkeit  would  have  to  be  reinstated  and  the  BStU  would  have 
to  be  closed  (1-40,  p.  34).  The  Stolpe  debate  certainly  did  at  times  seem 
almost  like  a  personal  contest  between  Gauck  and  Stolpe.  It  appeared  as 
though  only  one  of  the  two  would  emerge  triumphant  at  the  end  of  a  battle 161 
which  actually  reached  the  courts  on  several  occasions.  Stolpe  took  Gauck 
to  court  after  the  latter  had  said  in  an  interview  that  in  any  other  of  the 
five  new  Länder  the  evidence  which  had  been  brought  against  Manfred 
Stolpe  would  have  been  sufficient  to  force  his  resignation.  The  courts  ruled 
that  this  was  a  value  judgement  which  Gauck  was  not  entitled  to  make  in 
his  role  as  Bundesbeauftragter.  Gauck's  assigned  task  was  to  provide  the 
Untersuchungsausschuß  with  the  information  it  requested,  and  it  was 
ultimately  the  job  of  the  committee  to  assess  and  evaluate  this  material 
(J-1).  In  another  court  case  Stolpe  was  granted  access  to  what  was  termed 
a  Sonderakte  containing  material  relating  to  his  person,  but  was  not,  as  he 
had  originally  requested,  allowed  to  have  the  entire  178  kilometres  of  files 
searched  in  order  to  have  a  special  file  compiled  with  the  results  (1-17). 
Herta  Müller  described  Gauck's  problem  in  this  battle  as  follows:  'Mit 
Stolpe  identifizieren  sich  viele,  mit  Gauck  nur  wenige.  Und  die  Loyalen 
tun  heute  so,  als  wäre  die  Stasi  nicht  durch  Stolpe,  sondern  erst  durch 
Gauck  unheimlich  geworden.  '  (I-83,  p.  50)  In  the  end  both  parties  won  and 
lost.  Stolpe's  name  was  officially  cleared,  but  as  long  as  the  BStU 
continues  to  exist  there  is  a  chance  that  new  potentially  incriminating 
material  will  be  found  and  that  the  case  could  be  re-opened.  The  BStU  for 
its  part  continues  to  be  inundated  with  applications  from  the  private  and 
public  sector  to  view  the  files,  and  in  October  1995  Gauck  was  confirmed 
in  his  post  as  Bundesbeauftragter  for  a  second  five-year  term.  In  the  end, 
however,  the  Untersuchungsausschuß  attributed  just  as  much  credibility 
to  the  testimonies  of  former  Stasi  officers  as  to  the  material  which  was 
compiled  by  the  BStU  (F-2,  I,  27-30). 
6.1.7  The  Work  of  the  Untersuchungsausschuß 
The  work  of  the  Stolpe-Untersuchungsausschuß,  whose  final  report  went 
to  press  in  June  1994,  had  been  highly  topical  and  controversial.  The  eight 162 
invited  Bürgerrechtler  had  refused  to  testify,  both  Marianne  Birthler  and 
Günter  Nooke  had  resigned  from  the  committee  in  protest  at  the  manner 
in  which  they  felt  that  Stolpe's  highly  questionable  MfS  connections  were 
being  trivialised,  and  ex-MfS  officers  Roßberg  and  Wieland  had 
contradicted  themselves  and  each  other  on  several  occasions  regarding 
particular  details  of  Stolpe's  contacts  to  the  Stasi.  The  core  problem  for 
the  committee  in  bringing  the  Stolpe  debate  to  any  sort  of  satisfying 
conclusion  was  that  which  is  encountered  in  any  case  where  someone's 
previous  contacts  to  the  MfS  are  examined,  namely  that  there  is  no 
consensus  on  the  question  of  what  exactly  makes  this  contact  a  punishable 
offence  in  unified  Germany.  The  Untersuchungsausschuß  spent  much  time 
and  effort  examining  the  details  of  Stolpe's  contacts  to  the  MfS,  notably 
those  surrounding  the  awarding  of  the  Verdienstmedaille,  and  the 
question  of  whether  or  not  he  had  been  aware  that  he  had  been  referred  to 
by  the  Stasi  as  IM  'Sekretär'.  Stolpe  quite  simply  refused  to  resign  his 
political  mandate.  In  the  absence  of  the  ultimate  proof  of  the 
Verpflichtungserklärung,  and  with  numerous  statements  of  support  from 
prominent  politicians  and  theologians,  he  was  able  to  remain  in  office  and 
retain  credibility.  There  is  really  no  doubt  that,  as  far  as  the  MfS  was 
concerned,  Manfred  Stolpe  was  an  IM,  in  that  he  met  with  MfS  officers 
regularly  and  secretly,  supplying  them  with  information  which  was 
regarded  as  operativ  bedeutsam.  Had  a  signed  Verpflichtungserklärung 
been  found  in  the  course  of  the  investigation  it  is  doubtful  if  Stolpe  would 
have  been  able  to  remain  in  office.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  wording  of  the 
final  report,  which  states  that,  since  there  was  no  proof  that  Stolpe  knew 
that  he  had  been  registered  under  the  name  IM  'Sekretär',  or  that  he  had 
ever  explicitly  committed  himself  to  work  as  an  informer,  his  relationship 
to  the  MfS  was  that  of  a  'gleichrangiger  Verhandlungspartner'  (F-2,  I, 
165).  Yet  the  fact  that  no  document  was  found  in  which  Stolpe  committed 163 
himself  in  writing  in  effect  proved  nothing  (see  Section  One:  2.5).  MfS 
guidelines  suggest  that  it  was  often  the  case  that  individuals  such  as 
Stolpe  were  not  asked  to  make  a  written  commitment: 
Bei  Angehörigen  der  Intelligenz  und  besonders  bei  kirchlichen 
Würdenträgern  u.  a.  ist  durch  eine  systematische  und  zielstrebige 
Zusammenarbeit  zu  erreichen,  daß  das  Vertrauen  dieser  Personen 
zu  den  Organen  für  Staatssicherheit  wächst  und  das  Ministerium 
für  Staatssicherheit  wichtige  und  wertvolle  Informationen  erhält. 
Durch  ständige  ideologische  Beeinflussung  muß  im  Endergebnis 
eine  enge  Zusammenarbeit  geschaffen  werden,  so  daß  in 
besonderen  Fällen  selbst  von  einer  schriftlichen  Verpflichtung 
abgesehen  werden  kann,  wenn  ohne  eine  schriftliche 
Verpflichtung  das  Ziel  besser  erreicht  wird  bzw.  durch  die 
Ergebnisse  der  Mitarbeit  eine  unzertrennbare  Bindung  erfolgt.  (J- 
62,  p.  212) 
Despite  this  evidence  from  MfS  documentation,  the 
Untersuchungsausschuß  placed  much  importance  on  details  such  as  the 
existence  of  a  material  commitment,  never  really  scratching  the  surface  of 
the  issues  at  hand  to  discuss  how,  in  the  historical  context  of  the  GDR, 
such  contacts  to  state  organs  should  be  evaluated.  It  was,  in  fact,  almost 
impossible  for  the  committee  to  deal  with  these  issues,  since  other  less 
prominent  IM  were  at  the  same  time  being  dismissed  from  their  jobs  in 
public  service  if  they  were  shown  to  have  knowingly  conspired  with  the 
MfS  as  an  IM.  The  discussion  could  potentially  have  been  significantly 
more  enlightening  if  it  had  been  accepted  from  the  outset  that  Stolpe  had 
to  all  extents  and  purposes  been  an  IM.  The  question  of  whether  he  had 
compromised  himself  and  others  to  too  great  an  extent  in  order  to  achieve 
his  aims  could  then  have  been  examined  in  detail.  Robert  Leicht  suggested 
that  the  avoidance  of  the  real  issues  involved  was  partly  due  to  the  stance 
which  Stolpe's  opponents  adopted  from  the  outset: 
Dasi4ufregende  am  Fall  Stolpe  war  eben  die  Frage  des 
konkretisierten  politischen  Ethos  gewesen:  In  welchem  Verhältnis 
standen  die,  für  sich  genommen,  per  definitionem  zutiefst 164 
fragwürdigen  Kontakte  mit  der  Staatssicherheit  zu  den  auf  diese 
Weise  erzielten  humanitären,  politischen  und  kirchlichen 
Resultaten?  Doch  eben  diese  Diskussion  war  im  Grunde  nicht 
zugelassen  worden,  weil  schon  der  bloße  Gedanke  an  eine  legitime 
Beziehung  zwischen  Zweck  und  Mittel  von  den  schärfsten 
Gegnern  Stolpes  verabscheut  wurde  -  und  viele  Verteidiger 
Stolpes  deshalb  seine  Kontakte  vorsichtshalber  pauschal 
verteidigten.  [...  ]  Das  Ausweichen  vor  den  eigentlichen  Fragen  hat 
Stolpe  geschützt  und  seine  Gegner  gelähmt.  (1-87) 
Yet  it  was  not  solely  Stolpe's  opponents  who  ensured  that  the  most 
potentially  fruitful  issues  of  this  debate  were  neglected.  The  political  order 
of  the  day  dictated  that  if  Stolpe  were  shown  to  have  known  that  he  was 
registered  as  IM  'Sekretär',  then  he  would  have  been  under  considerable 
pressure  to  resign.  As  a  result  this  became  the  principal  question  with 
which  the  committee  busied  itself.  It  was  extremely  difficult  to  establish 
the  exact  details  of  events  which  lay  so  far  in  the  past,  and  contradictions 
and  ambivalence  were  the  only  result  of  attempts  to  recreate,  for  example, 
the  order  of  events  surrounding  the  awarding  of  the  Verdienstmedaille. 
Such  was  the  inconclusive  nature  of  proceedings  that  Joachim  Nawrocki 
remarked  at  the  end  of  the  twenty-fifth  sitting  of  the 
Untersuchungsausschuß:  'Es  kann  alles  so  oder  so  ähnlich  gewesen  sein, 
muß  aber  nicht.  '  (1-86)  In  Schwieriger  Aufbruch  Stolpe  stated  that  in  the 
frequent  conversations  he  had  with  the  MfS  it  was  possible  that  what  he 
had  said  had  not  always  been  reported  in  the  way  in  which  he  had  meant 
it,  and  that  controversial  statements  he  had  actually  made  might  well 
have  been  left  out  of  the  subsequent  reports  (J-91,  pp.  127,139).  Stolpe 
seems  also  to  have  anticipated  that  he  might  be  on  record  as  an  IM  and 
trivialised  this  fact  in  advance:  'Vielleicht  läßt  sich  der  Unterschied  aus 
den  Akten  nicht  immer  erkennen.  Vermutlich  hat  die  Staatssicherheit  ihr 
interessant  scheinende  Leute  in  den  internen  Berichten  als  Mitarbeiter 
geführt,  ohne  daß  die  Betroffenen  davon  Kenntnis  hatten.  '  (J-91,  p.  128) 
Stolpe  had  thus  predicted  the  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  which,  indeed, 165 
would  be  the  dominant  features  of  the  work  of  the 
Untersuchungsausschuß  set  up  to  investigate  his  Stasi  connections. 
6.1.8  Consequences 
The  final  report  of  the  Stolpe-Untersuchungsausschuß  was  published  in 
June  1994,  and  Stolpe  was  officially  'entlastet'.  The  Landtag  Brandenburg 
decided  on  the  basis  of  the  Untersuchungsausschuß  's  conclusions  that  in 
future  the  examination  of  each  individual  case  of  Stasi  collaboration 
would  have  to  go  beyond  merely  asserting  that  an  individual  had  worked 
for  the  MfS,  and  further:  'Niemandem  darf  die  persönliche 
Weiterentwicklung  und  der  Wille  zur  Neuorientierung  abgesprochen 
werden.  '  (F-15,  pp.  5-6)  The  fact  that  Stolpe's  name  was  officially  cleared 
threatened  only  to  further  marginalise  the  Bürgerrechtler  who  were  so 
against  his  remaining  in  power.  The  outcome  of  the  Stolpe  affair  and  their 
dissatisfaction  with  the  manner  in  which  other  political  parties  are 
confronting  aspects  of  the  Stasi  legacy  will  without  doubt  have  been 
influential  in  the  decision  of  the  seven  Bürgerrechtler  to  join  the  ranks  of 
the  CDU. 
6.2  'EINE  SPEZIALVARIANTE':  GREGOR  GYSI  (1-70) 
The  debate  surrounding  the  alleged  IM-Tätigkeit  of  PDS  golden  boy 
Gregor  Gysi  was  in  many  ways  similar  to  the  Manfred  Stolpe  affair.  Gysi 
is  a  phenomenally  charismatic  figure  who  undoubtedly  contributes 
significantly  to  the  success  of  the  PDS.  The  budding  post-unification 
political  career  of  the  former  lawyer  began  to  be  endangered,  however, 
when,  after  viewing  their  Stasi  files,  a  number  of  those  who  had  been 
represented  by  Gysi  in  the  GDR  claimed  that  the  evidence  they  found  in 
these  documents  proved  beyond  doubt  that  he  had  abused  his  position  of 
trust  to  betray  confidential  information  to  the  MfS  as  an  IM  (1-52).  In 166 
response  to  these  allegations  Gysi  claimed  time  and  time  again:  'Ich  habe 
die  Staatssicherheit  niemals  direkt  und  bewußt  informiert.  '  (1-54,  p.  49) 
Although  information  seeming  to  stem  from  Gysi  is  found  under  the  code 
names  IM  'Gregor'  and  IM  'Notar'  in  the  MfS  files,  it  appears  that  Gysi, 
possibly  as  a  result  of  his  social  standing,  was  not  considered  a  typical  IM 
by  the  M  fS.  There  was  no  formal  IM  file  for  Gysi  and  no  official 
Verpflichtung,  leading  the  BStU  to  conclude:  'Das  MfS  hat  die 
Zusammenarbeit  mit  Gysi  offensichtlich  nicht  wie  die  mit  einem 
gewöhnlichen  IM  gestaltet.  '  (I-70) 
Since  Gysi  was  even  less  willing  than  Stolpe  to  engage  in  dialogue 
concerning  his  dealings  with  MfS  representatives,  any  attempt  to  initiate 
debate  proved  futile,  and  the  issue  soon  deteriorated  into  an  at  times  petty 
battle  between  Gysi  and  a  number  of  former  Bürgerrechtler,  principally 
Katja  Havemann,  the  last  wife  of  Robert  Havemann,  who  claimed  that 
Gysi  had  abused  her  husband's  trust,  and  Bärbel  Bohley,  who  was  taken 
to  court  on  a  number  of  occasions  on  the  question  of  whether  she  was 
permitted  to  refer  to  Gysi  as  a  'Spitzel'  (1-4,1-69).  Bohley  continued  to 
refer  to  Gysi  in  this  way  even  after  she  had  been  threatened  with  a 
substantial  fine  for  doing  so,  defiantly  declaring:  'Ich  zahle  für  keinen  IM, 
ich  sitze  lieber.  '  (1-25) 
A  wide  range  of  public  personalities  began  to  take  sides  in  the  Gysi 
issue,  notably,  and  predictably  enough,  Gysi's  political  adversaries  in  the 
CDU  (1-5).  Signed  declarations  were  drawn  up  for  and  against  Gysi,  with 
thirty  Bürgerrechtler  claiming  in  one  such  statement:  'Gregor  Gysi  hat 
durch  seine  Tätigkeit  als  Anwalt  eine  der  größten  Karrieren  im  Lügen- 
Bespitzelungs-  und  Unrechtssystem  der  DDR  gemacht.  '  (1-89)  A  public 
declaration,  signed  by  the  likes  of  Stefan  Heym,  Heiner  Müller  and  even 
various  politicians  from  elsewhere  in  Europe,  argued  on  the  contrary:  'Daß 
ein  Beschuldigter  gezwungen  wird,  seine  Unschuld  nachzuweisen,  statt 167 
daß  ihm  seine  Schuld  nachgewiesen  wird,  stellt  eine  Umkehr  der 
Beweislast  und  einen  bedrohlichen  Angriff  auf  rechtsstaatliche 
Grundsätze  dar.  '  (I-26)  Statements  such  as  these  did  nothing  to  encourage 
any  form  of  open  dialogue.  Indeed,  the  likelihood  of  this  ever  being 
realised  had  become  even  more  remote  after  Gysi,  in  May  1995,  made  a 
public  statement  that,  unless  new  incriminating  evidence  were  produced, 
he  was  not  prepared  to  enter  into  any  further  debate  concerning  his  Stasi 
connections:  'Nicht  mehr  beteiligen  aber  werde  ich  mich  an  dem  Leerlauf 
des  beschriebenen  Karussells.  '  (1-32)  The  Gysi  debate  continues,  but  the 
fact  that  no  standard  Verpflichtungserklärung  committing  Gysi  to 
collaboration  with  the  MfS  has  been  or  is  ever  likely  to  be  found,  may  once 
again,  as  in  the  Stolpe  debate,  prove  decisive. 
I  asked  the  IM  whom  I  interviewed,  the  majority  of  whom  are  PDS 
voters,  if  they  believed  that  Gysi  should  be  forced  into  resignation  if 
irrefutable  evidence  that  he  had  officially  agreed  to  collaborate  with  the 
MfS  as  an  IM  were  to  be  found.  Most  thought  very  highly  of  Gysi,  and 
there  was  an  intense  reluctance  on  their  part  to  admit  that  it  was  at  all 
possible  that  he  had  been  active  as  an  IM.  'Falke',  for  example,  said  that 
he  considered  Gysi  to  be  extremely  intelligent  and  that  he  simply  could 
not  believe  that  he  could  have  knowingly  collaborated  as  an  IM  (A-3). 
When  I  pressed  the  point,  'Falke'  finally  said  that  even  if  it  were  to  be 
shown  that  Gysi  was  an  IM,  he  thinks  that  he  should  not  be  forced  into 
resignation.  Just  before  we  had  begun  discussing  Gysi  'Falke'  had  told  me 
that  he  considered  it  unfair  that  he  himself  should  be  dismissed  from  his 
employment  as  a  result  of  his  IM-Tätigkeit  being  revealed  considering 
that  he  lived  in  the  state  of  Brandenburg,  where  Manfred  Stolpe  was  the 
Ministerpräsident.  'Falke'  felt  that  justice  demanded  that  Stolpe  should 
also  be  forced  into  resignation.  I  remarked  that  his  opinions  on  Stolpe  and 
Gysi  seemed  contradictory.  He  paused,  finally  saying  that  this  was 168 
because  it  was  so  obvious  to  him  that  Stolpe  had  been  an  IM,  but  that  he 
could  just  not  imagine  that  this  was  the  case  for  Gysi  (A-3). 
Gregor  Gysi  is  such  a  pivotal  figure  in  the  PDS  and  so  strongly 
involved  with  political  issues  concerning  the  former  GDR  that  many 
simply  do  not  want  to  consider  that  he  could  have  been  an  IM.  Although 
some  of  his  former  clients  and  many  of  those  in  the  CDU  would  be  only  too 
happy  to  see  him  forced  to  resign,  unless  absolute  proof  of  willing  and 
conscious  collaboration  can  be  uncovered,  Gysi's  charisma  and  charm  will 
continue  to  ensure  that  the  widespread  support  he  has  in  the  former  GDR 
is  sufficient  to  let  him  remain  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  political 
arena  of  post-unification  Germany,  be  it  as  a  member  of  the  PDS  or  in  any 
other  function  he  might  choose  to  take  up. 169 
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7.1  FUNDAMENTAL  DIFFICULTIES 
After  he  had  been  given  a  two-year  suspended  sentence  for  his  role  in  the 
death  of  Chris  Gueffroy,  the  last  person  to  die  while  trying  to  escape  from 
the  GDR,  Andreas  Kühnpast,  one  of  the  four  border-guards  on  trial,  said 
of  his  punishment:  'Das  hat  mit  Rechtsstaatlichkeit  nichts  zu  tun,  das  war 
Willkür.  '  (I-8)  This  first  in  a  series  of  border-guard  trials  was 
representative  of  much  of  the  legal  reckoning  with  the  GDR  legacy,  in  that 
it  highlighted  some  of  the  key  difficulties  and  points  of  contention  involved 
in  such  an  undertaking.  The  border-guards  had,  by  firing  the  fatal  shots, 
been  the  most  directly  responsible  for  the  death  of  the  young  Gueffroy,  yet 
they  were  at  the  very  bottom  of  the  power  hierarchy  and  were  not 
responsible  for  the  Schießbefehl,  the  ora&-  which  demanded  that  anyone 
who  attempted  to  cross  into  the  FRG  be  shot.  The  courts  had  to  decide  if 
the  argumentation  used  in  the  border-guards'  defence,  that  they  had 
merely  been  following  orders,  was  acceptable.  This  was  for  many  an 
uncomfortably  familiar  defence  strategy  in  the  German  context,  and  Ral  fei 
Giordano  argued  that  it  was  time  that  the  Germans  began  to  face  up  to 
their  responsibility,  not  just  for  giving,  but  also  for  following  orders  (cited 
in  J-45,  p.  180).  Yet  any  severe  punishment  of  these  foot  soldiers  would 
have  seemed  inappropriate  when  those  who  had  been  responsible  for  the 
order  to  shoot  were  not,  at  least  at  this  point,  being  brought  to  trial. 
Bringing  a  case  to  bear  on  those  higher  up  the  power  hierarchy  was  a 
considerably  more  lengthy  and  complicated  process,  and  it  was  only  in 
early  1996  that  the  trial  against  six  leading  members  of  the  Politbüro 
began  for  their  part  in  the  deaths  at  the  German-German  border.  This 
trial  began  in  the  same  faltering  manner  as  others  involving  prominent 
and  often  elderly  politicians  from  the  former  GDR.  These  proceedings 
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caused  either  by  the  waning  health  of  the  accused  or  by  objections 
raised  on  various  formalities. 
The  chief  legal  difficulty  in  dealings  with  crimes  committed  in  the 
GDR  is  the  principle  of  nulla  poena  sine  lege,  Article  103  (2)  of  the  German 
constitution:  'Eine  Tat  kann  nur  bestraft  werden,  wenn  die  Strafbarkeit 
gesetzlich  bestimmt  war,  bevor  die  Tat  begonnen  wurde.  '  This  principle 
has  been  contested  on  many  occasions  since  1945,  and  Giordano  argues 
that  this  clause,  by  decreeing  that  'Gesetz  =  Recht',  effectively  means  that 
if  Hitler  had  created  legislation  for  geno  cide  then  no  one  could  have  been 
tried  for  his/her  role  in  carrying  out  the  Endlösung  (1-66).  In  order  for  the 
state  of  law  to  remain  credible,  however,  it  has  to  be  seen  to  adhere  to  the 
legal  principles  which  it  has  defined,  and  the  idea  that  this  clause  could  be 
nullified  in  the  legal  reckoning  with  the  GDR  past  was  never  really  given 
serious  consideration.  Andreas  Zielcke  commented  as  follows  on  the 
difficulties  involved:  'Das  Paradox  des  demokratischen  Rechts  ist  es,  einen 
Unrechtsstaat  in  rechtsstaatlichen  Verfahren  nicht  verarbeiten  zu 
können,  obwohl  er  (der  Rechtsstaat)  die  einzige  angemessene  Antwort  auf 
das  Unrecht  darstellt.  '  (I-46,  p.  79) 
At  a  conference  which  addressed  the  issues  involved  in  the  legal 
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reckoning  with^GDR  past,  Klaus  Kinkel  stressed  that,  in  confronting  the 
crimes  of  the  SED  state,  it  was  not  a  question  of  imposing  some  sort  of 
'Siegerjustiz':  'Es  geht  einfach  um  Gerechtigkeit.  Schuld  muß  allerdings 
konkret  und  individuell  nachgewiesen  werden.  '  (J-40,  p.  6)  Establishing 
individual  guilt  is,  however,  an  extremely  complex  legal  problem  and 
Kinkel  admitted  that  'eben  das  macht  die  Prozesse  so  schwierig'  (J-40,  p. 
6).  One  consequence  of  the  legal  difficulties  in  bringing  such  cases  to 
court,  as  Rainer  Frenkl  observed,  was  that  in  the  trials  against  leading 
members  of  the  SED,  the  gap  between  the  actual  political  guilt  and  the 
charges  brought  could  not  have  been  crasser  (1-84).  In  an  often  farcical 172 
trial  Erich  Mielke,  for  example,  first  stood  accused  of  the  murder  of  two 
policemen  in  1936,  and  not  for  any  injustices  carried  out  by  the  MfS.  One 
of  the  other  most  powerful  men  in  the  GDR,  Markus  Wolf,  was  sentenced 
in  December  1993  to  six  years  imprisonment  for  his  role  as  head  of  foreign 
espionage.  At  the  time  Wolf  declared:  'Verurteilt  werden  soll  ich,  weil  es 
vierzig  Jahre  die  Deutsche  Demokratische  Republik  gegeben  hat,  die  es 
im  politischen  und  Rechtsverständnis  der  Urheber  solcher 
Veranstaltungen  nie  hätte  geben  dürfen.  '  (F-6,  p.  34)  In  May  1995  this 
verdict  was  declared  invalid  and  overturned.  Wolf  could  only  have  been 
legally  punished  if  he  had  worked  for  a  foreign  power.  Since  he  had 
carried  out  his  duties  as  a  GDR  citizen  and  from  the  territory  of  the  GDR, 
it  was  decreed  that  he  was  free  from  guilt  in  a  legal  sense.  Wolf  is 
currently  on  trial  once  again  for  his  role  in  the  kidnapping  from  the  FRG 
to  the  GDR  of  individuals  who  were  wanted  by  the  MfS. 
In  general,  the  higher  up  the  power  hierarchy  an  individual  had 
been,  the  more  difficult  it  proved  to  bring  a  case  to  bear.  Even  Erich 
Honecker,  who  was  eventually  released  on  the  grounds  of  ill-health, 
maintained  that  he  considered  himself  'frei  von  jeder  Schuld  im 
strafrechtlichen  Sinne'  (I-77).  Many  former  Stasi-Opfer  were  disappointed 
to  discover  that  the  Rechtsstaat  would  not  necessarily  guarantee  justice 
for  the  crimes  which  had  been  committed  in  the  Unrechtsstaat,  and 
Marion  Gräfin-Dönhoff  denounced  Bärbel  Bohley's  now  infamous 
comment  that  the  citizens  of  the  GDR  had  hoped  for  'Gerechtigkeit'  and 
had  got  the  'Rechtsstaat',  as  a  'schlimmer  Satz',  accusing  the  former 
Bürgerrechtlerin  of  confusing  justice  with  revenge  (1-92).  Friedrich 
Schorlemmer  also  took  up  this  point,  criticising  the  tendency,  as  he 
perceived  it,  to  confuse  the  'Rechtsstaat'  with  a  'Rachestaat'  (1-61). 
Bohley's  comment  should,  however,  perhaps  not  so  much  be  taken  as  an 
indication  that  she  confuses  justice  with  revenge,  rather  as  the  realisation 173 
and  the  criticism  on  her  part  that  justice  cannot  always  be  obtained 
within  the  constraints  of  the  criminal  justice  system. 
7.2  CONSEQUENCES  OF  A  PEACEFUL  REVOLUTION 
Man  kann  von  einer  Revolution  nicht  verlangen,  daß  sie  sich  an 
rechtsstaatlichen  Regeln  hält.  Umgekehrt  kann  eine  Revolution,  die 
gewissermaßen  mit  der  Kerze  in  der  Hand  gemacht  wurde,  nicht 
von  den  Organen  der  Justiz  verlangen  nachzuholen,  was  die 
Revolutionäre  versäumt  haben  oder  versäumt  zu  haben  meinen. 
(1-14,  p.  126) 
It  was  a  bitter  discovery  not  only  for  Bohley,  but  for  many  of  those  who 
had  suffered  injustices  in  the  GDR  that,  since  the  FRG's  criminal  justice 
system  was  based  on  the  principle  that  the  accused  was  innocent  until 
proven  guilty,  it  would  offer  just  as  much  protection  to  those  who  had 
served  the  MfS  as  to  those  who  had  suffered  at  its  hands.  The  Neues 
Forum  in  Halle,  for  example,  was  taken  to  court  after  it  made  apparently 
anonymously  donated  lists  of  former  MfS  employees  and  IM  available  for 
public  consultation.  Although  checks  at  the  BStU  indicated  that  most  of 
the  people  on  the  lists  had  in  fact  collaborated  with  the  MfS,  the  courts 
ruled  that  the  individual  rights  of  those  concerned  outweighed  the  right  of 
the  public  to  this  information  (1-27).  Katrin  Eigenfeld  of  the  Neues  Forum 
argued  that  the  publishing  of  the  lists  had  been  entirely  successful  as  it 
had  resulted  in  a  'psychische  Reinigung'  in  the  town  of  Halle  (F-13,  p. 
160).  This  may  well  have  been  the  case  for  many  of  those  concerned,  but 
those  who  were  not  quite  as  enamoured  with  the  action  taken  were 
entitled  to  make  use  of  the  principles  of  the  criminal  justice  system  in 
what  proved  to  be  a  run  of  costly  court  cases  for  the  Neues  Forum. 
Wolf  Biermann  sees  much  of  the  frustration  with  the  limitations  of 
the  Rechtsstaat  as  resulting  from  the  fact  that  the  public  demonstrations 
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Weitsicht,  ja  und  zu  wenig  blinde  Wut'  (1-44,  p.  83).  The  presence  of  a 
little  more  'blinde  Wut'  could,  he  suggested,  have  been  cathartic  for  the 
East  German  population,  allowing  them  to  vent  their  anger  and  to  feel 
that  some  justice  had  been  done.  This,  however,  was  not  to  be.  Without  a 
single  death  and  very  little  bloodshed  the  GDR  ceased  to  exist  and  merged 
with  the  FRG.  The  fact  that  these  events  took  place  so  peacefully  and 
without  any  lynch  justice  meant  that  there  remained  a  lot  of  guilt  which 
had  not  in  any  way  been  seen  to  be  atoned.  Many  placed  their  hopes  in  the 
Rechtsstaat,  presuming  that  it  would  be  capable  of  carrying  out  this  task, 
and  were  disillusioned  to  discover  that  the  legal  system  and  a  higher 
notion  of  justice  were  two  quite  separate  constructs,  one  of  which  was 
concrete,  and  one  abstract.  In  a  discussion  of  the  concepts  of  justice  and 
law  Jacques  Derrida  comments  that  the  English  phrase  'to  enforce  the 
law'  is  enlightening,  since  it  serves  as  a  reminder  that  the  law  is  always 
something  which  is  imposed  by  force  (J-19,  p.  11).  He  continues:  'Kraft 
(Gewalt)  ohne  Gerechtigkeit  ist  tyrannisch.  Gerechtigkeit  ohne  Kraft 
(Gewalt)  wird  nicht  anerkannt,  weil  es  immer  Bösewichte  gibt.  '  (J-19,  p. 
11)  The  point  being  made  here  by  Derrida  is  precisely  that  which  was 
disregarded  by  those  in  the  former  GDR  who  had  hoped  that  justice  and 
the  law  were  one  and  the  same. 
7.3  THE  TREATMENT  OF  IM:  UNCERTAINTIES  AND 
INCONSISTENCIES 
Ein  wichtiger  Grund  für  eine  außerordentliche  Kündigung  ist 
insbesondere  dann  gegeben,  wenn  der  Arbeitnehmer  für  das 
Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit/Amt  für  Nationale  Sicherheit 
tätig  war  und  deshalb  ein  Festhalten  am  Arbeitsverhältnis 
unzumutbar  erscheint.  (G-1) 175 
When  the  StUG  came  into  force  on  29  December  1991  it  allowed  the  above 
ruling  in  the  Unification  Treaty  to  be  fully  implemented.  For  those  active 
in  the  public  sector  who  still  lived  with  the  secret  of  having  been  an  IM, 
the  StUG  meant  that  their  days  in  employment  were  potentially 
numbered.  At  the  end  of  May  1995  over  1,300,000  applications  had  been 
lodged  with  the  BStU  from  employers  in  the  public  sector  wishing  to 
discover  if  their  employees  had  collaborated  with  the  MfS  (F-17,  p.  111). 
Close  to  another  300,000  such  applications  concerned  predominantly  those 
active  in  politics,  in  the  church,  as  well  as  lawyers  and  notaries  (F-17,  p. 
111).  The  vast  majority  of  those  screened  in  this  way  are  found  not  to  have 
collaborated  with  the  MfS.  It  was,  after  all,  a  small  minority  of  the  East 
German  population  which  was  active  as  IM.  Of  20,000  teachers  who  were 
screened  in  the  Berlin  area,  for  example,  4.5%  were  found  to  have 
collaborated  with  the  MfS  (F-17,  pp.  7-8). 
Comparing  the  way  in  which  former  Secret  Service  employees  are 
being  treated  in  Germany  with  the  Czech  Republic,  Tina  Rosenberg 
concludes  that  the  German  approach  is  fairer,  since  individuals  are  not 
necessarily  dismissed  if  they  are  discovered  to  have  worked  for  the  MfS  (J- 
73,  p.  321).  It  should,  however,  be  stressed  that  the  German  system  is  only 
potentially  fairer.  In  practice,  comparable  cases  of  collaboration  are  often 
treated  inconsistently  within  and  between  Länder.  Reflecting  on  these 
discrepancies  Rosenberg  does  later  comment  on  the  absurdity,  as  she  puts 
it,  that  'Manfred  Stolpe  can  be  governor  of  Brandenburg,  but  [because  of 
his  previous  Stasi  connections]  he  could  not  drive  a  tram  in  Saxony'  (J-73, 
p.  324). 
The  final  report  of  the  Enquete-Kommission  cautions  against 
discrepancies  in  the  treatment  of  comparable  cases  of  former  Stasi 
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Daß  es  im  Prozeß  des  Zusammenwachsens  und  der  Herstellung  der 
inneren  Einheit  Deutschlands  keine  pauschale  und  dauerhafte 
Ausgrenzung  jener  geben  darf,  die  seinerzeit  in  ihren  Funktionen 
an  nachgeordneter  Stelle  an  dem  diktatorischen  System 
mitgewirkt  haben.  [...  ]  Gerade  auch  die  Überprüfungsmöglichkeiten 
nach  dem  Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz  (StUG)  sind  nicht  als 
gesellschaftliche  Diffamierung  zu  verstehen.  (F-1,  p.  281) 
The  above  statement  remains  ultimately  only  a  recommendation.  The 
German  system  allows  for,  but  does  not  demand  a  differentiated 
treatment  of  individual  cases.  There  are  no  set  rules  as  to  what 
constitutes  sufficient  grounds  for  dismissal,  and  some  decisions  are  thus 
bound  to  be  'pauschal',  undifferentiated.  There  have,  indeed,  been  many 
reports  of  inconsistencies  in  the  screening  of  public  service  employees  such 
as  teachers  (1-18,1-49).  The  most  notorious  example  of  where  the  system 
appeared  fundamentally  flawed  was  perhaps  the  case  of  the  woman  who 
lost  her  job  in  the  dog  taxation  department  of  the  finance  office  as  a  result 
of  having  worked  as  a  kitchen  help  for  the  MfS.  It  was  decided  that  the 
'hoheitliche  Funktion'  in  the  finance  office  could  not  be  carried  out  by 
someone  who  had  worked  for  the  MfS  (J-50,  p.  109).  Such  occurrences 
arise  partly  because  each  committee  responsible  for  examining  individual 
cases  sets  its  own  criteria  for  deciding  whether  the  person  concerned 
should  be  allowed  to  remain  in  employment.  Werner  Fischer,  who  was 
involved  in  the  screening  of  public  service  employees  in  Berlin,  reported 
that  the  committee  took  the  length  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit  into  account,  but 
that  all  those  who  were  still  active  in  the  autumn  of  1989  were 
automatically  dismissed  (1-43,  p.  68).  There  are  bound  to  be  crass 
differences  in  the  degree  of  collaboration  and  in  the  resulting  culpability  of 
all  whose  who  were  still  active  as  IM  in  1989.  The  decision  to  dismiss  all 
such  IM  seems  potentially  grossly  unfair  to  those  whose  co-operation  may 
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There  have  been  moves  to  change  the  law  concerning  the  treatment 
of  former  IM  to  facilitate  a  more  differentiated  approach.  As  the  St  UG 
now  stands,  screening  of  public  service  employees  is  only  permissible  for 
the  fifteen  years  after  the  law  came  into  force.  It  seems  likely  that  this 
limit  will  eventually  be  lowered.  Legislation  has,  indeed,  recently  been 
passed  which  will  mean  that  from  August  1998  the  BStU  will  no 
longer  be  obliged  to  disclose  information  concerning  an  IM-Tätigkeit  which 
came  to  an  end  before  31  December  1975  (1-60).  Furthermore,  even  if 
collaboration  took  place  after  1976,  the  BStU  will  not  have  to  release  this 
information  to  an  employer  or  potential  employer  if  it  is  decided  that  the 
extent  of  compliance  was  minimal.  There  are,  however,  certain  exceptions 
to  this  ruling.  Information  concerning  MfS  collaboration  by  Members  of 
Parliament  will,  for  example,  still  be  released.  For  many  of  those  who 
have  been  out  of  work  for  a  period  of  years  as  a  result  of  an  IM-Tätigkeit  it 
will  be  no  easy  task  to  find  employment  again,  even  after  such  a  change  in 
legislation.  In  addition,  such  an  alteration  offers  only  further  incentive  for 
those  whose  Stasi  connections  have  not  yet  come  to  light  to  continue  to 
remain  silent  about  this  aspect  of  their  biography.  In  some  ways  a  ruling 
where  all  IM  received  a  similar  trial  and  punishment  might  have  been 
easier  to  cope  with  for  at  least  some  of  those  concerned,  as  was  suggested 
by  one  former  IM  with  whom  Rosenberg  spoke  (J-73,  p.  383). 
In  actual  fact,  it  is4  as  all  minority  of  those  found  to  have  held 
contacts  to  the  MfS  who  actually  lose  their  jobs.  Of  the  4.5%  of  Berlin 
teachers  found  to  have  held  MfS  contacts,  a  mere  0.9%  were  eventually 
dismissed  after  the  cases  had  been  reviewed  (F-17,  pp.  7-8).  Some  of  even 
the  small  number  who  are  dismissed  are  able  to  contest  this  decision  on 
the  basis  of  procedural  errors  and  have  to  be  subsequently  reinstated. 178 
7.4  LEGALITY  AND  MORALITY 
The  underlying  and  recurring  problem  in  the  debate  concerning  the  legal 
reckoning  with  the  GDR  past  is  the  clear  confusion  of  legal  and  moral 
issues.  This  confounding  of  moral  and  legal  guilt  is  particularly  evident  in 
the  rationale  behind  the  mandatory  questionnaire,  asking  about  previous 
connections  to  the  MfS,  which  GDR  citizens  active  in  the  public  sector 
were  required  to  complete.  Many  who  had  collaborated  as  IM  decided  to 
deny  having  held  contacts  to  the  MfS.  The  fact  that  they  had  been 
untruthful  was  sometimes  used  as  a  further  reproach  when  their  IM- 
Tätigkeit  eventually  did  come  to  light.  IM  'Falke'  was  informed  in  the 
letter  announcing  his  dismissal  that  if  he  had  been  honest  about  his  MfS 
contacts  in  the  first  place  he  would  never  have  been  appointed  to  his 
promoted  position  and  that  'darüber  hinaus  ist  durch  das  Verschweigen 
der  Zusammenarbeit  mit  dem  Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit  das 
Vertrauensverhältnis  zwischen  Ihnen  und  Ihrem  Dienstherrn  zerstört'  (B- 
4).  There  are  no  legal  consequences  of  lying  on  the  questionnaire  and 
there  is  therefore  only  a  moral  incentive  to  tell  the  truth.  'Falke'  was 
informed  that  he  would  have  lost  his  job  even  if  he  had  taken  the  more 
morally  admirable  stance  of  admitting  to  his  Stasi  contacts.  He  was, 
nevertheless,  reproached  on  moral  grounds  within  the  legal  context  of  his 
sacking  for  not  doing  so,  as  though  this  morally  more  correct  behaviour 
could  actually  have  influenced  the  decision  to  sack  him.  The  concept  of 
such  questionnaires  was,  I  would  argue,  entirely  unsatisfactory.  Telling 
the  truth  only  meant  that  a  former  IM  was  likely  to  be  dismissed  sooner. 
Lying  generally  led  to  being  able  to  remain  in  employment  longer,  but 
could  result  in  a  moral  reproach  when  the  collaboration  was  eventually 
discovered.  The  questionnaires  were  thus  merely  a  pseudo-legal  way  of 
confronting  the  MfS  legacy,  which  ultimately  led  only  to  the  confusion  of 
legal  and  moral  issues,  leading  Friedrich  Schorlemmer  to  remark:  'Die  Art 179 
der  Fragebögen  führt  mich  in  eine  innere  Solidarität  mit  denen,  die  ich 
wahrlich  nicht  geschätzt  habe.  '  (J-82,  p.  234) 
7.5  THE  BStU  AND  THE  StUG 
Stefan  Heym  criticised  the  fact,  as  he  saw  it,  that  Germany  was  ruled  by 
two  institutions,  the  Gauck-Behörde  and  the  Treuhand  (J-36,  p.  73). 
Between  them,  he  argued,  these  two  government  bodies  had  more  power 
than  the  Politbüro  in  deciding  the  fates  of  GDR's  citizens,  by  producing 
information  which: 
der  Rest  der  Menschheit  auf  Treu  und  Glauben  zu  akzeptieren  hat 
-  und  welche  genutzt  werden,  um  ausgesuchte  Leute  abzuurteilen 
und  zu  verstoßen,  ohne  daß  die  so  Gestraften  je  Einblick  erhielten 
in  die  angeblichen  Beweise  ihrer  Schuld  oder  sich  auch  nur 
verteidigen  könnten. 
Da  ging  es  sogar  bei  der  Inquisition  milder  zu:  wenn  einer  die 
Folter  lebend  überstand,  wurde  ihm  vergeben.  Und  bei  dem 
berüchtigten  Senator  McCarthy  wurde  man  wenigstens  abgehört. 
(J-36,  p.  73) 
Heym  is  not  alone  in  his  disapproval  and  distrust  of  the  BStU.  During  the 
debate  concerning  the  creation  of  the  StUG  even  Jürgen  Fuchs  wondered, 
indeed,  whether  it  would  be  at  all  possible  'all  das  Leid,  Demütigung  und 
Lüge  tatsächlich  nunmehr  "behördlich"  zu  regeln?  '  (F-16,  p.  396).  Fuchs 
believed  that  the  answer  to  this  question  was  negative:  Vor  Ort,  dort  wo 
es  geschah,  müssen  die  Archive  geöffnet  werden.  Natürlich  nach  Recht 
und  Gesetz,  aber  ohne  diese  schreckliche  Behörden-  und 
Verwaltungsrhetorik,  die  um  sich  greift.  '  (F-16,  p.  396)  It  was  decided, 
however,  that  the  only  way  to  ensure  that  those  who  had  suffered  most 
would  be  protected  from  being  done  a  second  injustice  was  to  set  up  such  a 
body  to  meticulously  control  who  obtained  access,  and  under  what 
conditions,  to  the  very  intimate,  hurtful,  and  potentially  exploitable 
personal  information  which  makes  up  a  substantial  part  of  this  unique 180 
legacy.  The  MfS  dossiers  have  as  a  result  been  handed  over  to  a 
government  authority,  the  BStU,  which  must  act  within  the  constraints  of 
the  StUG.  This  fact  is  often  ignored,  and  at  times  one  might  be  led  to 
think  that  the  BStU  and  the  StUG  were  the  invention  of  one  man, 
Joachim  Gauck.  The  BStU  is  more  commonly  referred  to  as  the  Gauck- 
Behörde,  and  the  process  of  screening  public-service  employees  is  even 
popularly  termed  'gaucken'.  Gauck  is  then  often  seen  to  be  synonymous 
with  the  institution  of  which  he  is  in  charge  and  with  the  StUG.  This  was 
evident  when,  in  1991,  the  Humanistische  Union  went  back  on  its  decision 
to  award  Gauck  the  Fritz-Bauer-Preis  as  it  was  felt  that  to  do  so  would  be 
an  indication  of  approval  of  the  Gesetz  über  die  Sicherung  und  Nutzung 
der  personenbezogenen  Daten  des  ehemaligen  Ministeriums  für 
Staatssicherheit  /Amt  für  Nationale  Sicherheit,  the  law  which  was  the 
forerunner  to  the  StUG  (1-6,  G-2).  Another  example  of  such  thinking  is 
seen  when  Lesley  Bodi  comments  that  'Gauck  and  his  supporters  have 
tended  to  side  with  the  victims  and  not  the  culprits'  (J-12,  p.  15).  Bodi 
writes  as  though  Gauck  himself  had  personally  created  the  StUG  and 
founded  the  BStU  as  a  kind  of  citizens'  committee.  This  disregard  of  the 
facts  is  commonplace  in  certain  contexts,  and  Gauck  is  often  a  scapegoat 
for  those  who  feel  that  the  law  has  treated  them  unfairly.  An  article  in  the 
Junge  Welt,  for  example,  was  provocatively  titled,  'Können  wir  uns  einen 
Gauck  leisten?  '  (I-29). 
7.6  CONCLUSIONS 
Die  Aufarbeitung  der  Vergangenheit  ist  nur  in  beschränktem  Maße 
justitiabel.  In  weit  überwiegendem  Maße  ist  es  eine  Sache  der 
individuellen,  der  persönlichen  Hygiene  und  hat  nichts  mit 
Zuchthaus  und  Gefängnis  zu  tun.  (J-92,  pp.  182-83) 181 
Since  German  unification  there  have  been  many  calls  for  an  amnesty  for 
MfS  employees  (1-51,1-91,  J-21).  These  are  often  motivated  by  the 
recognition  of  the  immense  difficulties  involved  in  dealing  with  the  crimes 
of  the  GDR  within  the  legal  system.  The  low  number  of  cases  reaching  the 
courts  is  also  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  few  Opfer  are  coming  forward  to 
accuse  their  former  tormentors,  even  when  it  would  be  feasible  to  bring  a 
legal  charge.  In  one  notable  case  a  man  was  awarded  a  substantial  sum  of 
money  when  he  took  his  nephew  to  court  for  having  informed  the  GDR 
authorities  of  his  plans  to  flee  to  the  West.  The  denunciation  had  resulted 
in  a  three  year  prison  sentence  and  subsequent  Berufsverbot  for  the  man 
(I-71).  Many  other  Opfer  decide  against  taking  legal  action.  Even  Bärbel 
Bohley  admitted  that  she  herself  had  not  taken  this  step,  but  that  she 
would  not  like  to  have  this  right  taken  from  her,  arguing  that  an  amnesty 
would  mean  that  the  state  was  effectively  saying  to  its  citizens:  'Guckt  in 
eure  Akten,  aber  belästigt  die  Justiz  nicht,  geht  nach  Hause  und  bekommt 
eure  Magenschwüre  allein.  '  (I-55,  p.  94)  Bohley  also  pointed  out  that  since 
many  had  still  to  view  their  files,  an  amnesty  would  mean  that  the  right 
to  bring  their  oppressors  to  court  would  be  taken  from  some  individuals 
before  they  had  been  given  the  chance  to  exercise  it  (1-55,  p.  94). 
Even  if  the  will  were  there,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  bring 
many  former  IM  to  court,  since  their  primary  guilt  lies  most  often  in  the 
fact  that  they  abused  the  trust  of  others.  This  is  a  moral  guilt  which 
cannot  clearly  be  defined  or  punished  within  the  criminal  justice  system. 
The  confrontation  with  this  guilt  cannot  be  decreed  from  above  and  can 
really  only  take  place  on  an  interpersonal  level.  Difficulties  in  realising 
such  interpersonal  contacts  lie  partly  in  the  fact  that  the  legal  context  for 
confronting  the  IM  legacy  does  exist,  and  this  legal  confrontation  tends, 
particularly  for  the  IM  themselves,  to  overshadow  the  consideration  of 
moral  issues.  As  the  law  stands  former  MfS  employees  may  be  fired  from 182 
their  position  in  public  service,  with  the  result  that  very  few  IM  have  been 
willing  to  admit  to  their  IM-Tätigkeit  before  it  comes  to  light.  Attempts  in 
the  immediate  post-Wende  period  to  establish  a  forum  for  open  discussion 
between  Täter  and  Opfer  were  thus  ultimately  doomed,  and  although  a  so- 
called  Forum  zur  Aufklärung  und  Erneuerung  was  founded,  it  was  largely 
unsuccessful.  The  Forum  proposed  the  following  in  its  constitution: 
Wünschenswert  ist  die  Einbeziehung  unabhängiger 
Sachverständiger  und  die  Bildung  einer  das  Verfahren  leitenden 
unabhängigen  Jury.  Statt  auf  ein  juristisches  Urteil  zielt  das 
Verfahren  auf  Feststellung,  öffentliche  Dokumentation  und 
Bewertung  von  Umständen,  Vorgängen  und  Verantwortlichkeiten, 
die  Unrecht  bewirkten.  (F-9,  p.  6) 
Apart  from  the  clear  difficulties  arising  in  deciding  who  exactly  these 
'unabhängige  Sachverständige'  were  to  be,  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  what 
role  an  'independent  jury'  outside  the  criminal  justice  system  could  have 
played.  There  are,  however,  as  discussed,  clearly  issues  of  moral  guilt 
which  cannot  be  dealt  with  within  this  legal  framework.  It  is  this  equally 
problematic  personal  and  interpersonal  confrontation  with  the  Stasi 
legacy  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  three  chapters. 183 
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8.1  GENERAL 
The  brunt  of  the  anger  displayed  when  MfS  offices  were  stormed  and 
occupied  in  the  immediate  post-Wende  period  often  fell  on  those  at  the 
very  bottom  of  the  hierarchy  of  power,  on  the  Stasi's  secret  helpers,  the 
IM.  Many  of  the  174,000  IM  active  in  1989  and  of  the  many  others  who 
had  collaborated  in  the  past  were  not  known  as  such  to  even  close  friends 
and  relatives.  The  most  extreme  example  of  such  a  case  was  that 
concerning  Vera  Wollenberger  (now  Lengsfeld),  who  discovered  that  her 
husband  Knud  had  been  informing  on  her  under  the  cover  name  of  IM 
'Donald'  for  many  years.  There  was,  at  least  initially,  a  period  of  extreme 
uncertainty  in  interpersonal  relationships  when  it  seemed  that  the  IM 
were  'überall  und  nirgendwo,  fast  jeder  konnte  es  gewesen  sein,  und 
hinterher  war's  keiner'  (J-102,  p.  135).  Clarifying  who  had  or  had  not  been 
an  IM  and  putting  an  end  to  mass,  often  erroneous,  speculation  was 
considerably  more  difficult  before  the  StUG  came  into  force  at  the  end  of 
1991.  Very  few  IM  were  prepared  to  come  forward  and  confess  to  their 
previous  Stasi  connections.  Prominent  citizens'  rights  activist  Bärbel 
Bohley  bemoaned,  for  example,  the  fact  that  of  over  50  IM  reporting  on 
her,  not  one  approached  her  and  confessed  to  having  collaborated  (I-1). 
Bohley  had  to  wait  until  she  was  granted  access  to  her  Stasi  files  before 
she  could  establish  with  certainty  exactly  who  had  been  reporting  on  her 
activities. 
8.2  NICHT-OPFER 
Bärbel  Bohley  may  have  been  surprised  at  the  extent  and  form  of  the 
observation  of  her  public  and  private  life  but  she,  as  a  prominent 
dissident,  could  be  sure  that  her  activities  in  the  GDR  had  been  closely 
monitored.  Other  citizens  did  not  have  this  certainty,  yet  had  lived  their 
lives  in  the  belief  that  their  words  and  actions  could  potentially  be 185 
recorded  at  any  time.  As  a  result  many  had  to  some  extent  lived  as  though 
they  were  being  observed,  effectively  assuming  a  role  as  victim,  without 
actually  knowing  that  this  was  the  case: 
Wie  das  Monster  in  einem  Horrorfilm  saß  die  Stasi  in  jeder 
Gesprächsrunde  mit  am  Tisch.  Sie  hat  das  Vertrauen  der  Menschen 
in  ihrem  Staat  zersetzt  und  wesentlich  zu  seinem  Zusammenbruch 
beigetragen.  Die  Stasi  bespitzelte  und  verfolgte.  Und  Millionen 
Bürger  fühlten  sich  bespitzelt  und  verfolgt.  Beide  zusammen 
bildeten  eine  Horrorpartnerschaft  von  Verfolger  und  Verfolgtem, 
von  Täter  und  echtem  oder  vermeintlichem  Opfer.  (J-101,  p.  11) 
Many  of  these  'vermeintliche  Opfer'  were,  in  accordance  with  the 
Schwerpunktprinzip,  not  actually  under  observation  at  all.  In  the  Leipzig 
area,  500  of  670  Operative  Personenkontrollen  underway  in  1989 
concerned  individuals  involved  in  the  church,  culture,  or  opposition,  and 
only  23  Operative  Vorgänge  were  in  operation  outside  these  three  groups 
(F-13,  p.  32).  Evidence  does  suggest,  however,  that  from  the  outset  the 
Schwerpunktprinzip  was  not  always  adhered  to.  Speaking  in  1953,  the 
then  Secretary  of  State  in  charge  of  State  Security,  Ernst  Wollweber, 
complained: 
Die  Schwäche  des  Informatorennetzes  besteht  vor  allem  darin,  dass 
es  auf  alle  Objekte  gleichmässig  ausgedehnt  ist,  ohne 
Berücksichtigung  der  Konzentration  von  faschistischen  sowie 
anderen  feindlichen  Elementen  in  den  wichtigsten  Betrieben  und 
Dienststellen.  (F-5,  I)  59) 
This  and  later  evidence  suggests  that  a  significant  number  of  IM  were  not 
employed  on  the  basis  of  the  Schwerpunktprinzip,  but  rather  because  they 
were  loyal  citizens  who  proved  relatively  easy  to  recruit  and  subsequently 
manage.  Nevertheless,  the  tendency  to  concentrate  the  network  of 
observation  in  the  three  groups  named  above  was  marked,  with  the  result 
that  in  sections  of  society  outside  these  groups  there  was  a  significant 
number  of  'vemeintliche  Opfer'.  Hence,  a  type  of  'big  brother'  system 186 
functioned  in  the  minds  of  the  East  German  population  which  often  did 
not  correspond  to  reality.  Jurek  Becker  believed  that  this  phenomenon  of 
perceived  observation,  which  resulted  to  a  certain  extent  in  the  population 
imposing  a  form  of  self-censorship,  was  one  of  the  Stasi's  greatest 
strengths: 
Eirom  ihrer  [the  Stasi  's]  größten  Erfolge  bestand  darin,  daß  man  sie 
oft  auch  dort  vermutete,  wo  sie  gar  nicht  waren.  Viele 
Telefongespräche  wurden  nur  im  Hinblick  auf  den  Abhörenden 
geführt,  Briefe  enthielten  Floskeln,  die  nicht  an  den  Adressaten 
gerichtet  waren,  sondern  an  den  Kontrolleur,  und  auf 
Versammlungen  (jedes  Leben  war  voll  von  Versammlungen) 
klatschte  man  an  Stellen  Beifall,  daß  einem  selbst  übel  davon 
wurde.  Nach  Gründen  für  den  Zorn,  der  sich  nun  auf  die  verfluchte 
Stasi  entlädt,  braucht  man  also  nicht  lange  zu  suchen.  (J-33,  p.  77) 
The  fact  that  many  more  people  presumed  themselves  observed 
than  was  actually  the  case  is  reflected  in  the  finding  that  over  40%  of 
those  who  apply  to  the  BStU  to  see  their  Stasi  file  have  to  be  told  that  no 
such  file  exists  (F-8,  p.  52).  Some  of  this  number  are  extremely  reluctant 
to  believe  that  this  is  the  case  and  apply  again  in  the  belief  that  the  BStU 
has  not  been  thorough  enough  in  the  search  for  this  material  (F-8,  p.  52). 
It  is  possible  that  the  files  held  on  a  proportion  of  these  individuals  were 
partially  or  wholly  destroyed  in  the  hurried  attempts  of  the  MfS  in  the 
latter  days  of  its  existence  to  get  rid  of  potentially  explosive  material. 
Most  of  these  Nicht-Opfer  are,  however,  faced  with  the  probability  that 
their  activities  within  the  GDR  were  simply  not  considered  enough  of  a 
threat  to  warrant  observation  and,  if  they  choose  to  confront  this  fact,  are 
forced  to  reflect  more  closely  on  what  role  they  actually  did  play  in  the 
GDR,  if  not  that  of  a  bona  fide  victim.  Such  a  confrontation  with  the  past 
requires  a  great  deal  of  potentially  unpleasant  soul  searching,  and  it  is  for 
this  reason  that  Lutz  Rathenow  suggests  that  the  concept  of  'Aktenneid' 
will  start  appearing  in  psychology  textbooks  of  the  future  (J-69,  p.  64). 187 
Indeed,  a  proportion  of  even  those  who  stormed  the  MfS  headquarters 
crying  'Ich  will  meine  Akte',  may  well  have  since  discovered  that  no  such 
file  exists.  Rathenow  believes  that  these  and  other  potential  sufferers  from 
'Aktenneid'  would  rather  forget  the  past  than  confront  it:  'Es  sind  auf  die 
Dauer  nicht  die  Täter,  die  eine  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  gefährden.  Es 
sind  die  Nicht-Opfer,  die  kaum  verkraften,  nicht  Opfer  gewesen  zu  sein.  ' 
(J-69,  p.  64) 
The  realisation  that  there  were  very  many  more  supposed  rather 
than  genuine  Stasi  victims  of  observation  meant  that  the  average  citizen 
could  no  longer  regard  him/herself  as  quite  as  distinct  from  the  IM,  who 
had  previously  represented  'das  immanente  Böse'  (J-102,  p.  135).  Yet  such 
individuals  obviously  do  not  then  automatically  belong  to  the  category  of 
Täter.  If  this  large  group  of  Nicht-Opfer  did  not  behave  in  a  way  which 
warranted  MfS  observation,  yet  felt  themselves  to  be  opposed  to  the  state 
to  the  extent  that  they  suspected  a  file  might  have  been  held  on  them,  how 
then  can  their  behaviour  pattern  be  best  described? 
8.3  OPPORTUNISTIC  CONFORMITY 
Das  betrogene  Volk  betrog  ja  auch.  Es  machte  seine  Obrigkeit 
jahrelang  mit  all  den  Jubelaufmärschen,  mit  den  Fackelumzügen 
besoffen.  (Wolf  Biermann,  1-78,  p.  73) 
Various  analyses  of  the  average  citizen's  behaviour  in  the  GDR  have  been 
proposed  since  1989.  Psychologist  Hans-Joachim  Maaz  describes  the  East 
German  psyche  as  having  been  characterised  by  a  split  personality  (J-54, 
p.  76).  This  split  in  personality  enabled  East  Germans  to  betray  their 
private  convictions  in  public,  and  explains  why,  for  example,  well  over 
90%  of  the  population  went  along  with  the  farcical  voting  procedure.  Maaz 
argues  that  many  GDR  citizens  simply  did  not  feel  what  they  saw  or 188 
heard.  Had  they  done  so,  they  would  have  had  to  confront  their  public 
conformity  to  a  system  about  which  they  privately  harboured  grave  doubts 
(J-54,  p.  77). 
Harry  Schröder,  by  comparison,  divides  East  Germans  into  three 
groups:  standard  conformists;  non-  or  anti-conformists;  opportunistic 
conformists  (J-83,  pp.  166-67,  see  also  J-85).  Standard  conformists  were 
individuals  who,  at  least  initially,  believed  in  the  system  and  found 
justification  for  their  actions  as  representatives  of  it.  The  number  of  such 
individuals  decreased  throughout  the  GDR's  existence,  but  some  who  had 
become  disillusioned  worked  hard  to  continue  convincing  themselves  of 
their  stance,  motivated  by  their  previous  commitment  and  by  the  desire  to 
preserve  the  way  of  life  to  which  they  had  become  accustomed.  Only  a 
small  percentage  of  East  Germans  belonged  to  the  second  group  of  non-  or 
rather  anti-conformists.  These  were  individuals  who  spoke  out  or  took 
decisive  critical  action  against  the  status  quo.  Most  East  Germans  fell  into 
the  third  group  of  opportunistic  conformists,  defined  by  Schröder  as 
follows: 
Sie  wurden  im  echten  Sinne  durch  die  Bedingungen  dominiert, 
paßten  sich  ein  und  bedingten  zugleich  den  Erhalt  des  bestehenden 
Staatswesens.  Eine  Identifikation  mit  den  herrschenden 
ideologischen  Werten  fand  immer  weniger  und  sehr  passager  statt. 
[...  ]  Sie  waren  bemüht,  Möglichkeitsräume  zu  schaffen  und 
auszuschöpfen,  Auswüchse  zu  beschneiden,  andere  zu  beschützen, 
Unrecht  zu  bekämpfen.  Bei  dieser  Variante  bestand  natürlich 
immer  die  Gefahr  des  Opportunismus,  zumeist  auch  das  Faktum 
dessen.  Viele  DDR-Bürger  berufen  sich  heute,  um  dem  Vorwurf  des 
prinzipienlosen  Wendehalses  zu  entgehen,  auf  solche  Reaktanz. 
Und  die  meisten  haben  zumindest  punktuell  auch  irgend  etwas 
vorzuweisen.  (J-83,  p.  167) 
The  majority  had  then,  according  to  Schröder,  simply  learned  to  live 
with  the  existing  power  structures  and  to  use  them  to  their  own 
advantage.  Although,  as  Jens  Reich  suggests,  many  East  Germans  viewed 
the  GDR  with  'ironische  Distanz'  and  may  even  have  periodically  engaged 189 
in  acts  of  non-conformity,  their  general  behavioural  stance  was  one  of 
opportunism  (1-82).  This  interpretation  suggests  that  the  average  East 
German  was  very  much  aware  of  the  degree  of  disparity  between  public 
conformity  and  private  conviction,  rather  than  that  these  seemingly 
contradictory  behaviours  resulted  from  some  kind  of  schizophrenic  or  split 
personality. 
Even  prominent  'state  enemies',  who,  undoubtedly,  were  not  always 
willing  to  betray  their  private  beliefs,  were  very  much  aware  of  the  extent 
at  other  times  of  their  own  compliance.  Jürgen  Fuchs,  for  example,  asks: 
'Wer  hat  dann  da  nicht  auch  geschwiegen,  irgendwie  mitgemacht?  '  (J-26, 
p.  31)  Compliance  was  widespread,  and  the  day  of  true  revolt  came  very 
late  for  many  critical  minds.  The  stance  which  Jens  Reich  admits  to 
having  taken  was  typical: 
Viele  Jahre  bin  ich  meinem  Beruf  nachgegangen,  habe  den  Mund 
gehalten,  habe  in  der  politischen  Nische  gesessen,  habe  erst  spät, 
viel  zu  spät  erkannt,  daß  meine  Rolle  im  Leben  nicht  die  sein  kann, 
immer  alles  besser  gewußt  und  geschwiegen  zu  haben.  (1-53,  p.  41) 
Statements  such  as  the  above  underline  that  conforming  was  often 
a  conscious  action  which  resulted  in  cognitive  dissonance,  rather  than  a 
behavioural  tendency  which  was  caused  by  a  split  in  personality.  Michael 
Beleites  suggests  that  some  kind  of  discord  was  inevitable,  regardless  of 
how  one  behaved.  Both  conformity  and  non-conformity  resulted  in  conflict. 
If  individuals  behaved  in  a  way  which  was  at  odds  with  their  private 
beliefs,  this  resulted  in  inner  conflict.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  chose  to 
resolve  this  inner  conflict  by  acting  in  accordance  with  their  true 
convictions,  these  actions  might  result  in  outer  conflict  with  the  state  (F- 
14,  p.  85).  The  majority  of  East  Germans  opted  during  most  of  the  GDR's 
existence  for  the  inner  conflict,  choosing  to  live  with  the  resultant 
cognitive  dissonance  rather  than  with  the  undoubtedly  more 190 
unpredictable  outer  conflict  of  dealing  with  the  potential  wrath  of  the 
state  for  engaging  in  non-conformist  activities.  Jurek  Becker  commented 
that  the  government  of  the  GDR  was  thus  able  to  consider  itself  lucky 
since  it  'hatte  mit  einer  Bevölkerung  von  hoher 
Unterwerfungsbereitschaft  zu  tun,  mit  Bürgern,  deren  hauptsächliche 
Widerstandshandlung  darin  bestand,  sich  zu  ärgern'  (J-33,  p.  76). 
The  split  personality  described  by  Maaz  suggests  a  less  conscious 
behaviour  pattern.  Schröder's  term,  'opportunistic  conformity',  seems  to  be 
a  more  accurate  description  of  the  typical  attitude  to  the  state.  Such  a 
stance  is  a  far  cry  from  the  victim  status  which  many  would  have  liked  to 
be  able  to  lay  claim  to. 
Clearly  not  all  former  GDR  citizens  can  be  characterised  as  having 
been  opportunistic  conformists: 
Es  gibt  wirkliche  Täter  und  wirkliche  Opfer,  Schuldige  und 
Unschuldige  und  dann  auch  noch  dazwischen  die  vielen  anderen  - 
wir,  die  darin  gelebt  haben,  beschäftigt  mit  unserem  Überleben, 
mehr  oder  minder  anständig,  mehr  oder  minder  klug,  mehr  oder 
minder  feige  oder  mutig.  (Wolfgang  Thierse,  1-75,  p.  33) 
The  following  sections  will  discuss  the  difficulties  involved  in 
defining  who  belongs  in  these  categories  of  'genuine  Täter'  and  'genuine 
Opfer',  if  the  mass  of  the  'mehr  oder  minder  klug,  mehr  oder  minder  feige 
oder  mutig'  is  to  be  defined  by  a  behaviour  pattern  of  on  the  whole 
opportunistic  conformity. 
8.4  TÄTER 
According  to  Maaz's  theory,  the  split  in  personality  not  only  allowed  East 
German  citizens  to  conform  to  a  system  in  which  they  had  no  faith  but, 
since  the  cognitive  mechanism  involved  was  one  and  the  same,  to  be  active 
as  MfS  informers.  IM,  Maaz  proposes,  were  not  like  spies  in  films,  who 191 
slyly  become  involved  with  particular  individuals  solely  in  order  to  obtain 
information: 
Nein,  vielmehr  sind  die  sogenannten  Informationsdienste  und  das 
normale  Leben  eins.  Ein  Doppelleben  ist  gar  nicht  nötig  und  eine 
besondere  Verstellung  auch  gar  nicht  mehr  möglich,  weil  diese 
schon  längst  vollzogen  ist,  und  zwar  aus  ganz  anderen,  von  der 
Stasi  völlig  unabhängigen  Gründen.  Das  Sicherheitsorgan  ist  nur 
Nutznießer  davon.  (J-55,  p.  86) 
Maaz's  interpretation  suggests  that  the  IM  was  in  his/her  psychological 
make-up  indistinguishable  from  other  GDR  citizens,  that  it  was  merely  a 
question  of  the  extent  to  which  the  MfS  chose  to  make  use  of  this  inherent 
split  personality  which  determined  whether  or  not  s/he  became  an  IM.  He 
proposes  that  it  is  not  possible  to  divide  East  German  society  into  Täter 
and  Opfer,  as  aspects  of  both  were  incorporated  in  every  social  ranking  (J- 
54,  p.  102).  Although  Maaz  adds  that  the  balance  of  the  Täter  and  Opfer 
elements  and  therefore  the  level  of  guilt  did  vary  considerably,  his 
argumentation  to  some  extent  effectively  frees  the  IM  from  full  individual 
responsibility  for  his/her  actions,  since  these  had  been  pre-determined  by 
virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  person  concerned  had  been  raised  in  the  GDR. 
One  IM  interviewed  for  the  book  Stasi  intim  argues  similarly  that, 
whether  one  was  an  IM  or  someone  who  was  merely  tolerating  the  regime, 
the  same  psychological  mechanisms  were  at  work: 
Es  ist  einem  über  Jahre  moralisch  das  Kreuz  gebrochen  worden. 
Über  Jahre.  Und  das  ging  letztlich  jedem  DDR-Bürger  so.  Dem 
einen  mehr,  dem  anderen  weniger.  Diese  doppelte  Moral,  die  in  der 
Schule  schon  ihren  Anfang  nahm.  Diese  tagtägliche  Lüge,  die  ja 
jeder  mitgemacht  hat  in  irgendeiner  Form.  [....  ]  Wenn  du  lernst,  die 
große  politische  Lüge  zu  akzeptieren,  dann  gestehst  du  dir  kleine 
Lügen  auch  woanders  zu.  Unbewußt.  (J-71,  p.  146) 
Such  explanations  of  the  average  GDR  citizen's  behaviour  relativise 
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compliance,  can  no  longer  be  set  apart  to  the  same  extent  from  the  Nicht- 
Täter  /Nicht-Opfer.  Friedrich  Schorlemmer  is  highly  critical  of  those  who 
do  attempt  to  distinguish  their  behaviour  from  that  of  IM.  Individuals  who 
seek  to  attribute  guilt  to  the  IM  are  merely  trying,  according  to 
Schorlemmer,  to  escape  a  confrontation  with  their  own  individual 
responsibility  for  not  having  had  the  courage  to  oppose  the  system:  'Was 
früher  an  Mut  fehlte,  kommt  jetzt  als  Wut.  In  der  Friedfertigkeit  des 
Umbruchs  wirkte  auch  die  Angst  vor  der  eigenen  Courage  nach.  Die 
Rachepose  ist  eine  Variation  vierzigjähriger  Feigheit,  der  man  sich  nicht 
zu  stellen  wagt.  '  (J-82,  p.  252)  Schorlemmer  suggests  that  instead  of 
striving  to  attribute  guilt  to  particular  individuals,  the  crimes  of  the  past 
should  be  confronted  collectively  (J-81,  p.  58).  Playing  on  the  title  of  the 
Mitscherlichs'  work  on  the  difficulties  experienced  by  West  Germans  in 
coming  to  terms  with  the  demise  of  National  Socialism,  Schorlemmer  says 
that  most  East  Germans  have  'gar  keine  Lust  zu  trauern'  (J-57,  J-81,  p. 
93).  He  adds,  however,  that  he  cannot  really  reproach  anyone  for  behaving 
in  this  manner  as  'so  sind  wir  gemacht  worden  in  diesem  Land'  (J-81,  p. 
106).  Schorlemmer's  argumentation  seems  inherently  flawed,  as  he  asks 
individuals  to  recognise  that  they  are  collectively  responsible  for  the 
crimes  of  the  past,  yet  at  the  same  time  liberates  them  from  this 
responsibility  by  blaming  the  system  for  making  them  as  they  are. 
8.5  THE  FILES 
The  boundaries  between  the  categories  'genuine  Täter'  and  'genuine  Opfer' 
are  to  some  extent  only  further  blurred  after  an  analysis  of  the  Stasi  files. 
An  examination  of  an  IM  file  not  only  reveals  the  extent  of  an  IM's 
compliance  with  the  MfS,  but  also  that  of  countless  others  who  were  not 
classified  as  such.  These  files,  particularly  the  Personalakten,  could  only 
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It  was,  for  example,  necessary  for  the  MfS  to  thoroughly  screen  an  IM- 
Kandidat.  Post  which  the  Kandidat  and  his/her  immediate  family 
received,  particularly  any  correspondence  from  the  FRG,  was  scrutinised 
to  this  end.  The  censoring  and  control  of  post  was,  indeed,  widespread  in 
the  GDR,  and  Fricke  reports  that  from  a  total  of  over  100,000  letters  sent 
every  day  from  the  district  of  Dresden,  approximately  4000-5000  were 
closely  inspected  (J-25,  p.  48). 
Alongside  copies  and  the  occasional  photograph  of  suspicious  letters 
and  packages  which  the  IM  received,  a  variety  of  other  documentation, 
collected  in  order  to  thoroughly  vet  the  person  concerned,  is  also  to  be 
found  in  the  Personalakte.  This  can  take  the  form  of  reports  or  references 
from  the  particular  institutions  with  which  the  IM-Kandidat  was,  or  had 
been,  associated.  The  presence  of  this  material  is  evidence  that  high  levels 
of  co-operation  clearly  existed  between  the  MfS  and  these  various  bodies. 
The  relationship  between  the  head  of  a  school,  for  example,  and  the  MfS 
may  never  have  been  officially  formalised,  but  s/he  may  well  have 
regularly  supplied  the  MfS  with  such  documentation.  In  the  Personalakte 
one  will  also  find  character  descriptions  of  the  IM  or  IM-Kandidat  which 
were  supplied  by  members  of  the  general  public.  The  MfS  seems  to  have 
experienced  little  difficulty  finding  willing  sources.  Herbert  K,  a  former 
Hauptamtlicher  IM,  describes  carrying  out  enquiries  with  members  of  the 
general  public,  claiming:  'In  den  meisten  Fällen  sind  wir  aufgeschlossenen 
Leuten  begegnet.  [...  ]  Was  einem  da  alles  erzählt  wurde.  '  (J-39,  p.  58)  An 
example  of  this  kind  of  compliance  is  found  in  the  case  of  'Reiner'.  In  order 
to  check  if  'Reiner'  had  been  concealing  the  true  nature  of  his  work  as  a 
Hauptamtlicher  Führungs-IM  as  he  had  pledged  to  do,  the  MfS  decided  to 
make  enquiries  with  certain  neighbours  who  were  judged  as  trustworthy 
and  loyal  (C-4a,  I,  69).  Had  the  MfS  not  been  able  to  rely  on  fairly  wide 194 
acceptance,  or  at  the  very  least  tolerance,  of  such  control  mechanisms  it 
would  have  been  considerably  more  difficult  to  sustain  the  system  of  IM. 
The  IM,  of  course,  went  a  step  beyond  this  unstructured  compliance 
with  the  system,  and  although  it  is  possible  that  certain  informers  did  not 
cause  direct  harm  to  others  during  the  course  of  their  IM-Tätigkeit,  Katrin 
Eigenfeld  of  the  Neues  Forum  argued  that  one  must  also  consider  the 
indirect  harm  caused: 
Diese  IMs  haben  mein  Leben  bestimmt,  mein  Leben  verändert  in 
diesen  zehn  Jahren.  So  oder  so,  weil  sie  uns  vergiftet  haben  mit 
Mißtrauen,  sie  haben  Schaden  angerichtet,  einfach  nur,  daß  ich 
vermutet  habe,  daß  sich  im  meinem  Umfeld  IMs  befinden  könnten. 
(F-13,  p.  132) 
Some  IM  are  in  fact  aware  of  the  indirect  damage  which  Eigenfeld 
describes,  and  'Wolfgang'  tells  me  how  it  shocked  him  to  find  out  that  his 
daughter  had  nightmares  that  she  was  being  followed  and  observed  by  the 
Stasi,  since  he  had  previously  not  considered  this  potential  indirect 
consequence  of  the  MfS's  surveillance  measures  (A-7). 
Even  if  they  cannot  be  shown  to  have  directly  harmed  others,  the 
MfS  method  of  collecting  information  from  a  number  of  sources  and 
compiling  it  like  a  mosaic  must  be  taken  into  account  when  discussing  the 
relative  guilt  of  former  collaborators  (see  Section  One:  4.1.3).  All  IM  are, 
furthermore,  at  the  very  least  guilty  of  having  potentially  caused  their 
fellow  citizens  the  sort  of  indirect  harm  which  is  described  above.  Yet  this 
is  still  an  unsatisfactory  conclusion  to  the  Täter  /  Opfer  debate  as  far  as  the 
question  of  the  IM  is  concerned,  since  it  does  not  distinguish  differing 
levels  of  guilt  within  this  group.  The  issue  is  further  complicated  by  the 
paradox  that  many  IM  actually  helped  the  opposition  movement,  partly 
simply  by  swelling  its  ranks,  but  also  by  actively  working  on  opposition 
activities.  After  she  began  working  for  the  MfS  as  an  IM,  'Stephana'  was 195 
encouraged  by  her  Führungsoffizier  to  become  involved  with  particular 
religious  groups  whose  activities  were  considered  suspect.  In  some  ways 
these  tasks  came  naturally  to  her  since  the  groups'  interests  corresponded 
closely  with  her  own: 
Und  mir  hat  es  Spaß  gemacht.  Jedenfalls,  das  lag  mir  ja.  Ich 
hätte's  sowieso  gemacht,  muß  ich  mal  sagen.  Es  war  nichts,  was  ich 
irgendwie  nicht  gemacht  hätte.  Die  haben  mir  manchmal  bloß  noch 
auf  die  Idee  gebracht,  'Mensch,  mach  das  doch  ',  oder  gestärkt  in 
den  Gedanken,  'Fahr  da  und  da  hin',  also  nie  so,  daß  mir  das 
...  mir 
war  keine  Sache  eigentlich  jetzt  so  zuwider.  Und  wenn  ich  da 
mitgemacht  habe,  dann  aus  vollem  Herzen  und  habe  meine  Ideen 
mitgebracht.  Da  könnte  man  sagen  schizophren.  Aber  ich  habe  gar 
nicht  mehr  dann  den  Auftrag  gehört,  sondern  das  war  sowieso 
mein  Leben.  (A-8) 
'Stephana'  was  therefore  not  only  actively  involved  in  these  activities  in 
her  capacity  as  an  IM,  but  was  useful  to  the  MfS  precisely  because  of  her 
pre-existing  contacts  to  such  groups. 
Other  IM  besides  'Stephana'  have  a  similar  mix  of  Täter  and  Opfer 
elements  in  their  biographies.  The  MfS  began  to  observe  'Rolf  closely  in 
1983,  two  years  before  he  was  recruited  as  an  IM.  An  OPK  was  put  into 
operation  after  'Rolf  had  been  observed  carrying  photo  equipment  in  a 
forest  close  by  a  Soviet  training  ground,  and  it  was  suspected  that  he 
might  be  engaged  in  foreign  espionage  (C-1a,  p.  2).  When  these 
observations  led  to  the  conclusion  that  'Rolf  was  merely  engaged  in 
studying  the  flora  and  fauna  of  the  area  it  was  decided  that  he  should  be 
'weiter  als  IM-Kandidat  aufgeklärt  [...  ]  und  ein  IM-Vorlauf  angelegt 
werden.  Das  Material  der  OPK  soll  in  den  IM-Vorlauf  übernommen,  (C- 
la,  p.  3)  In  order  to  establish  that  'Rolf  was  not  involved  in  anti-state 
activities  he  was  then  observed  and  manipulated  by  other  IM.  Afterwards, 
he  remained  interesting  to  the  MfS  only  because  of  the  contacts  he  had 
made  through  his  commitment  to  environmental  issues.  Indeed,  one  of  the 
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precisely  that  they  have  connections  to  'operativ  interessante  Personen' 
(F-3,  p.  312).  This  means  that  many  IM  have  such  a  Täter/Opfer 
biography,  and  it  is  often  extremely  difficult  to  determine  to  what  extent 
they  are  'wirkliche  Schuldige  oder  Unschuldige'  (Thierse,  1-75,  p.  33). 
8.6  OPFER 
Even  those  involved  in  the  opposition  scene,  generally  regarded  as 
belonging  to  the  group  of  'genuine  Opfer',  often  worked  in  a  sense  within 
rather  than  against  the  status  quo.  Ibrahim  Böhme's  budding  political 
career  came  to  an  abrupt  end  when,  in  early  1990,  he  was  revealed  to  have 
been  an  IM.  The  news  only  served  to  confirm  the  suspicion  which  at  least 
some  of  his  many  acquaintances  had  harboured  for  some  time.  Markus 
Meckel,  for  example,  told  journalist  Birgit  Lahann  that  in  GDR  times 
Böhme  seemed  to  have  a  considerable  amount  of  information  about 
certain  high-ranking  party  officials:  'Im  Grunde  genommen,  sagt  Meckel, 
war  das  ein  Verdachtsmoment.  Aber  die  Informationen  waren  für  uns 
auch  wichtig.  '  (J-49,  p.  216)  Although  many  must  have  seriously  suspected 
Böhme  of  holding  dubious  contacts  to  the  MfS,  they  decided  not  to 
confront  this  situation,  but  rather  to  try  and  use  it  to  their  advantage.  By 
doing  so  they  allowed  themselves  to  fall  into  the  structures  of  conspiracy 
which  the  MfS  had  created. 
Similarly,  after  IM  'Rolf  confessed  to  a  man  on  whom  he  was 
supposed  to  be  reporting  that  he  was  working  for  the  Stasi,  he  and  the 
man  conspired  for  a  time  to  write  the  reports  which  'Rolf  subsequently 
supplied  his  Führungsoffizier  with.  The  man  hoped  that  if  'Rolf  turned  in 
positive  reports  about  him  he  would  be  able  to  convince  the  Stasi 
indirectly  that  he  was  not  a  danger  to  the  state,  and  that  the  travel 
restrictions  which  had  been  imposed  upon  him  would  subsequently  be 
relaxed.  In  acting  in  this  way  the  man  not  only  played  along  with  the 197 
rules  of  the  game  as  decreed  by  the  Stasi,  but  also,  in  order  to  clear  his 
own  name,  seems  to  have  distanced  himself  in  reports  from  other  potential 
Stasi-Opfer.  In  one  report,  for  example,  it  is  stated  that  'Rolfs' 
acquaintance  is  not  in  agreement  with  the  tenor  of  documentation 
released  from  the  Umweltbibliothek  and  that  he  believes  that  another 
man  involved  in  these  activities  is  only  trying  to  make  a  name  for  himself 
(C-1b,  p.  40).  One  could  argue  in  his  defence  that  this  Opfer  was  left  with 
no  alternative  to  try  and  improve  his  situation.  Had  his  plan  been 
successful  he  would  have  undoubtedly  been  able  to  ultimately  achieve 
more  for  the  environmental  issues  he  was  concerned  with. 
Perhaps  the  course  of  action  which  'Rolf  and  this  man  took  may 
also  have  presented  itself  as  the  most  obvious,  since  its  secretive  and 
indirect  nature  was  more  than  familiar  to  those  who  lived  in  the  GDR: 
Das  offene  Austragen  von  Konflikten  gab  es  doch  nicht.  Immer  gab 
es  nur  Fluchten  und  Nischen.  Ein  paar  Leute  sind  in  die  Kirche 
geflüchtet,  ein  paar  in  die  Kulturnisclen,  in  irgendwelche  Zirkel, 
und  alles  hatte  immer  den  Anstrich  von  Konspiration.  (Ang  elika 
Barbe,  J-49,  p.  243) 
These  niches  often  remained  just  that  and  did  little  to  threaten  political 
and  social  structures.  In  a  sense  their  existence  allowed  people  to  feel  that 
they  were  involved  in  some  kind  of  non-conformist  activity  and  thereby  to 
reduce  any  cognitive  dissonance  they  felt  about  generally  betraying  their 
private  convictions  publicly.  The  reduction  in  dissonance  which  they 
experienced  in  such  niches  meant  that  they  tended  to  comply  with  state 
policies  when  outside  them,  and  perhaps  partly  accounted  for  the  fact,  as 
Eppelmann  formulates  it,  that  'es  herrschte  ein  millionfaches  Schweigen 
über  Ereignisse,  die  nie  hätten  verschwtpgen  werden  dürfen'  (J-23,  p.  37). 
Eppelmann  admits  in  this  context  that  events  organised  by  his  church, 
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acted  in  some  ways  as  a  kind  of  therapy  for  society:  'Schließlich  riefen  wir 
ja  nicht  dazu  auf,  die  Regierung  zu  stürzen.  '  (J-23,  p.  158) 
The  sociologist  Wolf  Lepenies  contrasts  the  opposition  movement  in 
the  GDR  to  that  in  other  Eastern  Block  countries,  describing  the  East 
German  opposition  as  having  been  distinct,  in  that  its  supporters  were 
never  really  concerned  with  gaining  power  (J-51,  p.  32).  This  led  to  the 
development  of  'eine  jeder  Politik  gegenüber  skeptische 
Dissidentengesinnung  auf  Kosten  einer  wirksamen  Oppositionspolitik',  in 
which  no  real  thought  was  given  as  to  how  an  individual  viewpoint  could 
become  the  opinion  of  the  majority  (J-51,  pp.  34,36). 
By  their  own  admission,  those  involved  in  the  opposition  in  the 
GDR  were  certainly  content  at  times  with  their  position  in  society  and 
may  not  always  have  really  striven  to  overthrow  the  existing  social  order. 
Lutz  Rathenow  leaves  no  doubt  that  he  and  those  like  him  suffered  for 
their  beliefs  but  that  'zu  anderen  Zeiten  war  das  Leben  durchaus  nicht  so 
unbequem,  auch  "Dissident"  war  ein  Status  in  der  Staatshieralchie'  (J-68, 
p.  1465).  The  injustices  to  which  many  of  these  dissidents  were  subjected 
were,  of  course,  severe,  and  Jürgen  Fuchs's  portrayal  of  the  manner  in 
which  he  was  mentally  and  physically  manipulated  in  captivity  before 
being  forced  to  leave  the  GDR  should  serve  as  a  reminder  of  the  brutality 
of  which  the  MfS  was  capable  (J-28). 
8.7  CONCLUSIONS 
A  substantial  proportion  of  the  Stasi  debate  has  been  characterised  by 
attempts  to  establish  where  any  one  particular  individual's  behaviour 
could  be  placed  on  the  Täter  /Opfer  spectrum,  and  the  question  of  the 
relative  guilt  of  the  IM  has  been  one  of  the  central  issues  in  this 
discussion.  Attributing  responsibility  to  individual  IM  is  not  easy.  One 
could  say  that  all  IM,  because  they  worked  directly  with  this  system,  carry 199 
in  some  way  a  portion  of  the  guilt  for  the  injustices  carried  out.  The  IM 
network  was,  however,  only  capable  of  functioning  within  a  society  whose 
citizens  had  on  the  whole  come  to  accept  and  even  comply  with  the 
structures  that  supported  this  system  of  control. 
There  have  thus  been  many  calls  for  a  shift  away  from  an  often 
futile  attempt  to  define  East  Germans  in  terms  of  Täter  /Opfer  categories. 
Dönhoff  argues  that  since  such  a  mass  categorisation  is  not  feasible,  the 
aim  of  a  confrontation  with  the  recent  past  ought  to  be  'nicht  individuell 
Belastete  zu  ermitteln,  sondern  kollektive  Einsichten  zu  vermitteln  (J-20, 
p.  12).  The  majority  of  East  Germans  have,  however,  in  the  face  of  the 
social  and  economical  upheaval  which  unification  has  brought,  no 
inclination  to  confront  the  past  collectively.  On  a  one-to-one  level  such  a 
confrontation  is  also  not  taking  place.  Several  IM  I  spoke  to  were 
disappointed  by  the  apparent  lack  of  interest  aroused  by  their  confessions 
of  having  been  active  as  an  IM.  'Theodor'  described  how  when  he  confessed 
to  a  friend  that  he  had  reported  on  him,  the  man  reacted  with  silence: 
Ich  hoffte  auf  seine  Fragen.  Die  blieben  aus,  ich  erinnere  mich  noch 
meiner  Enttäuschung.  Vielleicht  fühlte  er  sich  einfach  überfordert. 
[...  ]  Es  wollte  ja  keiner  wissen,  wie  es  für  mich  dazu  kam.  Die 
Arbeit  der  Selbstanalyse  mußte  ich  schon  für  mich  allein  leisten.  Es 
war  nicht  schmeichelhaft  für  mich,  was  da  herauskam.  (B-3) 
'Rolf  was  similarly  disappointed  by  the  lack  of  interest,  as  he  saw  it,  in 
really  understanding  how  the  MfS  had  functioned:  'Das  hat  nie  groß 
interessiert,  wie  hat  dieses  System  funktioniert,  wie  hat  dieser  personelle 
Aufbau  auch  funktioniert,  wie  hat  sich  diese  ganze  Hierarchie 
zusammengesetzt.  '  (A-1) 
Difficulties  in  realising  fruitful  dialogue  in  such  confrontations 
often  arise  because,  having  confessed,  the  IM  seems  to  await  guidance  as 
to  how  the  conversation  should  progress.  Stefan  Heym  describes  how  he 200 
realised  with  astonishment  one  day  that  a  man  who  had  come  to  him  and 
confessed  that  he  had  reported  on  him  was  actually  awaiting  absolution 
(J-36,  p.  92).  Heym  sees  such  behaviour  as  resulting  from  gross 
deficiencies  in  the  confrontation  with  the  Stasi  past.  Scores  of  people  in 
united  Germany,  he  argues,  have  become  victims  of  a  'Beichtsyndrom': 
'Dem  einen  Teil  der  Bevölkerung  wird  unentwegt  zugeredet,  er  möge  nur 
vortreten  zur  medienwirksamen  Beichte,  dann  würde  alles  wohler 
werden,  politisch  und  überhaupt;  und  der  andere  lechzt  danach,  daß  ihm 
was  Sensationelles  vorgebeichvwird.  '  (J-36,  p.  92) 
Another  contributing  factor  underlying  the  apparent  lack  of 
willingness  on  behalf  of  East  Germans  to  analyse  the  structures  which 
supported  the  GDR  has  been  that  many  feel  that  they  share  a  common 
identity  as  the  underdogs  in  the  new  Germany.  Much  of  the  anger  which 
was  originally  directed  at  those  within  the  GDR  was  later  focused  on  those 
in  positions  of  power  in  former  West  Germany  who,  as  the  full  economic 
scale  of  unification  began  to  be  felt  in  the  former  East,  were  often 
apportioned  blame  for  making  East  Germans  the  victims  and  losers. 
Faced  with  the  demands  of  coming  to  terms  with  unemployment  and  a 
new,  less  rigid,  social  structure,  many  East  Germans  indulge  in  what  has 
become  known  as  Ostalgie.  A  critical  confrontation  with  the  past  does  not 
facilitate  this  nostalgic  reminiscing  about  the  good  old  days.  For  this 
reason  the  more  criminal  aspects  of  life  in  the  GDR  are  often  conveniently 
forgotten  in  order  to  allow  full  indulgence  in  a  shared  sense  of 
victimisation  and  in  a  mourning  for  what  has  been  lost.  Originally  many 
more  former  GDR  citizens  considered  themselves  Stasi  victims,  and  the 
extent  of  the  MfS's  might  was  exaggerated  in  the  confrontation  with  the 
past.  The  more  evil  the  Stasi  was  portrayed  as  being,  the  easier  it  was  to 
justify  conformity,  and  in  1990  Jurek  Becker  observed: 201 
Der  besondere  Eifer,  mit  dem  die  Stasi-Schikanen  nun 
angeprangert  und  verfolgt  werden,  scheint  mir  für  viele  wie  ein 
Versuch,  die  eigene  Unterwürfigkeit  ungeschehen  zu  machen.  Je 
schrecklicher  die  Bedrohung  dargestellt  wird,  der  man  ausgesetzt 
war,  für  um  so  verständlicher  muß  das  jahrzehntelange  Parieren 
gehalten  werden.  Wenn  man  ihnen  schon  den  perfekten  Untertan 
gespielt  hat,  sollte  man  da  nicht  wenigstens  glauben  dürfen,  daß 
einem  nichts  anderes  übriggeblieben  ist?  (J-33,  p.  77) 
The  feeling  of  hatred  towards  MfS  employees  and  particularly  towards  IM 
has  diminished  greatly  since  1990,  and  many  East  Germans  are  ready  to 
forget  or  disregard  the  severe  injustices  inflicted  on  what  is  really  a  very 
small  minority  who  were  not  content  to  conform  in  the  past.  The  small 
group  of  'genuine  Opfer'  are  left  marginalised  and  often  despised  for  their 
attempts  to  keep  the  debate  alive.  Chaim  Noll  refers  to  the  increasingly 
prevalent  readiness  to  forgive  and  forget  as  an  'allesbedeckender  Brei  der 
Versöhnung',  within  which  compliance  with  the  system  becomes  accepted 
as  having  been  the  norm  and  opposition  as  deviation  from  this  normality 
(J-65,  pp.  98-99).  Both  groups  at  either  end  of  the  Täter  /  Opfer  spectrum, 
that  is  those  of  'genuine  Opfer'  and  of  'genuine  Täter'  are  very  small 
minorities  and  represent  to  many  an  unwelcome  reminder  of  their  own 
conformity  and  of  the  serious  flaws  in  a  state  whose  loss  they  wish  to 
mourn.  A  wide-spread  societal  confrontation  with  the  methods  and 
structures  of  the  MfS  has  not  taken  place.  Emphasis  has  rather  been 
placed  on  a  more  superficial  sensationalist  approach  to  the  Stasi  legacy,  in 
which  the  behaviour  of  specific  individuals  has  been  highlighted,  rather 
than  the  general  tendencies  of  the  collective.  Many  East  Germans  are  now 
eager  to  ignore  the  failings  of  the  past  system  and  are  keen,  depending  on 
their  age  and  on  their  immediate  social  and  economic  situation,  either  to 
embrace  the  new  system  or  to  reminisce  about  the  former  one.  In  doing  so 
they  have  defined  new  categories  of  Täter  and  Opfer  relevant  to  the 202 
current  political  situation,  rendering,  at  least  in  the  interim,  the  old  ones 
and  the  debate  concerning  them  increasingly  obsolete. 203 
Section  Two:  Chapter  Nine 
LOOKING  BACK: 
A  STASI  INFORMER'S  CONFRONTATION  WITH  THE  PAST 204 
9.1  THE  ART  OF  MEMORY 
9.1.1  The  Phenomenon  of  Apparent  Forgetting 
Ich  bin  dankbar  dafür,  daß  ich  vergessen  hatte,  anscheinend  schon 
sehr  früh.  Wie  hätte  ich  all  die  Jahre  mit  diesem  Wissen  leben  und 
schreiben  sollen,  wem  ich  mich  offenbaren  können.  1 
Christa  Wolfs  popularity  in  her  own  country  was  largely  due  to  the 
critical  stance  she  took  towards  the  state  in  her  work  whilst  remaining 
still  fundamentally  supportive  of  socialist  principles.  She  was  highly 
celebrated  in  the  West  precisely  because  of  this  critical  stance,  somewhat 
ironically  enjoying  greater  popularity  than  others  who  were  less  content  to 
comply  with  the  restrictions  imposed  upon  them  by  strict  censorship,  and 
who  had  thus,  willingly  or  unwillingly,  left  the  GDR  and  gone  to  the  West. 
When,  in  early  1993,  the  news  broke  that  Wolf  had,  in  the  late  1950s  and 
early  1960s,  held  contacts  to  the  MfS  as  a  GI  (Geheimer  Informator)  under 
the  cover  name  of  'Margarete',  a  fierce  attack  was  launched  on  her  person 
by  her  critics  old  and  new,  in  what  seemed  to  be  a  continuation  of  the 
controversy  which  had  surrounded  the  publication  of  Was  bleibt  several 
years  previously  (J-104).  After  the  hysteria  had  subsided,  and  the 
evidence  from  the  files  was  examined  more  objectively,  it  was  generally 
accepted  that  the  extent  of  Wolf  s  compliance  had  been  minimal  and  had 
encompassed  only  a  brief  period  of  time.  It  was  argued  in  her  defence  that 
Wolf  and  her  husband  had  been  subjected  to  well  over  twenty  years  of 
what  was  at  times  round-the-clock  surveillance  as  a  result  of  the  very 
much  more  critical  stance  she  had  developed  towards  the  state  after  an 
initial  period  of  youthful  political  naivete  (J-99,  pp.  201,340).  This  was 
undoubtedly  the  case,  yet  the  real  shock  lay  not  in  the  fact  that  Wolf  had 
1  Christa  Wolf,  after  her  claim  that  she  had  suppressed  the  memory  of  her  contact  to  the 
MfS  as  an  informer  (J-99,  p.  203). 205 
held  contacts  of  this  kind  to  the  MfS  per  se,  but  rather  in  her  apparent 
forgetting  of  these  events  until  confronted  with  the  documentation  of  them 
in  her  MfS  files: 
Ich  fand  aber  bei  meinen  Akten,  zu  einem  'Auskunftsbericht',  auch 
ein  dünnes  Faszike,  aus  dem  ich  erfuhr,  daß  die  Stasi  mich  von  59 
bis  62  zunächst  als  'GI'  ('Gesellschaftlicher  Informant')  dann  als 
'IM'  geführt  hat.  Das  traf  mich  völlig  unvorbereitet.  (J-99,  pp. 
143-44)2 
In  not  admitting  to  having  collaborated  with  the  MfS  until  the  irrefutable 
evidence  from  the  files  lay  before  her,  Wolf  displayed  what  has  come  to  be 
a  classic  behaviour  pattern  witnessed  in  former  IM.  The  IM  denies  having 
held  such  contacts  to  the  MfS  until  evidence  from  the  files  is  produced 
which  renders  any  further  denial  futile.  At  this  point  s/he  claims  to  have 
suppressed  all  previous  knowledge  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit  until  the 
documentation  has  evoked  these  lost  memories.  Often  this  memory  jolt  is 
so  effective  that  the  IM  then  seems  to  remember  many  details  of  the 
contact  to  the  MfS  and  tries  to  relativise  it  by  claiming,  for  example,  that 
s/he  never  reported  anything  of  consequence  and  cannot  be  held 
responsible  for  causing  any  harm  to  fellow  GDR  citizens  (see  Section  Two: 
9.2). 
The  silence  on  the  part  of  former  IM  until  they  are  unmasked  has 
infuriated  those  who  were  observed  by  such  individuals.  Many  hold  the 
view  that  this  silence  is  almost  more  reprehensible  than  the  deed  itself. 
Advocating  the  resignation  of  Manfred  Stolpe,  Vera  Wollenberger  said 
that,  whereas  Stolpe's  co-operation  with  the  MfS  was  in  itself  highly 
questionable,  'noch  schlimmer,  ja  fatal,  ist  jedoch  das  spätere 
Verschweigen'  (I-16). 
2A  GI  was  actually  a  Geheimer  Informator,  an  earlier  term  for  an  IMS.  Wolf  appears 
here  to  have  confused  the  terms  GI  and  GMS  (Gesellschaftlicher  Mitarbeiter  für 
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There  are  obvious  practical  reasons  behind  an  IM's  conscious 
decision  to  remain  silent  about  his/her  Stasi  connections.  The  individual 
may  fear  being  sacked,  or  s/he  may  be  concerned  about  the  negative  social 
implications  which  potentially  follow  such  a  confession.  Rainer 
Schedlinski  had  the  following  to  say  on  the  matter: 
Solange  die  Feuilletonisten  sich  über  die  fehlende 
Geständnisbereitschaft  jener  IM's  [sic]  beklagen,  aber  gleichzeitig 
nicht  bereit  sind,  andere  Erklärungsmuster  zuzulassen  als 
Schizophrenie,  Korruption,  Erpressung  oder  den  postmodernen 
Verlust  der  Wahrheitskategorie,  liegt  das  Unverständnis  bei  ihnen 
selbst.  Dann  freilich  werden  ihnen  die  Angesprochenen  wohl  für 
alle  Zeit  jene  Erklärungen  schuldig  bleiben,  die  man  von  ihnen 
erwartet,  denn  wollte  man  sich  zu  dieser  Wahrheit  bekennen, 
müßte  man  lügen.  (J-77,  p.  75) 
Sascha  Anderson,  like  Schedlinski  a  writer  who  belonged  to  the 
Prenzlauer  Berg  scene  in  Berlin,  was  sensationally  outed  by  Wolf 
Biermann  in  1991  as  having  been  an  IM.  Biermann  made  the  revelation  in 
his  speech  on  the  receipt  of  the  Georg-Buchner-Preis,  referring  to 
Anderson  as  'der  unbegabte  Schwätzer  Sascha  Arschloch,  ein  Stasispitzel, 
der  immer  noch  cool  den  Musensohn  spielt  und  hofft,  daß  seine  Akten  nie 
auftauchen'  (J-10,  p.  300).  IM  such  as  Anderson  and  Schedlinski  often 
decide  after  there  can  be  no  doubt  in  their  own  minds  that  they  were 
considered  bona  fide  IM,  not  to  admit  to  this  fact  publicly  until  they  are 
effectively  forced  to.  Christa  Wolf  herself  waited  well  over  half  a  year  after 
viewing  the  evidence  in  her  files  before  she  decided  to  make  this 
information  public.  Yet,  what  of  the  period  before  an  IM  is  confronted  with 
evidence  from  the  files?  Are  the  statements  of  former  IM  who  claim  that 
they  had  actually  suppressed  the  knowledge  of  their  actions  to  be  taken  at 
face  value?  Is  it  at  all  possible  that  the  desire  not  to  have  been  an  IM  is  so 
strong  that  it  can  actually  block  the  memories  of  this  period  of  an 
individual's  past  life? 207 
9.1.2  Perceptions  of  Self  in  Autobiographical  Memory 
Psychologists  researching  autobiographical  memory  have  tended  in  recent 
times  to  reject  copy  theories  of  memory,  which  traditionally  supported  the 
notion  that  what  was  remembered  was  an  exact  replica  of  a  past  event. 
Michael  Ross  has  researched  extensively  into  the  area  of  autobiographical 
memory,  finding  further  evidence  that  individuals  employ  'implicit 
theories  of  self  to  construct  their  personal  histories'  (J-74,  p.  341).  In  other 
words,  people  will  tend  to  use  their  current  perception  of  self  to  infer  their 
past  behaviour.  Unless  information  is  salient  to  a  subject  which  leads 
him/her  to  believe  that  personal  attitudes  and  therefore  behaviour  have 
undergone  change,  then  s/he  will  tend  to  exaggerate  the  similarity  of  past 
to  present.  When,  in  1981,  Ross  and  Conway  had  two  groups  of  subjects 
listen  to  differing  statements  about  health  care  they  found  that  those 
subjects  who  heard  that  frequent  tooth  brushing  could  damage  teeth, 
reported  brushing  their  teeth  less  often  than  those  who  heard  a  message 
praising  tooth  brushing  (J-75,  pp.  127-28).  Ross  and  Conway  concluded 
that  since  people  are  'cognitive  conservatives  who  bias  their  memories  so 
as  to  deny  change  and  maintain  temporal  consistency  and  coherence', 
'attitudes  that  are  salient  and  are  judged  relevant  to  the  behaviour  in 
question  may  guide  reconstructive  memory'  (J-75,  pp.  128,135).  This  is 
the  basic  principle  of  'Dissonance  Theory',  formulated  in  1973  by  Goethals 
and  Reckman,  which  proposed  that,  since  individuals  feel  uncomfortable 
when  they  realise  current  attitudes  clash  with  prior  ones,  they  tend  to 
reduce  this  discomfort  (dissonance)  by  forgetting  their  original  stance  and 
presuming  that  their  opinions  have  not  altered  (J-75,  p.  131).  The  results 
of  this  line  of  research  are  applied  below  in  a  possible  explanation  of  the 
phenomenon  of  apparent  forgetting  witnessed  in  former  IM. 208 
The  majority  of  East  Germans  citizens  conformed  at  least 
superficially  with  state  policies  for  most  of  the  GDR's  forty  year  existence, 
with  many  displaying  their  genuine  dissatisfaction  and  disillusionment 
only  in  late  1989.  It  is  often  claimed  that  the  demonstrations  throughout 
East  Germany  at  this  time  played  a  major  contributing  factor  in  the  fall  of 
the  regime,  and,  although  many  GDR  citizens  were  taken  by  surprise  at 
the  speed  with  which  unification  was  achieved,  these  events  tended,  at 
least  in  the  Western  media,  to  be  interpreted  as  an  indication  that  the 
Volk  was  liberating  itself  from  the  throes  of  communism  and  embracing 
the  capitalist  system.  This  course  of  events,  one  could  suppose,  led  to  a 
change  in  the  self-perception  of  many  GDR  citizens,  who  now  considered 
themselves  to  have  been  active  opponents  of  the  SED  state.  Applying 
Ross's  findings,  that  individuals  tend  to  believe  their  attitudes  remain 
constant  over  time,  one  could  assume  that  those  who  were  dissatisfied 
with  the  state  in  1989  would  tend  to  presume  this  had  been  their  attitude 
before  this  time  and,  since  people  believe  behaviour  reflects  attitude,  could 
believe  that  they  displayed  this  discontentment  prior  to  1989.  This  would 
partly  account  for  the  fact  that  many  are  reluctant  to  accept  that  they 
were  not  under  direct  surveillance  (F-8,  p.  52,  see  also  Section  Two:  8.3). 
The  perception  of  oneself  as  a  non-conformer  is  then  perhaps  strengthened 
when  individuals  reconstruct  memories  of  past  behaviour  on  the  basis  of 
present,  more  critical,  attitudes  towards  the  GDR.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
former  IM  cannot  remember  having  had  any  contacts  to  the  MfS,  rather 
that  the  IM  remembers  the  contacts  as  such,  that  s/he  was  visited  by  an 
MfS  officer  on  several  occasions,  for  example,  but  strives  to  convince 
him/herself  that  this  contact  never  took  on  the  concrete  form  of  an 
agreement  to  co-operate  as  an  IM.  Ross  has  shown  that  people  generally 
have  difficulty  accurately  reconstructing  their  personal  histories  and  infer 
their  past  behaviour  from  current  attitudes  and  perceptions  of  self.  This 209 
self-image  is  currently  being  re-evaluated  and  perhaps  re-defined  for  the 
majority  of  former  GDR  citizens  in  the  context  of  the  vast  societal 
upheaval  which  they  have  witnessed.  When  the  element  of  the  social  and 
psychological  undesirability  of  having  been  an  IM  is  added  to  the 
equation,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  in  order  even  just  to  preserve  their 
self-esteem,  IM  often  apply  a  sort  of  'can't  have  been'  approach  to 
constructing  their  own  personal  history.  This  is  confirmed  by  a  statement 
from  Jutta  Braband,  who  resigned  her  political  mandate  for  the  PDS  after 
viewing  her  Stasi  files.  Braband  described  her  shock  at  being  confronted 
with  the  details  of  her  IM-Tätigkeit  which  she  found  in  these  files:  'Was 
ich  noch  erinnert  habe,  war  furchtbar  harmlos.  [...  ]  Ich  hatte  eine  Version 
der  ganzen  Geschichte  im  Kopf,  die  mein  Selbstbild  nicht  erschüttern 
konnte.  '  (I-41,  p.  40) 
The  issue  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  even  when  they 
were  actively  collaborating,  IM  may  well  have  had  a  complex  relationship 
to  the  self.  Commenting  on  the  cases  of  Anderson  and  Schedlinski,  the 
journalist  Mathias  Ehlert  said  that  the:  'Wahrnehmung  von  sich  selbst 
unterscheidet  sich  grundlegend  von  der  Wahrheit  der  Akten.  [...  ]  Sie 
waren  an  beide  Systeme  angeschlossen,  waren  inoffizielle 
Gesprächspartner  einer  Macht,  mit  der  sie  in  ihrem  offiziellen 
Selbstverständnis  nichts  zu  tun  haben  wollte.  '  (1-28) 
9.1.3  Terminological  Considerations 
The  question  of  terminology  is  often  neglected  in  a  consideration  of  the 
phenomenon  of  apparent  forgetting  witnessed  in  former  Stasi 
collaborators.  The  term  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter  has  only  come  into  general 
usage  since  1989,  and  although  'Stephana'  was  very  much  aware  that  by 
1989  she  had  been  meeting  with  a  representative  of  the  MfS  for 
approximately  four  years,  she  did  not  know  that  the  terminology  used  to 210 
describe  this  relationship  was  that  of  an  IM  meeting  with  an  Operativer 
Mitarbeiter:  'Dieser  Begriff  IM,  der  ist  mir  wirklich  erst  lange  nach  der 
Wende  bewußt  geworden.  '  (A-8)  She  describes  her  gradual  realisation  that 
she  too  was  one  of  the  group  of  IM  who  was  suddenly  receiving  so  much 
media  attention  as  follows:  `Bist  du  auch  einer?  Bist  du  keiner?  Ach 
Quatsch,  bist  du  keiner 
... 
dann,  Bist  du  doch  einer?  "'  (A-8) 
It  is  not  merely  the  label  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter  which  is  novel  for 
the  informer,  but  much  of  the  terminology  which  was  developed  and 
applied  in  this  highly  refined  system  of  observation  and  control. 
'Wolfgang',  for  example,  uses  the  term  Führungsoffizier  when  narrating 
his  biography,  but  adds  ironically  'wie  man  heute  so  schön  sagt'  (A-7). 
'Thaer'  considered  his  Führungsoffizier  to  be  a  friend  and  equal  and 
rejects  the  hierarchy  implied  by  this  label  (A-5). 
The  entire  Stasi  debate  is  conducted  in  what  are  for  the  majority  of 
IM  previously  unfamiliar  linguistic  concepts,  and  the  informer  must  first 
identify  him/herself  with  the  terminology  used  to  define  his/her  past 
actions  and  re-evaluate  and  re-define  his/her  image  of  self  and  of  personal 
history  in  order  to  incorporate  these  structures.  That  much  of  the 
terminology  applied  in  the  Stasi  debate  was  previously  not  in  everyday 
usage  is  underlined  by  the  following  words  from  'Katrin'  concerning  her 
recruitment:  'Ich  habe  ja  auch  'was  unterschrieben.  Das  hat  man  mir 
diktiert.  Da  steht  aber  nicht  Verpflichtungserklärung  darüber,  und  selbst 
dann  habe  ich  nicht  mehr  gewußt,  was  dadrin  steht.  '  (A-9) 
Experiments  into  learning  have  shown  that,  although  memory  is 
usually  more  accurate  if  recall  takes  place  in  the  same  context  as  original 
learning,  the  exact  reinstatement  of  the  incidental  environmental  context 
is  not  always  necessary.  Recall  can  still  take  place  when  the  subject  is 
simply  asked  to  imagine  the  original  learning  environment  (J-90,  p.  170). 
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cannot,  of  course,  automatically  be  directly  applied  in  an  interpretation  of 
the  phenomenon  of  apparent  forgetting  witnessed  in  IM,  yet  perhaps  they 
can  shed  light  on  some  of  the  issues  invo"d.  Since  the  GDR  no  longer 
exists  as  a  physical  entity,  it  is  perhaps  more  difficult  for  former  IM  to 
imagine  the  incidental  environmental  context  of,  for  example, 
recruitment.  The  individual  such  as  Christa  Wolf  who  looks  back  on 
his/her  life  in  the  GDR  does  so  from  within  a  newly  defined  physical 
context  and  using  linguistic  references  which  are,  for  most,  novel.  Recall 
for  the  details,  if  not  the  essence,  of  Stasi  collaboration,  may  thus  be 
impeded. 
A  main  failing  of  the  debate  concerning  the  relative  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  IM  has  been  the  emphasis  placed  on  the  details  rather 
than  on  the  essence  of  an  IM-Tätigkeit.  This  was  particularly  the  case  in 
the  debate  concerning  Manfred  Stolpe  (see  Section  Two:  6.1.7).  The 
Untersuchungsausschuß  spent  much  time  on  the  what  proved  futile 
attempt  to  establish,  for  example,  where,  when,  and  from  whom  Stolpe 
had  received  the  Verdienstmedaille.  It  is  conceivable  that  Stolpe  was 
consciously  lying,  but  just  as  plausible  that  he  was  no  longer  sure  of  the 
exact  course  of  events  surrounding  this  episode.  Once  again  it  is  possible 
to  draw  on  evidence  from  studies  into  memory  which  indicate  that  an 
individual  may  have  difficulty  recalling  his/her  whereabouts  even  for 
significant  life  events.  Larsen,  a  Danish  psychologist,  kept  a  diary  for  six 
months  and,  without  first  consulting  it,  later  tested  his  memory  of  his 
whereabouts  on  particular  days.  He  found  that  he  had  remembered 
hearing  about  the  Chernobyl  disaster  on  the  radio  in  the  morning.  His 
diary  told  him,  however,  that  he  had  been  'at  Pia's  place  just  after  work' 
when  he  heard  the  news  (J-103,  pp.  289-90).  Larsen's  recall  was  also 
inaccurate  for  his  whereabouts  when  he  discovered  that  the  Swedish 
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considerable  impact  for  any  Scandinavian.  Larsen  found  these  memories 
so  vivid  that  only  the  diary  convinced  him  that  they  were  false. 
In  the  Stolpe  debate  no  certainty  could  be  ever  established  on 
matters  such  as  the  details  surrounding  the  awarding  of  the 
Verdienstmedaille.  The  accounts  from  Stolpe  and  the  MfS  officers 
questioned  by  the  Ausschuß  were  often  vague  and  contradictory,  and  the 
whole  issue  became  at  times  merely  comical.  By  placing  the  emphasis  on 
the  details  of  Stolpe's  contact  to  the  MfS  rather  than  on  their  general 
nature  it  seemed  that  an  individual  was  free  from  guilt  if  certain  formal 
criteria  relating  to  an  IM-Tätigkeit  had  not  been  met.  The  silence  on  the 
part  of  some  IM  may  be  partly  a  result  of  this  focus  on  detail.  Some  IM 
may  attempt,  for  example,  to  convince  themselves  that  they  did  not 
actually  sign  a  Verpflichtungserklärung  and  were  perhaps  only  classed  a 
Kontaktperson:  'Kontaktpersonen  sind  vertrauenswürdige  Bürger  der 
Deutschen  Demokratischen  Republik,  die  zur  Lösung  bestimmter 
Aufgaben  angesprochen  werden.  Es  erfolgt  keine  Anwerbung  als 
Kontaktperson.  '  (J-62,  p.  205)  Since  a  Kontaktperson  would  not  face  the 
same  potential  repercussions  for  having  complied  with  the  MfS,  there  is 
an  obvious  incentive  to  remain  silent  about  contacts  to  the  organisation  if 
the  individual  is  unsure  of  how  exactly  these  were  defined.  A 
confrontation  with  individual  behaviour  is  not  facilitated  in  this 
atmosphere  where  terminology  rather  than  substance  is  often  the 
foremost  factor  in  deciding  a  person's  fate. 
In  summary,  there  are  then  many  reasons  why  an  IM  remains 
silent  about  his/her  contacts  to  the  MfS,  particularly  if  these  contacts  lie, 
as  they  did  in  Christa  Wolf  s  case,  in  the  distant  past.  An  altered  image  of 
self,  combined  with  the  social  undesirability  of  having  been  an  IM,  leads 
the  individual  to  adopt  a  'can't  have  been'  attitude  to  the  confrontation 
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behaviour.  The  Stasi  debate  has,  furthermore,  been  characterised  by  the 
often  sensational  unmasking  of  certain  individuals  as  former  IM. 
Ultimately,  however,  they  only  seem  to  suffer  serious  repercussions  for 
having  been  so  if  absolute  proof,  generally  in  the  form  of  a 
Verp  f  l'  ichtungserklärung,  can  be  produced.  In  this  sense  the  certified  IM 
have  to  some  extent  been  made  scapegoats  in  the  reckoning  with  the  GDR 
past,  and  a  consideration  of  individual  roles  outside  this  framework  has 
not  taken  place.  Since  IM  can  lose  their  jobs  on  account  of  their  former 
Stasi  collaboration,  there  are  no  legal,  only  moral  incentives  for  admitting 
to  an  IM-Tätigkeit,  especially  if  there  is  any  element  of  doubt  whatsoever 
on  the  part  of  the  individual  concerned. 
9.1.4  Release 
Once  the  moment  has  come  when  they  can  no  longer  publicly  or  privately 
deny  their  IM-Tätigkeit,  many  IM  seem  more  than  keen  to  talk  of  it.  Since 
none  of  them  approached  him,  Klaus  Hugler,  who  had  been  active  in 
church  groups  in  the  GDR,  decided  after  reading  his  Stasi  file  to  contact 
the  IM  who  had  been  reporting  on  him.  Although  these  individuals  had 
remained  silent  until  he  approached  them,  they  seemed  to  respond 
immediately  he  did  so,  almost  as  if  they  had  been  waiting  for  this 
moment.  IM  'Gerhard  Winzer',  for  example,  got  in  touch  the  day  after 
Hugler  wrote  to  him  (J-37,  p.  93).  'Fritz  Wunok'  phoned  Hugler 
immediately  after  receiving  his  letter  and  arranged  to  travel  from  Bavaria 
to  meet  with  Hugler  in  Potsdam  the  very  next  day  (J-37,  pp.  94-95).  This 
urgency  would  suggest  that  these  IM  had  been  holding  out  as  long  as 
possible,  hoping  that  perhaps  the  contact  to  the  MfS  would  remain 
undisclosed.  As  soon  as  the  IM  realises  that  s/he  has  been  unmasked  there 
seems,  in  some  cases,  to  be  a  tremendous  need  to  talk  of  the  contact.  It 
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him  as  they  hoped  to  persuade  him  not  to  inform  others  of  their  former 
Stasi  collaboration.  This  explanation  would  not,  however,  account  for  why 
the  IM  profiled  in  this  study  were  prepared  to  talk  to  me.  Although  I  had 
guaranteed  them  anonymity,  there  was  undoubtedly  a  certain  amount  of 
risk  involved  in  engaging  in  such  dialogue  with  a  complete  stranger.  When 
I  asked  them  why  they  had  decided  to  speak  to  me,  I  received  varying 
responses.  'Rolf  and  'Stephana'  both  said  that  they  felt  the  need  to  talk  of 
this  aspect  of  their  biography  in  an  attempt  to  come  to  terms  with  it  (A-1, 
A-8).  'Falke'  and  'Katrin'  emphasised  that  it  was  important  that  their 
version  of  events  be  heard  (A-3,  A-9).  I  suspect  that  most  of  my 
interviewees  were  glad  to  have  someone  to  relate  their  story  to,  and  that 
talking  to  me  afforded  them  the  welcome  opportunity  of  doing  so  without 
having  to  fear  any  negative  repercussions  which  might  follow  the 
admission  or  discussion  of  an  IM-Tätigkeit  in  their  own  immediate  circle 
of  acquaintances. 
Walter  Schilling  also  suggests  that  many  IM  do  wish  to  break  their 
silence  over  their  IM-Tätigkeit,  but  simply  do  not  find  the  strength  to  do 
so: 
Alle  IM  müssen  enttarnt  werden;  Nachdruck  auf  'enttarnt'.  Das 
hat  mir  selber  einer  gesagt:  Ihr  habt  mich  enttarnen  müssen;  ich 
hätte  es  von  allein  nicht  gekonnt.  Die  Macht  der  Konspiration  ist  so 
groß,  daß  er  das  gar  nicht  kann,  ähnlich  einem,  der  sein 
Suchtverhalten  nicht  zugeben  kann.  (F-13,  p.  98) 
9.1.5  Selective  Memory 
In  cases  where  the  IM  does  sooner  or  later  admit  to  the  IM-Tätigkeit,  a 
pattern  of  selective  memory,  or  rather  selective  confrontation,  develops  in 
the  way  in  which  s/he  consequently  narrates  the  past.  The  IM  will 
maintain  that  s/he  is  certain  of  particular  details  of  the  co-operation  with 
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received  financial  rewards,  having  met  with  the  MfS  officer  in  a 
Konspirative  Wohnung,  or  at  what  point  the  work  as  an  IM  was 
discontinued. 
Even  when  an  IM  does  finally  admit  to  his/her  Stasi  contacts  and  is 
prepared  to  talk  of  them,  this  confrontation  is  then  one  which  is  fraught 
with  denial,  suppression,  half-truths  and  ambiguities.  The  public  debate 
concerning  the  IM  has  to  a  large  extent  been  concerned  with  the  moral 
issue  of  how  such  individuals  should  confront  this  aspect  of  their 
biographies.  Statements  made  by  former  IM  are  often  disregarded  if  they 
do  not  correspond  to  factual  evidence,  and  an  analysis  of  these  statements 
and  therefore  of  the  way  in  which  such  individuals  actually  are 
confronting  their  past  tends  to  be  neglected.  Yet  this  latter  issue  is 
particularly  worthy  of  study  as,  after  all,  the  'importance  of  oral  testimony 
may  often  lie  not  in  its  adherence  to  facts  but  rather  in  its  divergence  from 
them,  where  imagination,  symbolism,  desire  break  in'  (J-67,  p.  100). 
9.2  'ICH  HABE  NIEMANDEM  GESCHADET':  3 
COPINGILEGITIMATION  STRATEGIES  FOR  CONFRONTING  AN 
IM  PAST 
9.2.1  General 
Very  few  IM  are  prepared  to  admit  publicly  to  any  feelings  of  guilt 
whatsoever  on  account  of  their  IM-Tätigkeit.  They  tend  rather  to  trivialise 
and  justify  their  actions  using  a  repertoire  of  by  now  standard 
legitimation  strategies.  These  strategies  might  at  first  seem  to  be  feeble 
excuses  for  morally  questionable  behaviour.  When  they  are  more  closely 
examined,  such  statements  can,  however,  provide  valuable  insights  into 
the  way  in  which  former  IM  publicly  and  privately  confront  their  Stasi 
3A 
common  justificatory  statement  from  former  IM.  For  a  list  of  such  typical 
legitimation  arguments,  see  J-87,  pp.  6-9. 216 
past,  as  well  as  into  the  way  in  which  they  viewed  the  contacts  to  the  MfS 
at  the  time  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit. 
9.2.2  'Das  Normalste  auf  der  Welt':  (A-9) 
The  Normalisation/Trivialisation  Approach 
'Katrin'  claims  that  as  a  convinced  patriot,  it  was  'das  Normalste  auf  der 
Welt'  for  her  to  agree  to  co-operate  with  the  MfS  as  an  Inoffizieller 
Mitarbeiter  (A-9).  In  a  pamphlet  advertising  her  candidacy  for  election  to 
the  Bundestag  in  1995,  she  writes  that  she  initially  viewed  the  contact  to 
the  MfS  'als  Beitrag  zum  Schutz  der  DDR  und  erst  mit  ihrem  Verlauf 
kamen  mir  Zweifel  an  ihrem  Sinn  und  ihrer  Berechtigung'.  Speaking  to 
me,  she  also  claims:  'Das,  was  heute  als  Spitzeltätigkeit  beschrieben  wird, 
ist  etwas,  was  ich  eingeordnet  hatte.  Also,  ich  würde  nie  sagen,  daß  ich  ein 
Spitzel  war.  '  (A-9)  'Katrin'  would  put  a  cross  in  her  diary  on  the  days  when 
she  was  to  meet  her  Führungsoffizier,  but  thought  no  more  of  it:  'Das  hat 
überhaupt  nicht  beunruhigt,  beschäftigt.  '  (A-9)  The  IM  files  relating  to 
'Katrin'  present  a  slightly  different  picture.  'Katrin's'  Führungsoffizier 
noted  that  after  she  arrived  in  Leningrad,  where  she  was  to  be  active  as 
an  IM  while  carrying  out  her  studies,  she  did  not  abide  by  the  agreement 
to  contact  him  by  telephone.  Several  months  passed  until  she  was 
prompted  by  a  letter  to  get  in  touch  with  him.  A  meeting  was  arranged 
soon  afterwards,  at  which  she  excused  herself  by  saying  that  the 
telephone  number  given  to  her  in  the  GDR  had  slipped  her  mind  (C-7b,  p. 
19).  The  Führungsoffizier  subsequently  noted  in  the  Treffbericht:  'Die 
ganze  Schilderung  war  ihr  recht  unangenehm.  '  (C-7b,  p.  19)  This  suggests 
that  the  story  about  the  forgotten  telephone  number  was  perhaps 
fabricated  and  that  for  some  reason  'Katrin'  had  begun  to  feel  that  these 
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The  information  in  the  files  of  the  IM  to  whom  I  spoke  indicates 
that  most  were  plagued  by  scruples  at  some  point  during  their  IM- 
Tätigkeit  (see  Section  One:  4.1.5).  'Rolf  s'  Führungsoffizier  noted  at  the 
beginning  of  his  IM-Tätigkeit:  'Der  IM  möchte  niemanden  [sic]  durch  seine 
Berichterstattung  Nachteile  verschaffen.  Bestimmte  moralische 
Hemmnisse  liegen  beim  IM  noch  durchaus  vor.  '  (C-1b,  p.  39)  The  MfS  was 
well  aware  that  IM  tended  to  be  troubled  by  such  doubts  and  documented 
methods  of  reducing  these  by  aiming  to  convince  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter 
that  their  actions  were  morally  justifiable.  In  an  introductory  speech  to  a 
seminar  on  the  work  with  IM,  Mielke  stated:  'Es  muß  jedem  IM 
klargemacht  werden,  daß  zwischen  der  konspirativen  Arbeit  für  das  MfS 
und  der  Spitzeltätigkeit  feindlicher  Agenten  Welten  liegen,  die  einen 
Vergleich  zwischen  beiden  verbieten.  '  (F-5,  I,  536) 
There  are  of  course  cases  of  IM  who  genuinely  did  not  doubt  the 
morality  of  their  actions.  In  the  files  held  on  IM  'Falke'  there  seems  to  be 
no  indication  whatsoever  that  he  at  any  time  expressed  doubts  about  his 
role  as  an  IM  (C-3a,  b).  In  conversation  'Falke'  emphasises  repeatedly  how 
much  this  work  was  merely  part  of  his  daily  routine,  and  when  I  ask  him 
if  he  felt  relieved  after  it  became  known  that  he  had  been  an  IM,  he 
replies:  'Das  hat  mich  nicht  belastet.  '  (A-3)  Cases  such  as  'Falke'  are,  I 
would  argue,  rather  the  exception.  Former  IM  are  more  often  reluctant  to 
admit  to  the  genuine  doubts  they  experienced  as  they  would  then  be 
unable  to  employ  this  particular  justification  strategy  of 
normalisation/trivialisation. 
At  the  time  when  s/he  was  active  as  such,  an  IM  could  only  guess  at 
how  many  other  IM  were  working  for  the  MfS.  Some  were  flattered  to 
believe  that  they  belonged  to  a  select  few  GDR  citizens  deemed  worthy  of 
carrying  out  this  important  task.  'Theodor',  for  example,  considered  the 
invitation  to  co-operate  as  an  IM  'eine  außerordentliche  Ehre'  (A-2).  IM 218 
'Stephana'  needed  a  long  time  after  the  Wende  to  come  to  terms  with  the 
fact  that  she  belonged  to  the  large  group  of  IM:  'Man  denkt  ja  immer,  man 
ist  ein  Einzelfall.  '  (A-8)  Whereas  at  the  time  of  their  active  involvement 
with  the  MfS  some  informers  tended  to  consider  their  situation  special, 
out  of  the  ordinary,  and  perhaps  this  feeling  even  led  to  increased 
motivation,  the  same  individuals  justify  their  collaboration  today  by 
stressing  exactly  the  opposite,  that  is  that  the  contacts  were  an  integral 
part  of  their  daily  lives,  a  regular  feature  of  their  routine,  which,  since  it 
was  in  essence  trivial,  even  banal,  was  morally  justifiable  and  as  such 
never  really  a  source  of  doubt  or  scruples. 
9.2.3  'Das  ist  eigentlich  eine  gute  Sache':  4  The  IM  as  Mediator  and 
Helper 
One  of  the  most  sensational  revelations  of  previous  Stasi  collaboration 
was  the  case  of  Knud  Wollenberger,  who  was  discovered  to  have  informed 
on  his  wife  Vera  under  the  cover  name  IM  'Donald'.  'Donald'  admitted 
publicly  to  no  feelings  of  guilt  for  his  actions,  claiming: 
I  was  reporting  on  myself  as  much  as  anyone.  [....  ]  Often  I  was 
telling  him  [his  Führungsoffizier]  what  I  said  and  did.  These  ideas 
were  all  part  of  what  should  have  been  possible  in  this  country. 
Our  activities  were  very  public.  I  tried  to  influence  my  handler  to 
change  his  thinking.  By  telling  the  Stasi  about  our  ideas,  I'm  sure  I 
influenced  them.  (J-73,  p.  378) 
'Donald'  was  not  alone  in  trying  to  convince  himself  that  what  he  was 
doing  was  of  benefit  to  the  opposition  scene  in  which  he  and  his  wife  were 
involved.  The  MfS  wanted  the  IM  to  believe  that  there  was  a  meaningful 
purpose  to  collaboration,  and,  as  discussed  earlier,  this  Sinn-Angebot  was 
often  influential  in  an  IM-Kandidat's  decision  to  co-operate  with  the  MfS 
at  the  time  of  recruitment  (see  Section  One:  3.2).  Often,  as  in  'Rolf  s'  case, 
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the  belief  in  the  Sinn-Angebot  was  short-lived,  and  although  both  the  IM 
and  the  MfS  endeavoured  to  keep  it  alive,  it  ceased  in  many  cases  to  be  a 
real  motivating  factor.  In  other  cases  events  took  exactly  the  opposite 
course,  where  an  IM  recruited  on  the  basis  of  'kompromittierendes 
Material'  later  developed  a  Sinn-Angebot  as  an  internal  justification  and 
therefore  coping  strategy.  This  was  the  case  for  IM  'Stephana',  who,  at 
least  initially,  understood  her  co-operation  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
threats  made  against  her  at  recruitment  because  of  her  role  in  the 
attempted  Republikflucht  of  an  acquaintance  of  hers.  Later  she  tried  to 
find  meaning  and  purpose  in  the  contact  to  the  M/S: 
Ich  hatte  so  langsam  das  Gefühl,  ich  war  so  ein  Mittler,  daß  diese 
Veranstaltungen  einerseits  stattfinden  konnten,  ja,  und 
andererseits  habe  ich  dem  natürlich  erzählt,  ja,  nicht  immer  die 
Wahrheit,  sondern  auch  immer  noch  mehr  schöngefärbt,  als  es 
dann  eigentlich  tatsächlich  oppositionell  war.  (A-8) 
The  word  'langsam'  is  significant  in  'Stephana's'  statement  as  it  indicates 
that  she  developed  this  personal  legitimation  argument  over  time.  It  is 
evident  that  statements  such  as  these  are  not  merely  justifications  which 
informers  employ  now  in  a  public  forum,  but  ones  which  they  developed 
and  used  at  the  time  of  their  collaboration  as  a  means  of  privately 
rationalising  behaviour.  This  phenomenon  led  one  commentator  to  remark 
of  Knud  Wollenberger's  arguments:  'So  abstoßend  Wollenbergers 
selbstgerechter  Ton  klingt,  so  schwer  ist  zu  erkennen,  wo  die  Grenzen 
liegen  zwischen  nachträglicher  Legende  und  ursprünglicher 
Überzeugung.  '  (I-38,  p.  36) 
This  particular  justification/coping  strategy  was  at  times  not 
entirely  unfounded.  Evidence  can  be  found  in  the  files  of  occasions  when 
IM  were  clearly  trying  to  use  their  position  to  benefit  others.  IM 
'Sonnenblume'  stressed  in  a  report  to  her  Führungsoffizier  that  an 220 
acquaintance  who  had  applied  for  a  visa  to  visit  a  relative  in  Sweden  was 
not  planning  to  use  this  opportunity  to  flee  the  GDR  (C-8b,  pp.  21-22). 
Indeed,  the  majority  of  the  reports  'Sonnenblume'  gave  were 
overwhelmingly  positive  character  descriptions  of  her  friends  and 
acquaintances.  She  tells  me  that  she  made  a  conscious  decision  to  write 
only  positively  of  others,  hoping  that  perhaps  the  person  in  question  might 
benefit  from  such  a  report  (A-10).  Although  at  other  times  the  reports  he 
gave  were  undoubtedly  potentially  harmful,  'Fuchs'  did  on  one  occasion 
report  that  the  inmates  had  been  complaining  about  the  bad  quality  of  the 
prison  food  and  medical  care  (C-5b,  p.  349).  In  this  case  'Fuchs'  certainly 
appears  to  have  been  trying  to  exercise  any  influence  he  may  have  had  to 
bring  about  a  change  for  the  better.  This  information  is,  indeed,  judged  as 
'politisch-operativ  bedeutsam',  and  measures  are  suggested  to  improve  the 
situation  (C-5b,  p.  349).  Even  Rainer  Eppelmann,  who  was  so  strongly 
opposed  to  Manfred  Stolpe  staying  in  power  as  the  Ministerpräsident  of 
Brandenburg  after  the  extent  of  his  MfS  contacts  came  to  light,  had  to 
admit:  'Manfred  Stolpe  hat  vielen  Menschen,  auch  mir,  bei  vielen 
Gelegenheiten  geholfen.  '  (J-23,  p.  295)  In  many  IM  careers  there  were 
undoubtedly  moments  where  the  IM  was  able  to  help  others.  These 
moments  were  emphasised  by  the  IM  at  the  time  of  collaboration  in 
his/her  self-image  as  they  are  stressed  now  in  order  to  justify  the  IM- 
Tätigkeit. 
Ironically,  the  MfS  did  not  always  pay  heed  to  more  critical 
information  supplied  by  IM,  which  could  have,  had  it  been  acted  upon, 
benefited  not  only  others  but  the  MfS  itself.  When  asked  in  1986  about  the 
general  mood  of  the  population,  IM  'Reiner'  reported  that  many  fellow 
citizens  had  expressed  the  view  that  they  saw  no  point  in  voting  (C-4b,  III, 
229).  'Falke'  was  equally  critical  when  he  reported  that  some  of  his 
colleagues  were  of  the  opinion  that  another  colleague  had  been  too  harshly 221 
treated  when  he  lost  his  SED  membership  as  a  result  of  a  minor 
misdemeanour  (C-3b,  II,  9).  In  1989  'Falke'  also  reported  that  many  older 
comrades  believed  that  mistakes  had  been  made  in  the  running  of  the 
country  and  were  disappointed  and  disillusioned  (C-3b,  II,  362-63).  These 
pieces  of  information  were  indications  of  general  and  widespread 
dissatisfaction  within  the  population,  yet  they  were  not  judged  as  'operativ 
bedeutsam'.  Perhaps  this  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  MfS 
nurtured  in  its  internal  ideology  a  somewhat  simplistic  concept  of  the 
enemy,  defined  as  those  individuals  'die  in  Gruppen  oder  individuell  dem 
Sozialismus  wesensfremde  politisch-ideologische  Haltungen  und 
Anschauungen  absichtsvoll  entwickeln'  (F-3,  p.  110).  The  work  with  IM 
concentrated  on  the  fight  against  this  enemy,  and  signs  of  general  decay 
and  of  disillusionment  within  the  ranks  of  those  who  were  basically 
faithful  citizens,  such  as  Talke's'  colleagues  in  the  police  force,  were 
consequently  ignored. 
That  ultimately  it  was  really  only  a  minority  of  IM  who  truly 
believed  that  co-operation  with  the  MfS  had  a  meaningful  and  justifiable 
purpose  is  reflected  in  the  results  of  the  Seidler  and  Schmidt  study,  which 
found  that  59.2%  of  the  IM  questioned  rated  the  success  of  their  work  as 
only  'satisfactory'  (D-6,  I,  137).  A  further  13.9%  considered  their  work  only 
'slightly'  effective.  The  cumulative  total  of  these  figures  indicates  that  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  IM  in  this  study  did  not  consider  that  their 
work  with  the  MfS  served  much  purpose.  Indeed,  only  8%  of  IM 
questioned  rated  the  effectiveness  of  the  work  'very  high'  (D-6,  I,  184). 
9.2.4  The  Omnipotent  MIS 
Bei  der  Staatssicherheit  handelte  es  sich  also  um  einen 
perfektionistisch  organisierten  Apparat,  versehen  mit  allen 
erdenklichen  personellen  und  materiellen  Ressourcen,  gegen  den 
bis  dahin  niemand  erfolgreich  angekommen  war.  (J-109,  p.  22) 222 
The  portrayal  of  the  MfS  as  'ein  perfektionistisch  organisierter  Apparat' 
was  one  which  was  dominant  in  the  immediate  post-Wende  period.  This  is 
an  image  which  former  IM  attempting  to  justify  their  Stasi  contacts  often 
exploit.  The  mightier  the  MfS  is  seen  to  be,  the  more  the  IM  is  justified  in 
claiming  that  attempts  to  resist  recruitment  or  to  end  the  IM-Tätigkeit 
would  have  been  futile.  By  exaggerating  the  omnipotence  of  the  MfS  IM 
aim  to  impose  an  element  of  inevitability  on  their  actions.  This  is  a 
legitimation  strategy  employed  not  only  by  the  IM  but  also  by  those  very 
much  further  up  the  power  hierarchy  in  the  GDR.  Politbüro  member  Kurt 
Hager  claimed  that  he  would  rather  not  have  lived  in  Wandlitz,  describing 
it  as  an  'aufgezwungene  Internierung'  (cited  by  Becker,  J-33,  p.  75).  On 
hearing  Hager's  statement,  as  Jurek  Becker  commented  ironically: 
'schlagartig  wurde  einem  klar,  daß  auch  die  Mitglieder  des  Politbüros 
Opfer  des  Politbüros  waren.  '  (J-33,  p.  75)  It  is  the  frequent  use  of  a 
vocabulary  of  necessity  in  legitimation  attempts  of  former  political 
agitators  in  the  GDR  which  particularly  disturbed  Becker,  since  it  denies 
free  will  and  individual  responsibility:  'Dieses  Ich  mußte  ist  unschlagbar, 
wer  es  sagt,  ist  vor  peinlichen  Befragungen  sicher.  '  (J-33,  p.  74)  This 
strategy  is  commonplace  and,  although  he  does  admit  to  having  had 
scruples  about  what  he  was  doing,  'Theodor'  reduces  his  individual 
responsibility  by  claiming  that  there  was  'eine  gewisse  Notwendigkeit'  to 
his  actions:  'Das  ist  eine  schlimme  Sache,  wenn  man  einen  Freund 
bespitzeln  mu/3.  '(A-2,  my  italics) 
By  justifying  behaviour  in  this  way  an  IM  implies  that  s/he  cannot 
be  considered  responsible  for  his/her  actions  since  they  were  to  a  certain 
extent  environmentally  determined: 
We  do  not  hold  people  responsible  for  their  reflexes  -  for  example, 
for  coughing  in  church.  We  hold  them  responsible  for  their  operant 
behaviour  -  for  whispering  in  church  or  remaining  in  church  while 
coughing.  But  there  are  variables  which  are  responsible  for 223 
whispering  as  well  as  coughing,  and  these  may  be  just  as 
inexorable.  When  we  recognise  this,  we  are  likely  to  drop  the 
notion  of  responsibility  altogether  and  with  it  the  notion  of  free 
will  as  an  inner  causal  agent.  5 
In  the  justification  strategies  of  IM  'Sonnenblume'  and  IM  'Karin  Lenz' 
the  inexorable  variable  which  they  define  as  being  largely  responsible  for 
their  co-operation  with  the  MfS  is  the  hold  which  their  respective 
Führungsoffiziere  had  over  them.  'Karin  Lenz'  describes  her 
Führungsoffizier  'Detlef  as  a  kind  of  psychological  mentor,  who  acted  as  a 
substitute  psychiatrist  and  whom  she  could  call  at  any  time  of  day  or 
night  (J-45,  p.  43).  'Karin  Lenz'  thus  reduces  the  individual  responsibility 
she  carries  for  her  actions  by  portraying  herself  as  a  victim  whose 
weaknesses  were  cleverly  exploited  by  the  MfS  with  the  result  that  her  co- 
operation  was  almost  inevitable. 
In  her  autobiography  'Sonnenblume'  describes  her  Führungsoffizier 
'Roland'  as  a  'teuflischer  Magnet',  thereby  doubly  emphasising  the 
inevitability  of  her  succumbing  to  him  (J-110,  p.  260).  In  conversation  she 
does,  however,  admit  that  she  has  perhaps  tended  to  exaggerate  the 
compelling  physical  and  mental  attraction  she  felt  for  this  man  in  an 
attempt  to  justify  her  IM-Tätigkeit  (A-10,  see  Section  One:  4.2.4). 
The  MfS  was  undoubtedly  in  many  respects  a  mighty  and  powerful 
institution  whose  cunning  it  was  not  always  easy  to  resist.  As  an 
examination  of  MfS  documentation  will  quickly  reveal,  the  organisation 
does  not,  however,  live  up  to  its  reputation  of  having  been  a 
'perfektionistisch  organisierter  Apparat'.  In  theory  'peinlichste 
Genauigkeit'  was  called  for  in  the  handling  of  documents  relating  to  the 
IM,  yet  in  practice  many  files  were  carelessly  kept  (J-62,  p.  222).  Reports 
were  often  not  filed  in  the  strict  chronological  order  stipulated  in  the 
5  The  behavioural  psychologist  B.  F.  Skinner,  cited  by  Morris  (J-60,  p.  58). 224 
guidelines,  and  files  often  overstepped  the  three  hundred  page  mark, 
although  a  reminder  that  this  was  forbidden  was  printed  on  the  front 
cover  of  each  document  (J-62,  p.  378).  Information  in  any  one  file  is  at 
times  contradictory  and  illogical.  'Stephana',  for  example,  was  judged  as  a 
suitable  IM-Kandidat  among  other  things  because  of  her  loyal  stance 
towards  the  GDR  (C-6a,  p.  34).  Given  that  'Stephana'  was  interrogated 
because  she  had  attempted  to  help  an  acquaintance  escape  to  the  West, 
and  given  that  she  had  herself  applied  twice  to  leave  the  GDR,  this 
statement  of  her  loyalty  seems  somewhat  absurd.  Since  the  distribution  of 
work  among  Operative  Mitarbeiter  was  highly  uneven  it  is  possible  that 
'Stephana's'  Führungsoffizier  was  simply  too  over-worked  to  notice  this 
contradiction. 
The  MfS  was  at  times  mighty,  but  never  omnipotent.  The 
propagation  of  this  myth  serves  the  needs  of  those  who  seek  to  justify 
their  conformist  behaviour  and  is,  therefore,  a  frequently  employed 
legitimation  strategy  by  former  IM. 
9.2.5  Relativisation 
Former  IM  will  sometimes  emphasise  that  there  were  very  definite  limits 
to  their  willingness  to  co-operate  with  the  wishes  of  the  MfS,  thereby 
aiming  to  minimise  personal  culpability  by  stressing  that  they  did  not 
comply  to  the  extent  to  which  they  could  potentially  have  done  so.  This 
coping/legitimation  strategy  is  the  opposite  approach  to  the  one  discussed 
above.  Instead  of  justifying  his/her  behaviour  by  emphasising  his/her 
helplessness  in  the  face  of  the  omnipotence  of  the  MfS,  the  IM  claims  to 
have  been  strong  enough  and  sufficiently  in  control  of  the  situation  to 
withstand  some  of  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  Führungsoffizier  and  to 
impose  certain  limitations  on  the  IM-Tätigkeit. 225 
After  the  shock  revelation  that  she  too  had  collaborated  with  the 
MfS  Christa  Wolf  claimed:  'Ich  habe  den  Leuten  nichts  erzählt,  was  sie 
nicht  in  jeder  Versammlung  hätten  hören  können.  '  (J-99,  p.  305)  This 
relativisation  strategy  is  extremely  common  and  was  employed  by  several 
of  my  interviewees,  inc 
. iding  'Katrin': 
Das  sind  keine  Dinge,  die  ich  mühsam  herausgespitzelt  habe.  Ich 
habe  mich  nicht  hingestellt  und  ihre  Briefe  gelesen  oder  irgendwas, 
und  deshalb  denke  ich  einfach,  daß  das  Wort  Spitzel  nicht  zutrifft. 
[...  ]  Ich  habe  niemandem  ausgehorcht  oder  bin  irgendwo 
mitgegangen  in  irgendeine  Feier,  um  hinterher  darüber  zu 
berichten.  (A-9) 
At  times  it  may,  indeed,  have  been  the  case  that  the  informer  only  gave 
information  which  was  known  to  him/her  anyway,  although  this,  of  course, 
does  not  necessarily  justify  the  breach  of  trust  which  was  involved  in 
reporting  these  details  to  the  MfS.  The  truth  content  of  relativisation 
statements  such  as  these  must  furthermore  always  be  questioned. 
'Stephana',  for  example,  employs  this  strategy  when  she  insists  that  she 
very  seldom  named  names  when  asked  about  those  present  at  the 
religious  meetings  she  attended:  'Ich  habe  versucht,  mich  immer 
'rauszureden,  damit,  daß  ich  die  Namen  mir  nicht  behalten  habe,  ich  habe 
also  sehr  wenig  Namen  angegeben,  weil  ich  immer  gesagt  habe,  ich  habe 
kein  Namengedächtnis.  '  (A-8)  The  reports  written  by  'Stephana's' 
Führungsoffizier  indicate  that  this  was  only  really  the  case  initially,  when 
'Stephana'  is  noted  as  being  unable  to  identify  by  name  various  people  at 
the  gatherings  she  is  questioned  about  (C-6b,  I,  54-55,60-61).  During  the 
course  of  her  IM-Tätigkeit  'Stephana's'  resistance  appears  to  weaken  and 
she  increasingly  refers  to  those  present  by  name. 
Rather  than  by  referring  to  the  content  of  their  meetings  with  the 
MfS,  'Falke'  and  'Fuchs'  relativise  their  collaboration  by  imposing  a 
contextual  limitation  on  it.  They  maintain  that  they  considered  the 226 
contact  to  the  MfS  almost  as  a  duty  in  their  line  of  work,  which,  since 
'Falke'  was  an  officer  in  criminal  investigation,  and  'Fuchs'  an  educator  in 
a  high-security  prison,  involved  a  considerable  amount  of  contact  to  MfS 
officers  on  a  daily  basis  (A-3,  A-6).  I  ask  'Falke'  if  he  then  considers 
himself  to  be  different  from  a  'Spitzel'.  He  pauses  for  some  time  before 
answering: 
Da  bin  ich  natürlich  gefragt...  könnte  ich  nicht  so  einfach 
beantworten 
... 
Nee 
... 
Spitzel 
...  unter  Spitzel  stelle  ich  mir  'was 
anderes  vor.  Wenn  ich  ganz  gezielt  ... 
Aufträge  annehme  und  die 
abarbeite,  und  so  was  hab'  ich  eigentlich  nicht  gemacht.  (A-3) 
Perhaps  'Falke's  last  words  in  answer  to  this  question  are  the  key  to  this 
strategy  of  relativising  the  IM-Tätigkeit.  After  a  long  pause,  which  was 
itself  quite  uncharacteristic  of  his  behaviour  during  the  interview,  'Falke' 
finally  says:  'Ja  klar,  eine  Art  Bespitzelung  ist  es  schon  gewesen.  Doch 
... 
doch,  doch,  aber  hundertprozentig  nicht.  '  (A-3) 
9.3  THE  QUESTION  OF  GUILT 
9.3.1  'Ich  habe  nicht  den  Eindruck,  daß  ich  Unrecht  getan  habe' 
(A-7) 
The  vast  majority  of  those  who  previously  held  high  office  in  the  GDR  and 
of  IM  claim  that  no  harm  was  ever  caused  to  an  individual  as  a  direct 
result  of  their  actions.  This  prevailing  tendency  has  led  to  the  image  of  the 
former  IM  as  someone  with  whom  dialogue  is  virtually  impossible, 
someone  who  is  not  prepared  to  admit  to  any  feelings  of  guilt  whatsoever 
for  their  actions.  'Die  Täter',  observes  Jürgen  Fuchs,  'so  scheint  es,  haben 
sich  längst  selbst  verziehen'  (cited  by  Schirrmacher,  J-78,  p.  308).  The 
unwillingness  to  acknowledge  personal  responsibility  is  often  tolerated  to 
a  lesser  extent  when  encountered  in  the  figure  of  the  IM  than  in  those 
higher  up  the  power  hierarchy,  and  Biermann  refers  to  this  phenomenon 227 
as  the  'Unstetigkeitsstelle  in  der  geometrischen  Kurve  unseres  Hasses'  (I- 
44,  p.  89).  Publicly,  in  fear  of  the  legal  and  social  implications  of  admitting 
to  guilt,  the  IM  generally  attests  his/her  innocence  if  no  direct  harm  can 
be  proved  to  have  been  caused  as  a  result  of  his/her  actions.  The 
reluctance  of  IM  to  admit  to  their  personal  guilt  is  intensified  by  the  fact 
that  no  other  individuals  or  groups  seem  prepared  to  accept  a  moral 
responsibility  for  the  injustices  which  were  carried  out  within  the  GDR: 
'Wo  keine  Schuld  ist,  braucht  es  auch  keine  Sühne.  Wie  sollen  auch  die 
kleinen  Leute  zum  Bewußtsein  ihrer  bescheidenen  Schande  kommen, 
wenn  sogar  die  großen  Verbrecher  sich  als  Menschenfreunde  spreizen.  '  (I- 
78,  p.  73) 
9.3.2  The  Ultimate  Victims 
The  issue  of  whether  IM  are  prepared  to  admit  to  any  feelings  of  guilt, 
publicly  or  privately,  is  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  many  have 
actually  suffered  since  the  Wende  as  a  result  of  their  IM-Tätigkeit  and 
have  no  desire  to  subject  themselves  to  any  further  possible  repercussions 
of  such  an  admission.  These  individuals  often  perceive  themselves  as 
double  victims  of  unification,  that  is  as  East  Germans  and  as  IM.  A  very 
small  proportion  of  IM  have  actually  been  fired  from  their  jobs  in  public 
service,  yet  their  IM-Tätigkeit  still  haunts  them.  They  are,  for  example, 
aware  that  they  must  act  within  certain  limitations  if  they  do  not  want  it 
to  become  public  knowledge  that  they  conspired  with  the  MfS.  Three  of 
the  IM  with  whom  I  spoke  regretted  that  they  could  not  become  involved 
in  politics  to  the  extent  they  wished.  Were  they  to  do  so  and  at  some  point 
to  be  screened,  they  would  run  the  risk  of  damaging  not  only  their 
personal  reputation,  but  also  that  of  their  party.  Other  IM  have  suffered 
in  different  ways.  'Fuchs'  and  'Falke'  both  lost  their  jobs  because  of  their 
IM-Tätigkeit.  'Katrin'  was  forced  to  resign  her  political  mandate.  IM 228 
'Theodor'  took  early  retirement  as  he  anticipated  that  if  he  did  not  do  so 
his  MfS  contacts  would  sooner  or  later  become  public  knowledge  and  he 
would  be  dismissed.  Some  IM  have  also  suffered  in  their  personal  life, 
losing  friends  who  feel  betrayed  by  them.  The  IM  also  suffers  from  the 
fear  of  being  denounced.  Most  IM  tend  to  have  confessed  their  IM- 
Tätigkeit  to  a  select  few  or  kept  their  secret  to  themselves,  and  immediate 
material  and  social  concerns  often  override  any  feelings  of  guilt  the  IM 
might  otherwise  experience.  Ultimately,  the  predominant  sentiment  of  the 
IM  is  that  of  self-pity;  on  the  one  hand  because  of  his/her  immediate 
situation,  on  the  other  for  having  supported  a  now  defeated  system  which 
has  been  shown  not  only  to  have  been  corrupt,  but  to  have  in  many  ways 
been  a  bureaucratic  shambles.  This  feeling  of  self-pity  is  prevalent  in  any 
discussion  with  former  IM,  as  highlighted  by  the  following  words  from 
Dirk  Schneider: 
Ja,  ich  habe  doch  keine  Chance  mehr,  noch  irgend  etwas  zu 
machen,  und  das  nehme  ich  auf  mich.  Das  ist  berechtigt.  Ich  habe 
immer  offene  Politik  gemacht  und  hatte  dieses  Geheimnis,  und  das 
hatte  ich  sozusagen  mit  mir  'rumzuschleppen.  Das  hat  mich 
wirklich  belastet,  und  das  finde  ich  nicht  in  Ordnung  -  das  kann  ich 
sagen  -  das  ist  ein  politischer  Fehler,  das  ist  ein  grundsätzlicher 
Fehler,  das  ist  keine  Frage.  Aber  mehr  kann  man  da  auch  nicht 
daraus  machen,  außer  das  ich  mich  sozusagen  selbst  ins  Abseits 
und  in  eine  unmögliche  Situation  manipuliert  habe,  unglaubwürdig 
bin.  Keiner  will  mehr  was  von  mir  hören,  weil  ich  mit  diesem 
Unrechtssystem  gekungelt  habe.  Das  ist  klar,  ja.  (H-1) 
When  I  ask  her  whether  she  feels  guilt  on  account  of  her  IM- 
Tätigkeit  'Stephana's'  response  also  indicates  that  the  sentiments  of  regret 
which  she  does  experience  are  often  ones  of  self-pity:  'Ja,  ja 
...  sagen  wir 
mal,  schuldig,  wütend,  enttäuscht.  '  (A-8)  'Rolf,  likewise,  does  experience 
guilt,  but  also  deeply  regrets  the  difficulties  which  his  Stasi  connections 
caused  him  personally: 229 
Erst  mal  war  ich  furchtbar  naiv,  dann  miserable  Gefühle,  wenn  ich 
an  die  Zeit  denke,  als  ich  dann  in  diese  Wohnung  gegangen  bin  und 
mich  mit  denen  getroffen  habe,  richtig  miserable  Gefühle.  Und 
...  ja  insgesamt  stehe  ich  dazu  und  sage,  ich  möchte  jetzt  diese  Zeit 
aus  meiner  Akte  tilgen.  Ich  sage  jetzt  nicht,  daß  das  mir  das 
furchtbar  leid  tut,  und  daß  ich  das  'rausreißen  möchte,  dazu  stehe 
ich  jetzt,  aber  es  tut  mir  leid  um  die  Zeit,  und  die  Nerven  und  das 
ganze  Theater  hier  zu  Hause,  was  wir  hier  hatten  dadurch.  (A-1) 
9.3.3  The  Coincidence  of  Circumstance 
IM  are  able  to  further  intensify  their  feelings  of  self-pity  by  emphasising 
that  it  was  the  coincidence  of  circumstance  which  led  to  them  becoming 
IM  when  others  did  not.  'Fuchs'  argues  that  the  chain  of  coincidence  which 
resulted  in  him  becoming  an  IM  began  as  far  back  as  the  time  when  he 
and  his  family  were  on  the  move  at  the  end  of  the  World  War  Two:  'Es  ist 
reiner  Zufall,  [...  ]  daß  man  diesen  Weg  eigentlich  gegangen  ist,  von  vielen 
Zufällen  hängt  das  ab.  Wenn  ich,  wenn  wir  nur,  sagen  wir  mal,  bei  der 
Flucht  die  Nacht  durchgefahren  wären,  wäre  ich  vielleicht  in  Bayern 
gelandet.  '  (A-6)  'Fuchs'  also  emphasises  the  coincidence  of  circumstance 
within  the  GDR.  When  I  ask  him  if  harm  was  ever  caused  to  anyone  as  a 
direct  result  of  his  reports,  he  admits  that  he  once  consciously  tried  to 
prevent  a  colleague  whose  competence  he  doubted  being  promoted  to  be 
his  successor.  'Fuchs'  now  argues  that  he  actually  helped  the  man,  as,  had 
he  stepped  into  'Fuchs's'  shoes  at  work,  then  he  too  'hätte  den  IM  machen 
müssen',  and  would,  like  'Fuchs',  now  have  lost  his  job  (A-6). 
'Sonnenblume'  believes  that  it  was  not  just  a  question  of  strength  of 
character  which  led  to  some  individuals  becoming  IM  and  some  not,  but 
also  of'günstige  Umstände'  (A-10). 
There  is  some  truth  in  the  argument  that  particular  individuals 
were  unlucky  to  be  asked  to  become  IM,  when  it  is  considered  that  the  IM 
were  not  informers  in  the  sense  that  they  occasionally  approached  the 230 
MfS  and  offered  information,  but  were  rather  carefully  selected  and 
screened  before  being  approached  by  an  MfS  officer. 
9.3.4  Summary 
IM  use  a  variety  of  strategies  to  rationalise  their  behaviour.  It  is 
important  to  consider  that  these  are  not  merely  a  means  of  publicly 
justifying  behaviour,  but  are  also  coping  strategies  which  help  to  reduce 
and  relativise  feelings  of  guilt,  which,  I  would  argue,  many  IM  suffer  now 
and  suffered  during  their  IM-Tätigkeit.  These  are  feelings  to  which  they 
do  not  readily  admit.  Many  experienced,  at  least  periodically,  doubts 
about  their  actions.  Today,  the  coping  strategies  which  they  have 
developed  often  do  not  allow  them  to  admit  to  these  doubts,  and  a  feeling 
of  self-pity  dominates  the  confrontation  with  the  past.  IM  tend  to  deny  all 
guilt  in  the  public  forum.  Privately,  they  are  unsure  of  what  they  have 
done  and  uncertain  of  what  the  future  will  hold  for  them.  These  varying 
and  conflicting  emotions  are  perhaps  best  summed  up  by  'Theodor'  in  the 
following  words: 
Wissen  Sie,  seit  1990,  und  das  sind  nun  4  Jahre,  lebt  man  mit 
diesem  Stigma,  Spitzel  gewesen  zu  sein.  Man  kann  sich 
rechtfertigen  vor  sich  selbst,  wenn  man  will.  Es  bleibt  doch  immer 
'was  hängen.  Und 
...  und  es  stellt  sich  'raus,  das  ist  so  sinnlos 
gewesen.  [...  ]  Ich  bereue,  nicht  zu  einer  kritischen  Haltung  gegen 
unsere  senile  Führung  gefunden  zu  haben.  [...  ]  Wir  haben  zwar 
gesprochen  über  die  Probleme,  ja,  die  Witze,  ja;  Einmarsch  des 
Politbüros,  Einschalten  der  Herzschrittmacher  -  alle  diese  DDR- 
Witze,  ja.  Die  wurden  offen,  die  wurden  auch  mit  dem 
Führungsoffizier  gemacht,  ja.  Alle  diese  Dinge  waren  offenbar,  aber 
im  Grunde  genommen  haben  wir  das  System  geführt,  d.  h.  unser 
Ethos,  als  Revolutionäre  die  Welt  zu  verändern,  haben  wir  nicht 
geachtet.  Wir  sind  miese  Kleinbürger  geworden  und  das  bereue 
ich.  Und  da  ist  meine  IM-Tätigkeit  oder  Stasi-Spitzeltätigkeit,  oder 
wie  man  es  immer  sagen  will,  natürlich  ein  Baustein  'von.  (A-2) 231 
Section  Two:  Chapter  Ten 
'WIEDERANEIGNUNG  DER  EIGENEN  BIOGRAPHIE':  1 
THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  THE  OPENING  OF  THE  STASI  FILES 
1  Engelmann,  describing  the  process  of  Akteneinsicht  for  many  Stasi-Opfer  (F-7,  p.  53). 232 
10.1  INTRODUCTION 
The  implementation  of  the  Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz  on  29  December  1991 
meant  that  theoretically  an  end  was  in  sight  to  the  mass  speculation 
about  who  had  or  had  not  been  involved  in  the  wide-scale  surveillance  and 
the  control  measures  put  into  action  by  the  MfS.  The  debate  over  the  law's 
specifications  had  been  heated,  leading  Jens  Reich  to  remark  that  the 
negotiations  had  been  characterised  by  'Drama  statt  Politik,  pathetische 
Gesten  statt  Handlungen'  (I-74,  p.  50).  No  other  post-communist  co 
passed  such  a  comprehensive  law  concerning  the  files  of  its  former  secret 
service.  The  Polish  writer  Andrzej  Szczypiorski  considered  this  method  of 
dealing  with  the  cumbersome  Stasi  legacy  flawed,  arguing  that  the 
Germans  were  only  torturing  themselves  by  confronting  the  harsh  truths 
contained  in  the  MfS  dossiers.  Szczypiorski  imagined  a  scenario  where  his 
own  wife  had  informed  on  his  activities  to  the  Secret  Service.  He  proposed 
that  this  fact  alone  would  amount  to  the  first  great  defeat  in  his  life. 
Becoming  aware  of  this  situation,  however,  through  the  possibilities  of  a 
StUG,  would  constitute  a  second  defeat,  indeed,  would  destroy  his  life 
completely  (J-94,  p.  368).  On  the  other  side  of  the  German/Polish  border 
the  response  to  the  StUG  was  immense,  indicating  that  many  did  not 
share  Szczypiorski's  fears  concerning  the  potentially  traumatic  personal 
consequences  of  viewing  one's  Stasi  file.  By  summer  1995,  when  the 
second  report  of  the  BStU  went  to  press,  over  2.7  million  applications  to 
view  files  had  been  lodged  (F-17,  p.  4).  The  majority  of  these  requests  had 
come  from  employers  in  the  public  sector,  but  close  to  one  million  were 
private  applications  from  ordinary  citizens  wishing  to  discover  exactly 
what  role  the  Stasi  had  played  in  shaping  their  past  lives.  The  answer 
which  these  individuals  receive  from  the  BStU  can  have  a  marked  impact 
on  their  understanding  of  self,  and  thus  on  the  individual  and  collective 
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10.2  THE  OPFER:  'ENTTÄUSCHUNGEN'  AND  'ENT- 
TÄUSCHUNGEN'  (I-39,  p.  183) 
Those  who  are  informed  by  the  BSt  U  that  they  were  under  Stasi 
observation  and  who  view  their  files  have  often  emphasised  the 
importance  of  subsequently  being  able  to  confirm  that  their  personal 
conception  of  the  biographical  details  of  their  life  is  valid.  After  accessing 
his  files  Jürgen  Fuchs,  for  example,  was  finally  able  to  prove  that  he  was 
in  fact  arrested,  interrogated  and  practically  forced  to  leave  the  GDR  in 
1976-77  (1-36,  p.  280).  When  he  was  literally  abandoned  in  West  Berlin  in 
1977,  Fuchs's  memory  was  the  only  witness  to  these  events.  Fuchs  is  able 
to  align  the  official  MfS  depiction  of  his  detainment  and  deportation  with 
his  understanding  of  his  own  biography.  Similarly,  Wolf  Biermann 
described  his  joy  at  finding  a  letter  in  his  file  which  his  mother  had  sent  to 
him  in  1969  but  which  he  had  never  received  (1-47,  p.  45). 
Often  the  information  available  to  an  individual  who  was  observed 
by  the  MfS  cannot,  however,  be  incorporated  into  a  pre-existing  notion  of 
personal  history,  but  forces  its  complete  re-evaluation,  as  in  the  notorious 
case  of  Knud  and  Vera  Wollenberger.  Had  the  Stasi  files  been  destroyed 
before  her  husband's  Stasi  connections  were  brought  to  light,  it  is 
conceivable  that  Vera  Wollenberger  (now  Lengsfeld)  might  have  forever 
remained  ignorant  of  this  fact.  Her  conception  of  personal  history  would 
thus  have  been  inherently  flawed,  since  it  would  have  been  based  on  false 
premises.  In  the  light  of  the  actual  or  potentially  destructive  consequences 
of  accessing  the  information  contained  in  the  MfS  files,  Lutz  Rathenow 
claimed  that  viewing  these  documents  had  a  more  profound  effect  on  his 
life  than  any  other  event,  including  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall  (1-62).  Even 
Joachim  Gauck  himself  admits  to  skimming  over  sections  of  his  file  and 
advises  each  individual  to  consider  very  carefully  whether  or  not  to 
proceed  with  Akteneinsicht  (J-17,  p.  96). 234 
Since  the  network  of  IM  was  not  evenly  spread  throughout  the 
population  of  the  GDR  but  operated  on  a  Schwerpunktprinzip,  it  is  almost 
inevitable  that  Stasi-Opfer  will  discover  that  some  of  those  whom  they 
previously  considered  close  friends  were  among  those  who  collaborated  as 
IM.  Similarly,  it  is  likely  that  in  some  cases  they  will  have  wrongly 
suspected  others  of  such  activities.  Günter  Kunert  experienced  great  relief 
upon  discovering  that  his  immediate  neighbours  had  not  been  spying  on 
him  after  all:  'Gerade  sie  waren  es  nicht.  Auch  das  ist  eine  durch  die 
Akten  vermittelte  Wahrheit,  derentwegen  man  sie  liest  und  lesen  sollte. 
Sie  belasten  nicht  bloß  Mitbürger,  sie  rehabilitieren  sie  auch.  '  (J-46,  p.  49) 
For  most  Stasi-Opfer  Akteneinsicht  is  thus  a  process  characterised, 
in  Biermann's  terms,  by  both  'Enttäuschungen'  and  'Ent-täuschungen'  (I- 
39,  p.  183).  This  dichotomy  is  illustrated  by  an  anecdote  from  Erich  Loest. 
Loest  told  of  how  he  wrote  a  letter  to  a  friend  whom  he  had  deduced  to 
have  been  one  of  the  IM  set  upon  him  (H-2).  He  was  shocked  later  to 
discover  that  he  had  suspected  the  wrong  man.  The  true  identity  of  the  IM 
concerned  was  that  of  a  much  closer  friend,  whose  trust  Loest  had  never 
questioned.  Loest  was  forced  to  re-evaluate  his  biography  in  light  of  this 
discovery.  On  the  one  hand  he  experiences  the  'Enttäuschung'  involved  in 
the  realisation  that  he  has  believed  one  man  to  be  a  good  friend,  who,  it 
transpires,  reported  on  his  activities  to  the  MfS.  Simultaneously,  a  feeling 
of  'Ent-Täuschung'  results  upon  discovering  that  he  has  wrongly 
suspected  an  innocent  man. 
The  discovery  that  one  has  wrongly  judged  others  can  itself  be  a 
traumatic  experience.  Speaking  to  the  Enquete-Kommission  Irena  Kukutz, 
one  of  the  members  of  the  Frauen  für  den  Frieden  group,  described  the 
disturbing  effects  of  her  realisation  that  she  had  wrongly  suspected  some 
of  the  other  group  members  of  being  Stasi  informers: 235 
Die  ganze  Zeit  und  seit  die  Stasi-Akten  offen  sind,  bin  ich 
unheimlich  erleichtert,  weil  sich  bewahrheitet  hat,  was  ich  mir  am 
Anfang  des  Jahres  1992  gewünscht  hatte.  Nämlich,  daß  ich  mich 
recht  oft  geirrt  hatte  in  den  Menschen.  Und  ich  bin  auch  darüber 
erschüttert,  wie  sehr  das  Mißtrauen  in  mich  eingedrungen  war,  und 
das  war  ja  auch  eine  Arbeit  der  IMs,  Mißtrauen  zu  säen  und  ich 
habe  sehr  vielen  Menschen  mißtraut  und  denke,  daß  auch  wir  ein 
bißchen  krank  geworden  sind  und  mußte  feststellen,  daß  ich  mich 
getäuscht  habe  und  habe  inzwischen  auch  mit  Frauen  geredet, 
darüber,  daß  ich  sie  verdächtigt  habe  und  das  war  manchmal  nicht 
ganz  einfach.  (F-13,  p.  163) 
Kukutz's  faith  in  her  sense  of  judgement  has  been  shaken,  and  her 
memories  and  conception  of  personal  history  must  go  through  a  process  of 
re-evaluation  in  light  of  the  knowledge  which  Akteneinsicht  has  brought. 
Günter  Kunert  also  comments  on  the  regrettable  consequences  of  the  all- 
pervasive  mistrust  which  the  system  fostered: 
Wir  haben  in  dem  untergegangenen  System  unter  deformierten 
zwischenmenschlichen  Beziehungen  und  Bedingungen  gelebt:  Wir 
waren  unfrei  in  unserem  beiläufigen  Benehmen  gegenüber  Dritten  - 
wie  eben  den  Nachbarn.  Wir  blockierten  selber  automatisch  unsere 
Empfindungen,  wir  schränkten  unsere  Kontaktfreudigkeit  ein, 
sobald  uns  ein  Blick  zu  neugierig  vorkam,  eine  Frage  zu  forschend, 
ein  Interesse  an  unserer  Person  nicht  ausreichend  begründet.  Wir 
führten  weithin  ein  Austerndasein.  (J-46,  p.  49) 
If  they  are  still  unsure  as  to  the  identity  of  the  IM  whose  cover 
names  appear  in  their  files,  Stasi-Opfer  may  apply  after  Akteneinsicht  to 
have  these  de-coded.  Marinka  Körzendörfer,  a  member  of  the  Lesben  in 
der  Kirche  group,  describes  her  decision  to  apply  to  do  so  as  follows:  'Schon 
weil  ich  bei  einem  Decknamen  zum  Beispiel  auf  zwei  mögliche  Personen 
kam.  Wahrscheinlich  ist  es  dann  die  fünfte.  Und  warum  sollte  ich  die 
beiden  ersten  falsch  in  Erinnerung  behalten?  '  (J-44,  p.  28)  Once  the 
possibility  exists  that  a  person's  understanding  of  his/her  biography  is 
based  on  false  perceptions,  s/he  may  feel  compelled  to  adjust  this  by 
viewing  his/her  Stasi  files.  There  is,  however,  a  potentially  high  price,  to 236 
be  paid  for  taking  such  a  step,  and  in  an  article  entitled,  'Die  Angst,  einen 
Teil  der  guten  Erinnerung  zu  verlieren',  Rainer  Eppelmann  remarked 
that  after  viewing  his  Stasi  files  he  considered  himself  'schlauer  aber 
ärmer'  (I-3). 
The  MfS's  influence  over  the  lives  of  these  Stasi-Opfer  continues 
then  to  be  considerable,  since  such  individuals  may  begin  to  re-remember 
the  past  on  the  basis  of  the  information  which  has  been  recorded  in  the 
files.  This  is  not  only  the  case  for  the  area  of  interpersonal  relationships, 
but  also  for  past  behaviour.  Bärbel  Bohley  concluded  that  the  fact  that  the 
Stasi  did  not  begin  observing  her  until  1982  meant  that  she  had  obviously 
not  been  sufficiently  active  in  the  opposition  scene  before  this  time  (J-13, 
p.  45).  Bohley  thus  seems  to  accept  the  MfS's  evaluation  of  the  extent  of 
her  opposition  activities.  Yet  it  may  be  the  case  that  Bohley's  commitment 
to  opposition  activities  before  1982  went  unnoticed,  rather  than  that  this 
point  marked  a  decisive  change  in  her  stance.  Marinka  Körzendörfer  was 
similarly  disappointed  to  find  that  the  behaviour  of  the  Lesben  in  der 
Kirche  was  occasionally  noted  as  having  been  'vorbildlich'  in  MfS  reports 
(J-44,  p.  26).  The  written  biographical  history  seems  to  be  judged  here  by 
the  two  women  to  have  more  objectivity  and  validity  than  their 
autobiographical  memory.  At  other  times  Körzendörfer  rejects  the  MfS's 
evaluation  of  events  and  relies  on  her  own  memory.  She  is,  for  example, 
annoyed  that  no  police  report  is  to  be  found  of  the  arrest  of  eleven 
members  of  the  group  at  the  celebrations  to  mark  the  fortieth  anniversary 
of  the  liberation  of  the  concentration  camp  at  Ravensbrück.  Körzendörfer 
remembers  that  the  women  certainly  did  cause  a  public  disturbance  on 
this  day  (J-44,  p.  26). 
Stasi-Opfer  such  as  Körzendörfer  have  an  ambivalent  relationship 
to  the  files,  as  demonstrated  by  their  evaluation  of  the  quasi-biographical 
account  of  their  lives  which  is  found  in  these  documents:  Klaus 237 
Schlesinger  felt  as  though  he  were  reading  a  novel  in  which  he  was  the 
protagonist  (J-79,  p.  30);  Vera  Wollenberger  found  it  to  be  a  distorted 
image  of  her  biography  (J-108,  p.  8);  Lutz  Rathenow  felt  that  it  was  not 
quite  his  biography  (1-65);  and  Jürgen  Fuchs  said  it  was  a  perverse  and 
destructive  caricature  of  his  (1-72).  On  the  one  hand,  the  Opfer  reject 
much  of  what  is  written  in  the  files  as  presenting  a  twisted  or  simply 
inaccurate  version  of  events,  yet,  on  the  other,  hope  that  the  files  will  be 
able  to  help  them  reconstruct  the  past  and  are  angered  and  disappointed 
to  discover  that  the  information  available  does  not  always  allow  them  to 
do  so.  Körzendörfer  is  disappointed  to  find  that  some  of  the  programmes  of 
the  Lesben  in  der  Kirche  group  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  files:  'Dabei  hatte 
ich  so  darauf  gehofft.  Unser  historisches  Bewußtsein  war  damals  nicht 
sonderlich  ausgeprägt.  '  (J-44,  p.  27)  Indeed,  Körzendörfer  continues: 
'Vieles  von  dem,  was  ich  mir  erhofft  hatte,  in  den  Akten  zu  finden,  war 
nicht  vorhanden.  '  (J-44,  p.  27)  It  is  as  though  she  has  been  hoping  that  the 
files  will  be  able  to  fill  in  the  gaps  in  her  biographical  understanding,  to 
make  it  whole.  In  actuality  the  information  in  the  files  often  does  not 
complete  but  rather  shatters  the  individual's  understanding  of  personal 
history. 
10.3  THE  INOFFIZIELLE  MITARBEITER 
It  is  not  merely  the  Stasi-Opfer  whose  understanding  of  self  and 
biography  can  be  radically  altered  by  Akteneinsicht,  but  also  those  of  the 
Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter.  As  discussed,  many  IM  report  being  shocked  to 
discover  that  they  belong  to  the  group  of  Stasi-Täter  (see  Section  Two: 
9.1).  Since  the  existence  of  an  IM  file  potentially  defines  the  private  and 
public  life  of  a  former  IM,  the  confrontation  with  this  aspect  of  an 
individual's  past  can  potentially  result  for  them  not  simply  in  a 
'Wiederaneignung'  of  their  biography,  but  in  its  complete  redefinition. 238 
The  IM  may  wish  to  view  the  actual  contents  of  the  file  and  faces 
the  choice  of  whether  to  apply  to  do  so.  If  s/he  decides  to  take  this  step 
then  s/he  must  reckon  with  certain  restrictions  on  the  material  which  will 
be  made  available  for  viewing.  The  StUG  stipulates  that  an  IM  is  only  to 
be  granted  access  to  those  parts  of  the  files  which  relate  to  his/her  person 
and  not  to  the  reports  which  s/he  helped  compile  (StUG,  §  16/4,  see 
Introduction:  1.5.2).  This  ruling,  in  addition  to  the  fact  that  applications 
from  former  IM  who  do  apply  to  see  their  file  are  generally  not  treated 
with  priority,  means  that  many  IM  have  either  not  seen  their  files  or  have 
been  allowed  only  limited  access.  They  are  thus  largely  ignorant  of  the 
exact  content  of  these  documents.  Although  they  often  claim  that  they 
never  told  their  Führungsoffizier  anything  of  consequence  and  cannot  be 
held  responsible  for  causing  harm  to  others,  they  are  really  no  longer 
entirely  sure  of  what  they  said  and  cannot  know  how  their  reports  were 
processed  and  recorded.  Almost  as  though  she  had  been  awaiting 
judgement  from  the  files  'Stephana'  asked  me  in  a  state  of  great 
excitement  after  I  had  viewed  her  file:  'Was  für  ein  Mensch  bin  ich  dann?  '2 
In  a  similar  manner,  one  of  the  IM  who  was  reporting  on  Erich  Loest  told 
him  that  she  felt  that  she  could  continue  to  look  Loest  in  the  eye,  adding, 
however:  'Oder  wissen  Sie  mehr  über  mich,  wissen  Sie  etwas,  was  ich 
vielleicht  vergessen  haben  könnte?  Meine  Gedanken  sind  so  verwirrt,  daß 
ich  auch  Selbsttäuschungen  für  möglich  halte.  '  (J-52,  p.  133) 
The  dilemma  on  the  part  of  someone  who  held  contacts  to  the  MfS 
of  how  much  to  admit  to  before  a  concrete  accusation  has  been  made  was 
particularly  evident  from  the  manner  in  which  Manfred  Stolpe  made  his 
Stasi  contacts  public  (see  Section  Two:  6.1).  The  details  of  this  contact, 
that  Stolpe  had  met  with  Stasi  officers  in  Konspirative  Wohnungen,  for 
example,  emerged  only  gradually  during  investigations  by  the  Stolpe- 
2  During  a  telephone  conversation,  July  1995. 239 
Untersuchungsausschuß.  Stolpe  was  only  ever  prepared  to  justify  those 
aspects  of  his  Stasi  contacts  for  which  evidence  had  been  produced. 
Shortly  before  the  final  report  of  the  Untersuchungsausschuß  was  passed, 
he  claimed  to  regret  the  at  times  lax  and  ambivalent  approach  he  had 
taken  to  making  his  Stasi  contacts  public:  'Ich  habe  durch  dieses 
Abwarten  den  Mißdeutungen  Vorschub  geleistet.  '  (1-59)  Yet,  had  Stolpe 
admitted  to  all  details  of  the  contact  in  early  1992,  he  would  have  been 
under  considerably  greater  pressure  to  resign.  The  course  of  action  he 
chose  was  therefore  the  only  one  which  allowed  him  to  remain  in  office  as 
the  Ministerpräsident  of  Brandenburg. 
Sascha  Anderson's  confrontation  with  his  Stasi  past  differed  from 
that  of  Manfred  Stolpe's  in  that  the  former  initially  denied  having 
collaborated  at  all.  When  he  eventually  admitted  to  this  fact,  Anderson 
stated  that  he  felt  unable  to  defend  himself  sufficiently  until  he  had  been 
given  the  chance  to  view  his  Stasi  files:  'Im  Augenblick  habe  ich  nichts  in 
der  Hand,  um  mich  an  etwas  Konkretes  zu  erinnern.  '  (1-79,  p.  65) 
Similarly,  'Wolfgang'  told  me  that  he  had  decided  to  wait  until  he  had 
viewed  his  file  before  confessing  to  his  family  that  he  had  collaborated  as 
an  IM  (A-7).  'Wolfgang'  is  thus,  to  some  extent,  waiting  for  the  files  to 
recreate  his  Stasi  biography,  the  details  of  which  he  can  no  longer  be  sure 
of.  He  is  unwilling  to  tell  his  family  of  his  IM-Tätigkeit  until  the  files  allow 
him  to  judge  the  true  extent  of  his  compliance  and  guilt. 
The  mere  label  IM  will  potentially  define  the  self-perception  and 
public  image  of  a  former  Stasi  collaborator,  and  Christa  Wolf  said  after 
the  debate  surrounding  her  Stasi  connections  that  she  felt  she  had  been 
reduced  to  these  two  letters  'I.  M.  '  (I-10).  Other  IM  are  also  keen  to 
emphasise  that  their  biography  should  not  be  defined  solely  in  terms  of 
their  previous  Stasi  collaboration  and  that  it  is  unreasonable  that  they 
should  be  judged  only  on  this  one  aspect  of  their  past  life.  'Sonnenblume', 240 
whose  IM-Tätigkeit  encompassed  a  period  of  just  over  a  year,  argued:  'Es 
ist  ja  nur  ein  winziger  Teil  meines  Lebens  letztlich,  ein  kurzer  Teil.  '  (A-10) 
'Theodor'  feels  that  no-one  understands  that  his  IM-Tätigkeit  was  'nur  ein 
Steinchen  im  Mosaik  des  allgemeinen  Verhaltens'  (B-3). 
As  in  the  case  of  the  Stasi-Opfer,  the  histories  in  the  files  of  those 
who  collaborated  with  the  MfS  as  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter  allow  only  a 
disjointed  and  fragmented  reconstruction  of  past  events.  Much  is  missing, 
and,  consequently,  the  information  which  is  recorded  may  be  in  danger  of 
being  retrospectively  judged  more  significant  and  representative  of  the 
individual  biography  than  was  the  case. 
10.4  THE  NICHT-TÄTERINICHT-OPFER 
Those  who  discover  that  their  behaviour  was  probably  not  sufficiently 
non-conformist  to  arouse  the  Stasi's  suspicions  and  warrant  observation 
must  re-evaluate  their  self-image  in  light  of  the  knowledge  that  details  of 
their  life  were  not  being  recorded  and  evaluated  (see  Section  Two:  8.2-8.3). 
At  least  initially,  many  were  unwilling  to  face  the  fact  that  as 
opportunistic  conformists  they  had  done  little  to  challenge  the  existing 
social  order.  Had  the  Stasi  files  been  destroyed  or  not  been  made  available 
to  the  public,  the  self-image  of  some  of  this  group  of  Nicht-Täter/Nicht- 
Opfer  might  have  been  markedly  different,  since  they  could  have 
continued  to  believe  that  they  had  been  under  surveillance. 
10.5  CONCLUSIONS 
Man  kommt  beim  Lesen  dieser  Akten  zu  dem  Punkt,  an  dem  man 
seine  Vergangenheit  neu  bewerten  muß.  (Gerd  Poppe,  1-7) 
In  1990  Lutz  Rathenow  argued  that  the  MfS  files  should  be  made  publicly 
accessible  in  order  that  everyone  have  the  opportunity  to  assert  'inwieweit 241 
er  Täter,  inwieweit  er  Opfer  war'  (J-68,  p.  1468).  This  possibility  has  now 
been  achieved  through  the  StUG,  and  citizens  of  the  former  GDR  face  the 
decision  of  whether  to  rely  on  their  existing  perception  of  biography  or 
potentially  be  forced  to  completely  redefine  this  conception  in  light  of  the 
information  which  is  present  or  absent  in  these  178  kilometres  of  filed 
material.  In  the  first  instance  these  personal  dossiers  are  significant  in 
that  they,  albeit  often  superficially,  divide  citizens  of  the  former  GDR  into 
the  categories  of  Täter  or  Opfer  or  Nicht-Täter  /Nicht-Opfer.  This 
categorisation  alone,  although  there  are  many  differentiations  within  each 
grouping,  affects  the  way  in  which  the  individual  will  remember  his/her 
biography.  Many  will  be  shocked  to  learn  that  they  belong  to  the  third  and 
largest  category  of  Nicht-Täter  /Nicht-Opfer  and  that  there  is  an  absence 
of  any  information  relating  to  their  biography  in  the  files.  For  those  who 
belong  to  one  of  the  two  minority  groups,  i.  e.  that  of  the  Täter  or  the  Opfer, 
the  information  which  is  available  will  potentially  have  considerable  and 
traumatic  impact  on  their  conception  of  autobiography,  in  terms  of  how 
they  view  their  interpersonal  relationships,  their  own  character,  and  their 
past  behaviour.  The  information  contained  in  the  MfS  files  has  the 
potential  both  to  dispel  and  to  create  myths  about  the  course  of  individual 
and  collective  biographies  in  the  GDR,  and  the  knowledge  which 
Akteneinsicht  has  brought  will  thus  have  a  profound  impact  on  the  way  in 
which  future  histories  of  the  German  Democratic  Republic  are  re/written. 
In  this  sense  the  Stasi  files  can  be  said  to  recreate  the  biography  of  a  lost 
nation. 242 
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11.1  STASI-HYSTERIA 
In  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  events  surrounding  German  unification 
the  Stasi  debate  was  at  the  forefront  of  any  discussion  of  the  GDR's 
problematic  legacy.  In  particular,  issues  concerning  the  Mfs's  Inoffizielle 
Mitarbeiter  were  the  focus  of  attention,  leading  Peter  Jochen  Winters  of 
the  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung  to  remark:  'Die  Auseinandersetzung 
mit  der  SED-Herrschaft  konzentriert  sich  jetzt  fast  nur  auf  das  Aufspüren 
von  Mitarbeitern  des  Ministeriums  für  Staatssicherheit  der  einstigen 
DDR.  '  (I-15)  Joachim  Gauck  described  the  sensational  emphasising  of  this 
aspect  of  GDR  history  as  'Stasi-Hysterie',  arguing  that  this  tendency  was 
indicative  of  obvious  deficiencies  in  the  approach  to  the  confrontation  with 
the  past  (1-2).  Yet  the  hysteria  and  hyperbole  which  characterised  the 
Stasi  debate  in  its  initial  stages  were  perhaps  inevitable.  If  East  Germans 
were  not  already  obsessed  with  the  Stasi  after  having  lived  their  lives 
imagining  that  its  spies  might  be  just  around  every  corner,  then  the  post- 
Wende  discovery  that  this  system  could  have  nurtured  such  absurdities  as 
a  husband  reporting  on  his  own  wife  only  served  to  increase  the  macabre 
fascination  of  the  issue. 
In  GDR  times  the  malaise,  described  by  some  as  a  form  of 
schizophrenia,  which  developed  in  response  to  the  permanent  suspicion 
that  one  might  be  under  surveillance,  had  spread  its  way  so  gradually 
throughout  the  population  that  many  were  unaware  that  they  too  had 
been  infected.  Once  the  system  which  had  carried  this  disease  had 
collapsed,  the  wounds  which  it  had  left  were  laid  bare  and  soon  became 
the  object  of  much  popular  and  scholarly  attention.  In  addition  to  the 
freak  appeal  which  the  intricacies  of  this  rather  unpleasant  side  of  GDR 
history  held,  another  key  factor  in  ensuring  that  the  IM  debate  remained 
at  the  forefront  of  the  reckoning  with  the  recent  past  was  the  desire  on  the 
part  of  a  people  which  had  been  active  as  both  the  agents  and  victims  of 245 
surveillance  to  understand  the  mechanisms  which  had  shaped  the  course 
of  their  past  lives.  This  process  involved  establishing  the  identities  of  the 
IM  which  had  until  then  been  kept  secret  and,  indeed,  at  times  had  been 
so  well-disguised  that  it  seemed  even  some  IM  themselves  were  unaware 
that  they  too  had  collaborated. 
The  debate  concerning  former  IM  certainly  received  extensive 
media  coverage,  but  it  was  not  the  case  that  those  engaged  in  the 
confrontation  with  the  GDR  past  were  only  concerned  with  this  one  issue. 
In  Bonn  an  Enquete-Kommission  was  being  set  up  to  examine  various 
aspects  and  consequences  of  the  dictatorship.  Around  the  same  time  the 
question  of  how  the  crimes  of  leading  party  functionaries  should  be 
addressed  within  the  legal  system  was  causing  some  commotion.  The 
former  head  of  state,  Erich  Honecker,  was  eventually  ordered  out  of  his 
refuge  in  the  Chilean  embassy  in  Moscow  and  brought  back  to  Berlin  for 
trial.  The  Honecker  trial  was  farcical  from  its  outset,  as  were  many  of 
those  involving  prominent  party  members.  These  men  had  managed  to 
assume  important  functions  in  the  GDR  up  to  the  point  of  its  demise.  Yet 
immediately,  and  perhaps  plausibly,  after  the  events  of  1989-90  their 
health  had  apparently  taken  a  severe  turn  for  the  worse.  Consequently, 
any  judicial  proceedings  were,  and  still  are,  greatly  hindered  by  constant 
pleas  that  the  accused  are  medically  unfit  for  trial.  Eventually  the  trial 
against  Honecker  was  abandoned  and,  although  it  was  suspected  that  the 
severity  of  his  ailing  condition  had  been  exaggerated,  these  doubting 
voices  were  silenced  when,  after  being  released  and  having  settled  in 
Chile  with  his  wife  and  daughter,  the  old  man  did,  indeed,  die  of  the 
cancer  he  had  complained  of  throughout  the  trial.  Attempts  to  bring  Erich 
Mielke  to  court  were  also  the  subject  of  much  interest,  as  were 
proceedings  against  various  border-guards,  the  latter  amounting  to  a 
lengthy  series  of  trials  headed  by  the  fraught  determination  of  Karin 246 
Gueffroy  to  see  that  justice  be  done  for  the  death  of  her  son  Chris  in 
February  1989.  The  nineteen-year-old  waiter  from  Berlin  had  been  the 
last  person  to  be  killed  while  trying  to  flee  West. 
As  sensational  as  some  of  the  above  events  were,  they  did  not  touch 
the  individuals  who  were  not  immediately  affected  by  them  to  quite  the 
same  extent  as  the  discussion  regarding  the  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter.  Until 
material  from  the  MfS  files  became  available  this  was  a  phenomenon 
which  potentially  reached  into  the  most  intimate  sphere  of  every  last  GDR 
citizen.  Focusing  on  this  particular  aspect  of  the  GDR's  legacy  was  also 
conceptually  easier,  since  the  MfS  was  a  historical  entity  which  it  seemed 
possible  to  define  and  analyse.  A  true  examination  of  the  historical  and 
political  factors  which  had  shaped  the  course  of  events  in  the  GDR  could 
only  really  have  taken  place  within  the  context  of  an  analysis  of  the  recent 
past  within  and  between  the  two  Germanys,  an  undertaking  which  was 
not  only  vast,  but  one  which  few  in  positions  of  power  in  the  former  FRG 
were  keen  to  embark  on.  The  trials  involving  those  who  had  acted  as 
mediators  between  East  and  West,  such  as  the  lawyer  Wolfgang  Vogel, 
and  the  head  of  Kommerzielle  Koordinierung,  Alexander  Schalck- 
Golodkowski,  were  already  sufficiently  uncomfortable.  Since  it  had  been  a 
feature  of  their  daily  lives,  the  IM  question  was  also  of  burning  interest  to 
the  Bürgerrechtler  who  were  heavily  involved  in  the  creation  of  the  StUG. 
The  IM  debate  was  also,  I  would  argue,  a  more  accessible  debate  for  the 
ordinary  citizen,  since  it  seemed  not  to  be  an  abstract  legal  or  political 
discussion,  but  one  concerning  the  most  basic  of  interpersonal  issues,  such 
as  trust  and  betrayal. 
11.2  POST-STASI-HYSTERIA 
After  the  elation  of  unification  had  subsided  former  East  Germans  soon 
became  aware  that  although  they  could  now  travel  outside  the  GDR 247 
without  further  ado,  and  had  access  to  the  so-longed-for  consumer  goods, 
these  freedoms  had  only  been  attained  at  a  price.  Despite  the  boom 
industry  of  the  numerous  re-training  programmes  established  in  the 
immediate  post-Wende  period  unemployment  figures  began  to  rise 
dramatically  in  the  former  East.  The  loss  of  the  material  security  which 
had  been  taken  so  much  for  granted  in  the  GDR  was  experienced  as  an 
unpleasant  and  unexpected  shock  for  many  East  Germans  who  had  been 
dazzled  by  the  neon  glitter  of  the  West.  Stefan  Heym  remarked  that  the 
East  Germans  had  hoped  for  socialism  and  KaDeWe  after  unification  and 
had  got  in  their  place  unemployment  and  Aldi  (I-85).  1  Former  East 
Germans,  previously  relatively  affluent  in  the  Eastern  Block,  now  found 
themselves  in  a  socially  and  materially  inferior  position  to  their  re- 
discovered  brothers  and  sisters  in  the  FRG.  Overnight  they  had  become 
children  in  their  own  country  who  had  to  be  re-trained  and  re-educated  in 
the  new  ways  of  the  West.  Hans-Joachim  Maaz  remarked  that,  whereas  at 
first  East  Germans  had  embraced  and  idealised  West  German  culture 
('das  beschämende  Nachahmungsgebaren'),  a  period  of  'Ernüchterung, 
Enttäuschung'  and  'verbitterte  Desillusionierung'  had  begun  to  set  in  as 
the  full  scale  of  the  economic  consequences  could  no  longer  be  disguised  (J- 
53,  p.  33).  Gradually,  the  distinct  advantages  of  life  under  the  umbrella  of 
the  socialist  dictatorship  which  had  been  so  gladly  forsaken  began  to 
seem,  in  retrospect,  increasingly  attractive.  The  unaccustomed  burden  of 
social  and  material  concerns  resulted  in  the  first  signs  of  nostalgia  for  the 
lost  state,  and  a  period  of  mourning  for  this  loss  set  in,  leading  Biermann 
to  observe:  'Es  stinkt  im  Osten  nach  Selbst-Mitleid.  '  (J-11,  p.  141) 
This  nostalgia,  now  popularly  referred  to  as  Ostalgie,  resulted 
primarily  from  a  sense  of  loss  of  the  security  and  familiarity  of  life  in  the 
1  KaDeWe  (Kaufhaus  des  Westens)  is  the  most  prestigious  department  store  in  former 
West  Berlin,  situated  on  the  West's  show  promenade,  the  Kurfürstendamm.  Aldi  is  a 
chain  of  cheap  supermarkets,  where  prices  are  kept  low  by  investing  an  absolute 
minimum  of  effort  and  expense  in  the  display  and  handling  of  produce. 248 
GDR.  It  seemed  that  every  aspect  of  former  life  had  been  replaced  by  the 
system  which  had  been  in  force  in  the  FRG.  GDR  citizens  experienced  this 
course  of  events  as  signifying  that  all  they  had  learned  in  the  GDR,  and 
therefore  their  whole  lives,  had  been  worthless.  Several  of  the  IM  with 
whom  I  spoke  mentioned  the  frustration  and  disillusionment  they  felt  at 
having,  as  they  expressed  it,  lived  a  substantial  proportion  of  their  lives  in 
vain  (particularly  A-2,  A-7).  Former  IM  will  tend  to  experience  this  feeling 
perhaps  more  acutely  than  those  whose  past  history  is  not  so  potentially 
incriminating,  but  the  sentiment  was  indicative  of  a  general  mood.  Often 
the  perceived  arrogance  of  the  West  was  seen  as  being  at  the  root  of  this 
problem,  as  the  following  statement  from  'Theodor'  illustrates: 
Durch  die  rasche  Einigung  sind  wir  so  in  die  Defensive  gedrängt 
worden  und  müssen  Dinge  verteidigen  ... 
ich  erwische  mich 
manchmal  selbst  -  Dinge  zu  verteidigen,  die  ich  früher  verdammt 
habe  -  einfach  aus  Wut  über  diese  Ignoranz.  Das  ist  eine  ganz 
gefährliche  Tendenz.  (A-2) 
Michael  Schmitz  addressed  the  issue  of  why,  in  psychological  terms,  it  was 
unrealistic  to  expect  that  those  in  the  East  would  do  anything  but  defend 
the  system  they,  however  willingly  or  unwillingly,  had  lived  in: 
Wer  von  den  neuen  Bundesbürgern  das  Eingeständnis  erwartet, 
ihr  gesamtes  Leben  in  der  DDR  vertan  zu  haben,  zwingt  sie  zur 
Verteidigung  des  alten  Regimes,  weil  von  ihrem  eigenen  Selbst 
sonst  nichts  übrigbleiben  würde.  (1-57,  p.  40) 
Yet  the  unification  had  not  been  forced  upon  the  former  GDR.  A  majority 
had  initially  embraced  it  and  merrily  discarded  the  restraints  of  their 
previous  life.  Now  a  mourning  process  had  begun  for  this  loss,  intensified 
by  the  realisation  that  public  and  private  identity  had,  of  course,  been 
integrally  linked  with  and  dependent  on  a  social  reality  which  had  so 
quickly  and  almost  entirely  disappeared.  Margarete  Mitscherlich,  whose 249 
analysis  of  the  way  in  which  ordinary  Germans  coped  with  the  end  of  the 
National  Socialist  dictatorship  had  such  an  impact  in  the  Federal 
Republic,  compared  the  conclusions  which  she  had  made  then  regarding 
former  West  Germans  with  the  situation  of  GDR  citizens  after  1989: 
Die  Trauer  um  die  Hitler-Zeit  war  bisher,  was  uns  selbst  betrifft, 
vor  allem  Trauer  um  den  Verlust  des  eigenen  Ich-  oder  Wir-Ideals 
und  der  eigenen  und  kollektiven  Selbstachtung.  Ich  glaube,  daß 
viele  Landsleute  aus  der  ehemaligen  DDR  nach  der  Vereinigung 
ähnlich  empfinden.  (J-58,  p.  413)2 
The  upsurge  of  these  feelings  of  self-pity  and  nostalgia  were  not 
indications  that  the  average  GDR  citizen  truly  desired  the  resurrection  of 
the  SED  state,  merely  that  s/he  experienced  the  need  to  regain  a  sense  of 
self  which  had  disappeared  with  it.  A  sense  of  common  identity  began  to 
develop  which  was  partly  based  on  fact  and  partly  on  retrospective 
sentimentality: 
'Das  werdet  Ihr  nie  verstehen!  '  ist  die  Abwehrformel,  mit  der  die 
Bewohner  der  DDR  ihr  Selbstmitleid  immunisieren  und  zugleich 
versuchen,  mit  Hilfe  eines  solchen  Erinnerungsprivilegs  ihre 
Identität  zu  bewahren  und  sich  selbst  zu  therapieren.  (J-51,  p.  27) 
Joachim  Gauck  referred  to  this  longing  for  the  past  as  a  desire  for  'das 
süße  Gift  der  Abhängigkeit'  and  bemoaned  the  fact  that  many  East 
Germans  were  unwilling  to  come  to  terms  with  the  freedom  they  so  had 
wished  for  and  to  become  'Subjekte  des  Gemeinwesens'  (1-76).  Instead 
they  yearned,  the  days  when  they  could,  under  the  dictatorship,  enjoy  the 
security  offered  to  them  by  their  role  as  the  legitimate  objects  of  decision- 
making,  dependent  on  the  state  to  determine  every  aspect  of  their  lives. 
The  perceived  victimisation  of  East  Germans  and  perceived 
criminalisation  of  the  structures  which  had  supported  the  GDR  meant 
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then  that  many  felt  that  their  entire  previous  life  had  been  negated.  They 
found  themselves  sharing  a  common  fate  with  those  whom  they  would 
have  previously  considered  adversaries,  and  the  former  IM  no  longer 
constituted  the  greatest  evil  in  this  new  society.  In  addition,  accounts  of 
how  brutal  life  under  the  dictatorship  had  been  were  no  longer  so 
popularly  received,  since  a  true  confrontation  with  the  crimes  of  the 
former  SED  state  did  not  facilitate  indulgence  in  the  nostalgia  which  had 
become  so  prevalent.  At  the  same  time  as  few  were  keen  to  be  reminded  of 
the  harsher  aspects  of  life  in  the  anti-fascist  state,  many  excused  their 
previous  lack  of  non-conformist  behaviour  with  the  reasoning  that 
conditions  had  been  so  oppressive  that  they  had  been  faced  with  no  real 
alternative  but  to  comply: 
Ihre  [former  East  Germans]  Rechtfertigungen  enthüllen 
Ungereimtheiten:  Sie  behaupten,  so  schlimm  wie  heute  (von 
Westlern)  getan  wird,  sei  das  Regime  gar  nicht  gewesen;  im 
gleichen  Atemzug  erklären  sie,  die  Diktatur  sei  so  hart  gegen  jede 
Abweichung  vorgegangen,  daß  es  zur  völligen  Anpassung  keine 
wirkliche  Alternative  gegeben  habe.  (I-57,  p.  40) 
The  small  minority  of  those  who  had  made  their  criticisms  audible 
in  the  GDR  and  who  subsequently  suffered  for  doing  so  were  left  feeling 
embittered  as  they  realised  that  they  were  among  the  dwindling  minority 
interested  in  seeing  an  extensive  confrontation  with  the  past.  Their 
situation  was  to  some  extent  comparable  to  that  of  victims  of  Nazi 
persecution,  some  of  whom  narrowly  escaped  death  in  camps  only  to  find 
that  no  one  was  particularly  interested  in  hearing  their  tales  of  horror. 
This  parallelism  of  experience  is  noted  by  Jürgen  Fuchs,  who  quotes 
Viktor  Frankl,  a  concentration  camp  survivor,  to  illustrate  his  point: 
Wenn  so  ein  Mensch  heimkehrt  und  feststellen  muß,  daß  man  ihm 
hier  oder  da  mit  nichts  besserem  als  Achselzucken  oder  billigen 
Phrasen  gegenübertritt,  dann  bemächtigt  sich  seiner  nicht  selten 251 
eine  Verbitterung,  die  ihm  die  Frage  aufdrängt,  wozu  er  eigentlich 
alles  erduldet  hat.  (J-27,  pp.  81-82) 
In  the  immediate  post-Wende  period,  when  it  seemed  that  a 
victimised  population  had  freed  itself  from  its  malignant  oppressor, 
culprits  were  sought  who  had  been  instrumental  in  enforcing  a  system  of 
control  so  brutal  that  it  had  allowed  almost  no  resistance.  The  Stasi  files, 
it  appeared  initially,  would  serve  to  identify  these  individuals.  After  these 
had  been  secured  through  the  efforts  of  the  Bürgerkomitees,  many  in  the 
East  were  keen  to  feast  on  their  contents: 
Daß  der  wesentliche  Teil  der  Stasi-Akten  vor  der  Vernichtung 
gerettet  und  einer  vormundschaftlichen  Verwendung  durch 
westdeutsche  Behörden  und  Archive  entzogen  wurde,  verdanken 
wir  dem  engagierten  Einsatz  mutiger  Menschen  der 
Bürgerbewegung,  einer  der  wenigen  Siege,  die  von  der  'Revolution' 
-  die  keine  wurde  -  übriggeblieben  sind.  Auch  das  Stasi-Akten- 
Einsichtsrecht,  mühsam  gegen  die  empfohlene  Absicht  zur 
Generalamnestie  und  zum  vorschnellen  Vergessen,  die  vor  allem 
immer  wieder  im  Westen  hörbar  wurde,  durchgesetzt,  erschien 
bislang  wie  ein  Rest-Triumph,  doch  noch  in  Würde  unsere  eigenen 
Angelegenheiten  klären  und  regeln  zu  können.  Doch  diese 
Hoffnung  zerrinnt  immer  mehr.  Diese  Akten  dienen  mehr  der  Jagd 
auf  Sündenböcke  als  der  Aufklärung  von  Schuld  und  der 
Verstrickung  in  abnorme  gesellschaftliche  Verhältnisse.  (J-55,  p. 
81) 
Soon  it  became  evident  that  these  scapegoats  were  not  so  easy  to  define, 
that  it  had  been  a  small  minority  who  could  claim  to  be  bona  fide  Stasi 
victims.  These  victims  now  served  only  to  remind  the  majority  of  their 
own  lack  of  active  resistance  and  of  the  brutality  of  a  system  which  they 
wished  to  idealise  retrospectively.  Once  again,  the  comparison  to  the 
immediate  post-war  period  was  apt,  as  demonstrated  by  the  following 
statement  from  Ruth  Klüger  describing  the  cold  reception  concentration 
camp  survivors  such  as  herself  received  at  this  time:  'Die  Überlebenden 252 
erinnerten  durch  ihr  bloßes  Dasein  an  das  Vergangene  und  Begangene.  ' 
(J-42,  p.  196) 
The  paradox  of  the  system  which  had  seen  many  IM  working  with 
the  opposition  at  the  same  time  as  they  worked  against  it  continued  to  be 
a  feature  of  the  post-Wende  period.  Werner  Seilhorn,  editor  of  the 
magazine  Horch  und  Guck,  a  publication  concerned  solely  with  the 
confrontation  with  the  GDR  past,  was  unmasked,  for  example,  as  having 
collaborated  as  an  IM.  Indeed,  there  were  many  surprises  regarding  those 
who  had  or  had  not  conspired  with  the  MfS.  The  Schwerpunktprinzip 
meant  that  a  substantial  proportion  of  those  who  had  been  in  some  way 
active  in  the  opposition  had  themselves  collaborated  with  the  Stasi.  The 
cases  of  individuals  such  as  Sascha  Anderson,  Manfred  Stolpe,  and  even 
Christa  Wolf  served  only  to  blur  further  the  boundaries  between 
categories  in  the  Täter  /Opfer  spectrum. 
In  the  hot-pot  of  deception,  secrecy,  and  lies  which  the  Stasi  files 
promised,  it  had  seemed  at  first  that  the  IM  were  a  definable  group  who 
were  more  obviously  guilty  than  the  majority.  Individual  tales  soon 
emerged  from  the  files,  however,  underlining  the  fact  that  the  IM  was  not 
a  type,  but  that  many  different  individuals  had  become  involved  with  the 
MfS  for  a  variety  of  often  circumstantial  reasons.  A  form  of  re- 
humanisation  of  the  individuals  behind  the  label  IM  took  place,  since  it 
was  clear  that  levels  of  guilt  between  any  two  cases  of  collaboration  could 
vary  significantly.  It  was  recognised  that  a  differentiated  approach  to  each 
individual  case  was  required  which  would  ideally  take  into  account  not 
only  the  specific  details  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit,  but  also  the  societal  context  in 
which  it  had  taken  place,  including  an  analysis  of  the  roles  which  others 
not  necessarily  classified  as  IM  had  played  in  the  mechanisms  of  control. 
Such  a  mass  moral  reckoning  was,  however,  not  particularly  feasible, 
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certainly  , not  desired  by  a  majority.  The  fact  that  the  system  had  not  been 
reformed,  but  completely  obliterated  ensured  that  any  comprehensive 
legal  confrontation  with  the  crimes  of  the  past  would  be  extremely 
complicated.  Furthermore,  the  individual  or  collective  guilt  of  the  IM  often 
defied  definition  in  a  legal  context.  Although  IM  had  not  been  physically 
omnipresent,  they  had  helped  to  create  a  general  atmosphere  of  distrust 
and  conspiracy  which  had  ensured  that  many  a  critical  sentiment  was 
never  voiced  lest  it  should  be  reported  to  higher  powers.  This  prevailing 
air  of  fear  and  distrust  also  contributed  to  the  fact  that  much  opposition 
activity  remained  in  the  underground,  surfacing  only  in  the  very  latter 
days  of  the  GDR's  existence.  The  IM  were  an  extremely  important  part  of 
the  machinery,  but  these  mechanisms  could  never  have  functioned 
without  the  silent  conformity  of  the  vast  majority  of  East  German  society, 
which  had  operated  on  a  national  code  of  conspiracy.  As  opportunistic 
conformists  individuals  complied  with  the  collective  because  they  had 
become  comfortable  in  the  slumber  of  a  predictable  pattern  of  material 
and  social  security,  in  which  the  individual's  true  convictions  were 
subordinated  to  the  desire  for  a  simple  and  relatively  harmonious  life. 
11.3  WAS  BLEIBT? 
Despite  initial  resistance  to  its  implementation,  the  Stasi-Unterlagen- 
Gesetz  has  stood  the  test  of  time.  Thousands  of  applications  for 
Akteneinsicht  continue  to  flood  into  the  BStU,  and  the  man  at  the  head  of 
this  institution,  Joachim  Gauck,  describes  the  continued  existence  of  these 
files  and  the  confrontation  with  their  contents  as  a  medicine  against 
nostalgia,  believing  that  without  the  files  'wären  die  Lügen  derer,  die 
damals  verantwortlich  waren,  weitaus  größer,  wäre  auch  in  großen  Teilen 
der  Bevölkerung  der  Grad  der  nachträglichen  Selbsttäuschung  weitaus 
höher'  (1-20).  Although  nostalgia  for  the  GDR  has  managed  to  blossom 254 
despite  the  shadow  of  the  files,  it  is  certainly  true  that  their  impact  has 
been  traumatic.  The  detailed  accounts  of  past  lives  which  are  found  there 
have  brought  shock  revelations,  and  individuals  have  been  forced  to 
reassess  their  biography  in  the  light  of  this  newly  acquired  knowledge. 
This  re-evaluation  has  resulted  in  the  often  unwelcome  acknowledgement 
that  a  proportion  of  what  any  one  individual  assumed  about  his/her  past 
may  be  invalid.  This  shock,  along  with  the  numerous  other  strains 
resulting  from  unification,  hit  a  population  which  was,  for  the  most  part, 
quite  unprepared  for  its  intensity. 
Any  truly  differentiated  confrontation  with  GDR  past  was  never 
going  to  be  achieved  when  East  Germans,  particularly  IM,  felt  that  their 
social  and  material  existence  was  seriously  threatened  and  that  they  were 
in  danger  of  losing  hold  of  an  individual  and  a  collective  identity.  The 
wide-scale  societal  confrontation  with  the  Stasi  legacy  has  up  until  now 
tended  to  be  hectic,  sensational,  and  mostly  undifferentiated.  Any  debate 
within  the  former  East  is,  furthermore,  clouded  by  the  shadow  of  the 
West,  the  other,  socially  and  materially  dominant  Germany.  Joachim 
Gauck  prophesied  that  it  would  take  two  generations  for  the  citizens  of 
former  East  Germany  to  liberate  themselves  from  the  'Untertan- 
Mentalität'  which,  in  forty  years  of  the  GDR's  existence,  had  so  gradually 
worked  its  way  into  the  population  through  a  'Prozeß  der  schleichenden 
Entmündigung'  (1-34).  During  the  passing  of  these  next  two  generations 
most  former  East  Germans  will  become  very  much  more  concerned  with 
integration  into  the  new  societal  structures.  Yet,  after  the  passing  of  this 
time,  a  rebellion  similar  to  that  which  occurred  in  the  FRG  in  1968  is 
unlikely,  if  it  were  to  result  at  all,  to  have  a  similar  impact  to  that  of  the 
angry  post-war  generation  in  the  former  FRG:  first,  since  the  events  of  the 
late  1960s  were  not  particular  to  Germany,  only  their  specific  content; 
second,  since  some  form  of  public  debate  has  taken  place  regarding  the 255 
most  recent  past,  necessitated  by  the  unique  decision  to  make  the  files  of 
the  MfS  publicly  available.  This  decision  was,  moreover,  taken  as  a  result 
of  the  pressure  applied  from  within  the  former  GDR.  Some  of  the  decisive 
policy-making  regarding  dealings  with  this  unique  legacy  was  thus,  in 
contrast  to  the  immediate  post-war  period,  fought  out  by  those  who  were 
directly  involved  and  not  by  a  foreign  and  victorious  power.  Finally,  and 
perhaps  most  significantly,  although  there  is  no  doubt  that  severe 
injustices  were  committed  under  SED  rule,  in  extreme  cases  resulting  in 
death  or  lifelong  physical  and/or  psychological  injury,  these  atrocities  are 
quite  simply  not  comparable  in  their  mass  and  brutality  to  the  crimes  of 
National  Socialism,  and,  therefore,  not  the  focus  of  international  attention 
to  anywhere  near  the  same  extent.  Erich  Honecker  and  his  Politbüro  had 
stood  by  and  watched  their  Schießbefehl  executed  and  had  overseen  the 
often  harsh  suppression  of  any  anti-government  activities  which  the  MfS 
was  able  to  detect,  but  theirs  is  a  crime  which  simply  does  not  have  the 
same  resonance  as  the  attempted  extermination  of  an  entire  people.  It  is 
unlikely  that  a  debate  as  explosive  as  the  recent  controversy  over  Daniel 
Goldhagen's  work  on  Hitler's  Willing  Executioners  would  ensue  half  a 
century  after  the  demise  of  the  GDR  (J-30). 
In  the  meantime,  those  whose  specified  task  it  was  to  ensure  that 
the  implicit  and  explicit  mechanisms  of  control  which  supported  the 
system  were  maintained,  that  is  the  IM,  are  often  seen  as  carrying  a 
greater  proportion  of  at  least  moral  guilt  than  their  superiors  in  the 
Politbüro.  Some  of  these  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter  quite  genuinely  feel  no 
regret  on  account  of  their  past  actions.  Most,  however,  must  live  with  the 
real  or  threatened  stigma  and  shame  of  having  engaged  in  such 
dishonorable  activity  in  the  service  of  a  defeated  and  corrupt  power.  This 
is  a  crime  which  has  been  distinguished  from  other  forms  of  compliance 
within  the  GDR,  in  that  merely  the  label  IM  can  result  in  social 256 
stigmatisation  and  material  loss.  Many  IM  thus  stand  judged  guilty  of  a 
crime  which  often  defies  legal  definition  in  anything  other  than  the  name 
and  awaiting  a  punishment  which  may  or  may  not  follow. 
The  detailed  accounts  of  past  lives  in  the  GDR  which  are  found  in 
the  MfS  files  have  brought  both  welcome  and  less  welcome  surprises,  and 
individuals  have  been  forced  to  reassess  their  personal  history  in  the  light 
of  this  newly  acquired  knowledge.  The  histories  of  collectives  such  as  the 
GDR's  writers'  association  must,  too,  be  rethought  and  rewritten  to 
incorporate  the  knowledge  which  Akteneinsicht  has  brought.  A  recently 
published  work  on  the  relationship  of  writers  and  the  Stasi  finds,  for 
example,  that,  in  1987,  a  staggering  twelve  of  the  nineteen  committee 
members  of  the  Autorenverband  were  active  as  IM  (1-58,  p.  225,  J-100,  p. 
558).  The  files  do  not  merely  help  the  people  of  a  lost  nation  to  acquire  and 
understand  their  own  history,  but,  to  a  certain  extent,  force  its  re- 
definition.  Even  some  of  those  who  were  under  Stasi  observation  are 
traumatised  by  the  realisation  that  significant  details  of  their  perception 
of  the  past,  in  terms  of  interpersonal  relationships  and  behavioural 
tendencies,  may  have  been  based  on  false  premises.  This  redefinition  of 
personal  and  collective  history  is  the  true  and  far-reaching  impact  of  the 
turbulent  confrontation  with  this  aspect  of  the  extraordinary  legacy  of  the 
MfS,  that  is  with  the  case  of  the  Inoffizielle  Mitarbeiter. 257 
APPENDIX  1 
Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  26  October  1994,  p.  9 
:..  -Es  geht  ihr  nicht  um  Schuldzuweisung 
Eine  schottische  Studentin  sucht  IMs  als  Zeugen  der  DDR-Vergangenheit 
Forscherin 
aus  Groß- 
britannien. 
,  sucht 
11  ehemalige  Inoffi- 
zielle  Mitarbeiter  des  MfS 
zwecks  Gespräch  zum  The- 
ma  Aufarbeitung  der  Stasi- 
Vergangenheit.  Vertrauli- 
cher  Umgang  garantiert.  " 
Auf  diese  Anzeige  hin  gab  es 
nur  eine  Zuschrift.  Hat  sich 
Barbara  Miller  zuviel  vorge- 
nommen? 
Sie  ist  24  Jahre  alt  und  hat 
im  Juni  1991  ihren 
￿Master  of 
Arts"  im  Fach  Germanistik 
abgelegt.  Die  Universität 
Glasgow  hat  sie  mit  einem 
Promotionsstipendium  aus- 
gestattet  und  für  ein  Jahr 
nach  Berlin-Brandenburg  ge- 
schickt. 
In  deutschen  Ohren  klingt 
Germanistik  immer  nach 
￿Zauberberg"  oder  der 
￿Gruppe  47".  Auch  Barbara 
Miller  kennt  sich  in  der  deut- 
schen  Literatur  gut  aus.  Vor 
allem  Georg  Büchner  hat  es 
ihr  angetan.  Von  den  Schrift- 
stellern  aus  der  DDR  schätzt 
sie  vor  allem  Volker  Braun 
und  Stefan  Heym.  Aber  es  ist 
nur  zu  verständlich,  daß  eine 
deutsche  Fakultät  im  Aus- 
land  nicht  nur  das  Fach  Lite- 
ratur  großschreibt.  Wer 
Deutschland  verstehen  ler- 
nen  möchte;  muß  sich  auch 
mit  Landeskunde  und  Ge- 
schichte,  Politik  und  Soziolo- 
gie  herumschlagen.  Doch 
viele  Wissenschaftler  in  Glas- 
gow  können  das,  was  sich 
nunmehr  im  vereinten 
Deutschland  abspielt,  nur 
schwer  einschätzen. 
Um  so  interessierter  zeig- 
ten  sich  die  Professoren,  als 
Barbara  Miller  im  September 
1993  von  einem  zweijährigen 
Deutschlandaufenthalt  an 
ihre  Heimatuniversität  zu- 
rückkehrte.  Sie  hatte  auspro- 
bieren  wollen,  was  sie  jahre- 
lang  studiert  hatte:  die  deut- 
sche  Sprache.  Auf  eigene 
Faust  war  sie  nach  dem  Stu- 
dium  nach  Deutschland  ge- 
gangen,  um  hier  eine  Weile 
zu  leben  und  zu  arbeiten. 
Ihre  ersten  Erfahrungen 
sammelte  sie  als  Englisch- 
Lehrerin.  Ihre  Schüler  waren 
vor  allem  ostdeutsche  Um- 
schüler,  die  durch  die  Wende 
arbeitslos  geworden  waren. 
Einige  galten  als  ￿Teilzeitar-  beiter  mit  null  Stunden"  -  ein 
sozialstaatlicher  Aufwand, 
den  sie  von  Schottland  her 
nicht  kannte.  Aber  ihr 
Sprachunterricht  weckte  kei- 
ne  falschen  Hoffnungen  auf 
einen  neuen  Job.  Viele  der 
angehenden  Dauerarbeitslo- 
sen  konnten  bei  ihr  etwas 
fürs  Leben  lernen.  Absurd 
erscheint  es.  Barbara  Miller 
im  Rückblick,  daß  sie  ihr  er= 
stes  regelmäßiges  Einkom- 
men  durch  die  hohe  Arbeits- 
losigkeit  im  vereinigten 
Deutschland  verdient  hat. 
Im  Unterricht  stieß  sie  auf 
ein  ungeheures  Gesprächs- 
bedürfnis.  Den  Schülern, 
von  denen  manche  doppelt 
so  alt  waren  wie  sie,  lastete 
der  Zusammenbruch  der 
DDR  schwer  auf  der  Seele. 
Oft  brachen  sie  die  Konver- 
sation  in  der  englischen  Spra- 
che  ab  und  fielen  ins  Deut- 
sche.  Und  oft  dachten  sie 
noch,  während  sie  redeten. 
Barbara  Miller  wurde  von 
ihren  Schülern  sehr  geachtet, 
vielleicht  auch,  weil  sie  keine 
Westdeutsche  war.  Diese 
Sympathie  beruhte  auf  Ge- 
genseitigkeit.  Denn  wer  in 
Europa  lebt  schon  auf  so  gro- 
ßem  Fuße  wie  die  Westdeut- 
schen?  In  der  Ex  DDR  fühlte 
sich  die  Rothaarige  oft  an 
ihre  schottische  Heimat  erin- 
nert.  Vor  allem  das  Mitein- 
ander  der  Menschen  er- 
scheint  ihr  hier  unkompli- 
zierter  und  wärmer.  Wenn 
sie  zu  Hause  einen  Pub  be- 
sucht,  würden  mitgebrachte 
Freunde  von  Freunden  viel 
schneller  in  das  Gespräch 
einbezogen,  als  das  in  West- 
deutschland  der  Fall  sei. 
Doch  inmitten  dieser  ver- 
trauensvollen  Atmosphäre, 
auf  die  sie  in  Ostdeutschland 
stieß,  gab  es  offenbar  auch 
eklatantes  Mißtrauen  und 
Vertrauensbrüche.  Die  Si- 
tuation  in  Ostdeutschland  sei 
einmalig,  meint  Barbara  Mil- 
ler.  Durch  die  Öffnung  der 
Stasi-Archive  käme  plötzlich 
ans  Licht,  was  sich  jahrelang 
im  Verborgenen  abspielte. 
Diesem  Phänomen  ist  sie  auf 
der  Spur.  Sie  möchte  mehr 
wissen  über  die  Motivation 
aer  IMS  und  über  den  Um- 
gang  mit  den  Vorwürfen,  de- 
nen  sie  plötzlich  ausgesetzt 
sind.  Dabei  geht  es  ihr  nicht 
um  Schuldzuweisung.  Ob  es 
die  Deutschen  wollen  oder 
nicht,  die  Stasi-Hinterlassen- 
schaft  ist  ein  Problem.  Und 
sie  möchte  sehen,  wie  in 
Deutschland  mit  diesem  Pro- 
blem  umgegangen  wird.  Als 
Außenstehende  kann  sie  un- 
voreingenommen  zuhören, 
ohne  die  Verstrickung  ein- 
zelner  zu  dramatisieren. 
Beim  Studium  der,  Gesetze 
bemerkte  sie  bereits  eine  Un- 
gleichheit:  IMs  dürfen  im 
Gegensatz  zu  den  sogenann- 
ten  Opfern  ihre  Akten  nur  in 
Ausnahmefällen  einsehen. 
Doch  Barbara  Miller 
möchte  an  ihrer  Universität 
in  Glasgow  keine  abstrakte 
Studie  abliefern.  Deshalb 
sucht  sie  das  Gespräch  mit 
Menschen,  die  im  Land 
Brandenburg  leben  und  die 
in  der  Öffentlichkeit  immer 
wieder.  als.  ￿Täter" 
bezeich- 
net  werden.  Wer  ihr  schrei- 
ben  möchte:  Barbara  Miller, 
British  Council,  Am  Trepto- 
wer  Park  28-30,12435  Ber- 
lin.  K.  S. 258 
APPENDIX  2 
INTERVIEW-FRAGEBOGEN 
1.  Biographie 
Könnten  Sie  bitte  etwas  zu  Ihrer 
Ausbildung/Arbeit/Ehe/Kinder  usw.? 
Biographie  sagen:  Kindheit/Schule/ 
2.  Werbungsphase 
Wann/wo/in  welcher  Form  war  der  erste  Kontakt  zum  MfS? 
War  es  Ihnen  bewußt,  was  vorging? 
Kannten  Sie  den  Begriff  'IM'*? 
Hat  man  damals  viel  über  die  Stasi  geredet  -  in  der  Arbeit,  unter 
Freunden,  usw.? 
Haben  Sie  lange  überlegt,  ob  Sie  sich  auf  diesen  Kontakt  einlassen 
sollten? 
Haben  Sie  damals  mit  jemandem  über  die  Kontakte  geredet? 
Mußten  Sie  eine  Verpflichtungserklärung  unterschreiben? 
Was  war  Ihre  Motivation  für  diese  Tätigkeit? 
3.  Vorherige  Einstellung/Erfahrung 
Wie  war  Ihre  vorherige  Einstellung  zum  MfS? 
Hatten  Sie  bereits  Kontakt  zum  MfS  gehabt? 
4.  Nach  der  Werbung  -  Gefühle/Ängste/Beziehungen 
Waren  Sie  mit  der  Entscheidung  zufrieden,  mit  der  Stasi 
zusammenzuarbeiten? 
Hatten  Sie  Angst,  daß  jemand  das  herauskriegt? 
Was  wäre  passiert,  wenn  jemand  davon  erfahren  hätte? 
Wie  haben  Sie  sich  dann  verhalten,  wenn  danach  über  die  Stasi  geredet 
worden  ist? 
Hat  sich  etwas  geändert  in  Ihren  Beziehungen  zu  Freunden/ 
Familie/Kollegen? 
5.  Aufgaben/Pflichten 
Hatten  Sie  konkrete  Aufgaben? 259 
Haben  Sie  diese  erfüllt? 
Haben  Sie  schriftliche  oder  mündliche  Berichte  abgegeben? 
Können  Sie  sich  an  einen  bestimmten  Bericht  erinnern? 
Ist  es  vorgekommen,  daß  Sie  sich  verweigert  haben,  einen  bestimmten 
Auftrag  zu  erfüllen? 
Könnten  Sie  vielleicht  ein  typisches  Treffen  mit  Ihrem  Führungsoffizier 
beschreiben? 
Wie  war  die  Beziehung  zu  dem  Führungsoffizier? 
Haben  Sie  jemandem  Schaden  zugefügt? 
Haben  Sie  damals  mit  jemandem  über  die  Tätigkeit  gesprochen? 
6.  Weiterer  Verlauf  der  Tätigkeit 
Wie  ging  das  dann  weiter? 
Wann/wie/warum/von  wem  wurde  die  Tätigkeit  beendet? 
7.  Nach  der  Tätigkeit 
Wann/aus  welchen  Gründen/mit  wem  haben  Sie  angefangen,  über  Ihre 
Tätigkeit  zu  reden? 
8.  Die  Wende 
Was  für  berufliche/persönliche  Folgen  hat  diese  Tätigkeit  für  Sie  gehabt? 
9.  Aufarbeitung  der  Vergangenheit 
Beschäftigt  man  sich  eher  zu  viel  oder  zu  wenig  mit  der  Aufarbeitung  der 
Stasi-Vergangenheit? 
Kann  man  unterscheiden  -  und  wenn  ja,  nach  welchen  Kriterien  - 
zwischen  Tätern  und  Opfern  der  ehemaligen  DDR? 
Sollten  ehemalige  Stasi-Mitarbeiter  strafrechtlich  verfolgt  werden? 
Was  halten  Sie  von  den  Urteilen  gegen  Wolf  und  Mielke? 
Sind  Sie  im  allgemeinen  zufrieden  mit  dem  Umgang  mit  MfS- 
Mitarbeitern?  Wenn  nicht,  wie  hätte  ein  solcher  Umgang  aussehen  sollen? 
10.  Gauck-Behörde/StUG 
War  dieses  Gesetz  nötig? 260 
Sollten  die  Akten  zugänglich  sein? 
Wie  finden  Sie  die  Arbeit  der  Gauck-Behörde? 
Haben  Sie  Einsicht  in  Ihre  Akte  beantragt?  Warum/nicht? 
11.  Bestimmte  Persönlichkeiten 
Stolpe 
Identifizieren  Sie  sich  mit  Manfred  Stolpe? 
Was  halten  Sie  von  der  Arbeit  des  Stolpe-Ausschusses/von  seiner 
Entlastung? 
Biermann/Anderson 
Was  hielten  Sie  von  der  Biermann-Aktion  gegen  Sascha  Anderson?  War 
seine  Handlung  gerechtfertigt?  Hat  Anderson  Schuld  auf  sich  geladen? 
Gysi 
Kaiser-Nicht 
12.  Bürgerrechtler 
Haben  Bürgerrechtler  wie  Bärbel  Bohley  eine  Funktion  in  der  heutigen 
Gesellschaft? 
13.  Nach  der  Wende 
Hat  sich  Ihr  Leben  im  allgemeinen  verschlechtert  oder  verbessert  seit  der 
Wende? 
Fühlen  Sie  sich  im  allgemeinen  eher  als  Deutscher  oder  mehr  als  Bürger 
der  DDR? 
14.  MIS-Tätigkeit/Rückblick 
Wie  stehen  Sie  zu  Ihrer  Tätigkeit  jetzt? 
Fühlen  Sie  sich  schuldig? 
Haben  Sie/Hatten  Sie  Kontakt  zu  anderen  MfS-Mitarbeitern? 
Haben  Sie  heute  noch  Kontakt  zu  den  Leuten,  über  die  Sie  berichtet 
haben? 
Wie  werden  Sie  von  Leuten  behandelt,  die  von  ihrer  Tätigkeit  erfahren? 
15.  Politik 
Welche  Partei  wählen  Sie? 261 
16.  Sonstiges 
Gibt  es  sonst  noch  etwas,  was  Sie  für  wichtig  halten? 
17.  Pseudonym/Deckname 
Wie  möchten  Sie  in  dieser  Arbeit  bezeichnet  werden? 262 
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Abbreviations 
AfNS  Amt  für  Nationale  Sicherheit 
AIM  Archivierte  Akte  eines  Inoffiziellen  Mitarbeiters 
ASt.  Außenstelle 
BStU  Der  Bundesbeauftragte  für  die  Unterlagen  des 
Staatssicherheitsdienstes  der  ehemaligen  Deutschen 
Demokratischen  Republik 
CDU  Christlich-Demokratische  Union 
DDR  Deutsche  Demokratische  Republik 
FDJ  Freie  Deutsche  Jugend 
FDP  Freie  Demokratische  Partei 
FIM  Führungs-IM 
GI  Geheimer  Informator 
GM  Geheimer  Mitarbeiter 
GMS  Gesellschaftlicher  Mitarbeiter  für  Sicherheit 
GVS  Geheime  Verschlußsache 
HFIM  Hauptamtlicher  Führungs-IM 
IM  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter 
IMB  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter  der  Abwehr  mit  Feindverbindung 
bzw.  zur  unmittelbaren  Bearbeitung  im  Verdacht  der 
Feindtätigkeit  stehender  Personen 
IME  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter  im  bzw.  für  einen  besonderen 
Einsatz 
IMK  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter  zur  Sicherung  der  Konspiration  und 
des  Verbindungswesens 
IMS  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter  zur  politisch-operativen 
Durchdringung  und  Sicherung  des  Verantwortungsbereiches 
IMV  Inoffizieller  Mitarbeiter,  der  unmittelbar  an  der  Bearbeitung 
und  Entlarvung  im  Verdacht  der  Feindtätigkeit  stehender 
Personen  mitarbeitet 263 
JHS  Juristische  Hochschule  des  MfS 
KgU  Kampfgruppe  gegen  Unmenschlichkeit 
KO  Konspiratives  Objekt 
KP  Kontaktperson 
KW  Konspirative  Wohnung 
MfS  Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit 
OM  Operativer  Mitarbeiter 
OPK  Operative  Personenkontrolle 
OSL  Oberstleutnant 
OV  Operativer  Vorgang 
PDS  Partei  des  Demokratischen  Sozialismus 
SAPMO  Stiftung  Archiv  der  Parteien  und  Massenorganisationen  der 
DDR 
SED  Sozialistische  Einheitspartei  Deutschlands 
SPD  Sozialdemokratische  Partei  Deutschlands 
Stasi  Ministerium  für  Staatssicherheit 
StGB  Strafgesetzbuch 
StUG  Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz 
VP  Volkspolizei 
VPKA  Volkspolizeikreisamt 
WS  Vertrauliche  Verschlußsache 
ZA  Zentralarchiv 264 
Common  Terms 
Akteneinsicht  The  process  of  viewing  one's  Stasi  files. 
Anforderungsbild  An  Anforderungsbild  profiled  a  particular  task,  and 
identified,  in  terms  of  experience,  ability  and  personality,  the  type  of 
person  who  might  be  suitable  for  this  task  and  who  could  therefore 
potentially  be  recruited  as  an  IM  (see  J-62,  p.  341,  Section  One:  1.3). 
Arbeitsakte  The  volume/s  of  an  IM  file  where  the  actual  reports  of  the 
meetings  between  the  IM  and  the  Führungsoffizier  were  filed  (see  J-62, 
pp.  111-16,  Introduction:  2.4.1). 
Bürgerrechtler  Citizens'  rights  activists.  The  term  is  widely  used  even 
now  to  refer  to  individuals  such  as  Bärbel  Bohley  who  were  prominent  in 
the  opposition  scene  in  the  GDR. 
Dekonspiration  The  term  applied  by  the  MfS  when  one  of  its  employees 
betrayed  confidential  information  to  outsiders  (see  F-3,  pp.  68-69).  Used  in 
this  study  to  refer  to  incidents  when  an  IM  broke  the  oath  of  silence  s/he 
had  taken  about  having  contacts  to  the  MfS. 
Enquete-Kommission  Commission  set  up  in  1992  which  was  concerned 
with  the  'Aufarbeitung  von  Geschichte  und  Folgen  der  SED-Diktatur  in 
Deutschland'.  Its  work  included  inviting  individuals  before  the 
commission  to  testify  on  various  aspects  of  life  under  the  dictatorship,  and 
commissioning  reports  from  researchers  working  in  the  field.  The  final 
report  of  the  Enquete-Kommission  was  passed  in  June  1994  (see  F-l,  F-11, 
F-13,  F-14). 
Führungs-IM  An  IM  who  was  in  charge  of  other  IM  and  GMS  (see  J-62, 
pp.  318-20). 
Führungsoffizier  The  MfS  employee  responsible  for  recruiting  and 
working  directly  with  IM.  The  term  Führungsoffizier  was  not  widely  used 
within  the  MfS,  but  is  much  more  commonly  applied  in  the  Stasi  debate 
than  the  more  formally  correct  term,  Operativer  Mitarbeiter,  even,  it 
seems,  by  former  MfS  officers  (see  J-62,  p.  17,  Section  One:  4.2). 
Gauck-Behörde  The  more  popular  term  for  the  office  of  the  BStU,  after 
the  head  of  the  organisation,  Joachim  Gauck. 
Geheimer  Informator  The  original  term  (1950-1968)  for  what  later 
came  to  be  known  as  an  IMS  (see  J-62,  p.  62). 
Geheimer  Mitarbeiter  The  original  term  (1950-1968)  for  what  later 
came  to  be  known  as  an  IMV  (1968-80),  and  finally,  an  IMB  (1980-1990). 
Gesellschaftlicher  Mitarbeiter  für  Sicherheit  An  individual  who  was 
periodically  approached  by  the  MfS  and  asked  to  give  information.  GMS 
were  to  be  'Bürger  der  DDR  mit  einer  auch  in  der  Öffentlichkeit 
bekannten  staatsbewußten  Einstellung  und  Haltung',  and  the  contact  to 265 
such  individuals  was  less  formalised  and  less  secretive  than  to  an  IM  (J- 
62,  p.  368). 
Hauptamtlicher  IM  Hauptamtliche  IM  worked  for  the  MfS  on  a  full- 
time  basis  but,  by  the  creation  of  a  cover  occupation,  a 
Scheinarbeitsverhältnis,  care  was  taken  to  ensure  that  this  fact  remain 
secret  (F-3,  pp.  195-96). 
IM-Kandidat  An  individual  who  was  to  be  recruited  as  an  IM  if  the 
thorough  checks  carried  out  on  him/her  at  this  preliminary  stage  proved 
satisfactory  (see  J-62,  pp.  91-116). 
IM-Tätigkeit  The  period  of  collaboration  between  an  IM  and  the  MfS. 
Juristische  Hochschule  MfS  training  college  situated  near  Potsdam. 
Konspiratives  Objekt  Any  location  other  than  a  Konspirative  Wohnung 
which  was  used  for  meetings  between  the  Führungsoffizier  and  the  IM. 
Konspirative  Wohnung  The  flat  or  house  used  for  the  secret  meetings 
between  the  Führungsoffizier  and  the  IM. 
Kontaktgespräch  The  initial  meeting  between  the  IM-Kandidat  and  the 
Führungsoffizier. 
Kontaktperson  Kontaktpersonen  (KP)  were  'vertrauenswürdige  Bürger 
der  Deutschen  Demokratischen  Republik,  die  zur  Lösung  bestimmter 
Aufgaben  angesprochen  werden'  (J-62,  p.  205).  There  is  some  evidence 
that  the  categories  of  IM  and  KP  were  not  always  as  distinct  as 
Erich  Mielke  would  have  wished  (see  J-62,  pp.  84-89). 
Legende  The  term  used  for  any  pretext  used  in  the  MfS's  work,  defined 
in  the  MfS-Wörterbuch  as  a  'glaubhafter  Vorwand,  durch  den  Personen  in 
der  operativen  Arbeit  über  die  wahren  Ziele  und  Absichten  des  MfS 
getäuscht  werden'  (F-3,  p.  240,  see  Section  One:  2.2,2.4). 
operativ  bedeutsam  Information  was  deemed  operativ  bedeutsam  if  it 
could  potentially  be  applied  in  the  fight  against  the  enemy  (see  F-3,  pp. 
171-72,  Section  One:  4.1.1). 
Operativer  Mitarbeiter  The  formally  more  correct  term  for  a 
Führungsoffizier. 
Operative  Personenkontrolle  The  first  stage  of  observation  of 
individuals  suspected  of  being  a  danger  to  internal  security.  OPK  were 
fundamental  in  determining  'Wer  ist  wer?  '  (see  F-3,  p.  286,  Section  One: 
1.1). 
Operativer  Vorgang  A  measure  implemented  to  observe  those  who  had 
been  deemed  state  enemies,  and,  if  necessary,  to  physically  or 
psychologically  harm  them  in  order  to  hinder  their  engagement  in 
opposition  activities  (see  F-3,  pp.  287-97,  Section  One:  1.1). 266 
Ostalgie  Popular  term  referring  to  nostalgia  for  the  GDR. 
Personalakte  The  volume/s  of  an  IM  file,  in  which  personal  details  of 
the  IM  concerned  were  recorded  alongside  any  information  relating  to 
his/her  immediate  family.  Documentation  regarding  the  selection  and 
recruitment  of  the  IM  was  also  stored  here,  as  well  as  other  general 
information,  for  example,  concerning  any  rewards  s/he  received  for 
services  rendered  (see  J-62,  pp.  111-16,  Introduction:  2.4.1). 
Pioniere  The  state-run  organisation  (officially  titled  Pionierorganisation 
'Ernst  Thälmann')  for  children  in  the  GDR,  of  which  membership  was  an 
implicit  duty. 
Rechtsstaat  The  term  used  to  define  a  state  whose  criminal  justice 
system  operates  on  the  democratic  principle  of  the  separation  of 
legislature  and  judicature. 
Republikflucht  A  term  used  by  the  SED  and  the  MfS  to  describe 
arg.  'escape-  from  the  GDR. 
Runder  Tisch  The  body  set  up  in  the  immediate  post-Wende  period  to 
facilitate  inter-party  dialogue  in  the  transition  period  of  the  run-up  to  the 
first  and  last  democratic  elections  in  the  GDR  in  March  1990  (see  J-24, 
Introduction:  1.4.2). 
Schießbefehl  The  order  to  shoot  anyone  found  trying  to  commit 
Republikflucht.  The  exact  implications  of  the  Schießbefehl,  i.  e.,  had  it  been 
an  order  to  kill  or  merely  to  wound,  were  heavily  debated  in  the 
controversial  series  of  border-guard  trials  (see  Section  Two:  7.1). 
Schweigeverpflichtung  The  (usually  written)  oath  of  silence  which  IM 
in  the  process  of  being  recruited  were  asked  to  make  at  the  end  of  the 
Kontaktgespräch  (see  Section  One:  2.5). 
Schwerpunktprinzip  Working  principle  of  the  MfS,  whereby  resources 
were  not  to  be  distributed  evenly  among  the  population  but  concentrated 
in  areas  of  suspected  subversive  activity  (see  F-3,  pp.  374-75,  Section  One: 
1.2.3). 
Siegerjustiz  Victor's  justice.  Attempts  of  the  legal  system  to  bring  the 
crimes  of  the  GDR  to  court  were  often  criticised  in  the  post-Wende  period 
as  representing  a  form  of  Siegerjustiz  (see  Section  Two:  7.1). 
Sinn-Angebot  A  term  used  by  Günter  Kunert,  and  throughout  this 
work,  to  describe  the  motivational  incentive  often  used  by  the  MfS, 
particularly  at  recruitment,  which  involved  convincing  an  IM-Kandidat 
that  such  collaboration  was  for  an  ultimately  justifiable  good  (J-47,  p.  18). 
During  the  course  of  the  IM-Tätigkeit  both  the  MfS  and  the  IM  often 
strove  to  maintain  the  belief  in  the  Sinn-Angebot  (see  Section  One:  3.2, 
5.4,  Section  Two:  9.2.3). 267 
Treuhand  The  more  common  term  for  the  Treuhandanstalt,  the  body  set 
up  above  all  to  administer  the  privatisation  of  formerly  state-run  GDR 
businesses  and  properties. 
Unrechtsstaat  The  term  used  to  define  a  state  whose  criminal  justice 
system  does  not  operate  on  the  democratic  principle  of  the  separation  of 
legislature  and  judicature. 
Verpflichtungserklärung  The  (usually  written)  declaration  of 
commitment  which  newly  recruited  IM  were  asked  to  make  at  the 
Werbungsgespräch  (see  Section  One:  2.5,2.6). 
Werbungsgespräch  The  meeting  during  which  an  IM-Kandidat  was 
recruited  as  an  IM  (see  Section  One:  Chpater  2). 
Zersetzungs-Maßnahmen  Measures  devised  to  physically  or 
psychologically  neutralise  the  enemy  (see  F-3,  p.  464). 268 
Key  Personalities 
For  more  detailed  information,  see  Wer  war  Wer  in  der  DDR:  Ein 
biographisches  Handbuch,  ed.  by  Bernd-Rainer  Barth  and  others 
(Frankfurt/Main:  Fischer,  1995). 
Bohley,  Bärbel  (b.  1945)  Bürgerrechtlerin.  Arrested  in  January  1988 
after  protesting  at  the  Rosa-Luxemburg-Demonstration.  Temporarily  left 
the  GDR  soon  afterwards  to  escape  a  long  jail  sentence.  Involved  in 
various  opposition/peace  groups  such  as  the  Initiative  für  Frieden  und 
Menschenrechte. 
Böhme,  Ibrahim  (b.  1938)  Co-founder  of  the  SDP  (the  Ost-SPD),  IM. 
De  Maiziere,  Lothar  (b.  1940)  Ministerpräsident  of  the  GDR  (April- 
October  1990),  IM. 
Eigenfeld,  Katrin  (b.  1946)  Bürgerrechtlerin.  Active  in  various 
church/peace  groups.  Co-founder  of  the  Neues  Forum  in  Halle. 
Eppelmann,  Rainer  (b.  1943)  Bürgerrechtler  and  theologian.  Co-founder 
of  the  party  Demokratischer  Aufbruch.  Chairman  (CDU)  of  the  Enquete- 
Kommission. 
Fuchs,  Jürgen  (b.  1950)  Writer  and  psychologist.  Close  acquaintance  of 
Robert  Havemann.  Arrested  in  1976  after  protest  at  Wolf  Biermann's 
expulsion.  Forced  to  leave  the  GDR  in  1977  after  nine  months 
imprisonment. 
Gauck,  Joachim  (b.  1940)  The  Federal  Commissioner  in  charge  of  the 
MfS  files. 
Gysi,  Gregor  (b.  1948)  Lawyer  and  politician  (PDS). 
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